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ABSTRACT 
The  Gulf  Cooperation  Council  (GCC),  a  regional  alliance  grouping  the  six  oil-  and 
gas-rich  Arabian  states  of  Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait,  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  Qatar,  Oman  and 
Bahrain,  was  founded  in  1981  with  the  purported  aim  of  "effect[ing]  coordination,  integration 
and  inter-connection  between  Member  States  in  all  fields  in  order  to  achieve  unity  between 
them"  (GCC  Charter:  Article  4).  Most  political  observers,  nevertheless,  insist  that  this  alliance 
was  born  out  of  a  common  concern  among  these  rich  but  sparsely  populated  and  militarily 
vulnerable  states'  for  their  security  and  political  stability  within  a  politically  volatile  region, 
and  the  need  for  a  regional  alliance  with  sufficient  capability  to  safeguard  their  interests, 
sovereignty  and  political  stability. 
Tliis  study  was  undertaken  with  a  set  of  interacting  aims  in  mind;  besides  the 
subsidiary  aim  of  examining  the  structure  and  operation  of  the  GCC  from  the  perspective  of 
competing  theoretical  approaches  to  federalism  with  a  view  to  exploring  their  viability  vis-A- 
vis  the  case  of  integration  which  the  GCC  represents,  this  study  primarily  aims  at  evaluating 
the  GCC,  as  well  as  the  political  and  social  basis  of  cooperation,  among  its  member  states  in 
the  light  of  attitudes  and  perceptions  within  Gulf  society.  With  regard  to  the  former  concern, 
the  aim  is  to  consider  how  useful  theories  of  federalism  are  in  understanding  and  interpreting 
the  GCC.  With  regard  to  the  latter  concern,  the  study  aims  to  explore  Gulf  social  perceptions 
of  the  factors  underlying  the  emergence  of  the  GCC,  its  institutions,  objectives,  policies  and 
problems  confronting  it  with  a  view  to  determining  the  extent  and  nature  of  both  the  attitudinal 
similarities  and  discrepancies  existing  between  different  social  Gulf  groups  as  well  as 
identifying  the  complex  network  of  historical,  socio-cultural  and  institutional  affinities 
operating  across  state  boundaries  within  the  GCC.  To  explore  perceptions  of  the  policies  and 
aspects  of  cooperation  which  the  GCC  considers  central  to  its  efforts  to  bring  about  greater 
unity  among  its  member  states,  two  surveys  were  undertaken  among  two  contrasting  groups: 
one  based  on  a  sample  of  top-mnking  officials  at  the  GCC  Secretariat  General  and  another 
based  on  a  sample  of  students  at  Kuwait  and  Qatar  universities. 
The  thesis  opens  with  several  background  chapters  addressing  the  practice  of  and 
experimentation  with  federalism  and  political  integration  in  the  Arab  world,  the  role  of  such 
socio-political  phenomena  as  tribalism  and  Arab  nationalism  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC,  the 
GCC's  basic  structure  and  machinery,  the  regional  and  international  circumstances  in  which 
the  GCC  was  created,  and  the  reactions  of  Arab  and  non-Arab  members  of  the  international 
community  to  the  emergence  of  this  Arab  Gulf  alliance.  The  remainder  of  the  study  is  devoted 
to  a  discussion  of  the  nature  of  samples  drawn  on  by  the  study,  the  strategy  employed  in 
drawing  the  samples,  the  types  of  method  relied  on  to  obtain  data,  obstacles  met  with  in  the 
course  of  fieldwork  and  to  an  analysis  of  the  empirical  data  bearing  on  the  perceptions  and 
attitudes  of  both  types  of  sample. 
Based  on  the  perceptions  of  the  sample  groups,  the  study  examines  institutions  and 
mechanisms  that  have  been  put  in  place  to  operationalise  the  GCC,  the  nature  and  level  of 
cooperation  in  different  policy  fields  as  well  as  the  problems  that  have  affected  and/or  have  the 
potential  to  affect  the  progress  and  future  of  the  GCC.  Included  here  are  the  internal  and/or 
external  factors  perceived  by  GCC  officials  and  citizens  to  have  been  instrumental  to  the 
creation  of  the  GCC;  the  level  of  interest  in  the  GCC  amongst  Gulf  citizens  and  awareness  of 
its  history,  institutions  and  policies;  the  nature  and  gravity  of  problems  that  GCC  officials  and 
citizens  perceive  as  obstructing  the  efforts  of  the  GCC;  the  type  of  areas  in  which  Gulf  citizens 
and  GCC  officials  view  the  organisation  to  have  made  concrete  progress. 
On  the  basis  of  GCC  citizens  and  officials'  attitudes  towards  the  GCC,  its  raison 
d'8tre,  policies,  and  problems  and  the  affinities  and  differences  in  attitudinal  patterns  that 
emerge  between  these  two  samples,  an  attempt  is  made  to  deten-nine  the  efficacy  with  which 
the  GCC  has  pursued  and  implemented  its  various  policies  and  the  nature  of  progress  it  has V 
made  to  date  in  the  pursuit  of  a  greater  integration  between  member  states.  From  this  the  study 
examines  the  level  of  satisfaction  (or  lack  of  satisfaction)  with  which  the  GCC  is  met  within 
Gulf  society.  These  attitudes  are  examined  against  the  changing  background  of  Gulf  politics, 
in  particular  the  two  major  periods  of  war  affecting  the  area  within  the  last  two  decades.  A 
concluding  chapter  summarises  the  questions  the  study  sets  out  to  answer,  the  framework  it 
adopts,  the  qualitative  and  quantitative  methods  it  relies  on  to  collect  the  empirical  data  and 
the  general  and  broad  findings  it  reaches.  It  also  compares  the  findings  of  this  work  with  that 
of  other  previous  studies  and  outlines  possible  future  lines  of  research. Acknowledgement  iii 
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Introduction  &  Overview 
1.1  Introduction: 
T  his  work  is  undertaken  with  one  central  concern  in  mind:  an  evaluation  of  the 
Gulf  Cooperation  Council  (GCC)  and  the  political  and  social  basis  of 
cooperation  among  the  member  states  of  this  organisation  in  the  light  of  the 
perceptions  and  attitudes  of  Gulf  citizens  and  policy-makers.  A  related  objective  is  to 
examine  the  structure  and  operation  of  the  GCC  from  the  perspective  of  competing 
theoretical  frameworks  of  federalism  so  as  to  explore  the  feasibility  of  these  approaches 
vis-A-vis  the  model  of  integration  initiated  by  the  GCC. 
This  introductory  chapter  is  structured  as  following.  In  the  first  section  is  a 
general  statement  relating  to  the  current  position  of  the  GCC  focusing  on  one  of  the  key 
problems  associated  with  its  creation  and  working  -  the  gap  in  opinion  and  perception  of 
this  institution  obtaining  between  GCC  policy-makers  and  citizens  of  Gulf  member  states 
towards  the  value  of  the  organisation.  A  further  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  outline  the 
objectives  pursued  in  this  research  project,  discuss  the  significance  of  this  study  and  how 
each  of  its  various  strands  is  integral  to  the  overall  conceptual  framework.  The  final 
section  discusses  the  overall  structure  of  the  thesis. 
1.2  The  GCC:  A  Statement  of  the  Problem: 
The  GCC  was  founded  in  May  1981  by  the  heads  of  the  member  states  of 
Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Oman,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  largely  in 
response  to  a  desire  among  the  Gulf  states  for  an  organisation  capable  of  pursuing 
economic  and  social  cooperation  and,  of  working  towards  greater  harmonisation  of  the Chapter  One:  Introduction  and  Overview  2 
politics  of  the  member  states.  The  GCC  was  also  founded  with  aim  of  creating  a 
powerful  regional  alliance  capable  of  withstanding  and  overcoming  the  political  and 
economic  challenges  of  the  volatile  climate  of  Middle  Eastern  and  international  politics. 
The  need  for  a  regional  alliance  with  sufficient  capability  to  safeguard  the  interests,  the 
sovereignty  and  political  stability  of  its  member  states  is  perhaps  nowhere  more 
immediate  and  urgent  than  in  the  case  of  the  oil-rich  GCC  member  states  with  their 
shared  demographic  and  geographical  disadvantages  vis-A-vis  such  neighbouring  hostile 
countries  as  Iran  and  Iraq.  The  sparsely  populated  nature  of  all  GCC  member  states, 
coupled  with  the  small  size  of  three  of  them  (i.  e.,  the  mini-  states  of  Kuwait,  Bahrain  and 
Qatar),  puts  them  in  an  unfouvarable  position  to  rebut  the  ever-present  expansionist 
ambitions  of  some  Middle  Eastern  regimes.  According  to  many  political  analysts  (see 
Qassirn  (1993),  Ommar  (1993),  al-Kuwari  (1992),  Peterson  (1987)),  these  disadvantages 
are  sufficient  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  any  one  of  these  states  fending  off  external 
aggression  on  its  own. 
Although  much  has  been  written  about  the  GCC,  its  policies,  objectives,  and 
achievement  in  the  various  sectors  of  cooperation,  a  comprehensive  evaluation  - 
especially  one  that  approaches  the  issue  from  the  perspective  of  the  perceptions  and 
attitudes  of  Gulf  citizens  themselves  -  of  the  organisation,  its  achievements  and  its  impact 
has  yet  to  be  made.  A  prominent  feature  of  social  perceptions  of  the  GCC  is  the  gulf  in 
opinions  as  to  the  impact  of  its  various  policies  and  nature  of  the  obstacles  confronting 
such  an  organisation.  While  the  GCC  political  elite  claims  that  the  organisation  has 
pursued  and  eventually  succeeded  in  bringing  about  a  substantial  level  of  cooperation 
over  economic,  social,  and  defence  concerns  among  its  member  states,  Gulf  citizens 
voice  different  opinions  and  manifest  quite  different  attitudes  towards  this  institution  and 
its  achievements. 
Building  on  the  member  states'  affinities  in  political  systems,  social  customs, 
heritage  (e.  g.,  religion,  history,  language,  etc.  ),  and  such  other  common  features  as 
source  of  wealth  and  oil-dependency,  the  GCC  Charter  envisioned  a  community  of  Gulf 
nations  coming  together  for  the  purpose  of  seeking  ways  of  establishing  cooperation, 
consolidating  links,  and  unifying  their  policies  with  the  general  aim  of  attaining  the Chapter  One:  Introduction  and  Overview  3 
'unity'  of  these  states,  An  assessment  of  both  GCC  policy-makers'  and  Gulf  citizens' 
attitudes  towards  the  GCC  will  not  only  allow  us  to  determine  and  explore  the 
perceptions  of  these  two  groups,  but,  more  importantly,  will  also  provide  us  with  an 
important  empirical  data  base  by  which  to  evaluate  the  structure  (e.  g.,  machinery  and 
institutions)  and  operational  performance  (i.  e.  policy  production,  efficiency  in  policy 
implementation,  etc.  )  of  this  organisation  as  well  as  to  highlight  the  (nature  oo  its 
progress  in  pursuit  of  its  objectives  and/or  problems  obstructing  this  progress. 
To  date  few  researchers  have  embarked  on  an  evaluation  of  the  GCC,  how  it  has 
sought  to  harmonise  policies  and  the  perceptions  towards  the  organisation,  and  its 
accomplishments.  Most  studies  have  been  on  the  whole  no  more  than  descriptive 
accounts,  based  on  little  or  no  empirical  data.  Though  the  GCC  has  been  in  place  for 
more  than  16  years,  Obeid  (1996)  and  al-'Esa  &  al-Manufi  (1985)  are  the  only  two 
researchers  who  have  attempted  to  assess  public  perceptions  towards,  and  opinions  of, 
the  GCC.  Al-'Esa  &  al-Manufis  (1985)  public  opinion  study,  based  on  a  random  sample 
drawn  from  four  districts  of  Kuwait,  gauged  the  public's  attitudes  towards,  and 
perceptions  of  the  GCC,  their  level  of  interest  in  the  organisation,  and  the  extent  to 
which  they  were  knowledgeable  about  it.  Obeid  (1996)'s  study  of  attitudes  towards  the 
GCC  was  based  on  a  random  selection  of  an  unspecified  number  of  Gulf  intellectuals  and 
sought  to  answer  a  set  of  related  questions:  to  what  extent  are  the  GCC  member  states 
moving  towards  a  state  of  full  integration?  and  what  are  the  underlying  factors  favouring 
and  assisting  full  integration  and  the  obstacles  standing  in  the  way  of  this  integration9. 
This  research  project  examines  the  perceptions  and  attitudes  of  two  contrasting 
groups,  (i)  the  political  elite,  based  on  a  sample  of  policy-makers  from  the  GCC 
Secretariat  General  and  (ii)  a  citizen  cohort,  based  on  a  sample  of  students  at  Kuwait  and 
Qatar  universities. 
The  GCC  was  formed  with  the  prime  objective  of  establishing  closer  relations 
among  the  member  states,  coordinating  their  policies  in  the  various  fields  and  setting  up 
firm  foundations  for  economic,  social,  and  political  integration.  The  GCC  Charter  called 
for  the  coordination  of  policies  in  a  wide  range  of  areas,  most  notably  in  foreign  policy, Chapter  One:  Introduction  and  Overview  4 
economic  and  social  policy,  and  in  regional  security  and  defence  policies.  However, 
according  to  some  local  and  outside  political  analysts  and  observers  (e.  g.,  al-Kuwari 
1992,  Obeid  1995,  among  others),  very  little  such  coordination  has  been  accomplished  to 
date  and,  to  that  extent,  significant  steps  have  yet  to  be  taken  towards  achieving  the 
much  desired  and  long-awaited  economic  and  political  integration  of  the  Gulf  states.  The 
conclusions  of  these  political  observers  contrast  markedly  with  the  repeated  assertions  of 
GCC  policy-makers  that  tangible  progress  has  in  fact  been  achieved  in  the  various  fields 
of  cooperation  among  the  member  states  of  the  GCC.  This  study  is  undertaken  with  the 
primary  aim  of  evaluating,  on  the  basis  of  both  Gulf  citizens'  and  GCC  officials' 
perceptions  of  and  attitudes  towards  the  GCC,  the  nature  and  level  of  cooperation  in 
different  policy  fields  and  the  extent  to  which  the  organisation  represents  a  step  towards 
some  form  of  political  integration  in  the  Gulf 
With  the  objective  of  identifying  perceptions  of,  and  attitudes  towards,  the  GCC 
two  surveys  were  carried  out  in  the  Gulf  among  two  sets  of  randomly  selected  samples 
(see  chapter  7  for  an  extensive  discussion  bearing  on  the  design  of  the  two  surveys, 
nature  of  selected  samples,  and  methods  of  data  collection).  The  issues  assessed 
included: 
i.  What  considerations,  internal  and/or  external  to  the  Gulf,  do  citizens  and  GCC 
officials  perceive  as  having  been  instrumental  to  the  creation  of  the  GCC? 
ii.  How  informed  are  Gulf  citizens  about  the  GCC  and  how  extensive  is  their 
interest  in  this  organisation? 
iii.  What  is  the  nature  and  seriousness  of  problems  that  Gulf  citizens  and  GCC 
officials  perceive  as  obstructing  the  progress  of  the  GCC? 
iv.  In  what  areas  of  cooperation  (if  any)  do  Gulf  citizens  and  GCC  officials 
perceive  the  GCC  to  have  made  substantial  progress? 
v.  What  kind  of  social  relations  and  ties  prevail  among  GCC  citizens? 
In  the  context  of  these  issues  the  aim  is  to  explore  attitudes  towards  those 
policies  and  aspects  of  cooperation  which  the  GCC  itself  deems  as  central  to  its  efforts  to 
achieve  greater  unity  among  its  Gulf  member  states.  These  include  in  particular: Chapter  One:  Introduction  and  Overview  5 
1.  The  foi-eiVi  12olicy  field.  -  A  primary  objective  of  the  GCC  is  to  coordinate  the  foreign 
policies  of  the  various  member  states  with  the  aim  of  reaching  a  common  foreign  policy 
to  which  all  member  states  are  able  to  subscribe.  Within  the  general  field  of  foreign 
policy,  the  survey  sought  to  elicit  GCC  officials'  and  citizen  attitudes  on  the  nature 
and/or  level  of  GCC  cooperation  and  coordination  efforts  in  reaching  common  policies  in 
such  areas  as: 
i.  relations  with  US  as  a  major  superpower. 
ii.  relations  with  Russia/  CIS. 
iii.  collective  reactions  to  periodic  crises. 
Closely  connected  to  the  foreign  policy  field,  the  surveys  also  sought  to  explore 
attitudes  towards  the  GCCs  common  defence  and  security  arrangements  in  place  to  deal 
with  such  regional  threats  as  the  Iraqi  threat  before  and  after  the  second  Gulf  war  and 
such  regional  conflicts  as  the  Yemeni  Crisis  of  1994. 
2:  The  economic  field.  Since  one  of  the  GCC  goals  has  been  to  strengthen  economic 
cooperation  and  establish  common  policies  between  the  member  states,  the  study  seeks 
to  understand  how  important  such  cooperation  was  considered  to  be.  In  the  case  of  the 
latter  attitudes  towards  the  achievements  to  date  are  examined  looking  at  four  specific 
economic  issues;  oil  production,  tariff  agreements,  import  policies,  and  export  policies. 
3:  The  social  policy  fie  Regarding  cooperation  among  the  GCC  member  states  in  the 
broad  area  of  social  policy,  the  two  samples  were  used  to  elicit  attitudes  towards  and 
perceptions  of  the  GCC  organisations  progress  in  achieving  greater  coordination 
specifically  in  the  issues  of  health  care,  education,  immigration  control  and  environmental 
protection. 
One  of  the  rationales  for  choosing  to  examine  citizens'  and  GCC  officials' 
attitudes  towards  the  GCC,  its  establishment,  policies,  and  problems  is  to  ascertain  the 
extent  and  nature  of  both  the  attitudinal  similarities  as  well  as  discrepancies  existing 
between  GCC  policy-makers  and  Gulf  citizens  on  these  diverse  but  interconnected 
issues.  In  light  of  these  attitudinal  affinities  and  differences,  an  attempt  will  then  be  made 
to  determine  the  efficacy  with  which  the  GCC  has  been  implementing  its  various  policies 
and  the  nature  of  progress  it  has  managed  to  achieve  in  its  pursuit  of  a  greater  integration Chapter  One:  Introduction  and  Overview 
between  the  member  states  since  its  creation  some  16  years  ago.  In  another  respect,  an 
exploration  of  citizens'  perceptions  of  the  GCC,  its  institutions  and  overall  policies  allow 
us  to  define  the  level  of  satisfaction  and  acceptance  with  which  this  organisation  is  met 
within  Gulf  society  and,  connectedly,  establish  the  level  of  pragmatism  with  which  the 
GCC  has  pursued  its  objectives. 
The  research  also  seeks  to  explore  the  nature  and  magnitude  of  the  gap  identified 
by  some  writers  concerned  with  the  GCC  and  developments  have  noted  between  the 
GCC  political  elite  and  Gulf  citizens  on  perceptions  of  the  institution.  Another  concern 
of  this  study  will  be  to  assess  Gulf  citizens'  attitudes  on  the  various  aspects  of  the  GCC 
and  its  policies  with  a  view  to  determining  whether  there  has  been  a  change,  and  if  so 
how  dramatic  in  their  attitudes  in  the  wake  of  the  Second  Gulf  war  of  1990.  Similarly,  an 
exploration  of  the  views  of  the  GCC  political  elite  on  the  GCC,  its  objectives  and  its 
problems  will  help  determine  whether  it  has  witnessed  any  (major)  changes  in  outlook 
and  perspectives  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1990  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait. 
1.3  Research  Obiectives: 
Central  to  the  concerns  of  this  study  is  an  exploration  of  the  structure  of  the  GCC 
and  other  related  issues  from  the  perspective  of  the  attitudinal  patterns  held  towards  the 
institution  within  the  Gulf  society.  Within  the  context  of  this  broad  concern,  the  study 
will  primarily  aim  at  analysing  the  degree  of  cooperation  and  coordination  of  common 
policies  between  the  GCC  members  in  various  fields.  More  specifically,  the  main 
objectives  pursued  in  this  study  will  involve  investigating  the  following  issues: 
1.  How  useful  are  theories  of  federalism  in  understanding  the  processes  of  cooperation 
between  GCC  member  states,  including  those  which  continue  to  provide  an  obstacle 
to  greater  political  cooperation  between  the  member  states? 
2.  The  structure  and  policies  of  the  GCC;  in  particular  how  certain  common  policies 
bearing  on  foreign  affairs,  defence/security,  health,  education,  and  immigration  have 
been  derived  and  whether  they  have  been  implemented? Chaptei-  One:  Inti-oduction  and  OveiTiew  7 
3.  What  is  the  role  of  such  social  and  political  factors  as  Tribalism  and  Arab  Nationalism 
in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC. 
4.  What  is  the  civil  basis  of  a  federal  Gulf  society. 
5.  Citizen  and  political  elite  attitudes  on  and  perceptions  of  the  formation,  nature,  and 
function  of  the  GCC-  based  on  a  randomly  selected  sample  of  university  students  as 
well  as  a  second  and  equally  randomly  selected  sample  of  GCC  policy-makers. 
6.  The  status  of  the  GCC  as  a  political  and  economic  regional  grouping  in  the  changing 
world  order. 
1.4  Research  Significance: 
The  significance  of  this  study  comes  from  its  attempt  to  develop  arguments  and 
reach  insights  that  will  contribute  to  the  development  of  a  better  understanding  of  the 
nature  of  the  GCC  as  an  economic  and  political  Middle  Eastern  confederacy,  its 
structure,  its  policies  and  its  overall  outlook  on  cooperation  between  and  integration  of 
its  member  states. 
Although  much  has  been  written  about  the  GCC,  there  has  so  far  been  little 
discussion  of  the  type,  level  and  effectiveness  of  the  cooperation  pursued  on  the  part  of 
this  organisation.  Moreover,  previous  research  on  the  GCC  has  yet  to  address  the 
question  theoretically:  through  adopting  federalist  arguments  in  the  context  of  the  GCC; 
with  the  exception  of  a  1993  account  by  al-Ahmad,  no  previous  studies  have  approached 
the  GCC,  its  cooperation  policies  and  its  short-  and  long-term  integration  objectives 
from  the  perspective  of  the  theory  of  federalism  in  general  and  from  the  perspective  of 
this  theoretical  framework  as  it  has  been  applied  to  the  case  of  the  Third  world,  in 
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1.5  Research  Scove  and  Limitations: 
The  focus  in  this  thesis  is  on  the  attitudes  of  the  Gulf  citizens  and  the  Gulf 
political  elite,  and  more  particularly  on  the  attitudes  of  students  and  the  GCC  policy- 
makers,  on  the  GCC,  its  policies,  objectives  and  the  problems  with  which  it  is  faced. 
Relying  on  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  methods  of  collecting  data,  this  study 
explores  levels  of  knowledge  about  the  GCC,  attitudes  towards  the  organisation  and  the 
level  of  interest  in  it  among  a  sample  randomly  selected  from  a  cross-section  of  Qatari 
and  Kuwaiti  students,  as  well  as  a  sample  of  GCC  high-ranking  officials  from  the  GCC 
Secretariat  General.  Qualitative  assessments  of  similarities  and  differences  in  attitudes 
and  perceptions  of  the  various  aspects  of  the  GCC  between  these  two  groups  provide  a 
basis  for  an  evaluation  of  the  impact  of  GCC  policies  on  Gulf  society  and  the  degree  of 
success  it  has  had  in  the  implementation  of  its  policies  including  the  degree  of  progress  it 
has  achieved  in  pursuit  of  an  eventual  integration  of  its  Gulf  member  states 
The  citizen  and  the  political  elite  surveys  conducted  for  the  purposes  of  this  study 
are  limited  to  a  cross-section  of  final  year  students  from  the  university  of  Kuwait  (in  the 
state  of  Kuwait)  and  the  University  of  Qatar  (in  the  state  of  Qatar)  and  to  small  sample 
of  GCC  high-ranking  civil  servants  respectively.  This  study  set  out  initially  to  survey 
students  from  more  GCC  member  states  and  a  larger  and  more  diversified  sample  of 
GCC  civil  servants,  but  a  combination  of  time  constraints,  resource  limitations  and 
beaurocractic  barriers  (see  chapter  concerned  with  methodology)  restricted  the  study  to 
Kuwaiti  and  Qatari  students,  and  to  a  specific  category  of  GCC  officials.  These 
limitations  notwithstanding,  the  results  and  insights  obtained  in  this  work  have  broader 
relevance  to  the  rest  of  the  GCC  states. 
1.6  Outline  of  Thesis  Structure: 
The  thesis  falls  into  twelve  chapters.  The  first  chapter  is  a  general  introduction  to 
the  overall  thesis  and  is  designed  to  acquaint  the  reader  with  the  purpose,  objectives, Chapter  One:  Introduction  and  Overview 
significance  and  layout  of  the  study  as  well  as  to  introduce  the  issues  and  questions 
addressed  in  later  chapters.  Chapters  two  and  three  both  focus  on  the  theoretical 
framework  of  the  study  but  from  different  angles.  Chapter  Two  discusses  the  concept  of 
federalism  and  assesses  the  applicability  of  some  approaches  to  federalism  to  the  GCC 
case.  It  also  examines  the  types  of  extant  federations  and  the  various  elements  of  these 
federations  as  well  as  the  type  of  integration  attested  in  the  case  of  the  GCC.  Chapter 
Three  examines  Yemen  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates  as  representative  cases  of 
federalism  and  political  integration  in  the  Arabian  Peninsula.  It  focuses  on  the  nature  and 
mechanisms  of  both  cases  of  integration  and  seeks,  through  exploring  the  obstacles 
facing  either  or  both,  to  highlight  the  potential  economic  and  political  challenges  that  the 
GCC  might  face.  Chapter  Four  provides,  by  way  of  a  broad  context  for  the  study,  a 
general  background  on  GCC  member  states  and  looks  at  the  historical,  cultural  and 
social  affinities  and  ties  which  bind  these  nations.  The  first  section  of  this  chapter  is  a 
brief  demographic  overview  of  the  GCC  member  states;  the  second  section  looks  at  the 
GCC  against  a  model  of  federalism  developed  by  Tarlton  (1965);  the  third  section 
discusses  the  organisational  structure  of  the  GCC,  and  the  final  and  fourth  section 
discusses  the  literature's  evaluation  of  the  objectives  and  achievements  of  the  GCC. 
Chapter  Five  considers  the  role  and  status  of  the  GCC  as  an  economic  and  political 
regional  grouping  in  both  the  old  and  new  world  orders  and  in  the  Gulf  region  both 
before  and  after  1990  and  discusses  the  role  of  the  new  world  order  on  to  the  emergence 
of  the  GCC.  This  chapter  focuses  on  the  role  of  both  old  and  new  world  orders  in  Gulf 
politics  and  on  the  impact  of  the  transformation  that  world  politics  has  witnessed  as  a 
consequence  of  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  on  the  rise  of  the  GCC.  Focus  will  be  laid,  in 
particular,  on  how  the  struggle  between  major  international  powers  for  political  leverage 
in  the  Gulf  area  has  shaped  the  politics  of  the  GCC  states  and  opened  the  way  for  the 
emergence  of  a  regional  alliance  between  these  states. 
Chapter  Six  examines  the  political  fragmentation  in  the  Gulf  through  the  role  of 
the  notions  of  tribalism  and  nationalism  in  the  creation  of  the  GCC.  In  this  chapter  such 
questions  as  whether  these  two  phenomena  have  created  the  conditions  conducive  for 
the  GCC  states  to  pursue  integration,  or  not,  are  discussed.  The  nature  of  tribalism  and 
tribal  affinities  within  and  across  GCC  societies  is  a  relatively  unexpected  aspect Chapter  One:  Introduction  and  Overview  10 
influencing  the  GCC  as  a  supra-national  organisation,  as  is  why  the  ideology  of  Pan- 
Arabism,  consequential  in  so  many  of  the  Arab  states,  has  had  but  a  slight  impact  on  Gulf 
society. 
Chapter  Seven  outlines  the  research  methodology  utilised  in  this  research  project. 
It  discusses  the  methods  of  data  collection,  the  types  of  sample,  and  problems  confronted 
during  the  fieldwork.  Chapter  Eight,  beginning  the  analysis  of  the  data  proper,  focuses 
on  GCC  political  elite's  attitudes  on  the  GCC.  The  aim  is  to  shed  light  on  whatever 
differences  there  might  be  between  this  category  of  Gulf  society  and  Gulf  citizens, 
specifically  on  the  perceived  progress  the  GCC  has  made  so  far,  the  perceived  degree  of 
success  it  has  had  in  adopting  and  implementing  cooperative  policies  and  the  perceived 
gravity  of  the  obstacles  and  problems  that  continue  limit  the  effectiveness  of  the  GCC. 
Citizen  (student)  attitudes  on  and  perceptions  of  the  various  aspects  of  GCC  are  the 
concern  of  chapters  nine,  ten,  eleven  and  twelve.  Chapter  Nine  explores  levels  of 
knowledge  about  and  interest  in  the  GCC  among  students.  Based  on  this,  an  attempt  will 
be  made  to  establish  the  linkages  there  are  between  the  GCC  as  a  political  institution  and 
its  member  states'  citizens,  what  kind  of  importance  it  is  accorded  by  the  Gulf  citizens, 
how  responsive  the  GCC  is  to  their  concerns  and  demands  and  the  level  of  transparency 
with  which  it  proceeds  in  adopting  and  implementing  policies.  Chapter  Ten  is  concerned 
with  issues  of  social  rapport  and  identity  and  explores,  in  particular,  the  level  of  social 
ties  and  cultural  affinities,  degree  of  interaction  and  nature  of  loyalty  among  the  GCC 
students.  By  examining  the  cultural  ties  and  social  affinities  that  bind  the  societies  of  the 
GCC,  the  chapter  aims  to  explore  what  underlies  the  strong  sense  of  "solidarity"  and 
"unity"  characteristic  of  these  societies  and  which  is  widely  acknowledged  in  the 
literature,  and  what  accounts  for  some  of  so-called  social  and  cultural  "integrative 
factors"  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC.  Student  perceptions  of  the  various  factors  leading 
to  the  creation  of  the  GCC,  the  political  machinery  of  this  institution  and  the  problems 
with  which  it  is  faced  are  explored  in  chapter  Eleven,  whereas  chapter  Twelve  is  devoted 
to  an  investigation  of  student's  perceptions  of  the  GCC  cooperation  policies.  Besides 
establishing  whether  there  are  any  similarities  and/or  differences  between  this  group  of 
sample  and  the  political  elite  focused  on  in  earlier  chapter  and  discussing  the  implications 
of  any  congruence  (or  its  absence)  between  the  views  of  the  two  samples,  the  aim  in Chapter  One:  Introduction  and  Overview 
these  two  chapters  is  to  determine  how  much  progress  the  GCC  is  perceived  as  having 
attained  within  Gulf  societies.  What  problems  are  perceived  to  form  a  stumbling  block  in 
its  pursuit  of  greater  cooperation  among  its  member  states  and  how  much  satisfaction  or 
dissatisfaction  with  its  institutions  and  policies  there  is  among  Gulf  citizens.  The  thesis 
concludes  with  a  recapitulation  of  the  main  findings  of  the  study  and  a  comparison  of 
these  with  previous  studies  dealing  with  attitudinal  patterns  within  the  GCC  society.  It 
also  outlines  suggestions  for  future  inquiry  into  attitudinal  patterns  and  social  perceptions 
in  the  Gulf  region. Chapter  Two: 
The  Federalising  Process  in  the  Gulf:  the  Case  of  the  GCC 
2.1  Introduction: 
The  conceptual  term  of  federalism  has  been  subject  to  virtually  as  many 
(different)  interpretations  and  definitions  as  there  have  been  scholars  who  have 
examined  the  concept,  including  in  particular  Riker  (1964),  Duchacek  (1970),  and 
Dikshit  (1975,1997a).  Each  has  failed  to  agree  on  a  single  definition.  However,  the 
essential  elements  of  the  theoretical  framework  of  federalism  have  been  fully 
discussed  by  these  scholars  and  others.  This  chapter  will,  in  part,  examine  the  broad 
theory  of  federalism  with  the  aim  of  determining  the  most  appropriate  approach  for 
interpreting  and  understanding  the  GCC  structure  and  operation.  It  will  also 
investigate  the  type  of  'federal'  integration  involved  in  the  case  of  the  GCC  and  how 
federalism  is  of  conceptual  value  to  understanding  this  case  of  Arab  regional 
integration.  Though  the  GCC  is  not  a  federal  state  per  se,  our  invocation  of  the  theory 
of  federalism  in  the  context  of  the  GCC,  a  regional  organisation  of  'inter-state 
cooperation',  is  not  unsuitable,  however.  The  various  approaches  to  the  concept  of 
federalism  are  used  not  with  a  view  to  showing  whether  they  fit  or  not  with  the  case 
at  hand,  but,  more  fundamentally,  with  a  view  to  illuminating  what  ties  the  GCC 
member  states  together,  how  this  organisation  came  into  existence,  how  it  operates, 
and  how  far  it  has  progressed  in  its  moves  to  create  an  integrated  union  among  its 
member  states. 
The  theoretical  discussion,  therefore,  will  be  divided  into  two  parts,  in  line 
with  the  aims  of  this  study.  The  discussion  in  the  first  part  will  examine  the  nature  of 
federalism,  with  particular  focus  on  the  factors,  whether  internal,  external,  or  a 
combination  of  both,  leading  towards  integration  (for  a  detailed  discussion  of  the 
internal  and  external  factors  contributing,  in  one  way  or  another,  to  the  emergence  of Chapter  Two  The  Bederalising  Process  in  the  Gutf-  the  Case  of  the  GCC  13 
the  GCC,  see  chapters  9  and  11).  The  motivational  characteristics  underlying  the 
process  of  territorial  integration  will  be  assessed  to  illustrate  the  applicability  of  the 
components  of  the  different  approaches  in  the  context  of  existing  federations.  The 
second  part  will  be  concerned  more  specifically  with  the  GCC  regional  integration 
model. 
2.2  Derinitions  of,  and  Approaches  to,  Federalism  &  the  Case  of  the  GCC: 
A  general  understanding  of  the  nature  and  origins  of  the  'federal  impulse'-  the 
shift  towards  political  integration  -  provides  the  background  to  the  case  of  the  GCC. 
Not  all  aspects  of  federalism  will  be  discussed  by  any  means,  the  attention  focusing  on 
those  that  are  of  potential  relevance  to  the  GCC,  including  the  set  of  external  and 
internal  motivations  and  the  obstacles  facing  this  type  of  political  organisation, 
particularly  within  a  Third  world  context.  How  the  federalising  process  contributed  to 
the  emergence  of  the  GCC  will  help  us  draw  conclusions  as  to  the  nature  and 
problems  of  the  GCC. 
Political  integration  arising  from  federations  or  confederations  have  almost 
always  been  born  mainly  out  of  a  voluntary  effort  of  a  number  of  distinct  or 
independent  regions,  constituent  provinces  or  states  to  merge  into  a  single  sovereign 
state  with  a  federal  central  power,  in  which  local  and  regional  polities  preserve  their 
autonomy.  However,  cases  of  federalism  and  federations  vary  significantly;  such 
federations  as  the  USA,  Canada,  India  and  Australia,  differ  from  each  other  in  terms 
of  extent  and  nature  of  federal  and  local  decision-making  power. 
Definitions  of  federalism  are  diff-use;  Smith  (1995:  4)  has  asserted:  "The  term 
federalism  has  been  subject  to  differing  meanings  and  applied  to  many  different 
situational  contexts,  and  identifying  its  defining  features  can  be  as  controversial  as 
evaluating  them.  "  Furthermore,  what  qualifies  as  a  case  of  fully-fledged  federalism  is 
still  a  matter  of  debate  among  scholars;  Forsyth  (1981),  for  instance,  has  argued  that Chapter  Two  The  Federalising  Process  in  the  Gulf.  the  Case  of  the  GCC  14 
most  scholars  eschew  answering  the  question  of  when  a  polity  can  be  labelled  as  truly 
federal. 
Five  central  components  have  been  discussed  in  the  literature  in  connection 
with  the  phenomenon  of  federalism. 
1.  Desire  for  unity: 
The  desire  and  need  for  some  form  of  political  integration  (i.  e.  greater  unity) 
constitute  two  important  factors  of  federalism.  The  move  towards  such  integration  of 
voluntary  expression  among  what  are  perceived  in  some  (but  not  necessarily  all)  ways 
similar  or  different  regions  has  been  emphasised  by  many  scholars,  such  as  Dikshit 
(1975),  Elazar  (1979),  Riker  (1964),  and  many  others.  Dikshit  (1997b:  269)  has 
defined  federalism  as: 
"A  federation  is  born  when  a  number  of  usually  separate  or 
politically  autonomous  units  (or  units  with  some  pretensions 
to  autonomy)  mutually  agree  to  merge  together  in  order  to 
create  a  states  with  a  single  sovereign  central  authority,  but 
retaining  for  themselves  powers  of  autonomous  decision- 
making  in  matters  that  are  predominantly  of  local  and  regional 
interests.  " 
The  factors  favouring  federalism  have  been  discussed  by  many  scholars 
between  which  there  is  a  measure  of  agreement  as  to  what  might  be  considered  the 
essential  components  for  the  emergence  of  any  federation.  Focusing  on  the  'classic 
federations'  of  the  US,  Canada,  Australia,  and  Switzerland,  Wheare  (1963)  argued 
that  there  are  five  prerequisites  for  federation.  The  need  for  a  common  defence  to 
allay  or  overcome  fear  of  external  and/or  internal  attack,  especially  in  the  case  of 
'vulnerable'  territories  is  a  common  factor.  Second,  is  the  desire  to  be  independent 
from  some  foreign  power  and  the  realisation  that  only  through  union  could 
independence  be  achieved,  (see  also  Dikshit  (1975)  for  a  similar  argument). 
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the  large  size  of  their  territories  presuppose  inter-state  cooperation  among  the  states 
for  two  reasons-  to  prevent  any  hostility  that  might  erupt  between  either  the  regions 
themselves  or  between  them  and  neighbouring  countries  and  to  protect  smaller 
regions.  Without  union,  these  might  face  an  insecure  future,  as  smallness  itself  of  a 
state  makes  it  that  much  more  vulnerable  to  external  threat  particularly  within  a 
geopolitically  unstable  area.  Robinson  (1961:  2)  has  emphasised  the  importance  of  the 
size  of  constituent  regions  in  creating  federal  entities  or  states:  "[ 
... 
]  countries  of  large 
areas  and  small  [size]  population,  or  even  rather  large  population  concentrated  in 
widely  scattered  areas,  are  obviously  suitable  for  this  [federal  union]  form  of 
government.  "  Both  Riker  (1964)  and  Dikshit  (1975)  agree  with  this  framework 
though  the  latter  adds  the  element  of  military  insecurity  to  highlight  and  ground  this 
point. 
The  notion  of  'unity'  itself  has  a  number  of  prerequisites.  Dikshit  (1975) 
specifies  several  factors  for  unity,  emphasising  the  sense  of  'common  military 
insecurity'  and  the  need  for  a  'common  defence'  as  the  most  important  of  these 
factors.  He  also  specifies  similarities  of  'race,  language,  and  culture  (including 
religion)  are  major  factors  for  unity  (see  also  Mill  (1947)  and  Riker  (1964)).  The  third 
factor  pointed  out  by  Dikshit  relates  to  the  interdependence  of  the  economies  of 
separate  units  to  which  there  was  expectation  for  greater  economic  benefits  would 
accrue  from  union.  The  final  point  noted  by  Dikshit  was  the  similarities  of  political 
institutions  as  one  of  the  factors  with  a  role  to  play  in  inducing  and  promoting  a 
federal  order.  Other  scholars  have  argued  that  the  last  two  factors  are  not  very 
important  or  not  as  important  as  the  other  factors  in  the  origins  of  federalism. 
Federations  are,  thus,  meant  to  achieve  benefits-  the  absence  of  such  perceived 
benefits  undermines  the  basis  of  federation.  The  literature  (see  Huglin  (1987),  Dikshit 
(1975),  and  Elazar  (1979))  differentiates  between  federalism  in  the  Western  world  and 
in  the  developing  countries.  In  some  Third  world  countries  federation  attempts  failed 
because  some  regions  did  not  benefit  from  the  federation  bond,  and  some  of  them 
became  poorer  than  the  others  in  certain  contexts.  For  example,  one  of  the  main 
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of  benefits  between  Egypt  and  Syria.  The  'poorer'  territories,  it  was  considered, 
would  gain  most  from  the  union,  the  burden  falling  on  the  richest  territories.  The 
political  elite  (government)  in  Syria  perceived  that  Egypt,  the  centre  of  authority  of 
the  federation,  gained  politically,  socially,  and  economically  more  than  did  Syria.  The 
imbalance  of  power  distribution  between  the  regions  could  affect  the  unity  and 
ultimately  lead  to  secession,  as  was  the  case  in  the  West  Indies,  for  instance. 
The  classification  of  association  or  union  types  and  motivation  factors  of 
integration  have  been  widely  discussed  in  the  literature.  Duchacek  (1970) 
distinguishes  between  voluntary  and  forced  unions  and  considers  factors  like  the 
territorial  size  of  the  region,  and  external  and  internal  pressures  as  instrumental  to  the 
emergence  of  cases  of  voluntary  integration. 
Basic  to  the  process  of  federalising  is  the  aspiration  for  greater  political 
cooperation.  Gagnon  (1993)  singled  out  such  aspiration  as  the  most  important 
motivating  factor  for  any  federal  order.  Thus,  he  argues  the  choice  of  any  society  to 
enter  the  'political  arrangements'  freely  and  willingly  as  one  of  the  important 
federalism  theory  constituents. 
Surnmarising  so  far,  federalising  process  are  linked  to: 
1.  The  need  for  a  greater  common  sense  of  security  and  a  permanent  solution  to 
external  and  internal  threats  and  to  counter  geographical  instability.  Such  instability 
influences  the  political,  social,  and  economic  life  of  the  state  and  its  citizenry.  The 
latter's  perception,  therefore,  will  heighten  the  demand  for  security,  increasing  the 
pressure  for  unity  or  greater  political  cooperation.  As  noted  in  Riker  (1964),  Birch 
(1966),  Livingston  (1968),  Paddison  (1983),  Dikshit  (1971;  1997a),  among  many 
others,  the  external  threat  is  one  of  the  motivating  factors  for  federal  existence. 
2.  Similarity  of  political  and  economic  institutions  are  a  contributory  political  factor  to 
any  federal  grouping.  In  the  context  of  supra-state  integrations,  this  factor  could 
assume  the  same  importance  as  that  attributed  to  the  common  need  for  security.  For 
example,  the  Gulf  states  are  broadly  similar  in  their  political  systems  and  political 
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dependent  on  oil  production,  creates  common  ground  for  political  cooperation  among 
the  members.  Also,  the  existence  of  common  social  institutions  across  national 
boundaries  of  the  GCC  member  states  (e.  g.  royal  monarchies  and  a  society  organised 
along  tribal  lines)  can  be  a  positive  motivating  element  for  inter-state  cooperation. 
Cultural  similarities  too  (e.  g.  race,  language,  religion)  can  be  a  major  component  for 
unity.  Equally,  the  importance  of  geographical  propinquity  is  important  not  only  in  the 
case  of  federal  but  also  in  any  regional  order. 
The  desire  for  greater  political  cooperation  between  GCC  states  is  apparent 
and  can  be  clearly  detected  in,  among  other  things,  local  media  interviews  with  the 
Gulf  political  elite.  Moves  towards  unity  among  the  Arabian  Gulf  states  have  been 
understood  in  the  literature  to  have  been  induced,  primarily,  by  fear  of  threats  to  the 
internal  stability  and  external  security  of  these  states.  For  example,  Twinam  (1987: 
29)  has  pointed  out  the  importance  of  security,  along  with  other  reasons,  as  a 
motivating  factor  for  the  GCC's  existence,  and  argued  that  one  of  the  main  goals  for 
establishing  this  organisation  were,  on  the  one  hand,  to  create  a  more  secure  strategic 
environment  for  the  GCC  members  and,  on  the  other,  meet  the  GCC  citizens  desire 
for  political  and  economic  unity.  As  countries  of  small  territorial  size  and  small 
populations  (Saudi  Arabia  being  the  exception),  the  security  and  sovereignty  of  the 
GCC  member  states  have  been  frequently  under  threat  from  the  two  hostile  regional 
powers  of  Iran  and  Iraq. 
Contributing  to  the  process  of  regional  integration  among  the  GCC  member 
states,  cooperation  among  them  has  been  facilitated  by  the  fact  that  they  are  closely 
linked  by  the  elements  of  a  single  historical  Arab  Uninia,  including  an  Arabo-Muslim 
culture  (i.  e.  common  Arabic  language,  cultural  heritage,  and  ethnicity),  a  common 
religion  (the  majority  being  Sunnis),  and  similar  attitudes  towards  the  Arabo-Israeli 
conflict.  These  similarities  have  strengthened  the  link  between  the  GCC  member 
states. 
It  is  often  the  case  that  the  aspiration  for  integration  or  greater  political 
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regions  is  paralleled  by  the  preferences  of  the  citizens.  It  is  equally  often  the  case  that 
a  cooperative  federation  is  created  or  an  economic  union  is  established  only  after  the 
citizens  of  the  constituent  units  of  such  a  union  have  been  consulted  as  to  the  form 
and  type  of  they  would  like  to  see  emerge.  But  while  it  is  true  that  the  Gulf  political 
elite's  strong  desire  for  establishing  some  form  of  union  wherein  economic,  social, 
military  and  political  cooperation  would  be  pursued  among  the  member  states 
mirrored  a  similar  desire  for  such  a  union  amongst  the  dominant  majority  of  Gulf 
citizens,  none  of  the  GCC  governments  consulted  its  citizens  for  their  opinions 
regarding  the  formula  of  inter-state  cooperation  among  the  member  states  of  this 
regional  organisation.  The  exclusion  of  the  citizens  from  the  decision-making 
processes  leading  to  the  creation  of  the  GCC  could  be  attributed  to  the  political  elites' 
fear  that  any  attempt  to  involve  the  citizens  in  such  processes  would  perhaps  open  the 
gate  for  demands  for  more  political  rights  and  more  participation  in  the  political  life  of 
the  area. 
A  study  undertaken  in  Kuwait  University  in  1984  investigating  the  Kuwaiti 
citizens'  attitudes  towards  the  cooperation  existing  between  the  GCC  member  states 
found  that  the  citizens  were  satisfied  with  the  principal  idea  of  creating  an 
organisation  along  the  lines  of  the  GCC  and  with  the  principles  on  which  inter-state 
cooperation  among  the  member  states  of  this  organisation  was  based  (see  also  al- 
Siyyasah  (1984),  al-Qabas,  (1985)). 
The  need  for  inter-state  cooperation  had  long  been  voiced  by  some  Gulf 
intellectuals  and  academics.  Al-Khateeb  (1974),  al-Nafeesi  (1974),  and  el-Ebraheem 
(1974),  for  instance,  have  all  argued  that  the  Gulf  states  should  seek  some  form  of 
cooperation  to  avert  being  dominated  by  foreign  major  powers.  The  desire  for  some 
form  of  union  has  thus  existed  and  has  been  expressed  by  the  educational  elites  well 
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2.  Federalism  as  a  Constitutional  Bargain: 
Riker  (1964)  pointed  out  that  at  the  core  of  federalism  is  a  bargain  struck 
between  the  central/national  leaders  and  the  local  elites  of  the  constituent 
governments  bringing  together  the  aggregating  territory  through  constitutional 
representation.  He  listed  two  points  as  favourable  factors  in  the  origin  of  federation. 
The  inclination  for  geographical  expansion,  arises  where  the  political  elites  of  the 
constituent  regions,  who  might  be  under  external  or  diplomatic  threat  and  are 
prepared  to  negotiate  a  federal  bargain.  Entering  the  new  arrangements  is  a  means  of 
avoiding  military  and  diplomatic  aggression.  Only  through  concessions  can  the 
political  elites  of  the  constituent  units  face  these  challenges  and,  through  federal 
arrangements  as  part  of  the  main  federal  bargain  process,  secure  their  'internal  front'. 
Military  threats  can  also  be  accepted  as  a  causative  factor  for  any  federal  principle. 
The  question  of  self-insufficiency  against  external  threat  is  a  motivating  factor  in  the 
establishment  of  federal  entity.  Arising  from  the  self-insufficiency  joing  a  federal  order 
means,  the  political  elite  accept  the  bargain  that  in  return  for  giving  up  some  military 
independence,  they  would  become  party  of  a  stronger  military  or  diplomatic  power  as 
well  as  a  larger  and  probably  stronger  polity.  Among  others,  Sawer  (1969), 
Livingston  (1956),  and  Davis  (1978)  have  criticised  Riker's  hypothesis  that  the  two 
conditions  are  the  most  important  factors  for  the  origin  of  federalism.  Dikshit  (1975) 
insisted  on  the  changing  importance  of  the  military  factor,  accepting  it  as  no  longer 
beneficial  in  the  rise  of  modem  federalism.  He  argued  that  the  main  objective  was  to 
create  a  body  politic  -  integrated  and  fully  functional  political  units  -  as  a  new 
approach.  He  described  post-1960  federations  as  a  new  type  of  modem  federations. 
Birch  (1968),  the  sole  author  to  have  attempted  a  partial  test  of  Riker's  thesis  in  his 
study  of  the  Malaysian  and  Nigerian  federations,  was  sceptical  about  the  elements  that 
have  been  raised  in  Riker's  study. 
The  GCC  member  states  have  come  under  continuing  threat  both  before  and 
in  the  aftermath  of  the  eruption  of  the  Iran/Iraq  war.  The  need  for  greater  security 
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West.  However,  according  to  many  intellectuals  (such  as  at-Kuwari  (1992)),  the 
political  elite  were  not  ready  to  concede  some  of  their  powers  to  overcome  the 
sovereignty  issue.  Though,  the  GCC  charter  calls  upon  the  member  countries  to 
pursue  greater  cooperation  in  domestic  and  foreign  policies,  one  cannot  easily  talk 
about  an  element  of  bargain  in  the  context  of  this  regional  union  as  each  member  state 
not  only  retains  the  right  to  determine  its  own  domestic  and  foreign  policies,  but 
equally,  the  local  implementation  of  the  organisation's  policies  and  statutes  remains  at 
the  discretion  of  the  member  states. 
3.  Economic  Resources: 
Dissimilarities  in  economic  resources  between  the  units  can  be  a  source  of 
both  advantage  and  disadvantage  to  the  federation  process.  Robinson  (1961:  1) 
characterised  federalism  as  "the  most  geographically  expressive  of  all  political 
systems.  "  Federations  are  based  on  the  existence  of  regional  differences  and  on  the 
recognition  of  the  claims  and  rights  of  the  component  areas  to  perpetuate  their 
individual  character.  Nfiller  (1956:  138)  also  elaborates  on  this  point  thus:  "The  vital 
point  of  a  federal  system  is  the  sense  of  locality,  the  belief  that  the  area  in  which  one 
lives  is  different  from  other  areas,  even  though  contiguity  with  them  may  provide 
many  interests  in  common.  "  Discussing  the  question  of  differences  in  economic 
resources  in  the  context  of  federal  orders,  Taylor  (1990)  argued  that  such  differences 
can  be  reduced  only  once  federation  arrangements  have  taken  root,  and  that  regional 
variations  would  decline  only  following  the  installation  of  a  federal  system. 
The  issues  of  economic  size  and/or  diversity  have  frequently  been  raised  in 
relation  to  federalism  (Riker,  1964;  Paddison,  1983).  Unifying  economic  resources 
differences  are  accepted  by  many  scholars  (e.  g.  Dikshit,  1975)  as  the  most  appropriate 
constitutional  arrangement  to  bridge  the  economic  and  social  differences  between 
distinct  geographical  regions  and  foster  a  more  socially  and  economically  balanced 
union.  Taylor  (1993)  argued  that  federalism  had  been  associated  with  the  larger 
countries  such  as  the  USSR,  Canada,  India  and  the  US.  The  latter,  for  instance,  owes 
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diversities  within  a  single  sovereign  federation.  Robinson  (1961)  claimed  in  his  study 
of  Australian  federalism  that  the  Australian  case  is  geographically  significant  for  a 
number  of  reasons.  First,  the  contiguity  of  the  large  areas  contributed  to  tie  the 
scattered  regions  together  in  one  type  of  union.  Second,  the  states  have  acquired  a 
sufficiently  distinctive  character  or  'personality'  within  the  federation  for  them  to  be 
treated  as  distinct  or  different  geographical  units,  (see  also,  Paddison  (1983)  for 
similar  argument). 
According  to  Taylor,  the  economic  strength  and,  by  implication,  the  success  of 
a  federation  experiment,  could  originate  in  a  number  of  constituent  regions  or  states 
bringing  to  bear  their  geographical  economic  diversities  within  a  single  sovereign 
federation.  On  this  account,  diversities  in  economic  resources  and  economic  strength 
of  the  constituent  units  would  constitute  an  asset  rather  than  an  obstacle  in  the 
continuity  of  a  federation.  Together,  the  Gulf  states  control  some  40%  of  OPEC  oil. 
However,  despite  their  wealth,  the  GCC  states  are  small  countries,  both  in  terms  of 
territorial  size  as  well  as  native  population,  and  are  to  that  extent  are  vulnerable 
militarily  and  of  questionable  viability.  In  addition,  Qatar  contains  one  of  the  biggest 
gas  fields  in  the  world  (some  7,100,000  m/  Cubic  meter  of  gas  reserve  (5.1%  of  the 
total  world  reserves),  (see  The  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  1997,  p.  845).  This  huge 
bulk  of  assets  and  economic  diversities  makes  the  Gulf  states  some  of  the  wealthiest 
countries  as  well  as  vital  economic  markets  in  the  world.  Since  the  economic  strength 
of  constituent  units  and/or  diversity  in  the  economic  resources  of  such  constituent 
units  are  incentives  for  integration,  the  GCC  would  have  to  coordinate  the  political, 
social,  and  economic  cooperation  policies  between  its  member  states  in  order  to 
achieve  the  various  aims  outlined  in  the  organisation  charter. 
4.  Political  Communities: 
Advocates  of  this  approach  claim  that  the  term  'federation'  refers  to  a 
gathering  of  political  communities  under  one  constitution  or  in  a  'league'.  Hicks 
(1978)  argued  that  historical  relationships  play  a  main  role  in  the  emergence  of  any 
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federal  type  of  union  depends  on  the  strength  of  relationship  among  the  constituent 
units  of  such  a  federal  union.  Importantly,  Hicks  linked  the  term  of  modern  federalism 
with  democracy,  alleging  that  the  first  and  most  important  way  in  which  federations 
came  into  existence  was  by  spontaneous  agreement  between  neighbouring 
governments  (note  the  usage  of  the  term  unity  as  an  approach  to  federation),  but  this 
did  not  necessarily  produce  more  than  a  'confederation'  in  which  the  federating  units 
agreed  on  a  central  body  to  which  they  sent  delegates.  Hicks  described  this  latter  sort 
of  federation  as  a  body  politic  with  virtually  no  powers  or  financial  autonomy,  within 
which  the  decisions  were  not  necessarily  binding  on  the  members.  She  also  claims  that 
a  federal  form  of  government  may  initially  emerge  under  the  recommendation  of  a 
retiring  colonial  power  and  later  leads,  given  suitable  circumstances,  to  a  basic  semi- 
spontaneous  agreement  for  federal  government.  Though  the  federation  created  and 
imposed  by  imperial  powers  could  benefit  these  foreign  states,  it  might  prove  more 
fruitful  for  the  federal  region,  as  is,  for  instance,  the  case  of  India  and  Nigeria. 
Political  communities  can  assume  different  forms  in  different  contexts.  They 
can  take,  for  instance,  the  form  of  unitary  states  in  one  territorial  community, 
motivated  by  such  reasons  as  strong  affinities  and/or  where  a  central  power  has 
engineered  unity  through  nation-statism.  Frederick  (1968)  approaches  federalism  as  a 
union  of  socially  diverse  groups  representing  different  political  communities  in  an 
overarching  polity. 
Duchacek  (1970)  proposed  the  concept  of  'territorial  community'  as  an 
aggregate  of  individuals  and  groups  who  share  not  only  common  experiences  but 
values,  fears  and  purposes,  and  argued  that  these  individuals'  and  groups'  awareness 
of  the  territorial  dimensions  of  their  collective  interests  and  actions  could  be  the  basis 
for  federalism.  Accordingly,  he  differentiated  between  two  types  of  association  that 
existed  as  political  communities.  The  first  type  is  the  voluntary  confederation  or 
alliance  of  states  based  on  a  decision  reached  by  two  or  more  independent  territorial 
communities  (usually  nation-states)  to  express  their  awareness  of  independence  and 
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coerced  integration,  where  the  dominant  region  annexes  a  weaker  region.  The  weaker 
region,  under  this  scenario,  is  less  likely  to  benefit  from  the  association. 
Duchacek  also  differentiated  between  three  types  of  associations,  viz.,  union, 
alliance,  and  organisation,  which  led  to  federalism.  He  argued  that  some  alliances  or 
confederations  led  to  early  federations.  For  example,  the  Swiss  federal  union  began, 
following  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  Everlasting  Alliance  in  1291,  as  a  defensive 
alliance  and  then  developed  into  a  federation  in  1847.  According  to  Duchacek, 
federalism  could  be  evaluated  against  a  yardstick  based  largely  on  the  American  case. 
The  criteria  for  evaluation  were  divided  into  two  main  factors,  what  he  termed  factors 
of  power  integration  and  factors  of  power  separation.  Under  the  former  category,  he 
listed  the  following:  exclusive  control  over  foreign  relations;  immunity  against 
secession  in  the  nation-states;  division  of  the  independent  spheres  of  authority  and 
power  between  the  central  and  regional  governments  in  such  a  way  that  no  conflict 
and/or  overlap  between  the  two  should  arise  (see  also  Wheare  (1965));  making  the 
amendment  of  the  federal  constitution  the  prerogative  of  the  parliament  and 
dependent  on  approval  of  a  certain  number  of  NWs  using  a  voting  system  adopted  by 
the  federation.  Under  'factors  of  separation',  he  specifies  the  following  criteria: 
indestructible  identity  and  autonomy  of  regions;  residual  and  significant  powers  for 
provinces  should  be  enumerated  with  the  rest  of  the  powers  being  reserved  by  the 
central  authority;  Bi-cameralism  and  equal  representation  of  equal  states;  two  sets  of 
courts  to  eradicate  an  overlapping  dual  federal-provincial  judicial  system;  a  supreme 
court;  and  a  clear  division  of  powers  between  the  core  and  peripheral  authorities. 
The  Duchacek  approach  to  political  communities  was,  however,  later  to  come 
under  criticism  on  account  of  being  constructed  on  the  basis  of  one  single  federal 
experiment,  viz.  the  USA,  and  is  therefore  not  necessarily  consistent  with  many  other 
existing  federal  and  confederal  situations. 
The  inclination  for  unity  over  the  desire  for  regional  autonomy  among  certain 
regions  can  create  a  unique  federal  phenomenon.  Watt  (1966)  asserted  that  a  federal 
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the  desire  for  regional  autonomy,  and  that  if  the  two  desires  were  approximately 
balanced,  the  federal  political  institutions  could  be  aborted.  The  most  essential 
motives  for  union,  according  to  Watt,  include  the  desire  for  political  independence; 
the  hope  for  economic  advantage;  the  need  for  administrative  efficiency;  enhancement 
of  the  conduct  of  both  diplomatic  and  military  external  relations;  creation  of  a 
community  with  a  compatible  outlook,  based  on  race,  language,  or  culture; 
geographical  factors  (e.  g.  proximity,  physical  nature);  the  influence  of  history  and 
historical  links;  similarities  and  differences  in  colonial  and  indigenous  political  and 
social  institutions;  the  character  of  political  leadership,  and  the  existence  (and 
influence)  of  other  successful  models  of  federal  union.  As  a  result,  he  called  upon  a 
theory  of  relative  balance  or  approximate  equilibrium  to  explain  the  process  of  federal 
parturition.  In  his  discussion  of  the  relation  between  desire  for  unity  and  desire  for 
autonomy  and  the  role  of  this  relation  in  the  emergence  and  continuity  of  federal 
orders,  Davis  (1978)  also  warned  that  an  imbalance  between  the  desire  for  unity  and 
the  desire  for  regional  autonomy  would  not  help  foster  a  proper  federal  order.  An 
imbalance  in  the  relationship  between  the  two  forces  has  no  doubt  led  to  the  collapse 
of  some  federal  institutions  as  in,  for  instance,  the  break  up  of  Pakistan. 
Much  of  the  literature  concerned  with  the  GCC  and  its  development  argues 
that  the  Gulf  political  elite's  desire  for  some  form  of  unity  and  inter-state  cooperation 
played  a  fundamental  role  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC.  The  argument  is  that  the 
close  cultural,  religious,  historical,  and  linguistic  links  that  tie  the  political 
communities  (governments)  in  the  Gulf  states  and  their  shared  apprehensions  and 
fears  (e.  g.,  the  alarm  caused  by  Iran/Iraq  war,  threats  from  Iran  following  the  Iranian 
revolution)  incited  them  to  pursue  the  need  and  value  of  establishing  some  alliance 
ensuring  each  member  state's  sovereignty  and  protection. 
5.  Distribution  of  powers: 
Federalism  can  assume  either  a  centralised  or  a  more  decentralised  forms. 
Decentralisation  of  power  would,  in  theory,  protect  the  small  constituent  regions  of  a 
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The  policies  pursued  by  a  federation  should  be  designed  to  enhance  and  consolidate 
the  division  of  powers  agreed  by  the  constituencies  or  member  units  of  such  a 
federation. 
The  distribution  of  power  varies  between  federal  or  other  types  of  union  and 
mirrors  the  level  of  integration  involved  in  such  an  order.  Elazar  (1979)  noted  that 
political  integration  is  the  raison  detre  of  federalism  and  that  the  federal  idea  rests 
upon  the  production  of  appropriate  political  and  social  institutions.  He  argues  that 
relationships  are  best  established  through  convenient  pacts  or  other  contractual 
arrangements  and  that  humans  are  capable  of  making  constitutional  choices.  Federal 
governments,  according  to  him,  thus  fall  into  two  types.  In  its  decentralized  form  the 
structure  involves  a  'pyramid  of  governments'  and  the  existence  of  a  strong  central 
authority.  India  and  Pakistan  are  good  examples  of  this  type  of  federation.  Second,  is 
a  non-centralized  government  in  which  power  is  so  diffused  that  it  cannot  be 
legitimately  centralized  without  the  break  up  of  the  constitution.  This  type  is  deemed 
by  Elazar  as  the  'more  acceptable'  of  the  two  types  and  is  best  exemplified  by  such 
federal  orders  as  the  United  States,  Switzerland,  and  Canada.  Elazar  identifies  six 
ambiguities  in  relation  to  federalism,  most  notably,  that  there  are  several  varieties  of 
political  (arrangements)  to  which  the  term  federal  has  been  properly  applied,  and  that 
federalism  is  directed  at  the  achievement  and  maintenance  of  both  unity  and  diversity, 
that  it  involves  both  a  political  and  social-cultural  phenomenon,  and  that  it  concerns 
both  means  (such  as  political  unification,  democracy,  popular  self-government,  the 
accommodation  of  diversity)  and  ends  (federalism  for  the  authority  is  not  a  tool  for 
achieving  other  goals  but  embodies  the  goals  themselves  as  well  as  the  means  for  their 
attainment  or  realization).  (see  Elazar  (1979:  l6ft)  for  a  more  detailed  discussion  of 
these  and  other  related  points). 
In  his  discussion  of  the  nature  of  federalism,  Duchacek  (1970)  noted  the 
centrality  of  the  division  of  powers  to  the  federal  mechanism,  arguing  that  "By  a 
federal  system  we  mean  a  constitutional  division  of  power  between  one  general 
government  (that  is  to  have  authority  over  the  entire  national  territory)  and  a  series  of 
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their  own  territories,  whose  sum  total  represents  almost  the  whole  national  territory.  " 
(188-231). 
The  division  of  powers  approach  is  difficult  to  apply  or  reconcile  with  some  of 
the  Third  world  federal  cases  owing  to,  among  other  things,  the  nature  and  enormity 
of  obstacles  facing  them.  Besides  the  absence  of  a  culture  of  political  democracy  and 
lack  of  diversity  of  economic  resources,  Third  World  governments  face  such 
intractable  internal  problems  as  lack  of  competence  in  political,  social  and  economic 
management  as  well  as  external  threat. 
There  is  a  need  for  further  study  of  federalism  theory  before  an  agreed 
definition  for  the  concept  of  federalism  is  likely  to  emerge.  Agnew  (1995:  pp:  299- 
300)  has  suggested  a  number  of  tendencies  in  the  current  form  and  processes  of 
federalism  around  the  world.  He  argues  that  there  is  no  universal  form  of  federalism, 
that  the  drawing  of  regional  boundaries  intrinsic  to  federalism  tends  to  rectify  and 
reproduce  the  group  differences  to  which  federalism  is  itself  a  response  (e.  g.,  former 
Soviet  Union,  Yugoslavia),  and  that  there  is  no  necessary  relationship  between  the 
growth  of  identity  politics  based  on  ethnicity  or  locality  and  the  emergence  of 
federalism. 
In  its  essence,  the  GCC  charter  did  not  seek,  at  least  in  the  short  term,  any 
division  of  powers  among  the  constituent  members,  focusing  instead  on  the  necessity 
of  harmonising  policies  in  social,  economic,  and  political  domains.  The  GCC 
governments,  described  by  most  of  the  scholars  (see,  for  instance,  al-Kuwari  (1992)) 
as  highly  centralized  authorities,  were  firmly  against  the  notion  of  conceding  or 
relinquishing  any  of  their  powers. 
2.3  GCC  as  a  Regional  Or2anisation: 
The  phenomenon  of  regionalism  has  been  interpreted  in  much  of  the  literature 
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and  regional  bonds  to  the  new  world  order.  Some  scholars  have  discussed  the  new 
role  of  regionalism  in  world  politics.  Fawcett  (1995)  examined  the  historical 
background  to  regionalism  and  identified  the  origins  of  the  new  regional  cooperation 
alliances  or  unions  to  the  end  of  the  cold  war,  the  economic  changes  witnessed  by  the 
modem  era,  the  end  of  third  world  worldism  and  to  the  process  of  democratization. 
As  pointed  out  by  many  scholars  (e.  g.  Hurrell  (1995)),  regionalism  is  an 
ambiguous  term.  Factors  of  geographical  proximity  and  contiguity  shape  and  define 
the  essence  of  regionalism  and  account  for  the  level  of  cohesiveness  within  any 
regional  grouping  or  order.  Most  literature  attributes  cohesiveness  to  one  or  more  of 
such  factors  as  (i)  social  solidarity  rooted  in  racial,  linguistic,  religious,  cultural  and 
historical  ties,  (ii)  economic  solidarity  and  how  powerful  the  organisation  is  in  matters 
of,  among  others,  trade,  export  and  import  industry,  and  (iii)  political  solidarity  as 
manifested  in  the  political  system  of  governance,  political  ideology,  and  political 
representation. 
The  development  of  regional  organisations  in  the  Arab  world  dates  back  to  the 
1960s  (see  chapter  3  (section  2)  discussion  of  earlier  experiment  in  federalism  within 
the  Arabs  world).  Hurrell  (1995)  describes  GCC  as  a  regional  alliance  created  in  early 
1980s  and  bringing  together  a  number  of  Gulf  states  in  pursuit  of  wider  regional 
cooperation.  Braibanti  (1987)  cited  the  similarities  in  political  systems  and  cultural 
values  existing  among  the  GCC  member  states  as  one  of  the  factors  that  led  to  the 
establishment  of  this  regional  organisation  of  inter-state  cooperation. 
Discussing  the  nature  and  type  of  inter-state  cooperation  pursued  by  the 
member  states  within  the  framework  of  the  GCC  as  a  regional  cooperation  union, 
Bishara,  ex-Secretary  General  of  this  organisation,  insisted  that  "the  Gulf  Co- 
operation  consists  of  six  independent  countries,  each  of  which  preserves  its 
sovereignty,  internal  laws,  and  distinctive  identity.  Coordination  and  cooperation 
[among  them,  however,  ]  is  to  achieve  unity  [policies  and  objectives]  between  them. 
(1988:  9) 
... 
I  called  for  a  confederate  formula,  where  every  member  state  can 
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political,  ideological,  and  strategic  framework,  and  I  think  that  the  general  articles  of 
the  GCC  charter  substantiate  that...  (1992:  66)". 
Most  of  the  literature  dealing  with  the  GCC  has  highlighted  the  importance  of 
cultural  and  political  similarities  among  the  member  states  as  a  supportive  factors. 
Christie  (1987)  noted,  that  a  common  language,  similar  cultures  and  political  systems 
are  the  most  distinctive  features  that  distinguish  the  GCC  from  other  (regional) 
organisations  (i.  e.  Maghribi  Cooperation  Council,  known  as  UMA,  Arab  Cooperation 
Council,  known  as  ACC).  In  his  study  of  the  emergence  of  the  GCC  as  a  regional 
organisation,  Ramazani  (1988)  pointed  out  that  Saud  al-Faisal,  the  Saudi  Foreign 
Minister,  attributed  the  establishment  of  the  GCC  to  a  number  of  reasons,  including,  a 
common  faith,  similarities  of  political  regimes,  unity  of  heritage,  similar  social 
characteristics,  and  the  desire  to  deepen  and  develop  cooperation  and  coordination 
among  the  Gulf  states  in  all  fields  (see  also  Angell  (1987)  and  Braibanti  (1987)). 
Noting  the  similarities  in  social  and  legal  systems  among  the  GCC  member  states, 
Angell  (1987)  drew  attention  to  the  important  fact  that  sharia  (Islamic  law)  has  been 
and  continues  to  remain  at  the  core  of  the  legal  system  of  all  countries  of  the  GCC. 
The  GCC's  existence  has  been  explained  in  some  of  the  literature  as  rooted  in 
security  needs.  The  creation  of  the  GCC  has  also  been  understood  as  motivated  by 
not  only  by  security  considerations  but  economic  factors  as  well.  Nakhleh  (1986) 
discussed  the  reasons  underlying  the  establishment  of  the  GCC,  its  policies,  problems 
and  prospects  and  ascribed  the  creation  of  this  regional  organisation  to  the  pervading 
commonalties  among  the  constituent  states  on  almost  all  fronts,  whether  political, 
cultural,  social  or  economic.  Tripp  (1995)  described  the  GCC  as  one  of  the  most 
successful  forms  of  regional  grouping  in  the  Arab  world  and  attributed  the  existence 
of  this  new  regional  Arab  organisation  to  the  need  for  economic  cooperation  among 
states  in  close  geographical  proximity  to  each  others.  in  her  discussion  of  the  nature 
and  type  of  the  GCC  integration  experiment,  al-Mubarak  (1991),  an  Arab  political 
analyst  and  academic,  argued  that  a  proper  confederation  is  far  from  becoming  a 
reality  in  the  context  of  the  GCC  countries.  She  did  not,  however,  rule  out  the 
possibility  of  a  confederation  emerging  among  the  GCC  member  states,  but  insisted Chapter  Tivo  The  Tederalising  Process  in  the  Gulf-  the  Case  of  the  GCC  29 
that  this  would  only  happen if  the  GCC  member  states  were  to  pursue  more  extensive 
cooperation  and  coordination  in  all  policy  fields  and  show  more  commitment  and 
discipline  in  the  implementation  of  the  organisation,  s  resolutions  and  policies. 
According  to  al-Mubarak  (1991),  al-Saleh  (1992),  an  ex-Vice-Secretary 
General  for  GCC  Political  Affairs,  and  many  other  leading  GCC  analysts  and  figures, 
the  GCC  had  managed  to  achieve  some  of  the  objectives  it  had  set  out  to  fulfil.  One  of 
the  points  of  the  research  here  is  an  evaluation  of  the  GCC's  attempt  to  pursue  an 
integrated  political  and  economic  union  among  its  member  states. 
2.4  Overview: 
Clearly,  the  usage  of  federalism  theory  in  this  study  does  not  mean  that  the 
GCC  is  a  federal  entity  on  a  par  with,  say,  the  USA,  Canada  or  India.  In  our 
examination  of  what  type  of  'federal'  integration  the  GCC  is  and  how  the  various 
components  of  federalism  are  manifested  in  the  case  of  this  Arab  alliance,  recourse 
has  been  made  to  the  theory  of  federalism.  Though  the  GCC  is  a  Third  World  case  of 
confederal  integration,  rather  than  a  federal  state  per  se,  on  a  par  with,  say,  the  Swiss 
or  American  federation,  and  though  the  GCC  exhibits  none  or  little  of  the  democratic 
traditions  and  practices  of  western  federations,  using  the  broad  model  of  federalism 
for  the  purpose  of  evaluating  the  'inter-state  cooperation'  achieved  between  the  GCC 
states  provides  potentially  useful  insights.  In  particular  the  process  of  federalisation  is 
of  value  to  understanding  the  complex  of  factors  which  brought  and  continue  to  tie 
the  GCC  member  states  together,  how  this  organisation  operates  and,  most 
importantly,  how  far  this  Gulf  regional  organisation  has  moved  in  its  drive  towards 
meaningful  inter-state  cooperation. 
With  the  exception  of  al-Ahmad  (1993),  the  notion  of  federalism  remains  up 
to  date  entirely  unexplored  in  the  context  of  both  the  Arab  Gulf  and  the  Arab  world. 
This  paucity  simply  reflects  the  relative  absence  of  federal  or  confederal  cases  in  both 
regions,  the  sole  exceptions  being  the  UAE  and  Yemen.  These  are  discussed  in  the 
following  chapter. Chapter  Three: 
Federation  and  Unification  in  the  Arab  World 
3.1  Introduction: 
H  aving  examined  the  broad  meanings  ascribed  to  federalism,  its  nature  and 
origins,  it  is  useful  to  look  at  the  practice  of  federalism  and  political 
integration  in  the  Arab  world  with  a  view  to  determining  how  the  theory  of 
federalism  applies  in  the  context  of  these  Arab  integration  experiments.  This  chapter 
will  discuss,  in  particular,  two  cases  of  federalism  in  the  Arab  world,  namely,  the 
United  Arab  Emirates  (UAE)  federation  and  Yemeni  unification.  The  significance  of 
these  instances  of  Arab  integration  derives  from  the  fact  that  they  are  thus  far  the  only 
two  relatively  long-established  political  integration  experiments  in  the  Arab  world, 
where  previous  attempts  at  political  integration  in  the  Arab  world  have  been  aborted. 
The  first  part  will  introduce  the  history  of  political  integration  in  the  Arab 
context.  The  UAE  federation  as  well  as  the  historical  background  and  the  political 
institutions  underlying  this  experiment  in  federalism  will  be  explored  in.  the  second 
part.  The  third  part  will  investigate  the  Yemeni  unification. 
3.2  History  of  Political  Integration  in  the  Arab  World: 
Attempts  at  Arab  integration  attempts  go  back  to  the  1950s,  with  the  creation 
in  1958  of  the  United  Arab  Republic  (known  as  UAR  and  also  as  the  United  Arab 
States  (UAS)),  a  loose  confederation  bringing  together  Egypt,  Syria  and  Yemen.  This 
first  experiment  in  federalism  within  the  Arab  world  was,  however,  short-lived;  in 
1961,  less  than  3  years  after  its  creation,  it  ceased  to  exist.  The  collapse  of  the  UAR 
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countries,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  power  struggle  for  political  hegemony  within  the 
confederation,  on  the  other  hand.  Though  the  regimes  of  the  three  countries  of  the 
federation  all  adhered  to  the  ideology  of  Pan-Arabism  (see  section  3.2.2),  substantial 
differences  soon  emerged  between  them  as  Egypt  sought  to  establish  its  supremacy 
within  the  federation  and  its  partners  in  this  federation  manoeuvred  to  resist  its  moves. 
The  bond  between  Yemen  and  the  United  Arab  Republic  was  a  modus  vivende,  rather 
than  a  constitution  bond.  Yemen's  Imam  Ahmad  became  increasingly  threatened  by 
Nasser's  growing  reputation  within  Yemeni  society  as  a  national  hero  and  by  the 
continuos  activities  and  existence  of  the  socialist  movement  of  Free  Yemenis  in 
Egypt. 
Attempts  at  Arab  integration  have  been  far  and  between.  One  undoubted 
reason  for  lack  of  such  attempts  is  the  differences  that  obtain  between  the  various 
political  systems  in  the  Arab  world  and,  consequently,  the  political  agendas  pursued 
by  these  various  regimes  as  well  as  their  modes  of  governance.  For  Drysdale  & 
Blacke  (1985),  colonial  powers  and  the  legacy  of  colonialism  also  bear  a  responsibility 
for  the  lack  of  integration  in  the  Arab  world.  They  assert  that  the  political  institutions 
and  structures  inherited  by  Arab  countries  from  these  past  powers  are  sometimes  so 
different  that  it  would  require  both  a  major  reason  (e.  g.  threat)  a  colossal  effort  and  a 
great  deal  of  political  will  to  bring  about  integration. 
3.2.1  United  Arab  Emirates: 
The  United  Arab  Emirates  (UAE),  a  federation  of  the  seven  emirates  of  Abu 
Dhabi,  Dubai,  Fujarah,  Sharejah,  Ajman,  Ras  al  Khayrnah,  and  Umm  al  Quwaina, 
represents  an  interesting  example  among  Arab  federations.  The  unique  status  of  the 
UAE  stems  from  the  fact  that  the  federation  is  grounded  in  strong  political,  economic, 
and  social  similarities.  In  the  words  of  Elazar  (1987:  246),  "[t]he  one  successful 
federal  experiment  in  the  Arab  world  to  date,  the  United  Arab  Emirates  (UAE),  is 
based  on  similar  principles"  (see  Ben  Dor  (1979)  for  a  similar  argument).  Elazar 
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sharing  and  power  distribution  exercised  within  this  federation.  But  while  Elazar 
(1979,1987),  Anthony  (1972),  Peterson  (1988),  Ben-Dor  (1979),  and  Taryam. 
(1987),  among  other  scholars,  have  characterised  the  UAE  federal  experiment  as  a 
successful  attempt  at  unification,  others,  like  al-'Atal  (1979),  have  rejected  such  an 
experiment  as  no  more  than  an  alliance  of  political  elites. 
An  evaluation  of  the  UAE  federation  structure  requires  an  understanding  of 
the  set  of  circumstances  and  factors  which  contributed  to  the  emergence  of  such  a 
federation  and  the  institutions  and  power  structures  involved.  An  assessment  of  the 
UAE  federation  and  the  complex  of  political,  social,  and  economic  similarities  binding 
the  various  emirates  making  up  the  federation  will  help  throw  important  light  on  its 
institutional  structure(s).  Equally,  and  in  view  of  the  substantial  similarities  between 
the  UAE  and  the  GCC  cases,  an  appraisal  of  the  UAE  federative  structure  and 
institutions  will  enable  us  to  determine  if  the  UAE  experiment  holds  any  insightful 
lessons  for  the  GCC. 
The  Basis  of  Federation: 
The  similarities  among  the  Gulf  sheikhdoms  provided  the  rival  rulers  in  the 
Trucial  states  with  the  incentive  to  merge  in  the  aftermath  of  the  British  withdrawal 
from  these  former  protectorates.  Even  before  the  proclamation  of  British  withdrawal, 
Abu  Dhabi  was  the  most  enthusiastic  of  the  sheikhdoms  for  some  form  of  federation. 
The  federation  materialised  in  1971  after  extensive  consultative  negotiations  between 
the  Gulf  states,  in  general,  and  the  sheikhdoms,  in  particular.  The  most  significant 
reasons  which  motivated  the  creation  of  the  UAE  federation  were: 
Internal  Presuires:  Similarities  between  the  political  systems  of  the  Trucial 
sheikhdoms  highlighted  the  importance  and  advantages  of  unification  of  the  nine  Gulf 
states  of  Abu  Dhabi,  Bahrain,  Dubai,  Fujarah,  Ajman,  Umm  al  Quwain,  Ras  al 
Khaymah,  Qatar,  Shadah.  Bahrain  and  Qatar,  however,  decided  to  opt  out  of  the 
'great  merger'  and  maintain  their  own  political  status  on  account  of  their 
dissatisfaction  with  the  distribution  of  authority  within  the  new  proposed  federation. 
Both  Qatar  and  Bahrain  were  fearful  of  the  prospect  of  a  federation  dominated  by  the Chapter  Three:  Federation  and  Unification  in  the  Arab  World  33 
two  sheikhdoms  of  Abu  Dhabi  and  Dubai.  According  to  Zahlan  (1989),  besides 
feeling  apprehensive  of  the  possibility  that  its  weak  economy  would  be  totally 
overwhelmed  by  the  stronger  economies  of  its  partners,  Bahrain  felt  both  aggrieved 
and  threatened  by  the  political  role  that  the  federation  was  willing  to  grant  to  Qatar. 
Abu  Dhabi  and  Dubai  sought  to  formulate  a  federal  constitution  which  would  lead  to 
the  creation  of  a  strong  sovereign  state.  As  Riker  (1964)  has  argued,  a  federation  is 
essentially  a  bargain,  where  the  constituent  units  would  be  willing  to  merge  only  when 
the  centripetal  forces  (the  desire  for  unity)  overwhelms  the  separatist  ones,  and  where 
the  constituent  units  see  greater  advantage  in  unity  than  in  separation. 
Al-'Atal  (1979)  has  argued  that  the  constitution  was  a  type  of  bargain  struck 
among  the  rival  rulers  without  any  consultation  of  the  citizens  and  with  total  disregard 
for  their  opinions  and  views.  From  al-'Atal's  point  of  view,  then,  the  citizens  were 
excluded  from  the  consultation  process  leading  to  the  creation  of  the  federation  and 
were,  to  that  extent,  denied  an  inalienable  and  integral  democratic  right.  This  lack  of 
consultation  of  citizens  on  the  part  of  the  sheikhs  was  neither  unexpected  nor  atypical; 
it  was  both  the  (inevitable)  result  and  the  reflection  of  an  "elitist,  paternalistic  system 
of  political  authority"  (Peck  1986).  Thus,  the  federation  was  a  political  bargain  struck 
among  and  agreed  on  only  by  the  political  elites  of  the  constituent  members  of  the 
new  federation. 
Realising  that  separate  small  sheikhdoms  meant  vulnerability  to  outside 
threats,  the  political  elites  of  some  small  Gulf  countries  saw  merger  through 
federation  as  of  clear  benefit.  The  rulers  of  Abu  Dhabi,  Dubai,  Fujarah,  Ajamn, 
Sharjah,  and  Umm.  al  Quwain  saw  that  their  survival  depended  on  unity  and  the 
creation  of  a  greater  federation.  Thus,  Sheikh  Zayed,  ruler  of  Abu  Dhabi,  and  sheikh 
Rashed,  ruler  of  Dubai,  took  the  initiative  and  approached  the  rulers  of  the  other 
sheikhdoms  with  a  view  to  creating  a  federation  bringing  together  the  Trucial  states. 
The  role  of  British  sovereignty  in  creating,  prior  to  their  withdrawal  on  December  2, 
1971,  a  consultative  council  of  the  sheikhdoms  helped  in  launching  and  establishing 
some  sort  of  cooperation  between  the  rival  rulers  of  the  Trucial  states  (Anthony 
1972).  Also,  the  policy  of  political  rapprochement  (political  reconciliation)  initiated  by Chapter  Three:  Federation  and  Unification  in  the  Arab  World  34 
the  British  government  led  to  a  sort  of  affinity  among  the  sheikhs  which  facilitated  the 
birth  of  the  federation.  However,  political  dissension  among  the  emirates  about  the 
type  of  federation  that  they  would  like  to  see  emerge  and  the  veto  privilege  conferred 
on  the  wealthiest  sheikhdoms  of  Abu  Dhabi  and  Dubai  in  the  Supreme  council  could 
havejeopardised  the  federation  project. 
"The  relevant  question  concerning  the  federation's 
[short]-term  political  prospect[s]  have  to  do  with  the 
pace  of  federal  development,  continuing  disagreement 
over  the  desirable  degree  of  integration,  remaining 
privileges  and  prerogatives  of  the  individual  emirates, 
and  the  opening  up  of  an  elitist,  paternalistic  system  of 
political  authority",  (Peck  1986:  120). Chapter  Three:  Federation  and  Unification  in  the  Arab  World  35 
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The  economic  conditions  of  the  constituent  states  of  the  UAE  affected,  and 
was  reflected  in,  the  political  status  of  the  states  within  the  federation,  with  the  two 
economically  powerful  emirates  of  Abu  Dhabi  and  Dubai  emerging  as  the  dominant 
political  states.  Peterson  (1988)  and  others  have  asserted  that  the  smaller  and  poorer 
emirates,  such  as  Ajman,  Fujairah,  Ras  al-Khaimah,  and  Umm  al-Qaiwain,  were 
dominated  by  the  two  rich  emirates  of  Abu  Dhabi  and  Dubai. 
Tribal  patterns  and  affinities  in  the  UAE  were  an  important  impetus  to  the 
emergence  of  the  federation.  The  rulers  originated  from  different  tribes;  the  Abu 
Dhabi  ruling  family  were  from  the  al-Nahyan  tribe,  the  Dubai  ruling  family  from  al- 
Makturn  tribe,  the  Ras  al-Khaymah  ruling  family  from  al-Qawsim.  as  well  as  Shajah, 
etc.  (Peterson  1988).  Tribal  inter-relationships  encouraged  federation  between  the 
sheikhdoms.  The  rival  tribes  sought  cooperation  or  unification  in  order  to  face  the 
challenges  of  a  new  world  and  bring  to  an  end  their  territorial  disputes.  Border 
disputes  and  conflict  triggered  by  such  disputes  had  in  fact  predated  the  independence 
of  the  Trucial  states.  Al-Hussari  (1986)  asserts  that  the  new  federal  arrangements  did 
away  with  borders  between  the  member  states  of  the  new  UAE  federation  and  with 
them  all  the  conflicts  and  tensions  that  they  caused  in  pre-federation  days. 
In  addition  to  the  internal  considerations  and  factors  motivating  the  emergence 
of  the  UAE  federation,  there  were  other  factors  which  played  an  equally  significant 
role  in  inducing  the  creation  of  this  federation. 
The  UAE  federation  consists  of  seven  emirates  (or  sheikhdoms),  viz.  Abu 
Dhabi,  the  capital  of  the  federation,  Dubai,  Sharjah,  Ras  al  Khaimah,  Ajman,  Fujairah, 
and  Umm  al-Qaiwain.  With  an  area  of  approximately  77700  kM2  (30000  miles2),  the 
federation  had  a  total  population  in  1991  estimated  at  1909000,  of  which  UAE 
nationals  (800,000)  account  for  38.4%  of  the  total  population  (see  also  Table  (4.5) 
for  other  Gulf  states  population).  Between  1990  and  1992,  UAE  GNP  was  in  the 
region  of  $22,020  per  head/  000).  However,  the  UAE,  much  like  the  rest  of  the  GCC 
states,  has  been  affected  by  the  cost  of  the  second  Gulf  war  (see  table  (3.2)).  The 
budget  deficits  that  the  UAE  has  been  showing  since  1990  have  been  caused  by  the Chapter  Three:  Federation  and  Unification  in  the  Arab  World  37 
post-Gulf  war  rush  on  the  part  of  all  GCC  states  to  acquire  more  armaments  with  a 
view  to  countering  future  regional  aggression. 
ble 
Abu  Dhabi  673)50  798  11.8 
Dubai  3900  501  128.5 
AJman  250  76  304 
Fujairah  1150  63  54.8 
Ras  al  Khaimah  1700  130  76.5 
Sharjah  2600  314  120.8 
Umm  al-Qaiwam  750  27  36 
.............. 
..  77700  1909  24.6 
*  1995  census 
Source:  Ile  Middle  East  and  north  Affica  1995,  P.  966. 
Table  3.2  The  UAE  General  IW(ILet  for  Various  Years: 
ca  1, 
Rtl(h  tet 
1990  15251  14394 
1991  14621  15220 
1992  16717  15538 
1993  15900  17630 
1994  16200  17610 
1995  16900  17950 
1996  17400  18250 
LI  sterling  =  5.668  UAE  Dirliam  (Dh)  (31  May  1996) 
Source:  IMF,  Govenument  Finance  Statistic  Yearbook;  '17he  Middle  East&  North  Africa,  1995,  P. 
968,  and  1997,  P.  1047. 
Thus,  as  is  clear  from  the  geographical  indicators  provided  in  the  above  table, 
some  of  the  sheikhdoms  are  small  in  size.  Ajman,  for  instance,  is  only  about  250  kM2. 
As  independent  political  entities  within  a  very  unstable  and  highly  volatile  region, 
these  small-sized  sheikhdoms  would  be  vulnerable  to  threats  from  neighbouring 
countries. 
Several  factors  help  explain  the  creation  of  the  UAE  federation.  For  elites  the 
political  benefits  following  from  greater  political  stability  and  resulting  from 
integration  were  a  major  advantage.  These  benefits  were  unequal,  however,  Abu 
Dhabi  and  Dubai,  as  the  major  oil  producing  sheikhdoms  among  the  emirates 
(accounting  for  70%  and  30%  of  the  UAE  total  oil  production  in  1987  respectively Chapter  Three:  Federation  and  Unification  in  the  Arab  World  38 
(Peterson  1988))  dominated  the  federation  as  in  their  right  of  vetoing  powers  in  the 
Supreme  Federal  Council.  The  small  size  of  the  UAE  (as  in  the  GCC  states  in  general) 
was  also  a  motivation  for  the  various  sheikhdoms  to  federate,  in  an  attempt  to  reduce 
the  demographic  imbalance  created  by  immigration  from  such  Arab  and/or  Muslim 
countries  as  Egypt,  Syria,  Iraq,  and  Palestine,  India,  Pakistan,  and  Iran.  Immigrants 
from  these  countries  had  come  in  search  of  jobs  in  the  oil  sector  during  and  after  the 
British  occupation.  The  Gulf  states  became  more  and  more  dependent  on  foreign 
labour  as  demands  for  it  continued  to  arise.  However,  the  new  federal  and  the 
sheikhdom  governments  did  nothing  by  way  of  curbing  immigration,  considerably 
Jeopardising  the  national  identity  of  the  Gulf  states. 
The  common  cultural  markers  of  the  various  sheikhdoms  was  a  further 
motivation  for  the  establishment  of  the  UAE  federation.  The  shared  Islamic  faith 
played  an  important  role  in  preserving  close  relationships  among  the  UAE  sheikhs  and 
led  them  to  create  a  unified  sovereign  state  with  a  constitution  founded  on  Islamic 
Law  (Shariah).  The  constitutions  of  most  of  GCC  states,  including  the  UAE,  are 
based  on  and  grounded  in  the  principles  of  Islam.  The  various  emirates  also  share  a 
common  language-  Arabic-  and  Arabo-Islarnic  heritage.  Equally  importantly,  most  of 
the  UAE  population  hail  ethnically  from  one  or  more  of  a  small  set  of  Arab  tribes. 
These  considerations  of  language,  heritage  and  race  were  most  effective  in  urging  the 
UAE  federation  to  come  into  being. 
While  the  UAE  and  the  Gulf  states  were  less  affected  than  other  Arab 
countries  by  the  movement  of  Arab  nationalism,  generally  known  as  Pan-Arabism,  the 
common  language  factor  was  a  significant  impetus  behind  the  federation  experiments 
in  this  part  of  the  Arab  world  (Ben-Dor  1979).  But  while  the  Arabic  language  is  the 
common  language  of  the  UAE  population  and  the  official  language  of  the  UAE  state, 
the  steady  growth  of  immigration  transformed  the  demographic  and  linguistic 
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Factors  Inducing  the  Establishment  of  the  UAE  Federation: 
1.  Role  of  the  Arab  Gulf  States  in  the  Federation  Establishment: 
The  Gulf  states  played  a  decisive  role  in  the  establishment  of  UAE.  One  aspect 
of  this  role  was  the  positive  role  of  diplomacy  undertaken  by  some  the  Gulf  states 
between  the  various  Trucial  sheikhdoms  during  the  negotiations  leading  to  the 
establishment  of  the  UAE  federation.  Kuwait,  for  instance,  was  the  main  mediator 
between  the  nine  sheikhdoms,  before  Bahrain  and  Qatar  decided  on  a  separate  future. 
Sheikh  Sabah  al-Ahmed,  Kuwait's  foreign  minister,  undertook  several  shuttle 
missions  between  the  nine  rulers  of  the  federation.  Though  his  mission  to  convince 
Bahrain  and  Qatar  to  join  the  federation  admittedly  failed,  his  shuttle  diplomacy 
between  the  other  states  was  successful.  Writing  of  Sheikh  Sabah's  role,  Heard-Bey 
(1982:  341-2)  stated  that: 
"After  Sheikh  Sabah  Al-Ahmed  visited  the  Lower  Gulf 
states,  Sheikh  Zayed  of  Abu  Dhabi  and  Sheikh  Rashid  of 
Dubai  met  in  18  February  1968  on  the  border  between  their 
two  states  and  formally  agreed  to  merge  the  two 
sheikhdoms  in  a  union,  conducting  jointly  foreign  affairs, 
defence,  security,  and  social  services,  and  adopting  a 
common  immigration  policy". 
Saudi  Arabia  was  the  other  Gulf  state  that  encouraged  and  promoted  the 
merger  and  federation  of  the  Trucial  states.  Saudi  Arabia's  King  Faisal  and  the  ruler  of 
Abu  Dhabi  spared  no  effort  in  urging  the  rulers  of  the  other  sheikhdoms  to  join  the 
federation  after  Abu  Dhabi  and  Saudi  Arabia  had  resolved  their  territorial  disputes. 
The  creation  of  the  UAE  federation  put  an  end  to  the  territorial  disputes  among  the 
various  UAE  emirates  ,  where  in  the  case  of  these  between  Abu  Dhabi  and  Dubai,  and 
between  Ras  al  Khaimah  and  Umm  al  Qaiwain  and  attributed  such  disputes  to  the 
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According  to  some  analysts  (e.  g.  al-Hussari  (1981)  Heard-Bay  (1982)  and 
Taryarn  (1987)),  the  UAE  federation  emerged  as  a  consequence  of  the  pressure 
exerted  on  the  Trucial  states  by  events  in  neighbouring  Arab  Gulf  countries  as  well  as 
a  consequence  of  the  fear  that  the  scattered  sheikhdoms  of  the  Trucial  states  could  be 
annexed  by  powerful  neighbours  such  as  Iran.  One  concern  of  the  sheikhdoms  was  the 
threat  of  radical  insurgency.  The  sheikhs  of  the  Trucial  states  were  apprehensive  of 
the  possible  spread  of  the  guerrilla  war  raging  at  the  time  between  the  Omani 
government  and  the  People's  Front  for  the  Liberation  of  the  Occupied  Arab  Gulf 
(PFLOAG)  which  sought  to  establish  a  sovereign  state  in  the  Dhafar  region.  The  fear 
of  the  civil  war  in  Oman  spreading  to  neighbouring  states  induced  the  rulers  of  the 
various  sheikhdoms  to  speed  up  the  process  of  federation. 
2.  Role  of  Regional  Powers  in  the  Emergence  of  UAE  Federation: 
The  Iranian  threat  was  a  decisive  factor  in  inducing  the  establishment  of  the 
UAE  federation.  Iran  possesses  the  demographic  as  well  as  the  economic  and  military 
power  to  pose  a  major  threat  not  only  to  the  UAE  but  other  neighbouring  Gulf 
countries  as  well. 
Iran's  dominance  of  the  Gulf  area  and  its  status  as  the  major  power  in  the 
region,  presented  a  major  threat  for  the  small  Gulf  states.  The  British  declaration  of 
withdrawal  from  the  Gulf  states  was  immediately  followed  by  the  Shah  of  Iran's  claim 
that  Bahrain  was  part  of  the  Persian  Empire  territories  seized  by  the  British.  Such  a 
claim  threatened  the  sovereignty  of  the  sheikhdoms  and  forced  them  to  think  seriously 
about  establishing  a  federation  that  would  place  them  in  a  better  position  to  protect 
their  shared  interests  and  sovereignty  from  potential  Iranian  external  aggression. 
Taryarn  (1987)  argues  that  Iran  also  urged  the  poorer  emirates  to  reject  the  control  of 
the  federal  government  and  linked  its  subsidies  to  these  emirates  to  their  rejection  of 
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3.  Role  of  the  Superpower: 
The  emergence  of  the  United  States'  and  the  Soviet  Union's  influence  in  the 
Mddle  East  and  Gulf  regions  -  the  Pan-Arabist  movement,  for  instance,  incorporated 
many  of  the  principles  of  the  socialist  ideology  (see  also  below)  -  had  an  enormous 
effect  on  the  political  organisation  of  the  sheikhdoms.  Peck  (1986)  argued  that  the 
emergence  of  the  United  States  had  the  same  effect  as  the  People's  Front  for  the 
Liberation  of  the  Occupied  Arab  Gulf's  (PFLOAG)  threat. 
Following  the  British  declaration  of  their  intention  to  withdraw  from  the  Gulf, 
the  United  States  began  reacting  against  the  USSR!  s  increasing  penetration  of  the  Gulf 
area  by  increasing  its  influence  in  the  region.  The  USSR!  s  close  relationship  with  Iraq 
and  the  USA  penetration  in  the  rest  of  the  Gulf  states  and  the  power  struggle  that 
ensued  between  the  two  superpowers  as  they  manoeuvred  for  influence  presented 
direct  threat  to  the  sovereignty  and  stability  of  the  various  small  Trucial  states.  The 
establishment  of  the  federation,  thus,  came  as  a  reaction  against  the  encroaching 
economic  and  political  influence  of  the  two  superpowers  as  they  fought  for  hegemony 
in  the  Gulf  region  (see  chapter  5  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  how  the  struggle  between 
the  USSR  and  the  USA  for  political  influence  in  the  Mddle  East  influenced  the 
emergence  of  the  GCC). 
Federal  Mechanisms:  The  Operation  of  the  Federal  UAE 
The  UAE  has  been  deemed  by  many  scholars  and  political  observers  as  a 
positive  experiment  in  federalism.  Peterson  (1988)  praising  the  survival  of  the  UAE 
federation  experiment,  wrote  that  "All  other  attempts  at  Arab  unity  have  been  dismal 
failures.  The  UAE  experiment  differs  from  most  of  these  in  that  it  has  been  a  real 
attempt  at  unification,  rather  than  simply  an  empty  political  statement.  "  (P.  198).  A 
knowledge  of  the  structures  developed  to  operationalise  federalism  in  the  UAE  would 
be  instructive. 
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1.  Supreme  Federal  Council  (SFC):  The  SFC  is  the  top  legislative  body  in  the  UAE 
federation.  The  head  of  state  and  the  vice-president  are  elected  by  and  from  among 
the  members  of  this  council.  The  SFC  drew  up  the  federal  constitution  and  has  the 
function  of  formulating  the  different  policies  of  the  UAE.  Each  of  the  seven 
constituent  emirates  is  represented  by  its  ruler  in  the  SFC  (see  the  Emirates  Centre  for 
Strategic  and  Research  Home  Page).  Each  ruler  in  this  federal  institution  has  a  single 
vote,  with  decisions  being  passed  on  approval  of  at  least  five  sheikhs.  The  SFC  is  the 
highest  policy-making  body  in  the  UAE  federation.  However,  Abu  Dhabi  and  Dubai 
have  the  right  of  vetoing  and  therefore  blocking  any  policy  or  decision  they  deem 
unsuitable  to  their  interests.  The  SFC  president,  who  is  also  head  of  the  state,  enjoys 
enormous  influence  within  this  council  and,  though  theoretically  shared  and  subject  to 
approval  of  the  SFC,  his  powers  within  this  body  remain  extensive.  He  has  the  right  of 
convening  the  SFC  and  presiding  over  its  sessions  as  well  as  representing  the  state 
(Peterson  1988).  In  June  18th,  1996,  the  SFC  re-endorsed  the  permanent  constitution 
and  the  Federal  National  Council. 
The  SFC  has  the  right  to  ratify  and  decree  the  federal  law  of  the  state  and 
international  treaties.  It  also  has  to  approve  the  budget  of  the  federal  state.  The  SFC 
meets  in  session  four  times  a  year  and  in  emergency  situations  should  the  need  arise. 
2.  Council  of  Ministers:  The  Council  of  Ministers  initiate  laws  and  submit  them  to 
the  SFC  for  authorisation.  The  Council  of  Ministers  is  described  by  the  constitution 
and  the  'legislative  power'  within  the  federation.  The  ministers  are  appointed  by  the 
prime  minister,  subject  to  approval  of  the  SFC.  Also,  the  SFC  president,  that  is,  the 
head  of  state,  appoints  the  senior  government  officials,  diplomats  (e.  g.,  ambassadors) 
and  other  government  representatives.  The  Council  of  Ministers  consists  of  sixteen 
ministers  and  six  state  ministers.  Cabinet  members  are  chosen  from  the  different 
emirates,  but,  usually,  the  important  portfolios  are  reserved  for  ministers  from  the 
dominant  emirates  of  Abu  Dhabi  and  Dubai.  The  prime  minister  must  be  chosen  from 
either  Abu  Dhabi  or  Dubai.  The  Cabinet  discusses  also  the  federal  budget  and  refers 
any  decisions  to  the  SFC  for  approval.  The  tasks  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  as 
detailed  in  Article  60  of  the  constitution,  include  supervising  the  implementation  of Chapter  Three:  Federation  and  Unification  in  the  Arab  World  43 
federal  laws,  decrees,  regulations,  Supreme  council  decisions,  international  treaties, 
and  other  agreements. 
3.  Federal  National  Council  (FNC):  Nominally,  the  FNC  is  a  consultative  body 
though  some  scholars  (al-Musfer  (1985),  Peterson  (1988),  Taryam,  (1987))  consider 
it  as  a  legislative  authority.  As  in  the  other  GCC  countries  (except  Kuwait)  there  is  a 
lack  of  elective  institutions  in  the  UAE.  All  of  the  GCC  States  have  consultative 
councils,  i.  e.  Bahrain,  Oman,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia.  In  the  UAE  the  INC  is  a 
consultative  body  only,  which  involves  forty  representatives,  with  the  number  of 
representatives  chosen  from  each  emirate  depending  on  the  economic  influence  that 
the  emirate  has  within  the  whole  federation.  Article  67  of  the  constitution  identified 
the  number  of  representatives  from  each  emirate  as: 
3.3  The  Number  of  Seats  Allocated  to  Each  Fmirqte- 
Abli  D11,11)i  8 
Dubai  8 
*Ras  al  Khaimah  6 
Sharijah  6 
Ajman  4 
Fujairah  4 
Umm  al  Qaiwain  4 
Total  40 
Ras  al-Khannah  joined  the  federation  after  its  initial 
establislunent. 
The  FNC  is  in  session  for  a  period  of  not  less  than  six  months  (see  Article  78) 
and,  unlike  the  SFC  sessions,  the  FNC  sessions  are  open  to  the  public  (Article  86). 
However,  there  has  not  been  much  public  interest  in  attending  the  sessions  of  this 
institutional  body. 
The  absence  of  suitable  representation  in  the  various  federal  councils  remains 
one  of  the  major  problems  confronting  the  UAE  federation.  Heard-Bey  (1982-  p. 
377),  identified  the  roots  of  the  problem  thus-  "Here  too,  the  constitution  is 
appropriate  to  the  requirements  of  the  new  federation,  because  the  nature  of  the  tribal 
societies  in  each  of  the  seven  Emirates  and  the  earlier  absence  of  formal  education 
limited  the  choice  of  suitable  representatives  to  the  small  number  of  leading  families.  " Chapter  Three:  Federation  and  Unification  in  the  Arab  World  44 
The  FNC  is  described  as  consultative  body  that  has  no  real  power.  As  in  the 
other  GCC  states,  consultative  bodies  are  advisory  and  have  no  ability  to  devise  policy 
or  to  amend  the  constitution  without  the  agreement  of  the  political  elites. 
4.  Higher  Federal  Court:  The  principal  function  of  the  Higher  Federal  Court  (HFC) 
is  the  adjudication  of  disputes  between  individual  emirates,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
between  any  of  the  various  emirates  and  the  federal  government,  on  the  other. 
Another  function  of  the  HFC  is  the  determination  of  the  constitutionality  of  federal  or 
state  laws,  the  resolution  of  jurisdictional  disputes  between  federal  emirates  or 
between  the  courts  of  two  or  more  emirates,  and  adjudication  of  crimes  against  the 
state,  such  as  those  affecting  its  security. 
The  competences  of  the  HFC  were  exclusively  defined  in  Article  (99)  of  the 
federal  constitution.  The  president  of  UAE  federation,  in  consultation  with  the  SFC, 
appoints  the  head  and  the  other  five  members  of  the  HIFC.  The  Supreme  Court  and 
the  other  courts  are  generally  independent  from  government  authority  and  therefore 
free  of  any  government  influence  or  pressure. 
Evaluation  of  the  UAE  Federation  (and  Its  Relevance  to  the  GCQ: 
Attitudes  towards  the  UAE  federation  experiment  have  been  divided. 
Supporters  (e.  g.  Taryam,  (1987))  of  the  federation  have  argued  that  it  constitutes  a 
positive  instance  of  an  Arab  "sub-alliance"  and,  to  that  extent,  embodies  a  concrete  (if 
local)  step  towards  Arab  unity.  For  Ben-Dor  (1979-  201),  the  UAE  "is  undoubtedly 
the  most  successful  (indeed  the  only  reasonably  successful)  federal  experiment  in  the 
Arab  world  thus  so  far".  Heard-Bey  (1982)  argued  that  one  of  the  factors  that  helped 
make  the  UAE  federation  by  far  the  most  successful  Arab  experiment  in  federation  is 
that  neither  the  rulers  nor  the  citizens  were  affected  in  any  significant  way  by  the 
radical  ideological  movements  that  appeared  and  sometimes  took  root  either  in  the 
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A  different  view  is  expressed  by  Anthony  (1972).  Assessing  the  federation  just 
six  month  after  its  establishment,  he  praised  the  UAE  federation  as  an  experiment 
while  recognising  that  it  faced  a  number  of  problems.  First,  there  were  threats 
confronting  the  new  federation  from  Iran  particularly  in  the  latter's  occupation  of  the 
three  UAE  islands  of  Abu  Mousa,  Big  Tunab  and  Small  Tunab.  Second,  political 
dissidence  in  the  emirates  and  the  threat  of  radical  opposition  groups,  and,  the 
traditional  tribal  and  dynastic  rivalries,  which  remain  strong  in  the  UAE,  posed  a 
constant  threat  of  political  fragmentation.  Peterson  (1988)  too  was  critical  of  three 
aspects  of  the  UAE  federation.  He  criticised  the  institutions  of  the  federation, 
especially  its  leadership  and  the  make-up  of  the  government,  pointing  out  that  the 
posts  of  the  president  and  vice-president  as  well  as  the  most  important  ministerial 
portfolios  are  the  preserve  of  the  dominant  emirates  within  the  federation,  that  is,  Abu 
Dhabi  and  Dubai.  Also,  he  argued  that  the  federal  constitution  of  the  state  failed  to 
address  political  pluralism  and  liberalism.  While  supportive  of  the  establishment  of  the 
UAE  and  its  achievements,  particularly  in  the  sector  of  essential  services  (public 
transportation,  education,  health  care,  ...  etc.  ),  Taryam  (1987)  drew  attention  to  some 
major  problems  confronting  the  UAE  federation,  most  notably  the  Iranian  threat  as 
well  as  the  border  disputes  which  continue  to  jeopardise  the  stability  and  survival  of 
the  federation. 
The  UAE  federation  has  also  been  criticised  for  the  fact  that  the  country's 
constitution  was  drawn  by  the  rulers  of  the  member  emirates  and,  as  such,  reflects 
these  rulers  desire  concerns  and  interests  rather  than  these  of  the  citizen  (al-Musfer 
(1985),  Taryam  (1987)).  While  evaluating  the  UAE  as  a  relative  success  in  Arab 
federalism,  al-Musfer  (1985)  was  critical  of  some  aspects  of  the  institutions  put  in 
place  to  operationalise  the  federation  and,  in  particular,  the  almost  total  centralisation 
of  power  within  this  federation.  One  might  argue,  in  this  respect,  that,  to  the  extent 
that  power  on  all  levels  has  been  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  the  central  government, 
the  UAE  would  best  be  characterised  as  being  a  form  of  quasi-federation. 
Some  of  the  problems  facing  the  GCC  are  similar  in  several  respects  to  those 
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external  threats  from  such  neighbouring  Gulf  states  as  Iraq  and  Iran.  However,  there 
are  significant  differences  between  the  two  cases.  While  zealous  protectionism  and  an 
unwillingness  to  compromise  in  pursuit  of  wider  inter-state  cooperation  remains  one 
of  the  intractable  problems  hindering  the  GCC's  progress,  the  federal  arrangements  in 
the  case  of  the  UAE  have  solved  the  difficult  issue  of  sovereignty  and  with  it  the 
related  problems  of  protectionism.  Similarly,  while  the  problem  of  border  disputes 
continues  to  undermine  cooperation  between  the  GCC  states,  all  the  border  disputes 
and  the  conflicts  and  tensions  resulting  from  these  disputes  have  ceased  to  exist 
between  the  various  emirates  with  the  creation  of  the  UAE  federation. 
In  general,  though  the  UAE  federation  still  faces  some  obstacles,  this 
experiment  has  been  a  qualified  success.  Besides  helping  settle  border  disputes  and  the 
sovereignty  issue,  the  federal  system  has  benefited  the  UAE  immensely,  in  that  it 
helped  transform  a  number  of  economically  and  militarily  vulnerable  and  traditionally 
small  sheikhdoms  into  a  modern  sovereign  state,  with  a  rapidly  developing  social  and 
industrial  infrastructure.  To  the  extent  that  the  UAE  federation  undoubtedly  embodies 
a  significant  step  towards  overcoming  ideological  divisions  and  building  a  long-lasting 
Arab  'sub-alliance',  the  GCC  and  its  member  states  might  stand  to  benefit  enormously 
from  this  Arab  experiment  in  federalism  in  their  efforts  to  establish  a  more  cohesive 
union. 
3.2.2  Yemen  Unification: 
The  unification  of  the  North  and  South  of  Yemen  took  place  in  1994. 
Attempts  at  unification  of  Yemen  have  a  long  historical  pedigree,  predating  even  the 
Ottoman  era.  On  a  number  of  these  occasion  attempts  were  pursued  through  coercive 
means.  There  are  several  reasons  for  studying  previous  Yemeni  unifications  in  the 
context  of  this  study.  First  of  all,  besides  the  close  geographical  proximity  of  Yemen 
to  the  Gulf  states,  Yemeni  society  is,  much  as  is  the  case  within  the  rest  of  the  Gulf 
society,  rooted  in  and  organised  around  tribes.  While  the  dominant  social  structure 
remains  tribal  in  both  Yemen  and  the  Gulf  states,  political  power  too  is  closely  inter- 
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throws  further  light  on  the  reasons  underlying  the  process  of  unification  as  well  as  the 
reactions  of  what  is  fundamentally  a  homogenous  society  to  the  unification  process. 
Prior  to  the  unification  of  the  two  countries  in  1994,  capitalist  North  Yemen 
and  Marxist  South  Yemen  were  locked  into  a  power  struggle  to  gain  power  and 
control  over  one  Yemen,  fuelled  by  conflicting  ideologies. 
Historical  Attempts  at  Unification  in  the  Yemen: 
There  have  been  several  attempts  to  unify  the  Yemen. 
1.  Confederation  of  the  North  Yemen  Imam: 
Abdul  Nasser's  1955  coup  d'etat  brought  the  monarchical  system  in  Egypt  to 
an  end  and  sought  to  purge  Egypt  of  feudalism.  Nasser  became  a  national  hero  in 
many  Arab  countries  and  the  establishment  of  the  United  Arab  Republic  between 
Egypt  and  Syria  in  1958  raised  hopes  of  greater  unity  in  a  divided  and  weakened  post- 
independence  Arab  world.  North  Yemen  under  the  reign  in  1958  of  Imam  Ahmad,  the 
only  Arab  country  to  join  the  United  Arab  Republic  confederation.  The  federation  was 
conceived  and  promoted  by  Nasser  as  part  of  his  effort  to  unify  the  Arab  world  under 
the  banner  of  Pan-Arabism. 
As  part  of  the  Jeddah  Pact  in  the  late  1950s,  the  Imam  of  Yemen,  a  Zaidi 
Shi'ite,  signed  a  treaty  of  cooperation  with  the  UAR,  paving  the  way  for  the  creation 
in  March  1958  of  a  confederation  between  Yemen  and  United  Arab  Republic,  which 
came  to  be  known  as  the  United  Arab  States.  Partly  because  of  the  geographical 
distance  separating  the  centre  -i.  e.,  Egypt-  from  the  periphery  4e.,  Syria  and  Yemen- 
and  partly  because  of  political  and  ideological  differences,  the  'United  Arab  States' 
never  really  progressed  beyond  a  loose  and  fragile  alliance  of  three  Arab  countries. 
To  Imam  Ahmad  joining  the  union  was  of  value  in  that  he  could  gain  Nasser's 
support  for  his  struggle  with  Britain  over  Aden  and  in  neutralising  the  opposition 
movement  of  the  Free  Yemenis'  based  in  Egypt.  The  confederation  proved  useful  in 
saving  Yemen's  fragile  system  from  the  Arab  leadership  struggle  which  began  to  cause Chapter  Three:  Federation  and  Unification  in  the  Arab  World  48 
concern  for  the  conservative  regimes  of  South  Arabia,  Saudi  Arabia,  Jordan,  and  Iraq 
in  1958.  While  the  West  supported  these  conservative  Arab  the  new  confederation  of 
the  United  Arab  Republic  and  Yemen  gained  the  acclamation  of  the  Soviet  bloc 
(Zabarah  1970).  Ingrams  (1961105)  argues,  in  connection  with  the  unlikely  alliance 
between  the  UAR  and  Yemen,  that:  "The  alliance  between  the  Imam  and  Nasser  may 
seem  curious  to  Westerners,  but,  though  Nasserism  and  Zaidism  were  implacably 
hostile  to  each  other  in  a  purely  Arab  context,  they  were  allies  against  Western 
colonialism". 
The  relationship  between  the  Imam  and  Nasser  was  later  to  become 
increasingly  strained  owing  to  their  different  ideologies  and  it  was  not  long  before 
these  differences  caused  the  alliance  to  come  to  an  end.  The  collapse  of  the  alliance 
started  when  rebellion  spread  among  the  army  of  Yemen  in  San'a  and  Ta'iz.  With  the 
country  verging  on  a  civil  war,  the  Imam  arrived  in  the  country  from  France  and 
immediately  restored  order. 
The  relationships  between  North  Yemen  and  the  United  Arab  Republic  were 
not  strong  enough  to  maintain  the  confederation,  while  the  Imam  and  Nasser's 
ideological  differences  were  irreconcilable,  ruling  out  the  possibility  of  any  real 
integration  (see  also  Little  (1968)).  Also,  though  there  was  strong  support  for  the 
confederation  among  the  citizens  (Zabarah  (1970)  of  both  nations,  neither  of  the  two 
countries  had  the  political  will  for  such  a  venture.  Neither  was  willing  to  make  the 
compromises  necessary  for  an  integration  of  two  separate  and  ideologically  different 
countries  into  one  sovereign  state. 
2.  South  Arabian  League  Federation- 
The  South  Arabian  League  federation  was  established  in  the  1959  between  several  of 
the  tribes  of  South  Yemen  in  reaction  to  the  emergence  of  the  UAR  federation. 
Marxist  ideas  were  widely  and  most  influential  among  these  tribes  in  the  1960's.  After 
the  creation  of  the  United  Arab  Republic,  some  of  the  south  Arabian  tribes  then  under 
the  sovereignty  of  the  British  crown,  expressed  a  desire  to  form  a  federation.  The 
tribes  in  question  were  Bayhan,  Awdali,  Fadhli,  Upper  Awlaqi,  Dali,  and  Lower  Yafi 
sheikhdoms. Chapter  Three:  Federation  and  Unification  in  the  Arab  World  49 
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The  South  Arabia  tribes  were  opposed  to  any  union  with  north  Yemen  as  they 
saw  the  Imam's  regime  as  reactionary  and  brutal  and  thus  incompatible  with  their 
radical  socialist  doctrine.  Though  the  UAR  was  a  socialist  regime,  the  south  Arabia 
tribes  were  also  unwilling  to  join  Nasser's  federation  on  account  of  ideological 
differences.  There  was  increasing  pressure  on  the  British  from  the  Aden  Trade  Union 
Congress  and  the  nationalists,  both  supported  by  Nasser,  to  withdraw  from  the  south 
Yemen.  The  new  federation,  an  autonomous  territory  under  British  protection,  came 
into  being  in  February  1959,  under  the  sponsorship  of  Sir  William  Luce,  governor  of 
the  south  Emirates  protectorates.  The  federation  treaty  designated  al-Ittihad,  beyond 
the  Aden  border,  as  the  capital  of  the  new  federation  bringing  together  the  sultanates 
of  Lower  Yafai,  Awdhali  and  Fadhli,  the  Emirates  of  Bayhan  and  Dhali  and  the  Upper 
Awlaqi  sheikhdoms. 
The  constitution  of  the  new  federation  established  two  Supreme  Councils,  an 
Executive  Authority  council  and  a  Council  of  Ministers.  The  federation  was 
represented  by  two  councils;  the  Council  of  Six  Ministers  with  executive  authority, 
where  each  region  was  represented,  and  a  Federal  Council  with  legislative  authority; 
to  which  six  members  from  each  state  were  appointed  (see  also  Little  (1968)).  Within 
the  federation,  the  Yemeni  authorities  were  to  coordinate  domestic  policies  whereas 
Britain  was  to  oversee  foreign  and  defence  policies  as  well  as  financial  aid  for  social 
and  economic  development  programmes.  Britain  was  also  to  maintain  the  federal 
army  and  the  National  Guard  to  suppress  any  future  rebellion  within  the  new 
federation.  The  British  maintained  and  preserved  the  fragile  federation  largely  to 
counteract  other  new  political  developments  in  the  Middle  East  and  compensate  for 
their  loss  of  influence  in  the  region.  The  establishment  of  the  UAR  federation,  the 
increasing  sympathy  for  Nasser's  brand  of  Arab  nationalism,  the  demise  of  the  pro- 
west  monarchy  in  Iraq,  the  civil  war  in  Lebanon,  and  the  Suez  invasion  fiasco  of  1956 
had  all  undercut  British  interests  and  influence  in  the  region.  Other  reasons  for 
Britain's  maintenance  of  the  new  federation  included  the  need  for  a  buffer  area 
offering  protection  to  their  base  from  internal  and  external  threats  as  well  as  the Chapter  Three:  Federation  and  Unification  in  the  Arab  World  51 
importance  of  Bab  al-Mandeb  at  the  southern  entrance  to  the  Red  Sea,  especially  after 
the  loss  of  the  Suez  Canal. 
The  federal  constitution  granted  the  British  the  right  to  run  the  Yemeni 
security  and  external  policies,  provoking  hostile  local  reaction  which  gradually  spread 
all  over  the  Mddle  East.  A  discriminatory  constitution,  which  withheld  the  franchise 
from  the  majority,  led  to  a  Yemeni  opposition  to  and  rejection  of  the  status  quo.  The 
Aden  Trade  Union  Congress  (ATUC),  opposed  the  federation  and  grew  more 
antagonistic  to  the  British  presence  in  Yemen.  Fuelled  by  Pan-Arabism's  call  for 
independence  of  all  the  Arab  countries  from  colonial  powers,  as  well  as  the  unity  of  all 
Arab  nations,  the  situation  grew  more  and  more  volatile.  Eventually,  the  Yemeni 
government  joined  opposition  parties  in  calling  for  British  withdrawal  and  the  right  of 
the  Yemeni  federation  to  build  a  new  relation  with  the  other  sheikhdoms  and  tribes  in 
Yemen. 
With  the  worsening  political  situation,  the  legislative  council  of  the  federation 
petitioned  the  British  government  to  amend  the  constitution.  The  British  response 
came  in  January  1961  with  the  new  governor  of  Aden,  Sir  Charles  Johnston,  who 
changed  some  of  the  articles  of  constitution,  granting  a  wider  role  for  the  Yemeni 
authorities  in  the  fields  of  foreign  policy  and  defence.  His  proposed  changes  proved 
unsatisfactory  to  all  Yemeni  groups.  The  ATUC  called  for  strikes  in  Aden  and  the 
federation  eventually  collapsed  following  the  escape  of  the  British  governor  to 
Ethiopia. 
Contemporary  Attempts  at  Unification  in  Yemen: 
The  late  1960s  witnessed  further  attempts  at  unification  between  North  and 
South  Yemen.  The  first  talks  started  in  1968  when  a  delegation  from  Aden  visited 
San'a'.  The  north  Yemenis'  dissatisfaction  with  the  rapprochement  initiated  by  Aden 
and  the  southerners'  uncompromising  socialism  led  to  the  suspension  of  the  talks. 
Besides  the  deep  differences  of  official  political  ideologies  of  the  two  countries,  there 
were  major  differences  in  their  foreign  policies,  especially  with  regard  to  the  Iran-Iraq 
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Yemen  was  an  ally  of  Iraq  and  had  even  sent  soldiers  to  assist  Iraq  in  its  war  against 
Iran. 
In  late  May  1990,  Yemen's  history  entered  a  new  phase  as  North  and  South 
Yemen  agreed  that  their  future  would  be  better  served  within  a  federation.  The 
unification  between  the  north  and  the  south  was  the  source  of  considerable  support 
among  the  people  of  both  Yemens,  with  the  inauguration  of  the  federation  being 
celebrated  with  huge  street  parties  in  San'a'  (MEED,  6  July  1990). 
The  new  constitutional  government  moved  quickly  to  integrate  both  former 
government  administrations,  establishing,  as  part  of  the  new  federal  government,  a 
cabinet  council  of  twenty  ministers  representing  both  North  and  South  Yemen  and  a 
new  Presidential  Council,  responsible  for  electing  the  new  president  of  unitary  Yemen. 
The  first  president  of  unified  Yemen  was  (and  still  is)  Ali  Abdullah  Saleh,  North 
Yemen's  pre-  union  president  and  leader  of  the  People's  Congress  Party,  while  the 
first  vice-president  was  Ali  Salem  al-Bhaid,  the  former  Socialist  Party  Chairman  in 
South  Yemen.  The  North  Yemeni's  domination  of  the  government  and  the  decision  to 
locate  both  the  capital  and  the  government  headquarters  in  North  Yemen  reflects  of 
the  latter's  greater  population. 
Ali  Abdullah  Saleh's  support  for  Iraq  during  the  Gulf  crisis  of  August  1990 
earned  Yemen  isolation  from  most  of  the  international  community.  In  addition,  almost 
one  million  Yemeni  expatriates  lost  their  jobs  in  the  Gulf  states  as  a  result  of  Yemen's 
support  of  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait.  The  bulk  of  returning  expatriate  Yemenis  put 
the  Yemeni  economy  under  much  economic  pressure,  but  the  discovery  of  oil  on  the 
borders  between  the  two  former  Yemens  helped  the  new  federation  absorb  this 
pressure. 
Nature  and  Problems  of  Unification: 
One  of  the  major  obstacles  that  faced  the  unification  of  the  Two  Yemens  was 
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equipped  with  'modem'  constitutional  institutions,  North  Yemen's  political  culture 
depended  largely  on  tribal  and  traditional  relations  and  institutions.  Besides  the 
daunting  task  of  bridging  these  differences,  there  were  other  difficulties.  In  North 
Yemen,  two  major  tribes  dominated  the  political  culture  of  the  country;  the  Hashed 
tribe  (from  which  President  Saleh  and  most  of  the  government  representatives  came), 
and  the  Bakiel  tribe.  Conscious  of  their  minority  status  in  North  Yemen,  the  Bakiel 
tribe,  though  in  control  of  the  territories  where  most  of  the  oil  wells  were  located, 
have  felt  that  any  union  would  exclude  them  from  power  sharing  and,  to  that  extent, 
were  determined  to  oppose  it.  To  avert  a  merger  that  would  marginalise  them  from 
power,  the  Bakeil  insisted  on  democratic  institutions  guaranteeing  the  rights  of  all 
sections  of  the  Yemeni  society. 
One  real  obstacle  for  the  unification  was  that  most  of  Yemeni  tribes,  especially 
those  of  North  Yemen,  were  heavily  armed,  creating  a  situation  in  which  there  was  a 
possibility  of  the  state's  authority  being  challenged.  Both  old  and  emergent  political 
parties  within  the  new  federation  used  legal  and  illegal  means  to  dominate  and  defeat 
rival  parties,  sometimes  resorting  to  such  extreme  measures  as  kidnapping  and  murder 
to  achieve  their  political  aims. 
The  two  leaders  of  North  and  South  Yemen  made  light  of  the  challenge  of 
integrating  a  former  Pro-Soviet  south  with  the  capitalist  north  and  it  was  not  long 
before  ideological  conflicts  and  irreconcilable  political  positions  led  to  the  outbreak  of 
a  civil  war  between  the  south  and  the  north  in  1994.  The  North,  owing  to  its  military 
and  economic  superiority,  managed  eventually  to  defeat  and  tighten  its  grip  on  the 
South  after  expelling  the  country's  socialist  leadership. 
3.3  Overview: 
Both  the  UAE  and  Yemen  cases  represent  different  expressions  of  federalism 
in  the  Arab  world.  The  UAE  was  initiated  between  rival  emirates  and  gradually 
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federalism.  Benefiting  from  a  willingness  by  the  political  elites  of  each  of  the 
constituent  states  to  pursue  mutually  beneficial  cooperation  within  the  context  of  a 
single  federal  sovereign  state,  the  UAE  oil  wealth  transformed  the  society  and  the 
political  systems  from  an  alliance  of  rival  tribes  to  a  stable  and  prosperous  modem 
state. 
The  Yemeni  federation  originated  between  two  countries,  South  Yemen,  a 
socialist  regime,  and  North  Yemen,  a  capitalist  state.  Owing  to  these  differences  in 
political  ideology,  the  federation  did  not  survive  for  long  and  was  soon  to  lapse  into  a 
civil  war  which  was  to  eventually  end  in  a  victory  for  the  north  and  in  the  latter 
imposing  its  political  will  on  the  south,  and  salvaging  the  federation.  Nonneman 
(1997)  points  out  that  lack  of  economic  resources  is  one  of  the  most  intractable 
problems  facing  the  Yemeni  federation  and  that  the  country  should  seek  to  attract 
foreign  investments  in  order  to  build  a  viable  economic  future.  He  also  notes  that  the 
most  notable  among  the  problems  facing  Yemen  on  the  domestic  front  are  issues  of 
political  reconciliation  and  consolidation  of  the  federal  institutions  as  well  as 
amelioration  of  its  foreign  policy  with  neighbouring  countries.  Clearly,  the  Yemen's 
unification  had  and  still  faces  both  internal  and  external  problems. Chapter  Foun 
The  GCC:  A  Preliminary  Assessment  of  its  Formation  and  Structure 
4.1  Introduction: 
T  his  chapter  aims  to  shed  light  on  the  social,  economic,  and  political 
conditions  of  the  GCC  and  its  basic  structure.  The  first  part  of  the  discussion 
is  concerned  with  the  circumstances  in  which  the  littoral  Gulf  states  agreed 
to  the  formation  of  the  GCC  and  the  manner  in  which  Arab  states,  Middle  East 
countries,  and  major  international  powers  reacted  to  the  creation  of  this  Gulf 
organisation.  Making  use  of  Tarlton's  model  of  assessment,  the  second  part  evaluates 
how  different  are  the  GCC  states.  The  discussion  will  conclude  with  an  exploration  of 
the  organisational  structure  of  the  GCC,  its  charter  and  its  achievements. 
4.2  AssesshiR  the  GCC  Formation: 
Moves  towards  political  integration  in  the  Gulf  began  mainly  between  the 
1950s  and  the  1970s  and  materialised  in  the  creation  of  the  federation  of  the  United 
Arab  Emirates,  which  is  considered,  as  has  been  discussed,  by  many  as  one  of  the 
more  stable  experiment  in  federalism  in  the  Arab  world. 
The  creation  of  the  GCC  was  met  with  mixed  reactions  in  the  Arab  states  and 
the  rest  of  the  world.  The  Arab  League  welcomed  the  creation  of  the  GCC  and 
regarded  such  an  organisation  as  a  positive  step  towards  Arab  unity.  According  to 
Shuriedch  (1995),  the  reaction  of  the  Arab  league  could  not  have  been  otherwise 
since  the  creation  of  the  GCC  was  consistent  with  the  League's  founding  principles, 
especially  Article  9  which  endorses  all  inter-regional  cooperation  and  partnerships  as 
long  as  they  do  not  conflict  with  its  charter,  or  undermine  the  interests  of  other Chapter  Four:  The  GCC:  A  Preliminary  Assessment  of  its  Formation  and  Stnicture  56 
League  member  states.  The  importance  of  the  creation  of  the  GCC  derives  from  the 
fact  that  it  represented  a  first  attempt  at  Arab  political  integration  following  such 
failed  attempts  at  Arab  unity  as  the  United  Arab  Republic  (UAR).  The  Arab  League's 
support  for  this  new  Arab  organisation  was  also  a  gesture  aimed  at  reviving 
confidence  in  an  Arab  world  still  feeling  weakened  and  demoralised  by  its  defeat  in  the 
1976  war  with  Israel.  Support  for  the  establishment  of  the  GCC  came  also  from  Arab 
conservative  regimes  engaged  in  constructive  partnerships  or  maintaining  amicable 
diplomatic  relations  with  the  littoral  Gulf  states. 
The  ideological  confrontation  and  rivalry  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  as  they  vied  for  supremacy  in  the  Third  World  conditioned  different 
reactions  to  the  emergence  of  the  GCC.  The  United  States  and  the  Western  bloc 
conspicuously  supported  the  emergence  of  this  regional  alliance.  After  the  collapse  of 
the  Shah's  regime  in  1979,  the  capitalist  bloc,  and  most  particularly  the  United  States, 
was  very  much  in  need  of  a  new  fiiendly  alliance  in  the  area  to  safeguard  its  interests 
against  potential  USSR  threats.  EI-Ebraheem  (1993)  argues  that  the  US  policy  in  the 
Gulf  has  always  been  based  upon,  and  guided  by,  the  assumption  that  the  Soviet 
Union  (and  its  presence  in  the  Gulo  represents  a  major  threat  to  American  interests  in 
the  area.  The  United  States'  support  for  the  GCC  was  thus  a  vital  part  of  its 
manoeuvres  to  protect  its  interests  in  the  Gulf  and  counter  any  potential  USSR  threat 
in  the  region. 
The  GCC  member  states  saw  American  support  as  of  vital  importance  to  the 
success  of  their  efforts  and  for  the  stability  of  the  whole  Gulf  region.  Twinam.  (1986) 
argues  that  America  had  urged  Gulf  supra-state  cooperation  and  strongly  endorsed 
the  idea  of  creating  a  regional  alliance  aimed  at  augmenting  the  security  and  political 
stability  of  the  member  states.  For  the  US,  an  organisation  grouping  a  number  of  US- 
allied,  politically  stable  and  economically  prosperous  Gulf  states  would  be  the  best 
way  to  preserve  and  protect  American  interests  in  the  region  (Twinam,  1986). 
On  the  other  hand,  and  coming  during  the  heady  days  of  the  cold  war,  the 
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fundamentally  characterised  by  suspicion  and  disapproval.  The  Soviet  Union  saw  the 
GCC  as  not  only  a  pro-capitalist  organization  but  an  essentially  American  initiative 
designed  to  bring  the  oil  rich  Gulf  countries  under  its  influence  (see  el-Ebraheem 
(1993),  Ramazani  (1992),  and  Twinarn  (1986)  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  the 
Socialist  bloc's  reaction  to  the  GCC  during  the  cold  war). 
4.3.  The  Rise  of  the  GCC: 
The  GCC,  inaugurated  in  May  1981,  consists  of  Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Oman, 
Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates  as  the  six  original  and  present-day 
member  states.  Most  of  the  literature  (see,  among  others,  Nakhleh  (1984);  Ramazani 
(1992)  notes  the  pervasive  and  substantial  similarities  which  exist  among  these  Gulf 
countries.  These  similarities  are  not  confined  to,  say,  language  and  religion  but  extend 
to  economic  resources,  ethnicity  and  the  nature  of  political  systems;  the  GCC  member 
states  are  all  Muslim  and  Arabic-speaking  countries,  with  native  populations  made  up 
entirely  or  largely  of  Arabs,  and  with  oil  as  the  dominant  economic  resource.  Peterson 
(1984)  notes  that  owing  to  many  fundamental  similarities,  the  six  member  states  of  the 
GCC  have  as  good,  or  better,  a  chance  of  making  a  success  of  their  union  than  any 
(other)  similar  assembly  of  Third  World  countries. 
The  GCC  was  established  during  the  early  years  of  the  Iran/Iraq  war,  and, 
according  to  many  (see,  for  instance,  Ommer  (1993))  the  war  played  a  causative  role 
in  the  creation  of  the  Council.  However,  in  any  discussion  of  the  various  structural 
and  causative  factors  that  were  instrumental  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC,  one  should 
not  ignore  or  underestimate  the  role  of  such  factors  as  the  Israeli  attack  on  Iraqi 
nuclear  facilities,  and  the  Israeli  occupation  of  south  Lebanon  had  encouraging  the 
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A.  Geographical  Significance: 
The  geographical  location  of  the  GCC  across  a  strategic  trade  and 
communication  route  has  been  at  the  root  of  the  long-running  interest  of  international 
powers  in  this  organisation  and  the  Gulf  region  in  general.  Peterson  (1988)  and  el- 
Ebraheem  (1993)  note  that  the  importance  of  the  Gulf  states  derives  from  their 
geographical  location  which  makes  them  a  link  between  the  eastern  and  western  parts 
of  the  world.  The  recent  discovery  of  the  huge  reserves  of  oil  had  augmented  the 
rivalry  between  major  international  superpowers  and  turned  the  Gulf  into  a  focal  place 
of  ideological  tension  and  confrontation  between  the  major  superpowers. 
The  geographical  proximity  of  the  GCC  countries  to  such  hostile  states  as  Iran 
and  Iraq  and  the  increasing  threat  the  small  Gulf  states  increasingly  faced  from  these 
two  regional  powers  alerted  the  Gulf  political  establishment  to  the  need  for  some  form 
of  union  whereby  they  could  collectively  thwart  any  external  threat  to  their  internal 
security.  Half  of  the  GCC  members  are  micro-states;  Bahrain  is  a  mere  240  square 
miles,  with  a  population  ofjust  over  half  a  million,  Kuwait  is  6,880  square  miles,  with 
a  population  of  less  than  two  millions,  and  Qatar  is  4,247  square  miles,  with  just  over 
a  million.  The  small  population  and  territorial  size  made  the  sovereignty  of  these  Gulf 
states  precarious,  with  some  of  them  forced  to  continually  live  in  the  shadow  of 
outside  aggression  from  hostile  Gulf  regimes.  For  these  vulnerable  states,  joining  a 
regional  alliance  with  other  fiiendly  Gulf  partners  was  considered  a  most  effective 
arrangement  in  pursuit  of  permanent  peace  and  political  stability  in  the  region. 
B.  Nature  of  the  GCC: 
Though  some  (e.  g.  Tripp  (1995))  regard  the  GCC  as  a  model  of  integration  in 
the  Third  world,  most  of  the  Gulfs  political  elite  and  analysts  insist  that  the  GCC 
experiment  represents  no  more  than  a  significant  case  of  regional  integration. 
According  to  the  GCC  Information  and  Research  Department  (1983:  pp.  1-2),  the 
GCC  Charter  lays  down  five  fundamental  principles  defining  the  Council's  general 
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cooperation  along  the  lines  of  the  Arab  League,  with  the  ultimate  aim  of  creating  a 
free  trade  zone  and  free  movement  of  capital  and  citizens.  Second,  it  stresses  the  need 
for  and  importance  of  coordination  of  policies  among  member  states  in  the  fields  of 
oil  industry,  the  economy,  technology,  international  relations  and  social  welfare. 
Third,  the  charter  opposes  any  foreign  intervention,  insisting  that  the  security  and 
stability  of  the  Gulf  should  be  the  responsibility  of  Gulf  states  only,  but  does  not  rule 
out  the  possibility  of  soliciting  the  support  of  allied  Arab  countries  and  friendly  non- 
Arab  states  when  deemed  necessary.  Appeal  to  such  an  external  support  was  evident 
during  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  in  1990.  Important  Arab  countries  such  as  Egypt, 
Syria  and  Morocco  supported  the  GCC  member  states  and  so  did  most  of  the  Western 
bloc,  including  the  US,  UK,  France,  Germany,  and  Canada.  Fourth,  the  GCC  charter 
places  much  emphasis  on  the  independent  sovereignty  of  each  of  the  member  states  of 
the  organisation.  Finally,  the  charter  stresses  that  the  GCC  is  an  Arab  and  a  Muslim 
Gulf  institution.  These  charter  points  summarise  the  background  and  aims  of  the  GCC 
and  indicate  that  the  organisation  had  committed  itself  to  abide  by  the  Arab  League 
charter  which  encourages  inter-state  cooperation  and  enjoins  non-interference  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  other  countries.  GCC  neutrality  vis-A-vis  outside  conflicts  was  fully 
evident  during  the  Iran/Iraq  war  despite  all  the  pressures  that  were  exerted  on  member 
states  to  take  sides  during  the  conflict. 
Most  of  the  literature  attributes  the  creation  of  this  regional  alliance  to  three 
main  reasons.  Security  factors  and  security  considerations  have  been  proposed  as  the 
first  category.  Sandwick  (1987)  claims  that  the  GCC  should  be  viewed  as  a  security- 
based  alliance  in  the  broadest  sense  insofar  as  it  seeks  to  create  a  stable  and  peaceful 
strategic  environment  in  the  region  through  the  cooperation  among  its  member  states. 
Al-'Esa  (1981),  Entessar  (1988)  and  McNaugher  (1984)  all  note  that  the  GCC  was 
created  as  a  response  to  the  escalation  of  the  Iran/Iraq  war  and  the  regional  threat  that 
became  increasingly  more  and  more  tangible  in  the  wake  of  the  Iranian/Iraqi  military 
conflict.  Many  of  those  who  identified  security  as  a  main  reason  for  creating  the  GCC 
refer,  in  particular,  to  the  strong  fear  amongst  Gulf  conservative  monarchical  regimes 
of  the  Shi'ite  Iranian  revolution.  Ramazani  (1981)  argues  that  the  Iran/Iraq  war  and 
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monarchies  and  prompt  their  concerted  effort  at  finding  a  collective  solution  to  these 
concerns.  Table  (4.1)  illustrates  the  military  imbalance  between  the  GCC  member 
states  and  both  Iran  and  Iraq. 
GCC  162000  457  150 
Iran  680000  462  262 
Iraq  382500  774  19 
Source:  MilitarV  Balance,  1992/93,  London,  1993. 
The  1990  Gulf  crisis  had  a  significant  effect  too  on  the  politics  and  the 
economy  of  the  Gulf  states.  Preoccupations  with  external  threat  and  concerns  for 
security  precipitated  a  rush  towards  armament  stockpiling  in  the  region,  with  most  of 
the  GCC  member  states  earmarking  much  of  their  budgets  to  military  spending, 
(Table  4.2). 
to  GNP: 
Bahraiii  0.24  4ý4  148 
Kuwait  9.30  6.5  249 
Oman  1.50  16.4  94 
Qatar  0.935  12.5  57 
Saudi  Arabia  13.70  14.0  1.738 
UAE  1.60  4.8  413 
Source:  ne  Military  Balance,  1992-93,1992,  pp.  105-25. 
source:  Human  Development  Report,  1994,  P.  170. 
Iran  and  the  Iranian  revolution  were  not,  however,  the  only  source  of  threat 
for  the  Gulf  states;  Iraq,  USSR,  South  Yemen  and  the  Israeli  occupation  of  south 
Lebanon  also  either  posed  immediate  threats  or  represented  potential  threats  to  the 
conservative  regimes  of  the  Gulf  Both  Iran  and  South  Yemen  sought  to  destabilise 
the  Gulf  regimes  and  undermine  the  political  stability  of  the  GCC  member  states. 
Ramazani  (1981)  alleged  that  the  Marxist  regime  in  South  Yemen  sought  to  strike  an 
alliance  with  the  Iranian  regime  by  destabilizing  the  situation  in  the  GCC  states 
through  inflaming  the  Shi'ite  minorities  in  these  states.  South  Yemen  strove  to 
stimulate  and  bolster  the  socialist  movements  in  the  GCC  states  in  an  attempt  to 
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A  second  category  of  reasons  for  the  creation  of  the  GCC  were  a  combination 
of  political  factors.  A  number  of  sources  have  pointed  out  that  the  desire  to  seek  more 
cooperation  among  the  politically  similar,  small,  and  more  or  less  equally  vulnerable 
Gulf  states  became  increasingly  stronger  as  a  result  of  the  external  threats  that  began 
to  emerge  with  the  Iranian  revolution  and  the  First  Gulf  War.  The  Gulf  regimes,  it 
was  proposed,  were  alarmed  by  the  outbreak  of  the  Iran/Iraq  war  and  the  eruption  of 
the  Iranian  revolution  and  sought  to  avert  any  threat  to  their  political  stability  through 
the  establishment  of  a  regional  alliance  of  political  similar  regimes  (see,  e.  g.,  al-Otaiby 
(1987)). 
Some  of  the  literature  (see,  for  instance,  al-Otaiby  (1987);  Nakhleh,  (1984)) 
adds  a  third  category  of  'driving  forces'  behind  the  creation  of  the  GCC.  The  relevant 
argument  here  is  that,  with  the  exception  of  Bahrain,  the  GCC  brings  together  a 
number  of  major  oil-producing  and  therefore  wealthy  Gulf  states  keen  to  safeguard 
their  oil  interests  through  coordinated  policies  and  harmonise  legislation,  particularly 
that  concerned  with  the  industrial  sector.  Overall  though,  while  economic  and  political 
reasons  played  an  important  role  in  the  creation  of  the  GCC,  the  rise  of  this  regional 
alliance  was  primarily  driven  by  considerations  of  security. 
4.4  Towards  a  Measurement  /  Assessment  of  the  GCC: 
The  study  of  federal  and/or  confederal  entities  and  the  various  mechanism  and 
institutions  put  in  place  to  operationalise  them  has  been  attracted  much  attention  from 
political  scientists,  and  political  analysts.  Different  scholars  have  put  forward  different 
models  as  viable  theoretical  frameworks  for  the  study  of  federalism  and 
confederalism. 
This  study  will  make  use  of  Tarlton's  (1965)  theoretical  model  of  federalism 
to  evaluate  the  degree  of  political,  economic  and  social  difference  within  the  GCC. 
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federal  society:  symmetrical  and  asymmetrical  federal  systems.  He  defined 
symmetrical  systems  as  where  the  component  states  share  common  cultural, 
economic,  social  and  political  factors  (see  figure  4.1).  Symmetry,  hence,  implies  a 
level  of  conformity  and  commonality  in  the  composition  of  each  separate  political  unit 
of  the  system  to  both  the  system  as  a  whole  and  to  the  other  component  states 
(Tarlton,  1965,  p.  867).  He  characterises  asymmetrical  federal  systems,  on  the  other 
hand,  as  where  the  component  states  do  not  display  similar  cultural,  economic,  social 
or  political  factors.  The  central  authority  within  asymmetrical  cases  of  federalism 
depends  on  the  diversities  in  the  larger  society  and  finds  political  expression  through 
local  government  possessed  of  varying  degrees  of  autonomy  and  powers  (Tarlton, 
1965,  p.  867). 
According  to  Tarlton's  model,  most  real  federal  cases  are  located  somewhere 
between  the  two  extremes.  He  alleged  that  his  scale  can  be  related  to  the  success  or, 
alternatively,  the  failure  of  any  case  of  federalism  depending  on  the  factors  of  the 
participating  regions.  In  the  case  of  symmetrical  federal  systems,  there  are  factors 
which  tend  to  unite  states  and  help  in  their  rapprochement  to  create  federal 
institutions.  Such  factors  could  be  territorial,  demographical,  social,  economic  and 
political  similarities  in  the  case  of  each  state.  Powers  in  the  symmetrical  case  of 
federalism  are  equally  distributed  and  thus  such  a  federal  system  is  similar  to  the 
confederation  type. 
In  the  asymmetrical  case,  most  of  the  regions  are  differently  represented  in 
terms  of  power.  In  addition,  there  are  factors  which  tend  to  undermine  the  federal 
bond  and  which  could  be  represented  differently  in  each  unit.  Such  factors  involve, 
among  others,  the  interests  of  each  state,  the  character  of  each  state  and  the  makeup 
of  the  whole  society.  Paddison  (1983)  argued  that  the  more  asymmetrical  states 
threaten  the  federation's  stability  by  their  greater  likelihood  of  vertical  conflict  with 
the  authority  of  the  federal  government.  The  relationship  between  the  federal  system 
and  the  units  and  even  between  the  units  themselves  are  not  equally  represented  in  the 
asymmetrical  case.  As  a  result  of  that  conflict,  the  type  of  bond  between  the  centre 
and  the  region  becomes  loose,  as  in  the  case  of  Quebec  in  Canada.  Figure  (4.1)  shows Chapter  Four:  The  GCC:  A  Preliminary  Assessment  of  its  Formation  and  Structure  63 
Tarlton's  dichotomy  between  Symmetrical  and  Asymmetrical  federal  systems  and  the 
position  of  most  present-day  federations. 
Figure  4.1  Symmetriad  Model  Components 
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Source:  Tarlton  (1965) 
The  element  of  symmetry  in  the  GCC  case  can  best  be  understood  in  terms  of 
the  various  cultural,  ethnic,  religious,  political,  linguistic  and  economic  factors  which 
unite  the  member  states  of  this  organisation  (see  preceding  paragraphs  for  a 
discussion  of  the  common  similarities  between  these  Gulf  states).  The  asymmetry 
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Although  Tarlton's  scale  is  not  relevant  in  its  details  to  the  GCC  case,  it  can  to  a 
degree  still  prove  useful  in  a  discussion  of  the  Council.  One  area  in  which  Tarlton's 
scale  can  be  useful  is  in  assessing  the  degree  of  representation  among  the  member 
states  and  illuminating  the  symmetrical  or  asymmetrical  nature  of  the  GCC 
phenomenon.  An  assessment  using  Tarlton's  scale  will  reveal,  among  others,  whether 
or  not  the  GCC  member  states  are  equally  represented  in  terms  of  power  and 
influence  within  this  organisation. 
Figure  (4.2)  sums  up  both  the  various  differential  and  compatible  elements 
among  the  member  states  of  the  GCC. 
Figure  4.2  Symmetrical  and  Asymmetrical  Factors  among 
the  GCC  Members  States: 
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Another  model  assessing  the  nature  of  federal  systems  is  that  of  Kornberg  et 
al.  (1979),  which  was  devised  to  assess  the  Canadian  model.  Kornberg  et  al.  (1979) 
looked  at  Canadian  separatism  in  light  of  David  Easton's  concept  of  citizen  political 
support,  using  three  variables  affecting  such  support,  viz.  the  collective  cost  and 
benefits  of  the  Canadian  federation,  Quebec's  power  and  the  cost  and  benefits  of 
federal  arrangements  to  that  province  and  other  regions  of  Canada  (Atlantic,  Ontario, 
Prairies,  British  Columbia),  and,  finally,  the  government's  responsibility  for  the  current 
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On  the  basis  of  a  study  sample  of  2562  respondents,  Komberg  et  al. 
hypothesized  several  political  factors  affecting  the  Canadian  case  seen  from  the 
citizen's  point  of  view.  Of  these  factors,  the  most  important  include  power 
distribution  and  the  scale  of  such  distribution;  public  support  for  the  government;  the 
cost  and  benefits  of  the  federation  from  one  province  to  another;  power  distribution 
and  influence  within  the  federation;  economic,  ethnic  and  linguistic  compatibility  and 
incompatibility  among  the  constituent  parts  of  the  federation;  and,  finally,  people's 
orientation  towards  politics. 
The  results  of  the  Kornberg  study  affirmed  that  many  people  perceive  their 
provinces  as  paying  disproportionate  costs  without  receiving  commensurate  benefits. 
Kornberg's  study  also  found  that  the  relationship  between  the  central  authority  and 
the  provinces  depended  on  the  strongest  state,  and  that,  to  that  extent,  power  had 
been  unequally  distributed  among  the  states,  a  characteristic  typically  associated  with 
asymmetrical  federation  types.  It  also  found  that  compatibility  of  the  economic, 
ethnic,  and  linguistic  factors  can  support  the  unification  process,  while  variety  and 
incompatibility  in  economic,  ethnic,  and  linguistic  factors  can  hinder  or  preclude  the 
integration  process. 
In  any  application  of  Tarlton's  and  Kornberg  et  al.  's  models  to  the  case  of  the 
GCC,  some  important  points  need  to  be  made.  First,  and  crucially,  both  models  of 
assessment  have  been  elaborated  in  the  context  of  situations  that  are  substantially 
different  from  that  of  the  GCC.  Tarlton's  model  was  predicated  on  the  basis  of  a 
federal  state  -  namely,  the  USA-  while  Kornberg  et  al.  's  model  was  developed  on  the 
basis  of  the  Canadian  federation.  The  GCC  case,  in  contrast,  is  regional  alliance,  and 
not  a  single  federal  or  confederal  state.  Second,  the  American  and  Canadian 
federations  are  prominent  Western  democracies  whereas  the  GCC  member  states, 
clearly,  are  not  democratic  in  this  Western  sense  with  the  exception  of  Kuwait  which 
saw  in  recent  years  the  introduction  of  important  measures  aimed  at  improving  its 
democratic  basis,  other  member-states  do  not  function  as  democracies.  These 
differences  do  not,  however,  of  necessity,  preclude  the  possibility  of  using  the 
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federalisation  and,  particularly,  the  degree  of  compatibility  among  the  organization 
constituent  members. 
Kornberg's  model  of  the  operation  of  federal  systems  is  based  on  a  set  of 
critical  factors  serving  as  evaluating  criteria,  most  notably  (i)  the  degree  of  political 
representation  and  influence  of  each  constituent  member  state  or  region  within  the 
federation,  (ii)  public  support  for  the  government,  (iii)  the  cost  and  benefits  and 
variability  thereof  from  one  province  or  region  to  another,  (iv)  Economic,  ethnic  and 
linguistic  uniformity  or  incompatibility,  and  (vi)  degree  of  people's  orientation  toward 
politics  in  the  regions. 
As  regards  power  distribution  and  political  influence  within  the  GCC,  it  is 
undeniable  that  Saudi  Arabia  -  as  the  largest,  most  populated,  and  strongest,  both 
economically  and  militarily,  of  the  six  member  countries-  is  a  most  dominant  political 
presence  in  the  organisation.  The  political  and  economic  influence  of  some  member 
countries,  as  argued  below,  has  been  a  source  of  much  tension  (and  conflict)  among 
the  member  states  of  the  organisation  (see  section  II).  Of  public  support  factor,  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  this  can  be  applied  to  the  GCC  owing  to  the  simple  fact  that  Gulf 
citizens  have  always  been  excluded  from  any  direct  or  indirect  participation  in  the 
GCC  decision-making  process:  the  GCC  was  created  without  any  formal  or  informal 
consultation  of  the  Gulf  public  and  it  continues  to  pursue  and  implement  policies  in 
total  seclusion  from  the  peoples  of  the  member  states. 
Compatibility  of  economic,  ethnic  and  linguistic  factors  is  undoubtedly  the 
most  prominent  aspect  of  the  organisation  and  this  compatibility  of  socio-economic 
and  historico-linguistic  factors  is  widely  perceived  to  have  played  an  indisputable  role 
in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC.  Braibanti  (1987:  PP.  205-6)  argued  in  this  regard  that 
"Geographical  propinquity  and  commonality  of  interest  are  buttressed  by  the 
remarkable  degree  of  cultural  and  religious  homogeneity  found  in  the  six  states.  The 
depth  of  this  homogeneity,  shared  by  no  other  group  of  nations  in  the  Islamic  world  of 
a  billion  adherents,  justifies  the  use  of  the  term  "Arabians"  as  distinct  from  the  term 
"Arabs  77 
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L  Factors  of  Sindlaritv: 
A.  Social  Components: 
1.  Cultural  Factors: 
Cultural  identities  are  linked  notably,  but  not  exclusively,  with  language, 
religion,  and  ethnicity.  Watts  (1991)  stressed  the  important  role  of  language  to  the 
success  of  the  federalist  bond,  noting  how  disparities  in  language  have,  for  instance, 
prevented  the  smooth  integration  of  Quebec,  a  French-speaking  region,  and  the 
English-speaking  rest  of  Canada.  Clearly,  no  such  differences  exist  in  the  Arab  world: 
Arabic  is  the  lingua  franca  for  all  of  the  GCC  states. 
A  second  dimension  of  culture  is  religion  and  religious  affiliation.  Islam  lays  at 
the  very  GCC's  ideological  foundation.  Islam  also  constitutes  the  fulcrum  of  political 
activity  in  the  GCC  states  and  is  likewise  essential  to  the  political  legitimacy  of  the 
governmental  systems.  The  tenets  of  Islam,  especially  the  holy  Qw-an  and  Sharia 
(Islamic)  law  represent  the  formal  basis  of  governance  and  the  judicial  system  of  each 
member  state  of  the  GCC.  The  Sunni  regimes  of  the  Gulf  states  felt  threatened  by  the 
rise  of  the  Shi'ite  faith  in  Iran.  In  the  wake  of  the  Iranian  revolution,  the  Shi'ite  threat 
to  the  Gulf  states  from  their  minority  Shi'ite  populations,  widely  feared  as  having  an 
unswerving  loyalty  to  Iran,  was  perceived  by  the  political  classes  as  a  major  threat  to 
the  internal  security  and  political  stability  of  the  Gulf  states.  Exacerbating  the  fear  of 
the  Shi'ite  threat  was  the  imbalance  in  the  Shi'ite  and  Sunni  populations  in  the 
neighbouring  countries  of  Iran  and  Iraq  where  the  Shi'ites  account  for  a  majority  of 
the  population.  Table  (4.3)  demonstrates  this  numerical  imbalance  between  the  Sunnis 
and  the  Shi'ites  in  Iraq  and  Iran  and  among  the  Gulf  states. Chapter  Four  The  A  Preliminary  Assessment  qfifs  Pormation  and  Sirilcoo-c  6X 
Bahrain  40  60 
Kuwait  70  30 
*Oman  40  60 
Qatar  90  10 
Saudi  Arabia  85  15 
UAE  84  16 
Iran  5  93 
Irau  45  55 
*:  In  Oman:  the  lbadi  sect  is  an  offshoot  ofthe  Shi'ite  sect. 
Source:  1.  The  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  1995  &  1997,4  1  st.  &  43  editions. 
2.  Encyclopedia  ofthe  Third  World,  4  th.  ed., 
Vol.  I  and  3,  G.  T.  Kurian.  1992  (ed.  ). 
A  third  component  of  culture  is  ethnicity.  In  the  context  of  the  GCC  ethnicity 
relates  to  one  dimensions  which  has  been  of  instrumental  significance  in  the  creation 
of  the  GCC,  viz.  the  tribal  origins  of  Gulf  citizens.  The  tribal  origins  of  both  Gulf 
monarchies  and  populations  set  the  Gulf  states  off  as  a  distinct  group  from  the  rest  of 
the  Arab  world.  Some  of  the  Gulf  tribes  are  spread  over  more  than  one  Gulf  state. 
The  Bani  Hajer  tribe,  for  instance,  is  spread  over  areas  of  Kuwait,  Bahrain,  Saudi 
Arabia  and  Qatar,  while  the  Otaibah  tribe  is  found  in  both  Kuwait  and  Saudi  Arabia. 
Old  tribal  relationships  bound  the  royal  families  of  the  various  Gulf  states. 
Crystal  (1995)  differentiated  between  two  political  tribal  forces  on  the  west  coast  of 
the  Gulf  First  were  the  mobile,  transient  confederal  tribes  bound  loosely  to  a  tribal 
unit  under  the  leadership  of  the  political  organisation  of  Rahama  Ibn  Jabir  political 
organization,  the  ruler  of  the  Qatar  Peninsula.  The  second  tribal  entity  involved  al- 
Qawasim  based  in  Ras  al-Khaima  Trucial  Oman,  and  the  Bani  Yas  tribe  in  Abu  Dhabi. 
Sweet  (1962)  identified  another  tribal  unit,  the  Utab  tribe  as  a  political  entity  who 
formed  a  protostate  alliance  along  the  Gulf  rim  in  Kuwait,  Bahrain,  and  Qatar. 
Schofield  (1991)  asserted  that  in  Kuwait  the  Utab  settlers  of  the  al-Sabah,  al-Khalifah 
and  al-Jalahimah  clans  originally  survived  only  on  Bani  Khalid  sufferance  until  they 
were  strong  enough  to  establish  some  trading  autonomy  and  ensure  their  own  political 
survival  in  1752.  In  Qatar,  al-Thani,  with  the  help  of  the  al-Murrah,  Bani  Hajar  and  al- 
Manasir  tribes,  fought  the  al-Khalifah  tribe  to  ensure  a  measure  of  political  autonomy 
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A.  I-Saquaf  (1975)  claimed  that  any  form  of  union  between  the  Gulf  states 
would  constitute  a  strong  deterrent  in  the  face  of  any  external  threat  or  interference 
owing  to  the  deep  relations  between  the  people  of  the  Gulf  Most  of  the  GCC  citizens 
hail  from  a  few  tribes  spread  over  the  geographical  territory  of  the  GCC,  most  of 
which  spread  across  the  state  boundaries  which  were  to  established  during  the 
colonial  period. 
The  common  ethnicity  of  both  Gulf  royal  families  and  citizens,  a  social  factor 
that  gives  the  Gulf  its  special  and  distinctive  character  amongst  Arab  countries, 
consolidated  the  desire  to  create  the  GCC.  Further  a  close  affinity  existed  amongst 
some  of  the  royal  families  of  the  GCC-  the  royal  families  of  Bahrain,  Kuwait,  and 
Saudi  Arabia  all  hail  from  the  same  Anazah  tribe  that  occupied  Najed  in  the  north  of 
the  Arabian  Peninsula  and  the  al-Thani  royal  family,  the  rulers  of  Qatar,  came  from 
Howtat  Bani  Tamem  in  Najed  (see  figure  (4.3)  for  more  details).  This  ethnic  affinity 
of  Gulf  royal  families  was  also  to  play  a  notable  role  in  the  establishment  of  the  GCC. 
Figure  4.3  The  Tribal  Roots  for  the  Roval  Families  of  the  GCC  Memeber  States 
f  --- 
Angah  E 
-  al-  Khalifah  (Bahrain) 
-al-  Sabah  (  Kuwait) 
al-  Saud  (Saudi  Arabia) 
al-  Thani  (Qatar)  I-  al-  Nahyan  (UAE)  al-  bu  Se 
(Oman) 
B.  Small  Size  of  Indigenous  Populations  &  the  Size  of  the  Foreign  Workforce: 
Population  size  is  a  problem  common  to  all  Gulf  states.  Each  of  the  GCC 
states  has  a  small  indigenous  population  and  an  increasingly  larger  expatriate 
community.  The  size  of  the  foreign  workforce  in  the  GCC  countries  has  reached  such 
levels  that  in  the  case  of  some  of  these  countries  the  ratio  of  the  expatriate  community 
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social  and  cultural  implications  of  a  small  indigenous  population  and  a  continually 
expanding  foreign  workforce  in  the  GCC  states.  Table  (4.4)  shows  the  GCC 
population  for  various  years  of  the  GCC  member  states  and  the  dramatic  shift  since 
1983  in  the  population  of  Kuwait  between  1991  and  1992.  The  evident  shift  was  the 
consequence  of  the  deportation  of  Iraqi  workers  and  those  from  countries  allied  to 
Iraq  that  the  Kuwaiti  government  deported  in  the  aftermath  of  the  second  Gulf  war. 
T 
Bahrain  0.39  0.42  0.47  0.5 
Kuwait  1.57  1.72  1.69  2.13 
Oman  1.15  2  1.42  1.52 
Qatar  0.31  0.36  0.34  0.49 
Saudi  Arabia  11.17  12.38  14.02  14.87 
UAE  1.21  1.35  1.5  1.59 
Notes:  n.  a.:  Not  Available 
Source:  U.  N.  Monthly  Bulletin  of  Statistics,  48,  Nos.  1-8,  PP.  39-41 
*:  'Me  Middle  East&  North  Africa,  1995. 
0:  The  Middle  East  &  North  Africa,  1998. 
es:  (NIIIII011s) 
103  0  194)5 
().  54  ().  58 
2.09  1.4  1.43  1.57 
1.58  1.64  *2.017  2.13 
0.44  0.45  0.53  n.  a. 
15.39  15.92  n.  a.  18.25 
1.63  1.67  *2.083  2.37 
Acute  labour  supply  shortages  have  been  identified  by  many  scholars  as  one  of 
the  main  challenges  facing  the  GCC  states.  AI-Saquaf  (1975)  affirmed  that  the  Gulf 
states  will  continue,  as  a  consequence,  to  need  more  native  and  foreign  human 
resources  to  cope  with  the  huge  financial  resources  that  the  region  provides.  Similarly, 
al-Rumahi  (1984)  emphasized  the  lack  of  a  sizeable  population  as  a  common  problem 
facing  all  the  Gulf  states.  He  noted  that,  as  a  result  of  their  small  populations,  the  Gulf 
states  depended  and  still  continue  to  heavily  depend  on  immigrants  to  compensate  for 
challenging  shortages  in  human  resources.  Figure  (4.5)  shows  the  differences  in 
volume  of  immigrants  among  the  GCC  member  states. 
Though  total  population  size  differs  between  member  states,  the  GCC 
countries  are  united  by  the  fact  they  are  all  characterised  by  the  same  problem-  a  very 
small  indigenous  population.  The  unifying  factor  of  a  small  native  population  has  been 
at  the  root  of  each  GCC  state's  concerns  for  its  security  including  Saudi  Arabia.  These 
security  concerns  have  been  compounded  by  continually  growing  expatriate 
populations  and  the  perceived  threat  it  poses  for  the  internal  security  of  these  states. 
Figure  (4.4)  and  (4.5)  show  the  growth  of  the  expatriate  community  for  different 
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Nationals  &  Non-Nationals: 
'Non-  Total 
Natiotials  Population 
-  ---  -----  ---------  -  ------  --  ----  hh  ------  -  ---------- 
KuNNail  1990  589221  28.6  1473054  71.4  2,062,275 
Oman  1993  1480531  73.4  537060  26.6  2,017,591 
*Qatar  1992  126000  22.5  433209  77.5  559209 
Saudi  Arabia  1992  *3,500,000  20.7  *  13,429,294  79.3  16,929,294 
o  UAE  1993  *800,000  38.4  *  1,283  100  61.6  2,083100 
Estimation. 
Source:  1.  The  Middle  East  &  North  Africa,  1995. 
2.  *:  at-Kuwari  (1996),  al  Arab  Newspaper.  1996. 
3.0:  Central  Bank  of  the  UAE. 
Fii!  ure  4.4  Numbers  of  Immi2rants  In  the  GCC  States 
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Fi2ure  4.5  The  Labour  Force  in  the  GCC  Member  States 
In  Year  1980  and  1990 
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990:  SwmC:  Birks  and  Sinclair.  GCC  Market  Report  MmrKjoy  Remirch  Centre  Durimm  UY,  1990. 
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C.  Economic  Similarities: 
As  noted  by  Tarlton,  compatibility  of  the  economic,  ethnic,  and  linguistic 
factors  can  support  the  unification  process  and  vice-versa.  With  the  sole  exception  of 
Bahrain,  all  the  GCC  member  states  are  oil-producing  countries.  The  economic 
similarities  among  the  GCC  member  states  as  a  raison  detre  for  the  creation  of  the 
GCC  has  been  much  discussed  in  the  literature  where  many  scholars  argue  that  the 
GCC  is  in  essence  an  economic  institution  (Drysdale  &  Blake  1985). 
Economic  cooperation  among  the  GCC  states  faces  ongoing  difficulties.  In  an 
evaluation  of  the  GCC  focusing  on  the  degree  of  economic  cooperation  among  the 
member  states  assessed  how  far  in  terms  of  the  states  have  been  willing  to 
compromise  on  the  question  of  sovereignty  in  favour  of  collective  benefits,  al-Rumahi 
(1984)  found  that  the  levels  of  economic  cooperation  remain  low  and  largely 
hampered  by  intransigent  prioritisation  of  national  interests.  AI-Otaiby  (1987)  also 
identified  the  economy  as  one  of  the  most  prominent  unifying  factors  in  the  case  of 
the  GCC  and  affirmed  that  all  of  the  GCC  countries  have  witnessed  the  growth  and 
development  of  petroleum-based  economies,  while  sharing  the  common  problems 
raised  by  a  near  total  dependency  on  the  single  resources. 
Million  US  S 
I  Revolues  as  Oil  Ský(Aof.  Fxpor(  Oil  ProductIMI 
I  Of  Exononly  ",  'P  of  tot-A  Exports'  Unit..  " 
Bahrain  652  57  41.6  0.043 
Kuwait  8922  83.1  83.7  1.753 
Oman  2540  83.7  87.9  0.616 
Qatar  2249  88  90  0.330 
Saudi  Arabia  25350  63.3  86.2  5.250 
UAE  1  10359  69.5  87.5  1.910 
Source:  Gulf  International  Bank,  Gulf  Economic  &  Financial  Report,  Issue  No.  10,  Dec.  1990,  Vol. napter  Pour:  I  he  Ci(-'C:  A  Preliminarv  Assessment  oj  its  Pigrmation  and  Stnicture  73 
:  (Million/Metric  T 
Bahrain  17  17  18  17  17  16  14 
Kuwait  59  54  63  61  49  81  100 
Oman  22  23  24  2568  28  35  40 
Qatar  13  11  13  153  15  15  18 
Saudi  Arabia  209  175  212  210  266  340  401 
UAE  1  55  55  59  74  84  95  1  qi-j 
Notes:  n.  a.:  Not  Available 
Source:  U.  N.  Monthly  Bulletin  of  Statistics,  1994,48,  Nos.  1-4,  PP  39-41 
0:  The  Middle  East  &  North  Africa,  1998. 
Table  4.6  GCC  Countries  by  GNP  for  Several  Years: 
GNP  (US  $  Per  Capita) 
B 
En1980 
01985 
1191991 
Saudi 
Thousands 
Source:  U.  N.  Statistic  Yearbook,  Issue:  39,  New  York,  1994,226. 
Fluctuation  in  oil  prices  in  the  1980s  had  a  devastating  effect  on  the  GCC 
member-  states'  economies.  It  has  been  alleged  that  the  GCC  states  were  willing,  after 
the  oil  crisis,  to  diversify  their  economies,  but  that  a  number  of  internal  problems 
stood  in  the  way  of  such  efforts  (A-l-Otaiby  1990).  Most  prominent  of  these  problems 
was  the  lack  of  a  suitable  labour  workforce.  A  second  problem  was  the  vulnerability 
inherent  in  the  role  of  GCC  states  as  suppliers  of  a  single,  albeit  major,  commodity  to 
world  markets  and  reliance  on  those  same  markets  to  provide  a  growing  portion  of 
the  goods  and  services  required  by  the  GCC  members  for  consumption  and  capital 
formation.  A]-Otaiby  (1990)  and  Said  (1993)  argued  that  the  problems  that  faced  the 
GCC  states'  attempts  to  diversify  their  economies  was  exacerbated  by  their  failure  to 
agree  on  common  policy  on  oil  production.  This  should  not,  however,  be  understood 
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as  implying  that  there  has  been  no  coordination  of  policies  among  the  GCC  states  in 
the  field  of  oil  production. 
In  general,  economic  similarities  have  been  a  unifying  factor  among  the  GCC 
states  and  they  continue  to  function  as  one  of  the  factors  consolidating  the 
cooperative  bonds  between  the  Gulf  states.  While  it  is  true  that  attempts  at  economic 
'harmonisation'  among  the  GCC  states  has  been  substantially  affected  by  the  second 
Gulf  war,  economic  cooperation  continues  to  feature  amongst  the  GCC's  most 
prominent  objectives.  Thus,  most  of  the  resolutions  endorsed  by  the  organisation  were 
concerned  with  either  the  oil  sector  or  wider  economic  questions. 
A  Political  Systems: 
Major  similarities  among  the  Gulf  states  arise  from  their  political  systems:  they 
are  all  monarchical  states,  and  in  that  sense  differ  from  the  majority  of  Arab  countries. 
In  each  of  the  Gulf  states,  political  power  is  in  the  hand  of  a  dynasty.  Peterson  (1988) 
characterised  the  political  systems  of  the  Arab  Gulf  states  as  "Traditional  Monarchies" 
in  which  governments  are  led  by  extended  ruling  families  linked  through  informal  but 
significant  consultative  mechanisms  with  religious  and  other  tribal  components  of 
society.  Drysdale  &  Black  (1985)  classified  the  Arab  states  into  two  type  of  political 
regimes:  radical  regimes,  such  as  Algeria,  Syria,  Egypt,  South  Yemen,  Iraq,  Libya, 
and  conservative  regimes  such  as  the  Gulf  states,  Morocco,  and  Jordan.  They  also 
pointed  out  that  over  the  years,  though  the  Gulf  royal  families  have  disagreed  on  a 
variety  of  issues,  especially  the  sensitive  question  of  sovereignty,  they  have  always 
come  together  for  mutual  protection. 
The  similarities  of  the  political  systems  of  GCC  states  has  been  a  topic  of 
much  discussion  in  the  literature  concerned  with  the  Gulf  and  the  GCC.  Nawwar 
(1993)  argued  that  previous  regional  attempts  at  promoting  inter-state  cooperation 
and  forging  regional  alliances  within  the  Arab  world  were  carried  out  primarily  by 
nationalistic  movements  which  called  for  and  urged,  among  other  things,  democratic 
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saw  in  the  ideology  of  these  nationalistic  movements  a  threat  to  their  conservative 
regimes.  It  was  in  an  attempt  to  counter  such  a  threat  that  the  political  elites  of  the 
Gulf  states  pursued  regional  alliance.  The  Gulf  tribal  systems  overlapped,  bringing  the 
sheikhs  in  the  Gulf  states  closer  and  strengthening  their  relations.  The  institutions  of 
'traditional  monarchies'  were  one  of  the  major  factors  that  assisted  in  the  creation  of 
the  GCC.  In  contrast,  most  of  the  previous  attempts  at  unification  within  the  Arab 
world,  including  the  Arab  Cooperation  Council  which  brought  together  Iraq,  Jordan, 
Egypt,  and  Yemen,  failed  owing  to  different  political  ideologies  and  the  difficulties  in 
reconciling  these  differences.  Failure  of  the  Maghreb  Union  was  also  on  account  of 
irreconcilable  ideological  differences.  Differences  in  political  regimes  and  political 
ideologies  has  thus  been  a  major  impediment  to  regional  integration  in  the  Arab 
world. 
II  Differences  attioniz  GCC  members: 
1.  Territorial  Size: 
Territorial  size  is  one  of  the  main  elements  of  difference  among  the  GCC 
countries,  though,  some  scholars  have  claimed  that  territorial  dissimilarities  were  in 
fact  one  of  the  factors  that  played  an  adyantageous  role  in  the  emergence  of  the 
Council.  Asymmetry  among  GCC  states  regarding  territorial  size  arises  from  the  fact 
that  while  half  of  the  GCC  members,  including  Bahrain,  Kuwait,  and  Qatar,  are  micro- 
states,  Saudi  Arabia  is  a  large  state.  To  a  degree  territorial  asymmetry  has  been 
translated  into  power  asymmetry  within  the  GCC  organisation,  with  smaller  states  like 
Bahrain  and  Qatar  occupying  'second  position'  to  Saudi  Arabia. 
Saudi  Arabia's  dominant  influence  within  the  GCC  has  caused  much 
resentment  among  some  of  the  small  countries  of  the  organisation.  The  Kuwaiti 
parliament  rejected  the  security  treaty  in  1983  on  account  of  the  belief  that  it  allowed 
bigger  countries  to  dominate  smaller  ones.  Some  scholars  accused  some  of  the  large 
GCC  countries  of  trying  to  increase  their  oil  reserves  through  expanding  the  size  of 
their  territories.  Border  disputes  among  the  GCC  states  relate  frequently  to  the 
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zones  as  an  alternative  to  absolute  state  sovereignty  and  as  a  solution  to  the  GCC's 
territorial  problems.  The  border  disputes  among  GCC  states  has  not  only  strained 
relations  between  them  but  might  well  undermine  the  future  of  the  organisation. 
Tension  has  characterised  relations  between  Saudi  Arabia  and  Qatar  ever  since  1992 
when  border  disputes  developed  into  brief  but  bloody  clashes  (the  al-Khafus 
incident).  Angered  by  the  incident,  Qatar  sought  a  rapprochement  with  Saudi  Arabia's 
arch  enemies,  Iran  and  Iraq.  The  conspicuous  differences  in  territorial  size  among  the 
states  is  that  sense  a  source  of  unease  and  tension  among  the  GCC  states  and  that 
sense  a  stumbling  block  in  the  way  of  the  GCC's  efforts  to  bring  the  member  states 
into  a  closer  form  of  economic  and  political  union. 
2.  Economic  Size: 
Judged  in  terms  of  their  economies,  the  GCC  states  fall  into  two  broad 
categories:  -  the  rich  countries  of  Saudi  Arabia,  UAE,  Kuwait,  and  Qatar,  and  the 
second  relatively  poorer  countries  of  Bahrain  and  Oman.  As  is  clear  from  Table  (4.8), 
per  capita  GNP  in  Bahrain  and  Oman  is  slightly  lower  than  in  the  rest  of  the  GCC 
members.  Lack  of  natural  resources  account  for  the  weak  economic  situation  in  both 
Bahrain  and  Oman.  Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait  have  supported  the  Bahraini  budget 
either  through  assets  or  oil  quotas. 
1ý11111ýilll  88  53  863  5  77/59 
Kuwait  20889  12458  11618 
Oman  5967  7112  6479 
Qatar  34226  17188  15165 
Saudi  Arabia  12373  7837  5853 
UAE  29191  20075  21057 
Table  4.8  also  illustrates  the  differences  in  economic  size  among  the  member 
states.  This  variation  in  economic  size  represents,  an  element  of  'asymmetry'  among 
the  GCC  member  states,  potentially  a  divisive  factor,  though  not  one,  so  critical  as  to 
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3.  Military  Imbalances: 
GCC  member  states  share  the  problem  of  manpower  shortages  to  meet  their 
military  needs.  The  military  imbalance  between  the  GCC  states  and  the  neighbouring 
powers  of  Iran  and  Iraq  has  been  a  main  source  of  concern  for  the  GCC  states  (Table 
4.9). 
4.9  The  (,  CC  stale,;  Nillitarv  Bala 
State  IM'Cuctý  Bud-"Ct 
("S/  Million) 
E'Stimation 
Year 
Air  N  avy  I  Total 
Bahrain 
-1 
1  ý,  '  1  1994  6800  700  600  1 
Kuwait  1683.5  1994  10000  2500  2500  16600 
Oman  1593.7  1994  25000  3500  4200  42900 
Qatar  301.4  1994  8500  800  800  10100 
Saudi  Arabia  16480.2  1994  68000  18000  11000  101000 
UAE  2026.3  1992  57000  2500  2000  61500 
Iran  2300  1992  51300  n.  a.  n.  a.  n.  a. 
Iraq  2600  1993  38200  30000  2000  n.  a. 
Egypt  2730  1993  310000  30000  20000  440000 
Israel  7200  1994  134000  32000  65000  602000 
Jordan  411.1  1994  90000  8000  600  98600 
Yemen  375  1993  61000  3500  1500  85000 
sonic  of  local  exchange  rate  figures  transferred  to  $  equivalent  exchange  rate  of  each  country  in  (31  May  1994)  for  the 
comparison  purpose  . 
1:  including  the  National  Guard  and  others. 
Source:  'Me  Middle  East  &  North  Africa  1995,41  ed.,  Europe  Publications  Limited. 
Table  4.10  Estimation  of  GCC 
Bahrain  281.9  150.5  187.2  203.7  195.7 
Kuwait  1245.8  1579.1  1373.7  1515.2  n.  a. 
Oman  1513  1940.1  1351.6  1354.2  1406.3 
Qatar  n.  a.  n.  a.  n.  a.  n.  a.  n.  a. 
Saudi  Arabia  23447.9  19249.2  14906.4  15264.7  28282 
UAE  1912.6  1973.7  1526.3  1532.6  1578.9 
Ile  real  figures  were  in  local  currency  and  transferred  to  S  equivalent  exchange  rate  of  each  country  in  (31  May 
1994)  to  compare. 
n.  a.:  Not  Available 
Source:  SIPRI  Yearbook  1992  World  Armaments  &  Disarmament,  P.  255. 
The  lack  of  both  collective  and  sufficient  defence  planning  on  the  part  of  the 
GCC  states  is  another  problem.  Table  4.10  shows  the  GCC  states'  expenditure  in  the 
military  sector.  However,  the  military  imbalance  among  the  member  states  themselves 
is  also  one  of  the  problems  standing  in  the  way  of  effective  collective  planning  in  the 
area  of  common  defence.  For  instance,  while  Qatar  possesses  an  army  of  8500, 
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Kuwait,  conscription  is  not  adopted  in  any  GCC  member  state.  Iraq's  lightening 
invasion  of  Kuwait  provided  obvious  testimony  to  the  striking  military  imbalance 
between  some  small  Gulf  states  and  other  major  powers  in  the  region.  These  problems 
underline  how  that  countries  such  as  Kuwait  and  Qatar,  which  are  also  small  both 
demographically  and  territorially,  cannot  provide  an  effective  military  defence  against 
external  aggression  except  as  part  of  an  alliance  (Cordesman  1984). 
4.5  Organizational  Structure  of  the  GCC: 
The  GCC  consists  of  three  main  bodies:  the  Supreme  Council,  the  highest 
GCC  authority,  the  Ministerial  Council  and  the  Secretariat  General.  Power  is 
concentrated  in  the  Supreme  and  Ministerial  Councils  (Figure  4.7  and  4.8). 
Fi2ure  4.7  The  Basic  Or2anisation  of  the  GCC 
6CIC 
CorFmusmon  For  SetIment  of 
Ministerial  CouncH  I 
Secretatiat  Generaý-ý  Se=tary  Ci  en" 
L  Assisstant  Assisatant  Secretary  Assisstant  Secretary 
Secretary  General  of  Political  General  ofFinancial 
I 
f 
G4  for  Legal  Affaris  &Adnurustrative  Affairs 
_y 
Affairs 
Infotmabon 
Centre 
Figure  4.8  Level  of  Power  and  the  GCC  Main  Bodies 
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1.  Supreme  Council: 
The  GCC  Supreme  Council  (SC)  is  the  highest  source  of  authority  in  the 
organization.  Each  state  is  represented  in  the  SC  by  its  head  of  state.  Figure  4.9 
shows  both  its  functions  and  the  timetabling  of  sessions.  Each  state  has  one  vote 
within  the  SC,  and  while  decisions  on  substantive  matters  must  be  carried  by  a 
unanimous  vote,  a  majority  vote  is  required  to  pass  resolutions  bearing  on  procedural 
matters  (Article  9).  It  should  be  noted  that  the  GCC  decisions  as  more  like 
recommendations,  akin  to  those  are  of  the  Arab  League  or  the  United  Nations  (Al- 
Mubark  &  Hadyah  1985). 
FiLrure  (4.9)  The  Supreme  Council  (  Rulers  of  the  States) 
Entrusted  with  General  Policy  -  Once  a  Year 
Analysc  reports  prepared  by  technical  experts 
Decide  the  Important  policies  ofthe  Sccretariate 
General 
Review  the  Recomendations  ofboth  -  Extraodinary  Meeting 
Ministeral  Council  and  General  Secretairate  Approved  by  at  least  2 
Appointing  the  GCC  Secretariat  General 
Member  States 
Amend  the  Charter 
Approve  the  Rules  of  Procedure 
Approve  the  GCC  Budget  of  Secretariat  General 
2.  Ministerial  Council: 
The  Ministerial  Council  is  the  executive  power  and  the  second  highest 
authority  in  the  GCC.  The  MC  is  comprised  of  the  foreign  ministers  of  the  member 
states  and  other  delegated  ministers.  The  council  presidency  is  exercised  by  the 
member  state  which  presided  over  the  last  ordinary  session  of  the  Supreme  council,  or 
if  necessary,  the  state  which  will  host  the  next  session  (Article  11). 
One  of  the  Ministerial  council's  tasks  is  to  produce  recommendations  for  the 
special  ministers  to  draw  up  the  policies  for  the  GCC.  For  the  most  part  the  council  is Chapter  Four  The  GCC:  A  Preliminary  Assessment  ofils  Torination  and  Stniclure  80 
little  more  than  a  platform  for  coordinating  opinions  among  the  ministers  of  the 
various  member  states.  The  Ministerial  fimetions  are  outlined  in  Article  12  of  the 
appendix  to  the  GCC  charter. 
3.  Secretariat  General: 
The  Secretariat  General  is  the  administrative  body  of  the  GCC  which  is 
located  in  Riyadh.  Saudi  Arabia  has  been  chosen  the  place  of  SG  simply  because  it  is 
the  largest  member  state.  The  Secretariat  General  and  its  employees  enjoy  diplomatic 
immunity. 
The  competence  of  the  Secretary  General  is  confined  to  overseeing  financial 
and  administrative  matters.  This  limitation  of  the  Secretary  General's  and  the 
Secretariat's  powers  has  contributed  to  increasing  the  gap  between  the  Secretariat 
General  and  the  two  higher  councils  (i.  e.,  SC  and  MC),  and  even  between  the  member 
states.  The  GCC's  annual  budget  is  prepared  by  the  Secretary  General  in  consultation 
with  all  the  member  states  and  submitted  for  endorsement  to  the  Nfinisterial  Council. 
Equal  participation  in  the  Secretariat  General  is  aimed  at  averting  control  by  those 
member  states  accounting  for  larger  parts  of  the  budget  (al-Mubark  &  Hadyah  (1985) 
and  al-Anaba  Newspaper,  30,  Oct.,  1985).  The  Secretariat  General  should  be  granted 
more  powers  to  allow  it  to  become  as  active  as  the  Secretariat  Generals  of  other 
international  organisations. 
4.6  Obiectives  of  the  GCC: 
As  discussed  earlier  the  GCC  aims  are  explicitly  laid  down  in  Article  Four  of 
the  organisation's  Charter.  A  first  aim  of  the  GCC  is  to  achieve  coordination, 
integration  and  cooperation  between  members  states  in  all  fields  and,  ultimately, 
(political,  economic  and  social)  unity  between  the  members.  A  second  major  aim  is  to 
strengthen  relations,  across  various  policy  fields  between  member  states.  A  third  and 
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commerce,  customs,  communication,  education,  culture,  health,  information,  tourism, 
legislation  and  administration.  A  fourth  aim  is  to  stimulate  scientific  and  technological 
progress  in  the  areas  of  industry,  mining,  water,  and  animal  resources;  establish  joint 
scientific  research  and  joint  ventures  and  encourage  cooperation  in  the  private  sector 
for  the  collective  good. 
These  objectives  remain,  however,  somewhat  indeterminate  where  the  notion 
of  'unity',  critical  to  the  vision  around  which  the  GCC  was  created,  is  itself  defined 
ambiguously.  Moreover,  the  Charter  neither  mentioned  nor  dealt  with  the  issue  of 
'common  defence'  against  potential  external  threats  or  aggression.  In  fact,  the  Charter 
fails  to  mention  the  issue  of  coordination  of  military  policies,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  'homeland  defence'  is  one,  if  not  the  main,  concerns  of  all  member  states  of  the 
organisation. 
Al-Otaby  (1990)  explained  this  omission  in  terms  of  the  GCC  states'  keenness 
to  foster  non-political  relations  and  cooperation  rather  than  pursue  any  ambitious 
objectives  of  common  defence  that  might  antagonise  neighbouring  Middle  Eastern 
countries.  Another  reason  is  the  consensus  of  the  member  states  around  the  notion 
that  military  cooperation  is  a  natural  consequence  of  a  federal  structure  (al-Otaby 
(1990)).  Bishara,  the  former  Secretary  General,  affirmed  that  "...  realising  the 
objectives  [laid  down]  in  the  charter  and  in  the  Economic  Agreement  Treaty  will 
certainly  lead  to  semi-confederate  Gulf  relationships.  "  (al-Anaba,  Dec.  12,1992). 
However,  on  another  occasion,  Bishara  characterised  the  GCC  Charter  as  laying 
down  a  significant  formula  for  cooperation  among  the  GCC  states  rather  than  a 
blueprint  for  federal  or  confederal  formula,  insisting  that  the  notions  of  federal  or 
confederal  formulas  that  have  been  mooted  in  Gulf  society  owe  more  to  popular 
interpretations  of  the  GCC  Charter  than  to  any  Charter  objectives  or  GCC  policies  as 
such  (al-Anaba,  May  3,1987).  Al-Rumahi  (1981)  argues  that  the  word  "cooperation" 
captures  the  essence  of  what  the  GCC  pursues  by  way  of  objectives,  noting  that 
though  it  had  been  used  so  often,  the  term  "unity"  seems  to  have  little  to  do  with  the 
nature  and  structure  of  the  relations  existing  among  the  member  states. Chapter  Four  The  GCC:  A  Preliminary  Assessment  ofits  Formation  and  Stnicture  82 
The  apparent  contradiction  in  the  GCC  Secretary  General's  characterisation  of 
the  formula  of  cooperation  pursued  by  this  institution  is  perhaps  the  best  reflection  of 
the  indeterminacy  and  ambiguity  of  the  organisation's  Charter.  Political  observers, 
nevertheless,  define  the  GCC  multi-point  cooperation  plan  as  a  formula  for  a 
confederal  organization. 
In  the  field  of  economic  cooperation,  the  Charter  urged  the  coordination  of 
policies  covering  the  oil  and  other  industries,  joint  ventures  in  Petro-chemicals  and 
agriculture.  Article  II  of  the  Economic  Agreement  Treaty  declares  that  "the  member 
states  shall  endeavour  to  coordinate  their  policies  with  regard  to  all  aspects  of  the  oil 
industry  including  extraction,  refining,  marketing,  processing,  pricing,  the  exploration 
of  natural  gas,  and  development.  "  Cooperation  in  these  areas  aimed  at  creating  a 
common  market  as  an  important  step  and  as  the  basis  for  boosting  the  economies  of 
all  members.  A  second  aim  from  cooperation  was  to  open  the  doors  for  the  free 
movement  of  both  nationals  and  capital,  and  remove  customs  and  tariff  barriers 
among  the  member  states.  Economic  cooperation  has  so  far  led  to  adoption  of  a 
number  of  interesting  policies.  Most  notable  among  these  is  (i)  a  treaty,  effective  since 
March  1983,  whereby  national  products  of  a  member  state  could  enter  the  market  of 
another  member  state  without  incurring  custom  duties.  (ii)  an  agreement,  effective 
also  since  March  1983,  sanctioning  the  free  movement  of  GCC  citizens  and  ensuring 
the  rights  of  GCC  citizens  to  work  in  member  states,  and  (iii)  the  establishment  of  the 
Gulf  Investment  Company  in  November  1983. 
The  economic  fait  accompli  stressed  the  need  for  more  cooperation  among  the 
member  states.  Yet,  as  al-Otaiby  (1990)  has  shown  levels  of  trade  among  the  GCC 
countries  remain  relatively  low  on  account  of  the  relative  absence  of  economic 
cooperation  among  these  states,  and  from  the  similar  rather  than  complementary 
nature  of  the  economies  of  the  member  states  (see  also  al-Zamil  (1989)  on  this  point). 
Given  the  events  such  as  the  Iran/Iraq  war,  and  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait 
that  took  place  during  the  1980s  and  1990  and  the  effects  these  events  had  on  the 
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cooperation  among  these  states  has  not  developed  significantly.  In  addition  to  the 
disastrous  effects  of  the  second  Gulf  war  on  some  of  the  member  states,  they  have 
endured  other  incidents  which  have  hardly  created  an  atmosphere  conducive  to 
pursuing  economic  cooperation  as  a  priority.  Most  notable  among  these  events  were 
(a)  the  unsuccessful  plot  in  Bahrain  in  December  1981,  (b)  the  shooting  down  of  an 
Iranian  F-  4  Phantom  Air  Force  plane  by  Saudi  Air  Force  over  Saudi  Arabian  territory 
on  June  1984,  (MEED,  Nov.  1984,  pp.  20-21),  (c)  the  bombing  of  Kuwaiti  facilities 
in  1984  and  1985,  and,  (d)  perhaps  most  important,  the  assassination  attempt  on  the 
motorcade  of  Kuwait's  Amir  by  a  suicide  bomber  on  May  25,1986  (al-Qabas,  26, 
May  1986).  One  would  in  fact  expect  such  events  to  assist  more  rapprochement 
between  the  member  states  of  the  GCC,  but  all  they  did  was  to  hamper  cooperation 
among  them. 
The  creation  of  the  GCC  has  had  important  benefits  for  the  littoral  states  in 
the  field  of  political  cooperation  (e.  g.  the  coordination  of  foreign  affairs)  in  general. 
However,  there  is  a  feeling  that,  by  joining  the  GCC  alliance,  smaller  states  like 
Bahrain,  Qatar  and  Oman  have  come  under  the  dominance  of  bigger  states  in 
particular  of  Saudi  Arabia  (see  Twinarn  (1987)  for  an  argument  to  this  effect). 
Prior  to  1990,  the  GCC  states  maintained  a  nonbelligerent,  neutral  status  vis- 
A-vis  all  external  conflicts  and  managed  to  avoid  involvement  in  many  of  the  conflicts 
that  the  Gulf  region  witnessed  during  the  1970s  and  1980s.  After  1990,  however,  the 
situation  changed  and  all  the  GCC  states  emerged  as  more  conspicuously  Pro- 
Western.  But  instead  of  coordinating  their  military  policies  and  plans  with  a  view  to 
reaching  a  common  defence  treaty  that  would  enable  them  to  counter  any  possible 
external  threats  or  aggression,  each  of  the  GCC  states  signed  a  defence  treaty  with  an 
outside  power  (e.  g.  US,  UK,  France). 
Border  disputes  are  one  of  the  major  obstacles  that  continue  to  constitute  a 
stumbling  block  in  the  way  of  greater  cooperation  among  the  GCC  states.  AI-Kuwari 
(1992)  argued  that  the  failure  of  the  GCC  states  to  solve  border  disputes  among  its 
member  states  not  only  rules  out  any  possible  future  unity  between  them,  but  hampers Chapter  Four:  The  GCC:  A  Preliminary  Assessment  of  its  Formation  and  Stnicture  84 
the  realisation  of  even  the  organisation's  Charter  objectives.  Failure  of  both  the 
Commission  of  Disputes  and  the  GCC  Supreme  Council  to  resolve  the  border 
disputes  to  the  satisfaction  of  all  involved  parties  has  caused  increased  tensions  among 
some  member  states  of  the  organisation  which  often  developed  into  military  clashes, 
as  in  the  case  of  Bahrain  and  Qatar  (see  Chapter  11). 
4.7  Overview: 
Following  a  brief  historical  background  to  the  GCC,  this  chapter  has  examined 
the  political,  cultural,  economic,  military,  and  linguistic  elements  of  compatibility  and 
incompatibility  among  the  member  states  of  this  regional  alliance  and  the  effects  such 
elements  have  had  in  either  promoting  the  emergence  of  this  organisation  or  hindering 
its  progress.  Discussion  in  this  chapter  also  touches  on  the  reactions  of  neighbouring 
NEddle  Eastern  countries,  Arab  countries  and  foreign  powers  to  the  emergence  of  the 
regional  organisation  of  the  GCC  and  on  the  rationale  underlying  such  reactions. 
It  is  true  that  the  member  states  of  the  GCC  have  so  many  things  in  common: 
besides  a  common  language  and  a  common  religion,  similar  ethnic  origins,  a  common 
cultural  heritage,  and  similar  system  of  governance,  these  Arabian  Gulf  states  share 
the  same  economic  sources  of  wealth  and  dependencies  and  face  the  same  threats 
from  neighbouring  powers  (see  earlier  sections  of  this  chapter  for  detailed  discussion 
of  these  commonalities  among  the  GCC  states).  Cultural,  religious,  ethnic,  linguistic 
and  economic  commonalities  are,  however,  neither  a  prerequisite  for  the  emergence  of 
a  regional  alliance  nor  a  guarantee  that  an  alliance  would  succeed  or  survive.  It  is 
political  understanding  and  consensus  that  essentially  defines  the  context  within  which 
an  alliance  or  regional  organisation  will  either  fail  or  succeed.  Politics,  be  it  regional 
or  international,  is  primarily  governed  by  considerations  of  immediate  or  potential 
interests  and  gains  and  to  that  extent,  no  similarities,  shared  values  or  common 
concerns,  strong  as  they  might  be,  would  be  enough  in  themselves  to  guarantee  that 
an  alliance  or  regional  grouping  would  achieve  its  aims.  In  other  words,  there  can  be 
no  cooperation  of  any  significance  and  in  any  field  without  political  cooperation.  The Chapter  Four:  The  GCC:  A  Preliminary  Assessment  of  its  Formation  and  Structure  85 
GCC  is  perhaps  a  good  example  in  this  regard.  Greater  cooperation  and  coordination 
of  policies  in  the  various  fields  is,  we  recall,  the  objective  principally  underlying  in  the 
emergence  of  the  GCC  as  a  regional  organisation.  However,  cooperation  in  many 
fields,  and  especially  the  important  fields  of  security,  the  economy  and  foreign  policy 
has  yet  to  reach  desirable  level  or,  in  certain  areas,  even  to  materialise  and  such 
cooperation  continues  to  be  constantly  undercut  by  the  absence  of  common  political 
will  to  compromise  on  such  issues  as  national  sovereignty  and  national  interests.  The 
absence  of  a  political  understanding  and  a  political  will  to  priorities  common  concerns 
and  common  benefits  of  cooperation  over  issues  of  national  sovereignty  not  only 
continue  to  hinder  cooperation  in  such  fields  as  the  economy,  health,  education  and 
immigration  but  is  the  principle  source  of  the  persistence  of  border  disputes  among 
various  members  of  the  organisation  as  well  as  the  persistence  of  a  strong  tendency 
among  the  member  states  to  adopt  and  carry  out  policies  in  total  independence  of  its 
partners  in  the  GCC. Chapter  Five: 
Changing  World  and  Regional  Order  and  the  GCC 
5.1  Introduction: 
c  hapter  five  examines  the  role  and  status  of  the  GCC  before  and  after  1990.  It 
investigates  the  various  external  factors  leading  to  the  emergence  of  the  Gulf 
organisation.  As  noted  earlier,  it  is  not  only  internal  circumstances  that  were 
important  for  the  decision  to  set  up  the  GCC;  the  circumstances  of  the  regional  and 
world  orders  have  also  played  an  equally  important  factor  in  its  emergence.  The 
economic  and  strategic  importance  of  the  Gulf  region  has  made  it  the  focus  of  much 
attention,  especially  during  the  twentieth  century,  firstly  from  Britain  and  the  Cold 
War.  The  interest  of  these  powers  in  the  Gulf  was  and  continues  to  be  fundamentally 
driven  by  the  need  to  secure  economic  interests  and  areas  of  political  and  strategic 
influence. 
The  'new  world  order'  has  been  defined  as  the  end  of  the  ideological 
confrontation  between  the  capitalist  and  the  communist  camp  which  characterised 
pre-1990  international  relations.  The  end  of  old  world  order  has  signalled  the 
emergence  of  the  US  as  the  single  most  dominating  economic  and  political  power  in 
the  world  order,  (see  also  al-Alkim.  (1994)  for  similar  argument).  Others  such  as 
Magdoff  (1992)  termed  the  new  world  order  as  the  'globalization'  of  internal 
relations,  where  the  need  to  expand  economically  has  become  the  mainstay  and  most 
prominent  feature  of  world  politics  and  international  relations.  Taylor  (1989)  argues 
that  the  cold  world  years  saw  the  emergence  of  the  United  States  as  a  superpower, 
replacing  Britain's  position  during  the  colonial  period,  and  the  replacement  of 
Germany  by  the  Soviet  Union  as  the  main  challenger  to  US.  He  also  argues  that  the 
Soviet  Union  was  the  country  most  responsible  for  destabilising  the  old  world  order, 
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The  interest  of  the  West  in  the  Gulf  was  and  continues  to  be  basically 
motivated  by  the  need  to  secure  access  to  the  huge  oil  resources  of  the  region.  The  oil 
wealth  of  the  Gulf  region  makes  political  stability  in  this  part  of  the  Mddle  East  of 
utmost  importance  to  Western  powers.  Equally  it  has  made  the  Gulf  area,  given  the 
importance  of  the  oil  commodity  to  the  industrial  sector  in  the  West  and  the  strategic 
importance  of  the  region,  a  focus  of  much  economic  and  political  competition 
between  both  superpowers  (i.  e.,  USA  and  USSR),  as  these  powers  vied  for  political 
leverage  and  economic  domination. 
5.2  Colonial  Ori2in  of  the  GCC  Member  States: 
Historically,  the  political  and  economic  importance  of  the  Gulf  region  grew 
after  the  discovery  of  the  oil  in  the  early  twentieth  century.  The  discovery  of  oil  in 
early  twentieth  century  brought  the  Gulf  to  the  forefront  of  world  politics  (al- 
Maskarie  (1992))  and  fuelled,  in  the  process,  a  power  rivalry  between  the  two 
superpowers  as  well  as  such  powers  as  Britain,  Germany,  and  France  which  has 
continued,  in  different  forms,  till  the  present  time.  Since  the  1930s,  Britain  maintained 
a  military  presence  in  the  region  to  prevent  the  other  colonising  powers'  involvement 
or  intervention  in  the  Gulf  region. 
The  political,  economic,  and  social  aspects  and  structures  of  the  Gulf  have 
been  dramatically  altered  by  the  emergence  of  the  Gulf  states.  Historically,  the 
importance  of  the  Gulf  attracted  successive  waves  of  European  powers,  the 
Portuguese,  Dutch,  French,  British,  and  also  the  Ottomans  had  all  had  some  presence 
at  some  point  in  the  region.  The  recent  history  of  the  Gulf  states  predominantly 
shaped  by  two  powers,  the  Ottoman  and  British  empires.  The  French  too  were 
interested  in  areas  north  of  the  Gulf  (Iraq)  and  mainly  in  the  north  of  Africa. 
However,  their  influence  in  the  Gulf  emerged  in  the  nineteenth  century  in  Muscat 
which  they  used  as  a  base  to  secure  the  sea  approaches  to  their  newly-acquired 
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The  influence  of  the  British  colonial  presence  in  the  Gulf  and  the  establishment 
of  the  GCC  was  significant  in  the  sense  that  the  relationships  that  characterised  the 
history  of  the  Gulf  states  prior  to  independence  have  eased  the  establishment  of  the 
GCC.  First,  the  British  imposed  similar  economic  and  administrative  policies  on  the 
Gulf  states  which  came  under  their  tutelage,  with  the  exception  of  Saudi  Arabia. 
Moreover,  cooperation  among  the  new  Gulf  states  existed  during  the  colonial  power 
era:  during  the  1950s  and  prior  to  the  advent  of  independence,  the  littoral  Gulf  states, 
together  with  Britain,  held  discussions  about  their  future,  cooperating  over  common 
problems  such  as  piracy. 
This  cooperation  that  existed  among  the  Gulf  states  continued  after  the 
withdrawal  of  the  British.  Soon  after  the  advent  of  independence,  there  were  attempts 
(see  Chapter  3  and  4  for  a  more  extensive  discussion  of  this  point)  to  bring  some  of 
the  newly  independent  Gulf  states  into  some  sort  of  a  federation.  Such  endeavours  led 
to  the  merging  of  seven  of  the  Gulf  sheikhdoms  into  what  is  now  known  as  the  UAE 
federation. 
5.3  Old  World  Order: 
The  Gulf  states,  like  all  countries  of  the  international  community,  have  been 
affected  by  the  Western  bloc-Eastem  bloc  stand-off  that  dominated  international 
politics  and  relations  during  the  cold  war  era  as  well  as  the  South/North  divide  that 
continues  to  characterise  world  politics  and  economies.  The  relationship  between  the 
developing  countries  and  the  industrial  world  has  always  been  asymmetrical,  both  in 
economic  and  political  terms.  This  relationship  between  the  two  has  been  'governed' 
by  the  world  economy,  the  real  generator  for  all  sorts  of  conflicts  in  the  world, 
including  the  East/West  and  North/South  divides.  In  centre-periphery  terms,  the 
relationship  between  North  and  South  is  defined  by  two  basic  processes.  First,  the 
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periphery.  Second,  the  North  also  sought  labour  to  support  the  industrial  process,  and 
the  supplier  was  again  the  South.  The  struggle  between  the  superpowers  was  thus 
rooted  in  the  need  to  gain  (access  to)  such  privileges  and  resources  as  raw  material 
and  labour  or  to  deny  access  to  the  other.  This  competition  centred  on  the  rivalry 
between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  the  focus  of  competition  often  being 
the  developing  countries. 
Short  (1993)  argues  that  during  the  years  of  the  'cold  war'  international 
politics  and  relations  were  largely  shaped  and  governed  by  the  economic  rivalry  and 
ideological  confrontation  between  the  two  major  superpowers,  the  United  States  and 
the  USSR.  He  contends  in  this  regard  that  "the  political  geography  of  the  world  order 
has,  until  very recently,  been  dominated  by  the  actions  of  the  two  superpowers.  The 
USA  and  USSR  have  dominated  the  world  -  indeed,  to  all  intents  and  purposes  they 
were  the  world  order.  They  provided  the  context  in  which  other  nations  adopted 
foreign  policies  and  pursued  economic  objectives.  "  (p.  57).  Short  also  explains  the  real 
aims  of  the  two  superpowers  in  the  international  order  as  those  of  securing, 
preserving  and  extending  areas  of  political  and  economic  influence.  Thus, 
"[s]uperpowers  attempt  to  maintain  and  improve  their  geopolitical  position  by 
extending  their  relative  spheres  of  influence"  and  that  "[t]he  goal  of  superpowers  is  to 
maintain  their  position  on  top  of  the  world  order.  They  achieved  their  status  through 
economic  power,  military  might  and  political  influence.  "  (p.  72).  Macfarlane  (1990) 
explains  the  competition  for  influence  and  domination  in  the  Third  World  between  the 
USA  and  USSR  in  terms  of  the  ideological  feud  between  these  two  camps  as  well  as  a 
perceived  vacuum  in  the  post-independence  Third  World.  Third  World  countries  in 
turn  were  able  to  foster  competition  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
by  'playing  off  one  superpower  against  the  other. 
The  confrontation  between  the  two  superpowers  and  the  polarisation  in 
international  relations  and  politics  that  resulted  was,  according  to  scholars  (e.  g.  Short 
(1993)  Rajab  (1989)),  rooted  in  a  relentless  straggle  for  economic  and  political 
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political  ideological  influence  generally  took  different  forms,  including  the  provision 
of  economic  subsidies  to  client  countries.  One  notable  way  of  winning  over  countries 
to  the  political  ideology  and  economic  philosophy  of  a  superpower  state  and  a  way  for 
the  latter  to  safeguard  political  and  economic  interests.  However,  pursuit  of  economic 
and  political  dominance  has  not  always  been  indirect  and  would  take  a  different  and 
more  direct  form  in  the  event  the  interests  of  the  superpower  are  seriously  threatened. 
The  threat  to  the  interests  of  the  West  as  a  result  of  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  saw 
the  mobilisation  of  Western  forces  against  the  invading  Iraqi  regime.  Other  instances 
include  the  USSR's  support  for  the  socialist  regime  in  the  Afghanistan  war  and  the 
alignment  of  the  US  with  the  'Mujahdeen'  in  their  war  with  the  socialist  government. 
Confrontation  became  inevitable  when  the  interests  of  either  superpower  came  under 
threat. 
The  Third  World  has  been  divided  into  three  types  of  camps:  First,  the  pro- 
Eastern  bloc,  aligned  to  the  USSP,  such  as  Cuba,  China,  Nicaragua,  Libya,  South  and 
Yemen;  second,  the  pro-Western  bloc,  aligned  to  the  US,  such  as  the  Gulf  states, 
Jordan,  much  of  South  East  Asia  including  Thailand  and  Singapore  and,  third,  the 
'Non-aligned'  countries,  neutral  towards  both  former  blocs,  such  as  India  (see  Frank 
(1992)). 
For  many  Third  world  countries,  the  post-independence  situation  was  one  of 
economic  struggle  and  political  instability.  Coupled  with  weak  governments,  these 
factors  made  Third  World  countries  especially  easy  targets  for  domination  by  the 
superpowers.  As  a  result  of  the  pressure  exerted  by  the  superpowers  on  decolonising 
and  post-colonial  countries,  and  in  an  attempt  to  break  away  from  at  least  diminish  the 
level  of  superpowers'  dominance,  a  move  was  made  to  create  a  non-aligned  bloc. 
Third  World  countries  also  sought  tighter  and  stronger  relations  with  their  (regional) 
neighbours  with  a  view  to  decreasing  the  superpower's  influence  and  domination.  The 
majority  of  scholars  (e.  g.,  Dikshit  (1975),  Duchaeck  (1970))  attribute  the  emergence 
of  various  forms  of  unions  (i.  e.,  federations,  confederations,  etc.  )  among  Third  World 
countries  to  the  threat  created  by  superpower  hegemony  and  to  the  need  among  such 
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The  Middle  East  was  looked  upon  by  the  major  power  players  as  a  buffer  zone 
in  the  confrontation  between  the  East/West  and,  thus,  became  a  focal  point  of 
struggle  between  the  two  rival  blocs  before  and  after  the  Cold  War.  Short  (1993) 
argued  that  between  1947  and  1964  the  Soviet  Union's  presence  in  the  Third  World 
centred  on  the  fostering  of  local  nationalist  movements  against  capitalism.  Thus,  in  the 
Arab  world,  the  Soviets  supported  nationalist  movements  in  Egypt,  Syria,  Iraq,  South 
Yemen,  Oman  and  Libya.  Prodded  by  the  Soviets,  the  Arab  revolutionary  regimes 
pursued  ideals  of  Pan-Arabism  in  the  1960s  and  early  1970s  in  their  attempt  to 
confront  neo-capitalism.  In  reaction,  and  to  safeguard  and  consolidate  Western 
interests  in  the  region,  the  West  strengthened  its  relationship  with  Israel  and 
supported  the  conservative  Middle  Eastern  regimes,  especially  the  oil  rich  states  of  the 
Gulf 
Following  the  emergence  of  revolutionary  regimes  in  some  of  the  Arab  states 
in  the  early  1950s,  the  confrontation  in  the  Middle  East  shifted  to  a  conflict  between 
the  US  and  the  newly  emergent  Arab  revolutionary  regimes.  The  Arab  states  saw  the 
creation  of  a  state  of  Israel  as  a  calculated  move  by  the  Western  bloc  to  maintain  their 
interests  in  the  Mddle  East.  According  to  al-Ebraheem  (1982),  the  inauguration  of 
Israel  as  a  state  inevitably  led  to  confrontation  and  the  subsequent  outbreak  of  the 
1948  Arab-Israeli  war.  The  1967  and  1973  Arab-Israeli  wars  were  a  continuation  of 
the  confrontation,  by  then  an  integral  part  of  the  Cold  War. 
The  Mddle  East  thus  became  an  area  of  confrontation  and  instability 
aggravated  by  the  unwavering  support  by  the  US  for  the  new  state  of  Israel 
(Ebraheem  1982).  The  West's  endorsement  and  support  of  Israel  created  deep-seated 
resentment  in  the  Arab  world.  The  East/West  stand-off  affected  the  various  countries 
of  the  Arab  world  to  different  degrees.  The  Arab  countries  of  North  Affica  proved 
highly  susceptible  to  socialism,  with  the  emergence  in  a  number  of  them  of 
revolutionary  and/or  socialist  regimes.  A  contributory  factor  in  the  emergence  of  these 
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the  case  in  Libya  and  Egypt.  The  more  conservative  Gulf  states,  however,  were 
resistant  to  the  spread  of  socialism  on  account  of  it  being  contradictory  to  the 
principles  of  Islam  and  to  the  strength  of  the  existing  political  regimes.  While 
antithetical  to  the  traditional  monarchical  regimes,  and  though  the  socialist  ideology 
was  rejected  by  the  conservative  Gulf  states,  socialism  remained  a  constant  threat  in 
the  region  partly  on  account  of  it  having  taken  such  a  strong  hold  in  such  countries  as 
South  Yemen,  Egypt,  under  the  nationalist  regime  of  Nasser,  and  Iraq,  under  the 
Ba'thist  socialist  party. 
Another  aspect  of  the  changing  political  realities  of  the  Gulf  and  Middle  East 
was  the  emergence  of  Iran  as  a  new  regional  power  in  the  1970s.  Under  the  Shah  and 
backed  by  the  West  especially  the  US,  Iran  emerged  as  a  new  guardian  of  the  West's 
interests  in  the  region,  and  as  a  new  bastion  against  the  spread  of  Soviet  influence  and 
threat  in  the  Gulf.  After  the  collapse  of  the  pro-Western  regime  of  the  Shah  and  the 
institution  of  an  Islamic  revolutionary  regime  publicly  antagonistic  to  the  US,  the 
latter  began  grooming  Iraq  as  the  new  regional  power  and  the  new  ally  in  the  region. 
The  struggle  in  the  Gulf  region  between  the  two  superpowers  was  essentially 
driven  by  economic  interests  and  search  for  political  influence.  The  end  of  the  colonial 
period  saw  the  Gulf  sheikhdoms  in  search  of  another  superpower  to  assume  Britain's 
role  in  maintaining  security  in  the  region,  causing  heightened  tension  and  an  increased 
rivalry  between  the  new  superpowers. 
The  Gulf  s  natural  resources,  and  especially  its  immense  oil  reserves,  made  the 
area  of  obvious  importance  geopolitically  for  the  West,  and  for  the  US,  in  particular. 
The  political  stability  of  the  Gulf  region  was  at  the  forefront  of  the  US  foreign  policy 
concerns  owing  to  its  huge  oil  resources,  both  prior  to  and  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
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World  Order  and  the  Emergence  of  GCC: 
The  demise  of  Great  Britain  as  a  colonial  power,  and  its  withdrawal  from  the 
Gulf  region  in  1960's  and  1970's  had  important  local  implications.  A]-Otaiby  (1984) 
argued  that  Britain's  withdrawal  highlighted  two  problems.  First,  withdrawal  was 
accompanied  by  the  creation  of  several  mini-states  in  the  Gulf  region,  which  had 
formerly  been  under  the  aegis  of  the  imperial  power.  From  the  British  point  of  view, 
the  reason  for  withdrawal  was  financial.  The  West  saw  the  creation  of  these  new  Gulf 
states  as  a  positive  step  towards  the  maintaining  of  stability  in  the  region.  AI-Otaiby 
(1984)  asserted  that  Britain's  decision  to  terminate  its  presence  in  that  part  of  the 
world  contributed  to  increased  instability  in  the  area.  Paradoxically,  withdrawal  was 
accompanied  by  increasing  dependence  on  oil  by  the  world  economy-  the  West's 
interests  in  the  region  was  increasing. 
Second,  withdrawal  of  Britain  from  the  Gulf  opened  the  door  for  a  struggle 
between  the  new  superpowers  -  the  USA  and  the  USSR  -  as  these  vied  for  economic 
and  political  influence  and  supremacy  in  the  region.  The  rivalry  that  characterised  the 
relations  between  the  two  superpowers  as  they  competed  for  economic  and  political 
advantages  was  one  factor,  but  no  means  the  only  factor,  that  motivated  the 
emergence  of  the  GCC.  The  discussion  will  next  turn  to  the  various  reasons  generally 
accepted  as  having  contributed  to  the  rise  of  the  GCC.  The  aim  will  be  to  determine 
the  nature  or  role  a  number  of  factors  played  in  the  creation  of  the  GCC. 
5.4  The  Establishment  of  the  GCC: 
As  noted  previously,  the  reasons  underlying  the  establishment  of  GCC 
involved  a  combination  of  both  external  and  internal  factors.  This  section  outlines 
these  two  factors  relating  them  to  the  changing  world  orders  in  which  the  Gulf  region 
has  been  'located'.  Both  reasons  generated  pressures  on  the  Gulf  states  to  pursue 
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A.  Extenialfactors: 
Several  factors  help  explain  why  the  GCC  was  established: 
The  Islamic  revolution  in  Iran:  The  collapse  of  the  moderate  and  conspicuously  pro- 
American  Shah  regime  in  Iran  led  to  much  political  turbulence  in  Iran  in  1979.  As  al- 
Otaiby  (1984)  has  argued  the  Islamic  Shi'ite  revolution  caused  considerable 
apprehension  in  the  Gulf  states.  Since  Iran  was  a  major  regional  Gulf  power,  the 
upheaval  in  it  created  a  apprehension  among  not  only  the  Gulf  states  but  also  the 
major  superpowers  and  particularly  the  US.  During  the  Shah's  regime,  the  US  was 
actively  engaged  in  strengthening  its  military  presence  in  the  Gulf  to  maintain  the 
stability  of  the  region  and  the  security  of  its  own  interests  and  those  of  the  West 
generally.  The  Americans  used  their  leverage  with  the  Shah  to  ensure  that  their  own 
interests  in  the  Gulf  region  would  be  maintained.  They  also  built  up  Iran's  military 
arsenal  with  a  view  to  turning  Iran  into  a  prospective  'policeman'  of  the  Gulf  and  to 
halt  any  possible  political  turbulence  and  agitation  in  the  region.  However,  the  largely 
unanticipated  coup  d'6tat  against  the  Shah  in  1979,  the  exit  of  the  latter  from  Iran  and 
the  revolution  of  Ayatollah  Rohollah  Khomeini  which  swept  over  the  country  turned 
the  US  policy  in  the  Gulf  upside  down. 
The  Islamic  revolutionary  elites  in  Iran  announced  publicly  the  illegitimacy  of 
monarchy  in  Islam,  implying  that,  from  the  perspective  of  the  Islamic  faith,  the  Gulf 
regimes  were  unlawful.  As  noted  by  Ramazani  (1979),  the  Iranian  government  sought 
to  inflame  local  unrest  by  reasserting  its  commitment  not  to  relinquish  control  over 
the  two  UAE  islands  of  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunabs  which  had  been  annexed  by  Iran 
during  the  Shah  regime.  Moreover,  Iran's  claim  during  the  Shah's  regime  that 
Bahrain,  because  of  its  majority  Shi'ite  population,  was  part  of  the  Great  Persian 
Empire  was  reasserted  by  the  new  Islamic  regime  in  Iran.  These  claims  were  the  first 
of  a  series  of  policies  designed  by  the  new  Iranian  leadership  to  create  unrest  in  the 
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The  Islamic  ShPite  fundamentalist  leaders  of  Iran  threatened  to  export  the 
Islamic  revolution  to  neighbouring  countries,  a  direct  threat  to  the  Gulf  regimes  and 
Iraq.  The  Iranian  government  threatened  to  'use'  the  ShPite  Moslems  in  the  Gulf 
states  to  cause  agitation  and  political  upheaval  in  the  Gulf  This  in  turn  represented  a 
direct  threat  to  the  US  and  Western  interests.  The  Iranian  government  stirred  up 
confrontation  and  aggression  in  the  Gulf  by  a  determined  effort  to  take  and  hold 
Western  hostages.  Thus,  not  only  the  Western  economy  was  to  come  under  threat, 
but  the  whole  West  became  a  target  for  Iranian  revolution.  The  Gulf  states' 
cooperation  and  policy  coordination  in  the  face  of  Iranian  threat  was  fragmented  and, 
at  best,  minimal  in  the  early  years  of  the  war.  Confronted  with  the  imminent  Iranian 
threat,  the  formation  of  the  GCC  was  the  only  viable  course  open  for  the  Gulf  states 
in  order  to  preserve  their  sovereignty  against  Iranian  intimidation  and  aggression.  . 
Thus,  the  Iranian  revolution  provided  a  forcible  impetus  for  the  Gulf  states  to 
seek  some  type  of  unification  for  the  purpose  of  ensuring  their  survival  and  political 
stability.  The  West's  support  for  the  nascent  GCC  was  necessary  to  ensure  the 
success  of  the  experiment,  strengthen  the  stability  of  the  organisation's  member  states, 
and,  by  implication,  protect  and  preserve  Western  interests  in  the  Gulf.  The  role  of  the 
Islamic  revolution  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC  organisation  was  undeniable,  (see 
also  al-Feshawai  (1992)). 
Iran/Iraq  war:  Though  it  was  Iraq  which  declared  war  on  Iran  during  the  1979 
armed  conflict,  which  was  to  prove  so  catastrophic  for  both  sides,  it  was  Iran  that  in 
fact  provoked  Iraq  into  starting  the  war  through  its  continuous  attempts  at  stirring 
unrest  among  the  Shi'ite  population  of  Iraq  (see  el-Rayyes  (1988).  A  series  of  acts  of 
aggression  undertaken  by  either  side  along  the  Iraqi/Iranian  border  compelled  Iraq  to 
cancel  the  Algeria  Pact,  agreed  between  the  two  countries  during  the  Shah's  rule 
stipulating  the  joint  use  of  the  Shutt  al-  Arab  waters. 
Iraq  also  represented  another  threat  to  the  Gulf  states.  However,  the 
involvement  of  the  regional  powers  of  Iran  and  Iraq  in  a  protracted  war  prevented 
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states  resolved  to  pursue  cooperation  among  themselves,  there  followed  prolonged 
negotiations  as  to  the  type(s)  of  coordination  which  would  be  of  mutual  benefit.  The 
nascent  GCC  organisation  was  intended'  according  to  the  description  of  the  first 
Secretary  General,  Abdullah  Bishara,  to  enable  the  participating  units  to  coordinate 
their  policies  in  the  face  of  rising  regional  and  global  uncertainties.  He  asserted  that 
the  GCC  did  not  represent  an  alliance  or  threat  against  a  specific  bloc  or  nation,  and  it 
was  hoped  that,  by  enhancing  and  strengthening  cooperation  among  its  members,  the 
Gulf  region  would  both  enjoy  peace  and  be  able  to  promote  international  and  regional 
order  (Bishara,  1982). 
Both  parties  to  the  Iran/Iraq  war  did  their  level  best  to  drag  the  various  Gulf 
states  into  the  conflict  either  through  direct  threats  or  more  specifically  through 
threats  to  the  stability  of  navigation  in  the  region  (see  also  Obied,  1996).  The  Iranian 
regime  threatened  the  Gulf  states  who  supported  Iraq.  Those  Gulf  states  that  sided 
with  Iraq  in  its  war  against  Iran,  mainly  Kuwait  and  Saudi  Arabia,  were  in  fact 
'forced'  to  do  so  by  Iraq;  it  seems  that,  with  hindsight,  a  refusal  to  support  Iraq  would 
have  meant  that  the  invasion  of  Kuwait  would  have  taken  place  even  earlier  than 
August  1990.  The  role  of  the  Iran/Iraq  war  could  thus  be  seen  as  one  of  the  most 
important  motivating  factors  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC  (for  more  of  discussion  of 
the  role  of  Iran/Iraq  war  see  chapter  8,9,  and  11). 
The  Soviet  Union  threat:  The  USSR  has  tried  to  establish  and  maintain  a 
presence  in  the  Arabian  Gulf  through  influence  and  leverage  in  the  socialist-inclined 
states  of  Iran,  Iraq,  and  South  Yemen.  Ramazani  (1979)  alleges  that  since  the  early 
1960s,  the  USSR  sought  to  increase  its  influence  in  the  region  via  support  for  national 
liberation  movements  and  socialist-inclined  governments.  The  Soviet  Union  used  its 
economic  leverage  with  South  Yemen  (to  whom  it  was  also  giving  military  aid)  as 
part  of  its  policy  of  rapprochement  within  the  region.  Yet,  as  Rammazani  (1979) 
argued,  the  Soviet  Union's  policy  of  rapprochement  failed  within  the  conservative 
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The  USSR!  s  influence  first  appeared  in  the  Gulf  region  when  the  Iraqi  regime 
signed  a  Treaty  of  Friendship  with  it  in  1972.  The  treaty  included  also  an  economic 
agreement  in  which  the  USSR  would  be  able  to  exploit  the  oil  wealth  from  the  'North 
Rumailah'  oil  field  in  the  south  of  Iraq.  The  Soviet  Union  hoped  that  the 
rapprochement  with  Iraq  would  give  them  a  Middle-East  platform  to  project  its  anti- 
Western  propaganda  in  the  Gulf  However,  their  expectations  were  not  to  materialise, 
though  the  Iraqi  rapprochement  with  the  Soviet  Union  did  create  a  situation  of  alarm 
among  the  Gulf  states.  The  Soviet  Union's  invasion  of  Afghanistan  in  December 
1979,  which  was  driven  according  to  many  (see,  e.  g.,  Page,  1979)  by  the  need  to  gain 
access  to  the  Gulf,  intensified  fear  among  the  Gulf  states.  The  Soviet's  invasion  of 
Afghanistan  met  with  strong  condemnation  from  all  the  Moslem  states,  with  the 
exception  of  the  socialist  regimes  in  Libya,  South  Yemen,  and  Syria.  The  Gulf  states, 
first  among  the  Moslem  countries  to  protest  and  condemn  the  invasion,  stipulated  a 
full  and  an  unconditional  withdrawal  of  forces  from  Afghanistan  before  any  sort  of 
relations  could  be  re-established. 
The  Brezhnev  Peace  Plan,  proposed  by  the  Soviet  Premier  Brezhnev  in 
December,  1980  during  a  visit  to  India,  was  completely  rejected  by  the  Gulf  states. 
The  Soviet  plan  called  for  a  halt  to  any  military  bases  or  interference,  and  any  use  of 
force  in  search  of  some  form  of  a  hegemony  in  the  Gulf  region,  in  addition  to  the  total 
respect  for  the  sovereignty  of  each  of  the  Gulf  states  (Kusnetsov  1981). 
The  Gulf  states  rejected  the  Soviet  proposal  and  insisted  on  a  filll  withdrawal 
from  Afghanistan  prior  to  re-initiating  any  diplomatic  relationships  with  the  Soviet 
Union  (see  Page  (1979)  for  similar  point).  The  Soviet  Union's  support  of  the  Dhofar 
Liberation  movement  in  Oman,  viewed  by  the  Gulf  states  as  socialist-inclined,  ruled 
out  any  sort  of  diplomatic  links  between  the  Gulf  states  and  USSR  and  increased  their 
fear  of  the  Soviet  threat  during  the  1970s.  The  exacerbation  of  the  situation  in 
Afghanistan  heightened  the  small  Gulf  states'  concern  for  stability  and  the  need  for 
cooperation  to  ensure  internal  and  external  security,  (see  also  al-Alkim  (1994)).  To 
the  Gulf  states,  the  Soviet  Union's  threat  was  an  important  and  concrete  external 
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The  Israeli  Problem:  In  his  discussion  of  the  Israeli  threat  to  the  Gulf  states, 
two  aspects  which  have  had  direct  bearing  on  the  formation  of  the  GCC  -  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  and  the  major  security  and  stability  challenges  it  has  posed  and 
continues  to  pose  for  the  region;  and,  the  Israeli  attack  on  the  Iraqi  nuclear  facility  at 
Osirak,  near  Baghdad,  on  June  7,1981  (Kechichian  1985).  This  demonstrated  the 
threat  to  security  in  the  Gulf  region  and  the  vulnerability  of  most  Gulf  states  to 
possible  Israeli  aggression.  The  Gulf  states,  much  like  the  rest  of  the  Arab  countries, 
endorsed  the  Palestinians'  cause  and  called  for  a  full  resolution  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  Some  analysts  have  argued  that  the  Gulf  states  took  the  possibility  of  an 
invasion  from  Israel  seriously,  especially  after  the  Israeli  attack  on  the  nuclear  facility 
in  Iraq  (Kechichian  1985). 
Though  an  Israeli  Invasion  of  any  of  the  Gulf  states  was  unlikely,  the  Israeli 
invasion  of  South  Lebanon  affirmed  their  fear  of  Israel's  intentions,  and  increased  the 
level  of  confrontation  in  the  Middle  East  region.  The  Israeli  actions  not  only  increased 
the  Gulf  states'  fears,  but,  more  importantly,  highlighted  the  weakness  of  the  Arab 
states  in  repelling  any  such  threat.  The  attack  on  the  Iraqi  nuclear  facility  also  raised 
doubts  on  the  political  and  military  leverage  and  efficacy  of  the  Arab  League.  The 
United  States,  a  major  ally  to  Israel,  vetoed  the  United  Nations'  adoption  of 
Resolution  242  calling  for  the  withdrawal  of  Israel  from  Arab  territories  annexed 
following  the  1968  Arab-Israeli  war.  The  US  and  generally  the  West's  advocacy  of 
Israel  provided  the  GCC  states  with  one  more  reason  for  pursuing  regional 
cooperation  in  order  to  secure  their  own  political  stability  and  survival.  The  role  of  the 
Israeli  threat  in  the  formation  of  the  GCC  might  thus  not  be  the  most  important 
factor,  but,  no  doubt,  was  significant. 
5.5  The  New  World  Order  and  Its  Important  in  the  Gulf  ReRion: 
The  collapse  of  the  USSR  in  1989  signalled  the  arrival  of  a  new  world  era 
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the  emergence  of  the  US  as  the  dominant  power  in  the  world.  The  USA  stood  as  the 
only  power  capable  and  willing  to  deploy  a  substantial  military  presence  in  the  Gulf 
region  in  the  event  of  external  aggression  (Bryen  and  Noble  1991).  According  to 
Freedman  and  Karsh  (1992),  such  late  1970s  and  1980s  events  as  the  Afghan  war, 
Iranian  revolution,  Iran-Iraq  war,  Israeli  invasion  of  South  Lebanon  and  Infifada 
eruption  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip,  were  some  of  the  ramifications  of  the  new 
world  order  in  the  Middle  East. 
As  part  of  its  efforts  to  instate  a  new  order  in  the  world,  the  US,  as  the  lone 
military  and  economic  superpower  in  the  world  and  the  dominant  force  in 
international  diplomacy,  tried  to  settle  the  unresolved  national  and  regional  issues  and 
problems.  Bryen  and  Noble  (1991)  alleged  that,  in  the  aim  of  asserting  and 
consolidating  its  hegemony  in  the  Gulf  region,  the  US  manoeuvred  hard  to  prevent 
any  other  power,  including  Russia,  from  any  active  involvement  in  the  resolution  of 
the  Arab-Israeli  conflict. 
Gulf  Crisis:  The  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  on  August  2,1990  and  the 
annexation  of  Kuwait  to  Iraq  caused  a  major  change  in  the  Arab  countries  inter- 
relations  as  well  as  a  major  split  among  them.  Iraq  alleged  that  Kuwait  was 
historically  part  of  Iraq  (its  19th  province)  and,  to  that  extent,  Kuwait  had  no 
legitimate  claim  to  independent  sovereignty.  The  Iraqi  annexation  of  Kuwait  was  met 
with  near  universal  condemnation  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  if  only  because  the 
annexation  of  Kuwait  would  mean  that  it  would  have  control  over  massive  oil 
reserves  and,  inevitably,  control  over  oil  prices,  threatening  thereby  the  interests  of  the 
world's  nations,  especially  the  West  (see  al-Saquar  (1995)). 
The  Iraqi  government  aims  were  not  only  to  seize  Kuwait  but  also,  in  the 
longer  term,  to  undermine  the  political  stability  of  the  rest  of  the  countries  of  the  Gulf 
The  United  States,  in  its  reaction  to  the  Iraqi  invasion  and  in  an  attempt  to  restore  the 
status  quo  in  the  region,  took  the  lead  against  the  Iraqi  aggression.  As  a  result  of  the 
threat  to  its  own  and  the  West's  interests  in  the  Gulf  created  by  the  invasion,  the  US 
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repel  the  Iraqi  aggression.  In  its  turn,  the  Iraqi  government's  media  reacted  angrily 
calling  for  an  Islamic  alliance  against  the  international  coalition  led  by  the  USA. 
Saddam  Hussein's  invasion  of  Kuwait,  however,  failed  to  draw  any  significant  support 
within  the  Arab  world  (Falah  (1993)).  Also,  US  military  intervention  in  the  region  was 
fundamentally  motivated  by  the  need  to  ensure  control  over  the  oil  reserves  in  the 
Gulf  remained  in  the  hands  of  Pro-American  regimes.  While  it  is  true  that  the  US 
intervention  in  the  Gulf  crisis  was  driven  by  considerations  of  interests,  it  is  equally 
true  that  such  an  intervention  took  place  only  after  the  Arab  League  failed  to  find  a 
solution  to  the  crisis.  The  inability  of  the  GCC  countries  in  countering  the  might  of 
Iraqi  army  left  the  GCC  states  with  no  choice  but  request  foreign  help  to  repel  the 
aggression  of  Saddam's  regime  (see  also  Cordesman  (1993)  for  a  similar  argument). 
In  an  attempt  to  rally  Arab  support  for  its  invasion  of  Kuwait,  the  Iraqi  regime 
resorted  to  a  number  of  strategies.  First,  the  Iraqi  regime  sought  to  split  the  Arab 
countries  by  tying  the  Kuwaiti  crisis  with  the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict  proposing  that 
the  Iraqi  army  would  immediately  withdraw  from  Kuwait  if  Israel  were  to  withdraw 
from  the  occupied  territories.  Second,  the  Iraqi  president  called  for  a  fairer 
distribution  of  the  wealth  accruing  from  the  oil  between  the  Arab  countries.  Though 
Saddam's  call  was  met  with  some  sympathy  among  the  poorer  Arab  countries,  the 
Iraqi  tactics  failed  miserably  (Kemp  (1991)).  It  is  not  difficult  to  see  why  the  Iraqi 
tactics  to  split  the  Arab  world  did  not  come  to  any  fruition.  Iraq's  claim  that  the 
presence  of  Western  troops  on  Saudi  soil  constituted  an  act  of  desecration  of  the  two 
holy  places  of  Mecca  and  Madina,  a  tactic  adopted  with  the  aim  of  inflaming  anti- 
Western  sentiment  among  the  Moslem  population  at  large  against  the  allies,  did  not 
trigger  any  response  among  Arabs  and  Moslems  for  the  obvious  reason  that  Western 
and  foreign  troops  were  stationed  along  the  Saudi-Kuwaiti  borders,  far  removed  from 
the  holy  sites.  Falah  (1993)  argues  that  the  US  military  presence  will  continue  to  exist 
in  the  Gulf,  and  in  the  Arabian  Peninsula,  in  particular,  well  into  the  next  century.  The 
continued  threat  to  US  interests  of  a  hostile  regime  in  Tehran  ensures  that  the  US  is 
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In  part  the  continued  instability  of  the  Gulf  region  is  due  to  the  West's  policy. 
The  West  was  unwilling  to  depose  Saddam  Hussein  from  power  so  that  as  the  'crisis' 
of  late  1997  (arising  from  denying  access  to  the  UN  to  Royal  Palaces  in  Iraq)  showed, 
he  is  able  to  play  off  the  Western  allies  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States.  Yet,  to 
have  deposed  Saddarn  Hussein  in  1990  would  have  opened  the  way  for  Iran  to 
encourage  and  support  pro-Iranian  Shi'ites  to  assume  power.  Clearly,  a  pro-Iranian 
Iraq  would  have  a  further  destabilising  effect  on  the  GCC  member  states.  Also,  the 
deposing  of  Saddarn  Hussein  would  open  the  way  for  Syria  to  assume  a  more 
dominant  role,  creating  in  turn  a  threat  not  only  for  the  GCC  member  states  but  for 
Israel  as  well.  The  changing  of  the  status  quo  could  lead  to  an  alliance  of  Syria  and 
Iran  which  would  affect  the  political  stability  the  Gulf  region  and  threaten  the  West's 
interests.  As  argued  by  Falah  (1993),  by  retaining  Saddarn  in  power,  protection  pacts 
could  be  signed  with  the  many  Gulf  states,  and  such  'rogue'  states  as  Iran  and  Syria 
would  be  deprived  of  gaining  any  political  advantages. 
The  Gulf  crisis  was  the  event  which  fragmented  the  Arab  world  and  split  the 
Arab  order  into  two  camps:  Iraq's  allies  including  Jordan,  Sudan,  Algeria,  and  Yemen, 
and  the  GCC  allies  including  Egypt  and  Syria.  The  fragmentation  of  the  Arab  world 
led  inevitably  to  hostility  between  many  of  the  Arab  world  countries.  The  Gulf  crisis 
has  created  lasting  political,  economic,  (and  environmental)  problems  for  both  camps 
and  as  part  of  the  new  world  order  -  as  well  as  outcome  of  it  -  has  had  a  significant 
political  impact  on  the  GCC. 
The  Peace  Process:  The  prospects  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East  prior  to  the  advent  of 
the  new  world  order,  and  especially  before  the  Gulf  crisis,  were  in  an  impasse. 
However,  it  is  arguable  at  least  that  the  Gulf  crisis  changed  the  aggressive  mood 
which  characterised  the  politics  of  the  region  and  was  contributory  to  a  new  era  of 
peace-making  in  the  region. 
A  lasting  Arab-Israeli  peace,  in  general,  and  a  permanent  resolution  of  the 
Palestinian-Israeli  conflict,  in  particular,  were  first  approached  during  secret 
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hostile  parties,  the  Arabs  and  the  Israelis,  was  one  of  the  major  ramifications  of  the 
new  world  order.  The  peace  process  aimed  to  generate  and  ensure  both  stability  and 
security  in  the  Middle  East,  including  the  Gulf  region.  The  influential  role  of  the  US  as 
a  superpower  in  resolving  regional  conflicts  crystallised  in  the  peace  process.  Both 
Israel  and  the  Palestinian  Liberation  Organisation  (PLO)  were  pushed  by  the  US  to 
settle  their  disputes  and  seek  a  lasting  settlement  of  their  conflict.  Thus,  in  September 
1993,  the  head  of  PLO  and  the  Israeli  Prime  minister  signed  a  peace  agreement  in 
Washington  to  end  the  hostilities  and  conflict  between  the  two  nations. 
The  GCC  encourage  the  peace  process  and  endorsed  the  agreements  signed 
between  the  PLO  and  Israel  and  between  Jordan  and  Israel  even  though  both  Jordan 
and  PLO  sided  with  Iraq  during  the  Gulf  crisis.  For  the  GCC,  peace  between  the 
Arabs  and  Israelis  was  a  welcome  development  as  they  had  always  thought  of  Israel 
as  a  threat  to  their  stability  and  security,  (see  al-Alkim  (1994).  The  GCC  support  for 
the  peace  agreement  and  the  peace  process  took  the  form  of  economic  aid  to  the 
Palestinians  and  such  member  states  as  Qatar  and  Oman  opening  diplomatic  relations 
with  the  state  of  Israel.  The  GCC  sought  from  its  support  for  the  peace  agreement 
between  the  Palestinians  and  the  Israelis  an  end  to  the  Israeli  threat  and  a  lasting 
peace  in  the  Gulf  area.  Yet,  by  the  latter  half  of  the  1990s,  following  the  election  of 
the  Right  to  power  in  Israel,  the  peace  process  seems  all  but  stalled. 
5.6  Overview: 
Throughout  the  cold  war  era,  the  two  major  superpowers  shaped  the  world 
order  and  their  rivalry  and  ideological  conflict  dominated  international  relations  and 
deten-nined  the  conditions  within  which  other  countries  of  international  community 
formulated  their  foreign  policies  and  defined  economic  policies  and  objectives. 
Recently,  however,  the  bipolar  structure  of  capitalist  West  versus  socialist  East  that 
characterised  the  world  order  of  the  cold  war  era  collapsed,  giving  way  to  the  a  new 
old  order  and  a  new  balance  of  global  power.  The  old  world  order,  dominated  by  two 
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supreme  as  the  undisputed  military  superpower  and  the  strongest  economy  in  the 
world. 
This  chapter  examined  how  Gulf  political  geography  in  general  and  the  GCC 
in  particular  evolved  in  the  political  and  economic  contexts  of  both  the  old  world 
order  and  the  new  world  order.  I-Estorically,  the  roots  of  the  GCC  lies  in  the 
foundations  laid  by  the  British  and  their  withdrawal,  but  it  was  regional  crisis  that 
were  to  be  instrumental  to  its  formation.  These  crisis  evolved  against  the  changing 
backdrop  of  post-  1945  international  relations.  The  role  of  political  and  economic 
conditions  associated  with  both  the  old  and  the  new  world  orders  in  the  creation  of 
the  GCC  will  be  taken  up  again  in  later  chapters  where  an  attempt  will  be  made  to 
examine  the  perceived  role  and  importance  of  these  conditions  among  both  Gulf 
citizens  and  Gulf  political  elites. Chapter  Six: 
The  Role  of  Tribalism  &  Arab  Nationalism  in  the  GCC's 
Establishment  and  Performance 
6.1  Introduction: 
T  his  chapter  examines  the  two  related  socio-political  phenomena  of  tribalism 
and  Arab  nationalism  in  the  context  of  the  Gulf  states  before  and  after  the 
1980s,  and  particularly  in  the  role  they  have  played  leading  to  the  emergence 
of  the  GCC  and  its  subsequent  performance.  The  chapter  starts  with  a  definition  of 
the  notion  of  the  'state'  in  the  context  of  the  Gulf  states.  The  meanings  of  'tribalism' 
and  'Arab  nationalism'  are  discussed  and  the  various  factors  promoting  the  persistence 
of  them  will  be  considered  in  section  6.2.  The  key  question  as  to  the  bearing  of  these 
factors  on  the  creation  and  working  of  the  GCC  will  be  addressed  the  penultimate 
section. 
The  Gulf  states  have  generally  been  described  as  'rudimentary'  sheikhdoms, 
partly  because  of  the  importance  tribal  relations  have  had  traditionally  in  the  littoral 
states.  They  continue  to  be  viewed  as  "BedouiW'  or  tribal  societies  even  after  the 
transformations  that  Gulf  society  has  witnessed  following  the  oil  boom  (see  among 
others  Gause,  1994). 
The  ideology  of  Arab  nationalism  which  swept  through  the  Arab  world  in  the 
twentieth  century  affected  the  Gulf  though  not  as  much  as  elsewhere.  Halliday  (1980) 
argues  that,  though  the  Gulf  rulers  were  alarmed  by  the  kind  of  Arab  nationalism  that 
was  advocated  by  Nasserist  Egypt  and  local  opposition  political  groups  within  the 
Gulf  favouring  one  or  other  version  of  Arab  nationalism,  the  Gulf  region  remained 
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contends  that  the  creation  of  the  GCC  was  born  out  of  the  perceived  needs  of  the 
ruling  elites  of  member  states  to  forge  a  regional  alliance  that  would  allow  them  to 
overcome  the  emergence  of  such  opposition  forces  and  their  realisation  that  they 
would  have  to  form  some  kind  of  political  union.  The  establishment  of  the  GCC  was 
in  this  sense  a  response  to  the  danger  that  the  increasingly  influential  ideology  of  Arab 
nationalism  posed  for  the  small  conservative  states  of  the  Gulf. 
6.2  Derinition  &  Nature  of  the  State  in  the  Context  of  the  Gulf: 
Definitions  of  the  concept  'state'  vary,  however,  the  concept  has  in  general 
been  interpreted  as  denoting  the  set  of  political  institutions  which  have  both  power 
and  sovereignty  over  a  certain  territory  (Evans,  1985).  Accordingly,  the  concept  of 
the  state  involves  two  major  components  or  functions;  a  functional  role  -  the  functions 
of  the  state  -  and  an  operational  role  -  the  process  whereby  the  state  operates.  At  the 
core  of  the  'state'  are  thus  two  conceptual  elements:  power,  defined  as  the  ability  to 
govern,  and  sovereignty,  defined  as  the  ability  of  the  state  to  legitimately  protect  its 
territory  and  exercise  authority  within  such  a  territory  (Riyadha,  1992,  pp.  14-15). 
Harik  (1990)  categorised  the  Arab  states  into  five  types:  (1)  The  Imam-Chief: 
Power  in  this  type  of  system  is  centred  in  the  hands  of  a  sanctified  person.  Pre-1970 
Oman,  Cyrenaica  (Libya),  among  others,  exemplify  this  category  of  state.  (2)  The 
alliance  of  chiefs  and  Imams:  Power  is  divided  between  the  tribal  chief  and  the 
religious  leader.  This  second  category  of  Arab  states  is  best  exemplified  by  Saudi 
Arabia.  (3)  Traditional  Secular:  Authority  is  inherited  within  a  certain  family  or 
dynasty.  Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Qatar,  UAE  are  among  the  more  obvious  examples  of  this 
states.  (4)  Bureaucratic-Military  Oligarchies:  Power  is  centred  in  the  hands  of  certain 
urban-based  military  or  military-backed  leaders,  as  in  Algeria,  Tunisia,  Libya,  and 
Egypt.  Finally,  (5)  The  colonially-created  State  system:  the  consequence  of  the 
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interests.  Iraq,  Jordan,  Lebanon,  Palestine,  and  Syria  exemplify  this  type  of  state 
system  (Harik  (1990)). 
In  Harik's  classificatory  system,  the  GCC  member  states  are  all  monarchical 
systems,  with  political  power  essentially  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a  dynastic 
family.  This  helps  define  the  similarities  which  characterise  the  Gulf  states.  Drawing 
attention  to  these  and  wider  similarities  which  exist  among  the  littoral  Gulf  states, 
Christie  (1987)  wrote  "[t]here  is  the  common  language-  Arabic,  a  common  religion- 
Islam,  closely  comparable  social  structures,  roughly  the  same  standards  of  economic 
development,  and  very  similar  systems  of  government,  [ 
... 
]  [emphasis  addeff',  (p.  7). 
The'closely  comparable  social  structures'  of  the  Gulf  states  is due,  in  part,  to  the  fact 
that  most  of  the  Gulf  tribes  straddle  two  or more  state  territories. 
6.3  Tribalism  &  Arab  Nationalism 
Tribalism,  as  a  socio-cultural  phenomenon,  has  been  understood  as  a  way  of 
social  life  and  a  type  of  societal  organisation  grounded  in  certain  norms  and  habits, 
most  especially  the  custom  of  nomadism  (pastoralism).  Peterson  (1977)  notes  that  at 
the  root  of  tribalism  in  the  Gulf  is  the  phenomenon  of  the  Badil  population  (nomads). 
Gause  (1994)  saw  both  tribalism  and  Islam  as  forms  of  "traditionalism"  which 
ultimately  created  the  basis  of  politics  in  the  Gulf  states.  According  to  Ibn  Khaldun 
(1332-1406),  the  tribe  or  "Qabilah"  is  one  of  the  multi-strata  accounting  for  the 
social  and  political  hierarchy  at  the  heart  of  the  Bedouin  society.  The  nature  of  this 
hierarchy  is  illustrated  in  Figure  (6.1): Chapter  Six:  Tribalism  &Arab  Nationalism  107 
Fi2ure  6.1  The  Social  &  Political  Structure  of  the  Bedouin  Society 
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In  the  context  of  the  Arab  states,  the  concept  of  Nation'  is  deeply  rooted  and 
derives  much  of  its  significance  from  the  Islamic  principle  of  Vninia'.  Islam  sought  to 
unify  the  various  hostile  Arab  tribes  of  the  Pre-Islamic  Arab  peninsula  under  one 
Muslim  state,  what  the  Islamic  Scriptures  refer  to  as  the  'Umma'  (Muslim  Nation). 
Thus,  the  'Uninia'  is  a  wider  concept  that  encompasses  or  subsumes  both  sub-tribal 
and  supra-tribal  divisions  as  well  as  other  hierarchical  social  and  political  structures. 
Tribes  exercise  power  over  the  territories  they  control.  The  Gulf  states  differ 
as  to  how  one  or  other  major  tribe  came  to  seize  power  and  establish  political 
dominance  within  a  given  state.  The  dynasty  ruling  Saudi  Arabia  captured  power 
through  force.  Political  power  in  Bahrain,  Kuwait,  and  Qatar  was  achieved  via  trade 
and  trade  power  (Crystal,  1995).  Political  power  in  UAE  was  the  culmination  of  an 
alliance  between  several  tribes,  while  religious  leadership  was  at  the  basis  of  the 
political  system  in  the  littoral  state  of  Oman.  Al-1yobi  (1992)  asserts  that  tribal 
relations  and  alliances  have  dominated  the  basis  of  the  political  life  since  the  advent  of 
the  modem  Gulf  states  (see  also  Peterson  (1977),  Crystal  (1994),  Nawwar  (1993), 
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saw  the  equal  emergence  and  consolidation  of  the  new  ruling  family  system  in  the 
Gulf 
Central  to  the  tribal  system  and  customs  are  two  concepts:  the  Majfis  and  the 
Shoura.  The  Majlis,  the  public  session  presided  over  by  the  ruler,  is  held  so  as  to  listen 
to  the  people's  grievances.  Townsend  (1992)  describes  the  role  of  the  tribal  'niajfis' 
as  an  informal  gathering,  usually  held  in  the  evening  and  attended  by  men  seeking  to 
make  a  comment  or  a  request  or  voice  a  complaint  (p.  372).  The  Shoul-a,  a  concept 
rooted  in  the  political  system  of  Islam,  is  the  process  of  consultation  with  tribal  or 
community  elites.  `Ussabiyah"  or  tribal  affinity  is  one  of  the  key  elements  of 
tribalism.  Barakat  (1994)  asserts  that  'Ussahiyah  stands  at  the  heart  of  tribalism  and 
plays  a  major  role  in  its  existence.  One  manifestation  of  "'Ussabiyah  "  is  tribal  affinity; 
in  effect,  "'Ussahiyah  "  can  be  understood  as  tribal  politics.  The  political  hierarchy  of 
the  tribal  system  comprised  many  strata.  At  the  apex  of  the  pyramid  stands  the  Sheikh 
or  the  "Amir"  whose  power  came  from  his  wealth  and/or  his  dynastic  roots  in  the 
tribe.  The  tribal  maj1is  constitutes  the  second  most  powerful  authority  within  the  tribal 
hierarchy.  Members  of  such  maj1is,  the  distinguished  among  the  tribe,  acquire  their 
positions  by  virtue  of  their  socio-economic  power  and  influence  within  the  tribe. 
Arab  Nationalism  refers  to  an  ideology  based  on  a  mixture  of  political  and 
social  motivations  to  create  a  distinctive  homeland.  Kohn  (1975)  defines  nationalism 
as  a  political  creed  that  underlies  the  cohesion  of  modem  societies  and  legitimises  the 
claim  to  authority.  A  great  deal  of  literature  focuses  on  the  relation  between  the  two 
concepts  of  nation-state  and  nationalism. 
The  rise  of  the  ideology  of  Arab  nationalism  -i.  e.  the  movement  that  came  to 
be  known  as  Pan-Arabism-  in  the  Arab  world  is  largely  a  twentieth  century 
phenomenon.  Anderson  (1983)  contends  that  central  to  nationalism  are  two  essential 
components,  the  spread  of  language  and  dominance  of  culture.  El-Rayyes  (1988) 
singles  out  the  cultural,  linguistic,  poetic,  religious,  emotional  and  tribal  aspects  of  the 
Arab  society  as  the  main  components  of  Arab  nationalism.  Language  is  a  critical 
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most  especially  the  'Ussabiyah'.  A  vital  prerequisite  in  the  rise  of  both  ideologies  is 
the  existence  of  cultural  similarities.  Territoriality  is  a  third  component  shared  by 
tribalism  and  nationalism. 
Though  the  two  ideologies  of  tribalism  and  Pan-Arabism  differ  in  terms  of 
central  principles,  both  were  part  of  the  socio-political  scenery  against  which  the  Gulf 
states  and  politics  must  be  understood.  Tribalism,  however,  has  always  and  remains 
stronger  than  Arab  nationalism  owing  to  the  history  of  the  Gulf  societies. 
6.4  Si2niricance  of  Tribalism  &  Arab  Nationalism  in  the  Gulf: 
Prior  to  the  discovery  of  oil  the  relationships  between  the  two  major 
categories  of  society  within  the  Gulf  states  -  the  Bedouin  and  sedentary  populations  - 
had  been  affected  as  a  result  of  the  major  politico-economic  developments  that  the 
region  had  witnessed.  Yet,  it  was  the  massive  economic  developments  that  took  place 
in  the  GCC  states  as  a  result  of  the  discovery  of  oil  in  the  region  that  widened  the  gap 
between  the  urban  (the  hader)  and  the  Bedouins  populations,  the  former  benefiting 
disproportionately  from  the  newly  acquired  wealth  (Hopkins,  1989). 
The  Gulf  states  were  affected  by  the  storm  of  Arab  nationalist  movements 
which  swept  the  Arab  world  during  the  late  sixties  and  early  seventies.  Ramadan 
(1993)  alleges  that  the  rise  of  regionalism  in  the  Gulf,  culminating  in  the  creation  of 
the  GCC,  was  a  consequence  of  the  failed  ideology  of  'Pan-Arabism'  and  a 
subsequent  return  to  statism  and  parochial  nationalism.  The  rise  of  Arab  nationalism 
and  the  influence  of  Pan-Arabist  movements  in  the  Gulf  states  before  and  after  the 
creation  of  the  GCC  remained  quite  limited  owing,  in  part,  to  the  high  levels  of 
illiteracy  among  the  populations  of  the  Gulf  states.  This  prevailing  illiteracy  did  not, 
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The  ruling  elites  in  the  then  relatively  new  Gulf  states  were  apprehensive  of 
Arab  nationalism  and  the  philosophy  that  it  represented.  The  movement  of  Arab 
nationalism,  whose  leaders  were  mostly  intellectuals  from  lower  class  origins,  was 
opposed  to  the  existence  of  the  newly  established  sheikhdoms,  dismissing  them  as  no 
more  than  a  creation  of  the  British  colonial  power.  In  the  present-  day  Gulf  states, 
Arab  nationalism  has  all  but  disappeared  as  an  active  or  influential  ideology,  to  be 
replaced  by  the  more  vociferous  and  parochial  'nationalisms'  of  the  Gulf  states.  The 
threat  of  strident  nationalism  for  the  regional  alliance  of  the  GCC  has  come  from 
member  states  in  the  form  of  intransigent  'statism'.  Fuelled  by  the  intractable  question 
of  sovereignty,  statism  has  been  hindered  and  continues  to  hinder,  the  progress  of  the 
GCC,  serving  as  a  divisive  force,  and  standing  in  the  way  of  greater  cooperation 
among  the  GCC  member  states  and  the  integration  of  their  political,  economic  and 
social  institutions. 
Tribalism,  on  the  other  hand,  has  been  a  uniting  factor  among  the  GCC  states. 
The  similarity  of  tribal  systems  and  the  close  historical  and  blood  ties  among  the 
various  Gulf  tribes  assists  rapprochement  between  the  GCC  member  states  and  have 
facilitated  inter-state  cooperation  among  them  (Figure  6.2). 
Figure  6.2  The  Roles  of  Tribalism  and  Nation-Statism  in  the  GCC: 
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The  Gulf  tribes  and  the  continuity  of  the  tribal  system  in  this  region  have 
benefited  the  political  regimes  of  the  GCC  states  in  a  distinctive  way,  in  effect,  the 
Gulf  regimes  have  recognised  that  support  of  tribal  affinities  could  be  a  means  of 
perpetuating  the  political  status  quo.  Tribalism  can  be  used  directly  in  supporting  the 
states.  Hameed  (1986)  argues  that  though  there  is  a  culturally-based  disdain  among 
Bedouin  recruits  for  military  service,  Gulf  rulers  have  continually  shown  preference 
for  recruiting  armies  from  the  Bedouin  populations  of  Gulf  society.  Unlike  the  skilled 
urban  and  'modemised'  populations,  known  to  have  weaker  loyalties  often  to  the 
leadership,  tribes  are  known  for  their  loyalty  to  the  sheikhs.  To  an  extent,  the  relation 
between  the  two  is based  on  mutual  interests  and  benefits;  the  ruling  families  rely  on 
tribes  and  tribal  systems  to  preserve  the  status  quo  while  the  Bedouin  are  able  to 
preserve  and  protect  their  interests  through  their  representatives  in  the  armed  and 
security  forces.  The  modus  vivendi  between  tribes  and  ruling  families  has  been 
disrupted  by  the  development  of  oil  economies.  The  part  played  by  the  tribe  in  socio- 
political  organisation  has  been  increasingly  taken  over  by  modem  government 
institutions,  leading  to  a  gradual  weakening  of  the  historically  long  relation  between 
political  organisation  and  the  tribes  (Abir,  1979). 
Arab  Nationalism  did  bring  to  bear  considerable  external  pressures  on  the  Gulf 
states.  Zahlan  (1989)  asserts  that  the  Palestine  problem  and  Nasser's  Pan-Arab 
policies  had  a  considerable  influence  on  the  internal  politics  of  Kuwait  and  Bahrain. 
During  the  1960s  and  1970s  Bahrain  and  Kuwait  the  only  two  Gulf  states  to  have 
numerous  political  parties  as  well  as  an  elected  parliament.  Also,  the  close  relationship 
that  Saudi  Arabia  fostered  with  the  US  has  been  interpreted  as  in  part  the  result  of  the 
aim  of  the  ruling  monarchy  to  break  away  from  the  influence  Nasserist  Egypt  (Zahlan, 
1989).  The  shift  towards  the  US  resulted  from  the  threat  to  monarchical  rule  inherent 
in  the  Egyptian  revolution  and  its  call  for  Arab  socialism. 
The  diffusion  of  Arab  nationalism  in  the  Gulf  states  has  been  extensively 
discussed,  most  of  the  literature  agreeing  that  Arab  nationalist  movements  appeared 
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of  an  important  Arab  nationalist  movement  in  the  late  1960s.  The  spread  of  Pan- 
Arabist  ideology  to  Bahrain  and  some  of  the  other  Gulf  states,  particularly  Kuwait, 
was  largely  due  to  the  significant  inroads  education  was  making  in  this  part  of  the 
Gulf  Another  factor  was  the  spread  of  foreign  newspapers  (e.  g.  newspapers  from 
Egypt  and  Lebanon),  while  in  Kuwait  the  influence  of  Arabs  nationalism  increased  as 
a  consequence  of  Nasser's  direct  encouragement  of  the  Kuwaitis  to  become  more 
involved  in  Arab  affairs  (see  among  others  el-Rayyes,  1988). 
In  fact  Pan-Arabism  had  relatively  little  effect  in  the  Gulf  for  a  number  of 
reasons.  First,  Arab  nationalism  came  under  close  scrutiny  by  the  Gulf  governments 
and  lost  much  of  its  appeal  after  the  collapse  of  the  Egypt-Syria  union  and  even  more 
so  after  the  defeat  of  the  Pan-Arab  regimes'  in  the  1967  war.  Peterson  (1988)  asserts 
that  the  Arab  defeat  in  June  1967  war  signalled  the  failure  of  Nasserism  and  marked, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  decline  of  the  Pan-Arabist  ideology  and,  on  the  other,  the  rise  of 
the  Islamists.  Second,  'front-line  states'  (i.  e.  the  Pan-Arabist  regimes)  crucially  relied 
on  the  Gulf  states  for  funds.  Thus,  Kuwait  and  Saudi  Arabia  provided  funds  to  Egypt, 
Syria,  and  Jordan  while  Qatar  and  the  UAE  too  began  fiinding  Syria  and  Egypt  in 
1973  (el-Rayyes,  1988).  The  Gulf  states'  bankrolling  of  the'front-line  states'was  done 
in  an  attempt  to  placate  these  Pan-Arabist  regimes  and,  thus,  was  one  way  of 
protecting  the  stability  of  their  own  conservative  monarchical  regimes.  Yet,  Arab 
nationalism  sought  to  overthrew  the  Gulf  regimes.  Abir  (1979)  asserts  that  in  1960 
Egypt  adopted  a  "unity  of  purpose"  ideology  and  became  dedicated  to  the  overthrow 
of  all  Arab  regimes  whose  rulers  and  system  of  government  impeded  the  progress  of 
Arab  unity.  Third,  there  was  a  growing  perception  among  Gulf  citizens  that  the  Pan- 
Arabist  regimes  sought  to  gain  control  over  all  sources  of  energy  in  the  region  and 
that  its  leaders  were  intent  on  governing  in  an  authoritarian  and  anti-democratic 
manner  in  the  Arab  world. 
Since  its  inception,  Arab  nationalism  has  had  a  number  of  implications  for  the 
Gulf  states.  In  pre-independence  days  the  ideals  of  the  movement  were  designed  to 
cause  unrest  and  encourage  the  overthrow  of  the  colonial  powers  in  the  littoral  Gulf 
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gap  between  the  poor  and  the  rich  Arab  countries  through  control  of  oil  revenues,  an 
ideology  to  which  the  Gulf  governments  were  entirely  opposed  (el-Rayyes  (1988)). 
According  to  Abdul-Dime  (1992),  Arab  nationalism  rejected  internationalism  bent  on 
economic  hegemony  and  the  fanaticism  of  ethnicity  and  sought,  instead,  human 
cooperation  on  an  international  scale.  At  the  regional  level,  Arab  nationalism  pursued 
Arab  integration  in  the  form  of  either  confederations  or  federations.  Yet,  if  Pan- 
Arabism  was  seeking  to  establish  Arab  unity  this  was  unlikely  to  materialise  owing  to 
the  irreconcilable  ideological  differences  between  the  Gulf  states  and  the  front-line 
regimes  advocating  Arab  nationalism,  in  particular  Egypt,  Syria. 
The  GCC  was  established  in  an  attempt  to  overcome  the  internal  and  the 
external  threats  they  faced  and  continue  to  face.  By  creating  the  GCC,  these  states 
aimed  to  create  a  new  identity  for  themselves  but  without  isolating  themselves  from 
the  Arab  nation.  Yet,  by  establishing  a  regional  alliance  in  the  form  of  the  GCC,  the 
member  states  had  isolated  themselves  from  the  Arab  environment  and  planted  the 
seeds  of  a  restricted  Gulf  (Khaly)  identity,  Kechichian  (1985).  As  Sa'id  and  Abdul- 
Jouwad  (1989)  argue  the  creation  of  GCC  has  resulted  in  the  centre  of  policy-making 
in  the  Arab  world  focusing  on  Riyadh  and  the  other  littoral  Gulf  States. 
6.5  Overview: 
The  role  of  Arab  nationalism  and  of  Pan-Arabist  ideology  in  the  establishment 
of  the  GCC  was  limited  for  a  number  of  reasons.  Clearly,  the  revolutionary  ideals  of 
such  Arab  nationalist  states  as  Egypt,  Syria  and  Libya  was  found  unacceptable  by  the 
conservative  political  systems  of  the  Gulf.  As  el-Rayyes  (1988:  p.  84)  asserts  the  Gulf 
states  governments  have  found  in  'balkanisation'  a  haven  for  their  privileged  oil 
revenues,  resisting  any  attempt  at  Arab  unity  which  might  threaten  to  dilute  their 
newly-found  wealth.  Arab  nationalism  too  was  seen  by  the  Saudi  political 
establishment  as  anathema  to  Islam  and  the  concept  of  an  Islamic  nation  (p.  93).  Yet, Chapter  Six:  Tribalism  &  Arab  Nationalism  114 
if  the  political  regimes  of  the  Gulf  states  opposed  Arab  nationalism  and  its  ideals,  that 
did  not,  however,  preclude  the  spread  of  this  ideology  among  Gulf  citizens. 
The  role  that  tribalism  has  played  in  the  creation  of  the  GCC,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  far  from  minimal.  Strong  tribal  affinities  existing  among  the  various  Gulf 
states  acted  as  one  of  the  major  factors  that  facilitated  the  creation  of  the  GCC.  Yet, 
the  impact  of  tribes  and  tribalism  on  the  political  life  in  the  Gulf  states  has  been 
gradually  diminishing  because  of  the  growing  gap  emerging  between  the  political 
regimes  and  the  tribes;  the  consultative  councils  established  by  governments 
throughout  the  Gulf  states  have  taken  over  most  of  the  functions  previously  in  the 
hands  of  tribal  councils  and  authorities. Chapter  Seven: 
Research  Methodology 
7.1  Introduction: 
A  primary  objective  of  this  research  is  to  examine  perceptions  of  the  GCC,  the 
structure  of  the  organisation,  its  functioning,  including  how  it  formulates  and 
implements  common  policies,  and,  in  the  light  of  such  perceptions  explore  whether 
there  is  a  social  and  political  basis  for  federalism  in  the  Gulf  These  perceptions  are 
drawn  from  two  sample  surveys,  one  of  top-ranking  officials  at  the  GCC  Secretariat 
General,  the  other  from  Gulf  citizens,  specifically  students  at  the  University  of  Qatar  in 
Doha  (State  of  Qatar)  and  Kuwait  University  in  Kuwait  City  (State  of  Kuwait). 
Elite  and  citizen  perceptions  of  the  GCC  will  be  examined  with  the  aim  of 
highlighting  the  level  of  satisfaction  with  the  organisation  among  the  two  samples. 
Their  perceptions  will  also  be  explored  with  a  view  to  illuminating  the  degree,  nature, 
and  type  of  cooperation  existing  among  the  member  states  of  this  organisation.  In  light 
of  these  perceptions,  the  study  also  evaluates  the  actual  achievements  of,  and  problems 
confronting,  the  GCC. 
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  discuss  the  manner  in  which  the  data  was 
collected,  the  problems  arising  from  the  nature  of  the  data,  the  strategy  used  in 
drawing  the  political  elite  and  citizens  samples,  and  the  types  of  methods  employed  to 
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7.2  Research  Desi2n: 
7.2.1.  Methods  of  Data  Collection: 
Several  types  of  research  strategy  were  exploited  to  collect  the  relevant  data. 
Basic  reliance  was  placed  on  the  use  of  the  questionnaire  method.  The  primary  data 
obtained  through  the  use  of  a  questionnaire  was  supplemented  with  interviews 
conducted  among  key  personnel  at  the  GCC  Secretariat  General,  and  the  use  of 
secondary  sources  including  GCC  documents  and  reports,  together  with  newspapers 
and  other  material. 
The  design  of  this  study  integrates  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  methods  to 
the  study  of  how  the  GCC  is  imagined.  A  synthesis  of  both  approaches  was  deemed 
appropriate  for  several  reasons.  The  nature  of  the  research  objectives  required 
selectivity  with  regard  to  both  information  and  sample  type.  In  connection  with  the 
selectivity  of  the  information  required,  the  questionnaire  had  to  be  designed  and 
interviews  conducted  carefully  so  as  to  target  relevant  types  of  date.  As  to  the  sample 
selection,  the  study  needed  to  target  high-ranking  GCC  officials,  and  in  particular 
those  concerned  with  policy  and  decision-making  within  the  institutions  of  the  GCC. 
Needless  to  say,  only  such  a  sample  could  provide  the  study  with  the  pertinent 
information  needed  to  carry  out  an  evaluation  of  the  different  aspects  of  the  GCC 
institution.  The  use  of  a  questionnaire  permits  the  collection  of  both  qualitative  and 
quantitative  data  that  can  be  used  to  either  corroborate  (or  negate)  assumptions  and 
data  derived  from  the  secondary  sources. 
As  is  widely  accepted  the  use  of  questionnaires  and  interviewing  has  both 
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Fi2ure  7.1  The  Main  Advantap-es  and  Disadvantap_e 
of  Ouestionnaire  and  Interview-  Based  Surveys 
Can  be  used  to  study  Data  affected  by 
attitudes,  values,  beliefs  chrarcteristic  of  the 
and  motivatives.  respondents 
(e-g-memory,  experience, 
Potential  to  be  able  to  collect 
knowledge,  personality). 
information  from  differing  social 
groups. 
Respondents  will  not 
necessarilly  report  their 
attitude,  beliefs 
...  etc 
accurately. 
Structured  surveys  generate 
standarised  data. 
Source:  Robson,  C.  (1993,  p.  128) 
Sampling  the  Political  Elite: 
A.  On  Use  and  Nature  of  Questionnaire 
The  reason  for  questioning  GCC  officials  is  to  understand  their  perceptions  of 
the  various  reasons,  either  regional  or  international,  underlying  the  establishment  of 
the  GCC,  their  reactions  to  an  assembled  list  of  factors  bearing  on  the  creation  of  the 
organisation  derived  from  the  general  literature,  and  their  understanding  of  the  GCC's 
objectives,  policies,  problems,  achievements,  and  levels  of  cooperation  among  its 
member  states  in  various  political,  economic,  social,  and  environmental  fields. 
To  elicit  the  perceptions  of  the  GCC  officials  sample  investigated  in  this  work, 
a  questionnaire  was  designed  and  submitted  to  the  sample  in  question  (see  Appendix 
(A)).  The  questionnaire  submitted  to  the  GCC  officials  sought,  in  one  instance,  the 
sample's  opinions  on  the  various  factors  motivating  the  creation  of  the  GCC.  The 
sample  was,  in  particular,  asked  to  identify  what  they  deem  to  be  (a)  regional  factors 
(i.  e.,  considerations  local  to  the  Gulf  area)  and/or  (b)  international  factors  (i.  e.,  extra- 
regional)  behind  the  emergence  of  the  GCC.  The  sample  was,  in  particular,  asked  to 
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from  very  important  to  least  important  and  to  the  set  of  external  factors  by  ranking 
them  on  a  scale  of  importance  ranging  from  I  for  most  important  to  4  for  least 
important. 
A  second  part  of  the  questionnaire  explores  the  respondents'  perceptions  of 
the  GCC  functions  and  functioning.  This  particular  part  of  the  questionnaire  involved 
three  broad  questions  relating  to  the  aims  of  the  GCC,  the  problems  hindering  the 
realisation  of  the  GCC  objectives,  and  the  achievements  realised  by  the  organisation  to 
date. 
The  third  and  final  part  of  the  questionnaire  deals  with  perceptions  of  the  level 
of  cooperation  among  the  GCC  member  states  in  different  policy  fields.  These  include 
cooperation  on  international  foreign  policies  (e.  g.,  policies  towards  the  US  as  a  major 
superpower;  those  relating  to  oil  production;  and  those  towards  Russia/CIS),  regional 
foreign  policies  (e.  g.,  a  common  security  policy,  the  Arabo-Israeli  question;  the  Iranian 
threat,  etc.  ),  and  internal  GCC  policies.  The  latter  include  harmonisation  of  member 
states'  foreign  policies  towards  such  regional  groupings  as  the  EU;  cooperation  in  the 
area  of  social  policy  (i.  e.,  health,  education),  and  economic  and  environmental  policies 
(e.  g.,  Common  Tariffs,  environment  protection,  etc.  ). 
As  noted  above,  a  prime  objective  of  the  questionnaire  was  to  explore  the 
political  elite's  perceptions  of  the  structure  of  the  GCC,  its  functioning,  formulation  of 
policies  and  levels  of  cooperation  among  the  member  states  of  this  institution.  To 
obtain  such  data,  the  quostionnaire  needed  to  incorporate  both  'open'  and  'closed' 
questions.  Open-ended  questions,  accounted  for  the  majority  of  information  gathered 
from  the  key  officials  in  the  GCC  Secretariat  General.  Data  bearing  on  such  questions 
as  aims,  problems,  and  achievements  of  the  GCC  as  well  as  the  various  factors 
motivating  its  establishment  are  best  obtained  and  explored  through  the  use  of  open- 
ended  questions. 
Closed  questions  were  employed  to  arrive  at  the  sample's  perceptions  of  a  list 
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and  reasons  in  question  was  compiled  by  the  researcher  from  secondary  sources, 
mainly  background  literature.  With  regard  to  GCC's  common  policies,  informants 
were  required  to  evaluate  the  level  of  cooperation  among  the  member  states  by 
ranking  a  set  of  listed  common  policies  on  a  Likert  scale  ranging  from  I  (very  little 
cooperation)  to  3  (considerable  cooperation)  (see  for  example  figure  8.5).  As  regards 
the  reasons  leading  to  the  emergence  of  this  regional  grouping,  the  sample  was  asked 
to  assess  a  proposed  list  of  internal  factors  by  ranking  their  perceived  importance  on  a 
Likert  scale  going  from  I  (for  very  important)  to  4  (for  least  important)  and  a  second 
list  of  external  factors  by  ranking  their  perceived  importance  in  the  emergence  of  the 
GCC  on  also  a  Likert  scale  ranging  from  I  (for  most  important)  to  4  (least  important). 
Closed  questions  differ  ftom  open-ended  ones  in  that  they  restrict  the  sample's 
responses  to  predetermined  options,  and  are  to  that  extent  'easier'  to  respond  to  (see, 
among  others,  Robson  1993,  Arber  1993).  A  further  advantage  of  the  closed  question 
is  the  ease  it  offers  to  respondents  in  the  filling  of  the  questionnaire.  Further,  this  type 
of  question  is  more  necessary  when  investigating  a  sample  like  the  one  targeted  here 
(i.  e.  top-ranking  officials  in  the  GCC),  who  have  little  time  to  spare  and  are  extremely 
difficult  to  gain  access  to.  The  disadvantage  of  the  closed  question  is  that  it  may 
channel  respondents  to  giving  particular  answers. 
In  his  discussion  of  the  role  and  importance  of  open-ended  questions  in  the 
gathering  of  data,  Robson  (1993)  notes  that  "[plilot  work  using  interviews  and  open- 
ended  questions  can  provide  suggestions  for  closed  alternatives.  Another  possibility  is 
to  have  some  open-ended  questions  in  the  self-administered  questionnaire,  and  to  have 
respondents  classify  their  own  open-ended  responses  using  provided  categories  (e.  g., 
as  'very  positive',  'positive',  etc.  ).  "  (p.  243).  It  follows  from  this  that  open-ended 
questions  can  not  only  be  used  to  obtain  information  and  insights  which  the  researcher 
can  build  on  to  devise  a  closed  set  of  questions,  but  can  also  be  utilised  to  obtain 
categorical  responses  by  requesting  the  sample  to  rank  their  responses  in  terms  of  a 
defined  scale  or  set  of  provided  options.  These  advantages  of  open-ended  questions 
were  exploited  in  the  gathering  of  the  data  analysed  in  this  study,  in  that  the  data  and 
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(elite  sample)  and  using  open-ended  questions  were  benefited  from  and  built  on  to 
develop  a  second  questionnaire  to  be  administered  to  a  second  sample  (citizen 
sample).  More  specifically,  the  open-ended  questions  used  in  the  elite  sample 
questionnaire  were  formulated  into  corresponding  closed  questions  in  the  second 
questionnaire  administered  to  the  Citizen  sample. 
Obtaining  the  relevant  data  needed  for  this  research  project  would  have  proved 
much  more  difficult  were  only  one  single  type  of  questions  to  have  been  relied  upon, 
especially  because  of  the  difficulty  the  researcher  had  in  accessing  informants  from  the 
GCC.  Investigation  of  any  aspect  of  the  GCC  can  only  be  carried  out  after  permission 
is  granted.  Furthermore,  the  sensitivity  of  political  elite  to  some  of  the  research 
questions  proved  a  considerable  obstacle  that  was  only  eventually  overcome  through 
reliance  on  personal  contacts  and  the  assistance  of  the  Department  of  GCC  affairs  in 
the  Qatari  Foreign  Ministry. 
One  of  the  problems  of  the  open-ended  questionnaire  is  that  the  coding  of 
responses  may  be  problematic.  Nevertheless,  this  type  of  question  was  considered  the 
best  method  for  this  research  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  open-ended  questions  offer 
respondents  the  opportunity  to  answer  questions  in  more  detail  and  to  elaborate  on 
and  justify  points  of  views,  attitudes,  and  opinions.  (Set  against  this  is  that  this  type  of 
questions  may  result  in  difficulties  of  interpretation  for  the  researcher,  so  that  caution 
in  this  regard  needs  to  be  exercised.  )  Secondly,  the  open-ended  type  of  questions 
allows  the  respondents  to  convey  the  subtleties  of  their  attitudes  instead  of  forcing 
them  to  choose  answers  that  may  or  may  not  necessarily  capture  their  viewpoints 
(Judd  et.  al.,  1991). 
B.  Interviews: 
The  interview  is  a  conversation  initiated  by  the  researcher  with  the  intention  of 
obtaining  data  relevant  to  his/her  research,  and  directed  by  him/her  towards  specific 
issues  and  topics  related  to  the  aim  of  his  study  (Cohen  and  Manion,  1989).  Thus, 
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The  latter  were  conducted  with  some  of  the  key  actors  at  the  GCC  Secretariat  General 
and  the  questions  asked  and  issues  raised  during  the  interview  were  those  dictated  by 
the  main  objectives  of  this  study. 
The  researcher  prepared  a  list  of  questions  to  pose  to  the  key  (elite)  figures 
who  insisted,  prior  to  the  interview,  on  complete  confidentiality.  A  small  number  of 
key  actors  refused  to  cooperate  with  the  researcher  and  simply  turned  down  the 
invitation  for  an  interview.  Ideally,  more  interviews  should  have  been  conducted:  it 
was  only  through  the  help  of  personal  contacts  that  it  was  possible  to  secure  the 
agreement  of  four  key  officials.  The  interviewees  were  highly  experienced 
administrators,  some  of  them  having  held  their  position  since  the  inception  of  the 
GCC.  The  interviews  were  carried  out  either  at  the  GCC  headquarters  (during 
working  hours)  or  elsewhere  (outside  working  hours). 
C  Nature  and  Type  of  the  Political  Elite  Sample 
The  fieldwork  for  this  study  was  undertaken  at  the  GCC  Secretariat  General  in 
Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia.  Top-ranking  officials  at  the  GCC  were  targeted  for  two  main 
reasons  -  by  definition  they  are  close  to  the  actual  policy-making  process  within  the 
organisation,  and,  they  originate  from  the  various  member  states  of  the  GCC.  After 
discarding  incompletely  filled  in  questionnaires,  a  total  of  39  policy-  maker  drawn 
from  committees  and  sub-committees  of  the  GCC  Secretariat  General  were  used  for 
the  purposes  of  analysis. 
The  role  of  the  elite  within  the  GCC  is  to  lay  the  common  ground  necessary  to 
achieve  the  coordination  and/or  harmonisation  of  policies  between  member  states,  and 
their  implementation.  The  GCC  elite  is  concerned  with  the  study  and  evaluation  of  the 
policies  submitted  by  members  of  the  GCC  Ministerial  Council  prior  to  the  latter 
submitting  them  in  turn  to  the  Supreme  Council  for  consideration. 
The  sample  was  drawn  from  the  heads  of  the  main  committees  and  policy- 
makers.  Since  it  was  only  possible  to  gain  access  to  the  committees  covering  political, Chapter  Seven:  Research  Methodology  122 
economic,  social,  and  environmental  affairs,  the  sample  was  composed  of  the  policy- 
makers  sitting  on  half  of  the  GCC  total  number  of  committees.  (Figure  (7.2)  shows  the 
total  set  of  committees  making  up  the  Secretariat  General  ).  Each  head  of  a  committee 
that  the  researcher  was  allowed  access  to  was  given  a  questionnaire  to  distribute  to  the 
members  of  the  committee  or  branch  of  committee  he  chairs.  Relying  on  the  help  of 
heads  of  committees  in  the  distribution  and  collection  of  questionnaires  proved 
instrumental  in  two  ways:  not  only  was  it  more  efficient,  but  it  was  also  the  best  way 
to  secure  the  cooperation  of  respondents  guaranteeing  a  higher  rate  of  return  of  the 
questionnaires  than  otherwise.  In  one  case,  the  head  committee  for  Economic  affairs 
distributed  the  questionnaire  together  with  an  internal  dictat  requesting  the  members 
of  his  committee  to  fill  in  and  return  the  questionnaires  he  distributed  on  behalf  of  the 
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D.  Elite  Sample's  Characteristics: 
Sensing  the  sensitivity  of  many  of  the  questions  posed  in  the  questionnaire,  all 
the  top-level  GCC  Secretariat  General  officials  who  volunteered  to  cooperate  with  the 
researcher  chose  to  withhold  information  bearing  on  the  nature  of  their  position,  the 
nature  of  departments  they  were  associated  with,  and  the  duration  of  their  service. 
Thus,  nationality  remained  as  the  only  variable  by  which  the  perceptions  of  the  sample 
could  be  cross-tabulated.  All  the  interviewees  insisted  prior  to  the  start  of  each 
interview  on  not  quoting  their  names  and  positions,  justifying  their  request  in  terms  of 
Article  Sixteen  of  the  GCC  Charter  whereby  "[ 
... 
]  all  the  Secretariat  General's  staff 
[ 
... 
]  shall  refrain  from  any  action  or  behaviour  that  is  incompatible  with  their  duties 
and  from  divulging  confidential  matters  relating  to  their  appointments  either  during  or 
after  their  tenure  of  office.  "  (p.  9). 
Nationality 
One  of  the  undertakings  of  the  investigation  of  the  GCC  political  elite's 
perceptions  of  this  organisation  is  to  explore  how  (and,  indeed,  whether)  nationality  is 
linked  to  (or  possibly  influences)  attitudinal  patterns.  The  nationalities  of  the  elite 
sample  embraced  four  of  the  six  member  states  of  the  GCC  owing  to  the  following 
factors-  the  shortfall  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  some  of  the  officials  were 
participating  in  study  meetings  in  preparation  for  the  annual  GCC  summit. 
Unavoidably,  interviewing  took  place  at  a  time  that  unfortunately  coincided  with 
preparations  for  the  GCC  summit. 
Table  7.1  GCC  Secretariat  Ceneral  Civil  Servants  &  Elites.  bv  Nationalii 
Polic  -  Making  Elites 
Nationality  4'Otat  *,  Vample  Size 
Balirainis  35  9  7 
Omanis  19  5  3 
Kuwaitis  5  2  0 
Qataris  6  4  2 
Saudis  263  35  27 
3  2  0 
332  57  39 
source:  0  GC(  secl  clal  ial  Geim  al 
F'stimated  size  ofElites  bý  Nationality 
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The  Citizen  Sample: 
A.  Nature  and  Type  of  Citizens'  Sample 
As  one  of  the  main  objectives  of  this  study  is  to  explore  attitudes  towards  the 
GCC  at  various  'levels'  within  the  organisation  based  on  a  study  of  citizen  perceptions 
of  the  institution's  policies,  aims,  problems  and  achievements.  The  investigation  also 
sought  to  investigate,  whether  there  is  a  political  and  a  social  basis  for  federalism,  and 
if  so,  how  extensive  is  that  basis. 
Attitudinal  and  perceptual  positions  can  be  explored  in  different  ways.  Such 
issues  require  the  adoption  of  carefully  constructed  methods  of  investigation.  One 
research  strategy  thought  appropriate  was  the  use  in  the  questionnaire  of  both 
qualitative  and  quantitative  questions,  much  as  was  the  case  with  regard  to  the  elite 
sample.  A  self-administered  questionnaire  was  designed,  partly  in  the  light  of  findings 
gained  from  the  political  elite  questionnaire  (see  above),  and  distributed  among  a 
sample  of  university  students  at  the  Universities  of  Kuwait  and  Qatar  in,  respectively, 
the  States  of  Kuwait  and  Qatar.  The  sample  was  limited  to  Honours  students  in  the 
two  faculties  of  Social  Sciences  and  Administration  &  Commerce  in  the  universities. 
The  constrained  nature  of  the  sample  reflects  the  difficulties  of  doing  such 
research  in  the  Gulf  in  particular  of  being  able  to  questionnaire  a  sample  of  Gulf 
society  at  large.  As  noted  earlier,  investigating  an  issue  of  the  kind  addressed  here 
requires  research  permission  from  the  governments.  What  is  more,  permission  to  carry 
out  the  required  fieldwork  is  not  always  forthcoming,  especially  when  the  study  is 
concerned  with  political  issues.  One  other  factor  militating  against  opting  for  a  sample 
of  'ordinary'  citizens  is  the  fact  that  interviewing  females  particularly,  in,  say,  the 
street,  is  not  a  socially  sanctioned  practice  within  the  ultra-conservative  societies  of 
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Time,  effort  and,  most  importantly,  the  sensitivity  of  politics  in  the  region  ruled 
out  the  option  of  a  more  broadly  based  sample  survey.  Given  the  very  sensitive  nature 
of  politics  in  the  Arab  countries,  and  the  consequent  tendency  of  the  populace  to  avoid 
debating  political  issues  in  public,  obtaining  credible  and  unbiased  data  (i.  e.,  views, 
opinions,  attitudes,  etc.  )  would  necessitate  gaining  the  trust  of  interviewees,  a  process 
that  is,  at  best,  time  and  effort-consuming,  if  plausible.  Wuelker  (1993;  p.  165)  points 
out  in  this  regard,  in  the  context  of  his  discussion  of  questionnaires  as  a  research 
method  in  an  Asian  environment,  that  "[ 
... 
]  it  has  been  found  that  in  many  of  those 
[Asian]  countries  human  relationships  have  remained  more  'natural'  and  'unspoilt' 
than  in  the  west.  Mutual  trust  still  plays  a  bigger  part  than  is  the  [ 
... 
I  [case]  of  the 
industrialised  countries.  [ 
... 
]  Furthermore,  the  clear  cut  social  structure  and  the 
infrequency  of  intermingling  of  the  different  classes  make  it  possible  to  achieve  the 
desired  purpose  with  smaller  samples  than  in  the  west.  "  [emphasis  added]. 
In  Qatar,  the  sampling  design  comprised  several  stages.  Opting  for  Honours 
students  in  the  departments  of  Geography,  Economics,  and  Administration,  the 
researcher  requested  and  obtained  their  timetables  so  as  to  be  able  to  make  contact. 
Qatar  University  has  yet  to  set  up  an  independent  Department  of  Politics,  though, 
politics  and  politics-related  subjects  are  taught  in  both  the  Departments  of  Economics 
and  of  Administration. 
In  selecting  the  sample  at  Kuwait  University,  and  again  within  the  objective  of 
meeting  time  constraints,  attention  was  restricted  to  Honours  students  in  the  two 
departments  of  Geography  and  Politics.  Honours  students  in  the  department  of 
Geography  at  both  Kuwait  and  Qatar  Universities  would  have  studied,  over  the  four- 
year  period  of  study,  three  or  more  subjects  bearing  on  the  GCC.  Thus,  by  the  final 
Honours  year,  students  are  expected  to  be  quite  knowledgeable  about  the  GCC. 
Beyond  the  various  subjects  studied  within  academe,  information  about  the  GCC 
could  be  acquired  from  a  wide  variety  of  other  sources.  Faculty  and  departmental 
seminars  play  an  active  role  in  informing  students  about  the  organisation,  as  does  the 
Gulf  mass  media,  which  is  predominantly  subject  to  state  control  and  censorship, 
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about  the  GCC  include  places  of  social  interaction  and  information  exchange  as  the 
majIis  (pL  majdalis)  (a  male  gathering  place)  and  educational  panels  (public  seminars 
and  conferences  (organised  by  Universities  and  other  educational  institutions). 
The  design  of  the  self-completed  questionnaire  distributed  among  students 
went  through  a  number  of  stages.  The  questionnaires  pilotted  using  (Arab)  university 
students  both  at  Qatar  University  as  well  as  the  University  of  Glasgow.  A  second  and 
final  version  of  the  questionnaire  was  then  designed  incorporating  the  insights  and 
comments  obtained  from  the  pilot  survey.  The  final  version  of  the  questionnaire  falls 
into  seven  related  parts.  With  the  exception  of  those  parts  which  were  concerned  with 
information  on  the  background  of  informants  (e.  g.  gender),  all  the  other  remaining 
(six)  parts  consisted  of  questions  specifically  formulated  to  either  determine  the 
respondent's  knowledge  of  the  GCC  or  their  perceptions  and  attitudes  on  some  aspect 
or  other  of  the  GCC.  Specifically,  part  one  explore  the  respondents'  knowledge  of  the 
GCC;  part  two  pursues  their  perceptions  of  the  underlying  reasons  for  the 
establishment  of  the  GCC  as  well  as  of  its  functions;  part  three  gauges  their  social  ties 
and  part  four  examines  the  question  of  identity  within  the  GCC  through  an  exploration 
of  their  loyalties.  Part  five  explored  attitudes  towards  the  politics  of  GCC  before  and 
after  1990;  and  part  six  is  concerned  with  the  sample's  perceptions  of  the  status  and 
future  developments  of  the  GCC.  A  final  question  invited  the  sample  to  express  its 
views  on  forms  of  cooperation  among  the  GCC  member  states. 
Concern  among  students  with  the  GCC,  and  of  developments  within  it,  often 
translates  into  the  organisation  of  a  series  of  conferences  and  seminars  debating 
political  cooperation  in  the  Gulf  region.  The  Kuwaiti  Students  Union,  for  instance, 
held  a  series  of  debates  during  April  1981,  November  1984  and  1985  focusing  on  the 
achievements  of  the  GCC  and  the  various  impediments  that  continue  to  stall  its 
economic,  social  and  political  objectives.  The  occasional  interviews  with  students 
published  by  the  Gulf  press  also  bespeak  a  high  level  of  awareness  of  the  GCC  and  an 
appreciation  of  the  reality  and  challenges  of  political  cooperation  among  the  member 
states  of  this  council  (see,  e.  g.,  the  Kuwaiti  dailies  al-  Watan  [April  3rd,  1981],  At- 
Siyasah  [November  28th,  1984],  and  al-  Qabass  [November  4th,  1985]).  It  follows Chapter  Seven:  Research  Methodology  127 
then  that  many  university  students  are  reasonably  familiar  with  the  history,  problems, 
and  prospects  of  the  GCC.  In  fact  the  educational  elite  is  not  the  only  category  of  Gulf 
society  which  is  commonly  interviewed  about  GCC  issues  on  the  pages  of  the  region's 
newspapers  and  magazines;  the  press  also  regularly  carries  interviews  with  both  the 
political  elite  as  well  as  citizens  (see,  for  instance,  al-  Riya  in  December  19th,  1993 
issue).  Figure  (7.3)  schematises  the  sample  structure. 
R  Fieldwork  &  Sampling  Process 
The  gathering  of  sufficient  (and  relevant)  data  for  this  research  project  required 
lengthy  field  visits.  Close  supervision  of  the  research  process  was  necessary  because  of 
difficulties  with  the  sampling  frame,  and  to  ensure  an  adequate  return  of 
questionnaires.  There  were  no  readily  available  reliable  lists  of  the  student  population, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  the  fieldwork  for  this  project  coincided  with  the  start  of  the 
second  term  of  the  academic  year  in  Gulf  universities,  it  was  necessary  to  rely  on 
incomplete  lists.  Secondly,  lest  some  of  the  sampled  respondents  might  prove 
unenthusiastic  about  the  questionnaires  and  fail  to  cooperate,  official  authorisation  was 
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were  due  to  end  in  order  to  explain  and  distribute  the  questionnaire  (together  with  the 
help  of  teaching  staff). 
A  set  of  important  procedures  had  to  be  undertaken  prior  to  the  distribution  of 
the  questionnaire.  First,  prior  to  approaching  respondents  at  Qatar  University,  it  was 
necessary  to  gain  permission  from  the  Vice-Chancellor.  Permission  to  have  access  to 
students  in  the  Faculty  of  Arts  at  Kuwait  University  was  secured  from  the  Dean  of 
Faculty  of  Humanities  at  Qatar  University.  This  intervention  was  equally  instrumental 
in  securing  such  facilities  as  accommodation,  a  study  office,  and  the  cooperation  of 
staff.  To  sample  students  in  the  faculty  of  Commerce  and  Economics  (in  Qatar),  it  was 
necessary  to  gain  permission  from  the  head  of  the  Department  of  Politics.  Prior  to 
distribution  of  the  designed  questionnaire,  the  researcher,  once  he  was  introduced  to 
the  students  by  a  member  of  faculty  staff,  would  usually  start  by  reassuring  the  sample 
that  all  information  provided  would  be  treated  in  strict  confidentiality,  and  would  then 
proceed  to  explain  the  aims  of  the  study  and  illustrate  how  to  fill  in  the  questionnaire. 
D.  Characteristics  of  the  Citizen  Sample 
The  citizen  sample  embodied  a  varied  mix  of  social  characteristics.  In  term  of 
their  social  characteristics,  the  student  sample  represents  individuals  of  varying  social 
backgrounds  representing  the  different  social  classes  of  the  Gulf  society.  Such  a 
diversity  should  benefit  a  study  probing  attitudinal  and  perception  patterns  in  as  it  is 
likely  to  be  more  representative  of  Gulf  society  at  large.  Furthermore,  the  student 
sample  is  important  in  its  own  fight,  since  they  constitute  the  basic  pool  out  of  which 
future  policy-makers  and  key  figures  in  government  are  likely  to  be  drawn.  The  choice 
to  draw  the  study  sample  exclusively  from  Honours  students  was  grounded  in  the 
assumption  that  such  students  would  be  more  knowledgeable  about  the  organisation 
than  students  in,  say,  their  first  years  of  university. 
Student  attitudes  about  political  issues  in  the  Arab  world  have  received  much 
attention  in  the  literature,  and  most  notably  in,  among  others,  Farah  (1977),  Ebraheem Chapter  Seven:  Research  Allethodoloýy  129 
(1981),  and  Salame'  (1988).  In  a  study  of  the  young  and  of  their  perceptions  of 
politics  and  democracy  in  the  Arab  World,  based  on  a  sample  of  UAE  university 
students,  al-Suwaidi  (1995)  concluded  that  the  "young  and  better  educated  generation 
[of  Arabs] 
...  are  more  aware  of  the  challenges"  (p.  91)  confronting  their  society  as 
well  as  the  opportunities  available  to  them  within  this  society.  Being  the  'young  and 
better  educated  generation'  of  Arabs  and  showing  a  greater  level  of  awareness, 
students  are  arguably  the  more  likely  within  the  society  to  express  their  views  more 
freely,  voice  its  concerns  more  articulately  and  appreciate  more  fully  the  complexities 
of  politics. 
The  number  of  students  surveyed  for  the  purposes  of  this  study  totalled  700 
respondents.  As  Table  7.2  illustrates,  out  of  the  700  administered  questionnaires,  more 
than  590  (a  response  rate  of  84.3%)  were  retained  as  valid.  Some  15.7%  of  the  total 
number  of  returned  questionnaires  had  to  be  discarded  on  account  of  their 
incompleteness.  This  high  rate  of  return  was  due  to  the  care  given  to  the  distribution 
and  collection  of  questionnaires,  the  cooperation  of  faculty  staff,  and  perhaps  the  fact 
that  the  students  saw  the  experience  as  an  opportunity  to  express  their  attitudes  freely 
and  in  total  confidentiality.  The  sampling  design  needed  to  incorporate  questions 
seeking  profile  information  about  the  respondents  and  identifying  variability  in 
attitudinal  patterns  were  cross-tabulated  against  nationality.  In  terms  of  their 
demographic  features,  although  the  respondents  were  sampled  in  two  locales,  viz. 
University  of  Kuwait  and  the  university  of  Qatar,  the  sample  was  in  fact  drawn  from 
several  GCC  member  states.  Besides  the  Qatari  and  Kuwaiti  students,  the  sample 
comprised  also  Bahraini,  Emirati,  Omani  and  Saudi  students  studying  at  these 
universities. 
7.2  Distribution  of  the  Citizens  Samnle  b%,  Nati 
-  -----  -  ---  ---  - 
Qatari 
Other  GCC 
274  46.4 
46  6.8 
590  100 
0  Total  number  of  students  in:  Qatar  University  6943  (1995/96) 
Kuwait  University  I  10  17  (1992/9  1). 
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Nationality 
As  regards  nationality,  the  sample  falls  into  three  categories.  Besides  the  Qatari 
and  Kuwaiti  respondents,  the  sample  also  included  a  small  contingent  of  students  from 
other  GCC  member  states.  The  universities  of  Qatar  and  Kuwait  were  chosen  as  a 
locale  for  conducting  for  both  general  and  specific  reasons.  First,  the  nature  of  the 
questions  explored  in  the  study  could  have  proved  too  sensitive  to  examine  in  the  rest 
of  the  Gulf  states.  In  his  discussion  of  the  difficulties  inherent  in  mapping  public 
opinion  in  the  Arab  world,  Salame'  (1988)  argues  that  "Polls  are  not  something  much 
cherished  by  authoritarian  regimes  and  the  few  we  have  are  restricted  to  a  very  limited 
group  of  Arab  countries  and  on  a  very  limited  number  of  topics.  Hence,  to  speak  of 
Arab  public  opinion  is  a  very  risky  exercise,  where  the  illustration  you  use  is  easily 
refuted  as  unrepresentative"  (p.  235).  Second,  to  the  extent  that  the  researcher  is  of 
Qatari  nationality  and  a  former  graduate  of  a  Kuwaiti  university,  Qatar  and  Kuwait 
were  the  only  two  GCC  countries  where  he  could  rely  on  personal  contacts  to  secure 
permissions  and  facilities  instrumental  to  the  undertaking  of  his  fieldwork.  Third,  the 
choice  of  Kuwait  as  a  focal  point  of  sampling  offers  an  interesting  and  extra  line  of 
inquiry  relating  to  whether  there  has  been  an  identifiable  shift  in  attitudinal  patterns 
among  the  Kuwaiti  citizens  as  a  result  of  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  1990. 
Gender 
It  is  widely  accepted  within  research  in  the  social  sciences  that  gender  and 
gender  factors  account  for  different  behavioural  patterns.  Judd  et.  al.,  (1991) 
emphasised  the  importance  of  gender  considerations  in  social  studies,  affirming  that 
explicit  information  should  be  provided  about  the  gender  of  the  informants 
participating  in  an  experiment  or  survey  bearing  on  such  social  phenomena  as  attitudes 
and  perceptions. 
Arab  societies  are  generally  perceived  as  heavily  male-dominated  and 
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subservient  role  within  Arab  society,  this  state  of  affairs  has  been  gradually  changing  in 
more  recent  times  as  women  have  been  playing  an  increasingly  more  active  role  in 
society.  An  exploration  of  attitudinal  patterns  within  the  Gulf  society  could  therefore 
be  expected  to  reflect  the  changing  status  and  position  of  women  within  this  largely 
conservative  society. 
To  establish  whether  there  are  any  significant  differences  between  male  and 
female  students'  attitudinal  patterns,  that  is,  whether  gender  accounts  for  attitudinal 
differences  among  students,  required  a  sample  drawn  from  both  sexes. 
As  Table  7.3  indicates,  male  respondents  are  outnumbered  by  females  in  the 
survey.  While  male  students  account  for  40.1%  of  the  total  sample  (236  out  of  a  total 
of  590  students),  females  represent  59.9%  (352  out  of  a  total  of  590  students).  The 
overrepresentation  of  females  in  the  survey  reflects  the  dominant  ratio  of  females  to 
males  at  both  Qatari  and  Kuwaiti  universities  (see  footnote  appended  to  Table  7.3). 
The  larger  number  of  females  vis-A-vis  males  in  higher  education  can  itself  be  taken  as 
an  indicator  of  the  considerable  progress  that  women  have  made  in  contemporary  Gulf 
society. 
This  imbalance  is  true  for  all  the  national  sub-sample,  the  differences  being 
most  extreme  amongst  Kuwaitis  (34.4%  males  and  65.6%  female). 
Kuwaiti  Qatari  *Other  GCC  Total 
Male  93  123  20  230 
%  34.4  45.2  43.5  40.1 
Female  177  149  26  352 
%  65.6 
.............................................. 
54.8 
..........  . 
56.5  599 
Total  270  .  ..........................  272  .....................................................  46  .......................................  590 
%  45.9  46.3  7.8  100 
o  'rotal  number  of  students  in:  Oatar  Universitv  (Male-  1875-  Fernale-  506R  -  Fimireq  from  1995/96)-  Kuwait  I  Jnivergitv  (Mate 
3502ý  Female:  7515  -  Figures  from  1991/92). 
Source:  1.  Kuwait:  Annual  Statistical  Abstract  1994,  p.  367.  Qatar:  p.  150 
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Age: 
Age  is  one  of  the  social  categories  also  assumed  to  play  a  significant  role  in 
influencing  differences  and  changes  in  such  behavioural  phenomena  as  social 
perceptions  and  attitudes.  Besides  influencing  perceptions  and  attitudes,  age  could 
also  provide  a  clear  referential  index  as  to  the  nature  of  the  dominant  age  group  within 
a  particular  society. 
While,  not  unexpectedly,  the  majofity  of  the  sample,  totalling  85.1%  of  the 
overall  sample,  fall  into  the  'under-25  years  of  age'  category,  the  25  to  35  age 
category,  the  only  other  group  constituting  the  sample,  accounts  for  14.9%  of  the  total 
sample.  Table  (7.4)  illustrates  the  distribution  of  the  sample  by  age.  The  relatively 
young  nature  of  the  informants  is  on  account  of  the  fact  that  the  investigated  sample  is 
drawn  in  its  entirety  from  university  students,  a  societal  group  customarily  made  up  of 
the  younger  generation  within  society. 
The  results  in  relation  to  the  two  variable  of  age  and  gender  were  found  to  be 
insignificant  and  were  therefore  discarded  from  consideration. 
Table  7.4  Distribution  of  the  Citizens  Sanmle  bv  A2e: 
Age  Nettionalifl, 
Kuwaiti  Qatari  0  Other  CCC 
..................  .......... 
Total 
........................  Under  25  238  219  45  502 
%  88.1  79.9  97.8  85.1 
25-35  32  55  1  88 
%  11.9  20.1  2.2  14.9 
Over  35  0  0  0  0 
0 
.  .....  ..  .  ....  Total  270  ..........  274  ........  I  ......  I  ..............  ..  .  46  590 
O/o 
1 
45,8  46.4  7.8  100 
0:  Con.,  im,:  dstudents  1rom.  BaInain,  Oman.  t  AE 
. 
Sandi  Arabia. 
Type  of  Students: 
Gulf  states  have  similar  educational  systems,  especially  in  terms  of  the  duration 
of  schooling  given  in  the  various  stages  of  education.  The  school  entry  age  throughout 
the  GCC  is  six  years  and  university  entry  in  all  GCC  member  states  requires Chapter  Seven:  Research  Methodology  133 
completion  of  12  years  of  combined  elementary  and  secondary  schooling.  Entry  to 
university  in  all  GCC  states  is dependant  on  satisfaction  of  a  number  of  requirements, 
namely,  passing  the  national  secondary  school  certificate  examination  as  well  as 
achieving  a  set  mark  in  this  examination.  Building  on  the  similarity  of  the  educational 
systems,  the  GCC  has  set  up  a  sub-committee  specifically  concerned  with  the 
harmonisation  of  curricula  at  all  levels  of  schooling  and  education. 
In  Qatar,  the  Civil  Service  Council  is  the  main  government  department  that 
oversees  the  allocation  of  jobs  to  graduates  in  accordance  with  their  qualifications. 
Jobs  in  governmental  sectors  are  widely  preferred  by  new  and  future  graduates,  on 
account  of  the  greater  security  they  offer,  particularly  in  comparison  to  the  private 
sector.  Al-Kuwari  (1996)  criticised  the  Qatari  government  policy  towards  the 
education  sector,  asserting  that  a  failure  to  recruit  new  graduates  into  the  government 
and  its  reliance  on  foreign  expertise,  caused  a  major  financial  problem  for  the  state. 
There  has  been,  however,  an  increasing  tendency  on  the  part  of  GCC  governments  to 
recruit  nationals  into  key  positions  previously  occupied  by  foreign  expatriates,  as  part 
of  a  resolute  process  of  replacement  of  foreign  cadres  with  newly  graduate  nationals. 
This  sample  was  undertaken  with  the  express  aim  of  investigating  attitudes 
towards  the  GCC.  A  random  sample  drawn  from  university  students,  and,  in 
particular,  from  the  fourth  year  (Honours)  students,  was  deemed  most  suitable  in  this 
regard  (see  above  on  the  nature  of  departments  the  students  sample  is  affiliated  with). 
The  decision  to  sample  specifically  Honours  students  was  motivated  by  the  assumption 
that  this  category  of  students  would  be  more  informed  about  the  GCC  and  therefore 
more  capable  of  providing  considered  responses  to  the  set  of  questions  included  in  the 
study  questionnaires. 
At  both  Qatar  and  Kuwait  Universities,  students  in  the  Departments  of 
Geography  study  such  subjects  as  the  industrial,  population,  human  and  urban 
geography  of  Kuwait,  Qatar,  or/and  other  Gulf  states.  For  instance,  a  fourth  year 
module  is  entitled  'Qatar  or  Kuwait  and  the  Arabian  Peninsula'  and  is  mainly 
concerned  with  the  study  of  the  history  as  well  as  other  issues  bearing  on  both  the Chapter  Seven:  Research  Methodology  134 
Gulf  and  the  GCC.  Other  modules,  such  as  political  geography  address  issues  and 
questions  bearing  on  the  GCC.  Similarly,  Departments  of  Politics  in  Kuwait  and 
Departments  of  Economics  and  Administration  in  both  Kuwait  and  Qatar  offer 
modules  focusing  on  the  GCC  and  matters  related  to  this  organisation. 
7.3.  Secondary  Sources: 
Secondary  data  bearing  on  the  issues  raised  in  this  study  were  collected  from  a 
number  of  sources  including  Qatar  University  Library,  Kuwait  University  Library,  the 
Kuwait  Information  Centre,  and  the  Information  Centre  of  the  GCC  General 
Secretariat  in  Riyadh.  The  secondary  data  collected  and  referred  to  consisted  of 
official  GCC  documents,  proceedings  of  seminars  on  GCC  affairs,  radio  and  television 
programmes  and  debates  addressing  issues  connected  with  the  GCC,  and  books, 
articles,  newspapers,  and  other  literature  tackling  various  aspects  of  the  GCC. 
The  secondary  data  were  selected  with  a  view  to  contextualising  the  arguments 
of  the  study,  broadening  the  scope  of  discussion  and  illuminating  the  findings  of  the 
empirical  study  of  the  two  samples.  Some  of  the  secondary  sources  of  data  were  also 
collected  at  the  University  of  Glasgow  as  well  as  the  School  of  Oriental  and  African 
Studies  in  London.  Most  of  the  secondary  data,  however,  were  collected  during  the 
researcher's  first  visit  to  the  GCC  Secretariat  General  in  Riyadh  and  especially  during 
his  second  visit  to  Qatar  and  Kuwait.  One  of  the  secondary  sources  of  data  which 
proved  most  valuable  to  the  present  study  were  the  proceedings  of  the  seminar  dealing 
with  GCC  issues  and  organised  by  the  Faculties  of  Social  Science  of  the  various  GCC 
universities.  A  second  important  source  was  Gulf  newspapers  which  in  some  cases 
conduct  annual  investigations  of  the  GCC  including  critical  articles  and  editorials,  and 
interviews  with  both  citizens  and  the  elite  classes.  These  investigations  are  usually 
carried  out  by  the  press  just  before  the  Supreme  Council's  annual  summit  held  in  one 
of  the  GCC  member  states. 
Though  the  secondary  Arabic  data  addressing  the  various  facets  of  the  GCC 
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extensive,  they  remain  highly  selective  and  tentative.  The  governments'  sensitivity  to 
any  critique  challenging  or  undermining  their  objectives,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
general  conservatism  of  political  analysts,  on  the  other  is  largely  responsible  for  this 
particular  feature  of  GCC  literature. 
7.4.  Data  and  Sample  Survey  Problems: 
Zarkovich  (1993)  examined  some  of  the  problems  of  sampling  work  in 
developing  nations,  arguing  that  it  is  often  the  case  "that  in  underdeveloped  countries 
the  possibilities  for  choice  are  seriously  limited  in  almost  any  respect.  "  (p.  102).  Some 
of  the  drawbacks  of  the  research  data  and  sample  central  to  this  study  concern  the 
nature  of  the  data  as  well  as  the  sample  coverage. 
One  problem  with  the  questionnaire  and  interview  data  obtained  from  the 
political  elite  is  the  fact  that  the  information  was  restricted  to  nominal-scales,  limiting 
thereby  the  possibility  of  implementing  advanced  statistical  tests.  However,  this 
problem  does  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  data,  nor  the  conclusions  reached. 
Difficulties  were  also  experienced  in  the  coding  of  the  answers,  particularly  for 
the  open-ended  questions.  As  the  data  was  loaded  onto  the  computer,  it  soon  became 
obvious  that  the  only  software  that  could  manipulate  the  data  was  SPSSX.  The 
problem  was,  however,  solved  by  converting  the  responses  obtained  for  each  open- 
ended  question  into  an  ordered  hierarchy  of  categories.  In  particular,  responses  to  the 
question  bearing  on,  for  instance,  perceptions  of  the  GCC's  aims,  were  converted  into 
the  variable  categories  'very  important',  'important',  'less  important,  and  'not 
important'. 
Though  all  six  nationalities  corresponding  to  the  six  member  states  making  up 
the  GCC  were  represented  in  our  elite  sample,  not  all  of  these  nationalities  were 
equally  represented.  While  some  were  over-represented,  others  were  considerably 
under-represented  in  the  sample.  As  is  indicated  by  Table  (7.1),  the  over- Chapter  Seven:  Research  Methodoloýy  136 
representation  of  certain  nationalities  arose  from  the  unequal  representation  of  the 
various  nationalities  amongst  the  GCC  Secretariat  General  civil  servants.  The 
representation  of  the  various  nationalities  within  the  sample  matches  the  overall 
breakdown  of  the  political  elite  by  nationality  within  the  GCC  Secretariat  General. 
Thus,  whereas  Saudi  civil  servants  account  for  almost  80%  of  the  total  number  of  the 
organisation's  employees,  nearly  70%  comprised  Saudi  officials,  in  the  elite  sample 
mirroring  their  over-representation  within  the  GCC.  In  part  this  over-representation  of 
Saudi  officials  reflects  the  overall  demographic  dominance  of  Saudi  Arabia,  though  it 
may  also  be  due  to  the  location  of  the  GCC  headquarters  in  Riyadh.  Some  of  the 
under-representation  of  the  other  nationalities  of  Kuwaiti  and  Emirati  Secretariat 
General  policy-makers,  was  due  to  chance-  either/being  on  holiday  and/or  declining  to 
respond  to  the  questionnaire  or  agree  to  an  interview,  for  example.  The  under- 
representation  of  the  Qatari  nationality  within  our  elite  sample  --only  2  out  of  the  4 
Qatari  Secretariat  General  officials  were  available  to  fill  in  the  questionnaire--  was  due 
to  the  political  commitments  of  these  officials  at  the  time  the  fieldwork  was 
undertaken. 
Access  to  the  student  population  presented  numerous  difficulties.  First,  since 
Qatar  University  adopts  a  policy  of  segregation  between  male  and  female  students,  the 
researcher  had  to  rely  on  the  cooperation  of  faculty  staff  in  the  distribution  and 
collection  of  questionnaires  intended  for  female  students.  Second,  not  all  lecturers 
were  willing  to  grant  the  researcher  a  chance  to  distribute  the  study  questionnaire 
amongst  their  students.  Third,  as  noted  earlier  in  this  chapter,  undertaking  a  survey  in 
any  Gulf  university  requires  permission  from  the  authorities,  approval  for  which 
customarily  takes  a  considerable  time  to  secure. 
7.5.  Overview: 
This  chapter  has  aimed  to  meet  two  main  goals:  (i)  to  introduce  the  general 
framework  and  methodology  adopted  in  this  study;  and  (ii)  to  furnish  a  detailed 
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chapter  has  outlined  the  nature  of  strategy  and  methods  followed  in  gathering  data 
bearing  on  attitudinal  patterns  towards  the  GCC,  (b)  discussed  the  various  problems 
encountered  during  the  fieldwork  in  connection  with  both  the  gathering  of  the  relevant 
data  (e.  g.,  problems  emanating  from  reliance  on  questionnaires  and  interviews  as 
methods  of  eliciting  data  in  the  context  of  this  work),  and  the  sampling  process  (e.  g., 
difficulties  in  accessing  respondents),  and  (c),  justified  the  choice  of  the  two  types  of 
sample  examined  in  this  research  project.  Of  the  second  aim,  the  chapter  discussed  the 
chosen  samples  in  terms  of  their  major  characteristics  (i.  e.,  nationality  of  respondents, 
their  gender,  age,  etc.  ). 
In  gathering  data  for  this  study,  numerous  obstacles  were  encountered, 
especially  with  respect  to  sampling  and  access  to  respondents.  Such  obstacles  and 
difficulties  were  discussed  earlier  in  this  chapter  but  some  of  these  obstacles  are  worth 
emphasising  again. 
First,  approaching  females  (even  for  the  purposes  of  a  survey)  is  not  a  socially 
sanctioned  practice  within  the  ultra-conservative  Arabian  Gulf  societies.  Since  Qatar 
University  enforces  a  policy  of  segregation  between  male  and  female  students,  the 
researcher  had  to  rely  on  the  cooperation  of  faculty  staff  in  the  distribution  of 
questionnaires  among  female  students  and  the  collection  of  these  questionnaires. 
Second,  carrying  out  a  survey  in  any  Gulf  institution,  be  it  political  or  educational, 
necessarily  requires  permission  from  the  relevant  authorities.  What  is  more,  permission 
to  carry  out  the  required  fieldwork  either  customarily  takes  a  considerable  time  to 
secure  or  is  not  always  forthcoming,  especially  when  the  fieldwork  bears  on  a  political 
institution.  Third,  politics  remains  largely  a  'sensitive'  topic  in  the  region,  with  Gulf 
citizens  and  political  elites  generally  preferring  to  eschew  political  issues  in  public, 
making,  thereby,  the  obtention  of  (credible  and  unbiased)  data  bearing  on  attitudes  and 
opinions  towards  political  institutions  considerably  difficult.  Numerous  GCC  officials 
refused  to  cooperate  with  the  researcher  and  simply  turned  down  the  invitation  for  an 
interview,  and,  as  a  consequence,  the  sample  had  to  be  scaled  down  and  limited  to  the 
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The  political  elite's  sensitivity  to  some  of  the  research  questions  proved  a  major 
obstacle  and  it  was  only  through  reliance  on  personal  contacts  and  assistance  of  the 
Department  of  GCC  Affairs  in  the  Qatari  Foreign  Ministry  that  the  agreement  of  a 
number  of  GCC  officials  to  participate  in  the  survey  was  eventually  secured.  Similarly, 
it  was  only  owing  to  the  intervention  of  key  university  figures  such  as  the  Vice- 
Chancellor  and  the  Dean  of  the  Faculty  of  Humanities  at  Qatar  University  that  it  was 
possible  to  secure  access  to  students  and  the  cooperation  of  faculty  staff. 
a Chapter  Eight: 
GCC  Cooperation:  Elite  Perceptions 
8.1  Introduction: 
c  hapter  Eight  is  devoted  to  an  analysis  of  the  perceptions  of  a  sample  drawn 
from  the  political  elite  working  at  the  GCC  Secretariat  General.  In  the  first 
part  of  the  chapter  focus  is  placed  on  elite  perceptions  of  the  factors 
underlying  the  establishment  of  the  GCC.  The  sample  under  study  is  comprised  of 
policy  makers  and  heads  of  policy  committees.  The  sample's  perceptions  will  be 
evaluated  regarding,  first,  the  role  and  importance  of  regional  reasons  -  i.  e.,  those 
specific  to  the  Gulf  and  Mddle  East  regions  -  and,  second,  the  role  of  extra-regional 
factors,  events  and  developments  underpinning  the  emergence  of  the  GCC  as  a 
regional  alliance.  The  second  part  will  examine  their  perceptions,  and  evaluation,  of 
what  the  GCC  has  achieved.  Specifically,  the  main  aims  of  the  GCC,  its  problems  are 
assessed;  together  with  attempts  at  cooperation  between  the  states  acting  through  the 
GCC. 
8.2.  Reasons  for  Establishment  of  the  GCC:  Elite's  Perceptions 
Regional  Factors: 
NakhIah  (1986),  Obeid  (1996)  and  Ramazani  (1988),  are  among  those  who 
have  addressed  the  issue  of  what  factors  underlay  the  rise  of  the  GCC  as  a  regional 
alliance.  They  contend  that  of  all  the  factors,  directly  or  indirectly,  involved  in  the 
emergence  of  the  GCC,  regional  factors  -  that  is,  factors  specific  to  the  Gulf  and  the 
Middle  Eastern  area,  -  were  the  most  important.  These  'internal'  reasons  can  be 
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states  themselves  and  'push'  factors  originating  from  within  the  Gulf  generally  and  the 
Middle-East. 
A.  Internal  Motivations: 
According  to  much  of  the  research  on  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  rise 
of  the  GCC  as  a  regional  alliance  (see,  for  instance,  Ommer  (1993),  Qassim  (1993) 
and  Obeid  (1996)),  GCC-internal  factors  have  played  a  much  less  important  role  in 
the  emergence  of  the  GCC  than  have  external  regional  factors  such  as  the  Iranian  and 
Iraqi  threats  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  member  states,  and  the  Iran/Iraq  war.  Though 
the  reported  factors  internal  to  the  GCC  which  created  the  demand  for  its 
establishment  are  various,  this  study  will  focus  only  on  what  the  literature  has  argued 
as  being  the  most  important.  Thus,  the  survey  questionnaire  listed  four  such  reasons 
frequently  described  in  the  literature,  namely  (i)  'the  political  lead  given  by  GCC 
rulers'  or  sheikhs'  (to  create  a  platform  for  cooperation  among  the  member  states),  (ii) 
the  'desire  of  the  citizens'  for  closer  political  cooperation  between  neighbouring 
fhendly  states,  (iii)  the  'historical  ties  and  affinities'  of  the  member  states,  and  (iv)  the 
ccommon  political,  economic  and  social  characteristics'  uniting  the  member  states  and 
which  distinguish  them  as  a  group  within  the  region. 
Nearly  half  of  the  sample  perceived  the  'rulers'  desire'  as  the  'most  important' 
internal  factor  in  the  creation  of  the  GCC.  The  second  most  'important'  internal 
factor,  to  be  cited  was  'historical  relations';  46.2%  of  the  sample  were  of  the  view 
that  'historical  relations  and  bonds'  were  an  important  factor  in  the  materialisation  of 
the  GCC.  Both  findings  are  hardly  surprising  in  view  of  two  considerations:  the  elite's 
strong  loyalty  to  their  governments  and  a  widespread  awareness  among  the  GCC 
citizens  of  the  strong  cultural,  linguistic,  political  and  social  affinities  that  cut  across 
the  societies  and  peoples  of  the  various  member  states.  Table  (8.1)  shows  the  results 
obtained  in  regard  to  the  sample's  perceptions  of  the  importance  of  'the  rulers'  desire' 
and  'the  historical  relations  and  affinities'  factors  in  the  rise  of  the  GCC.  The  least 
important  reason  was  given  as  the  'desire  of  the  citizens';  35.9%  of  the  sample 
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this  was  explained  by  a  top  senior  official  at  the  GCC  Secretariat  General  thus:  "[ 
... 
] 
the  most  important  internal  factor  is  the  desire  of  Sheikhs;  however,  the  Gulf  peoples' 
aspiration  for  unification  is  a  common  reason  [among  the  GCC  members]  but  not  a 
very  effective  one.  "  (Gulf  Elite.  1). 
Table  S.  I  Elite  Perception  of  Kev  Factors  inluencin2  the  Creation  of  the  GCC  % 
GCC  Rewsoll  .  ....................  . 
for  EstabliSbow.  0t  Very  Important  Less  Least 
..........  I  ................  ................  ................ 
mportant 
..........  .........  .........  ...........................  ..  . 
lfflpý!  nt  ITP 
Desire  of  Rulers  48.7  .  .  .  23.1  ...............  ............  7.7  .......  15.4 
Desire  of  Citizens  7.7  17.9  28.2  35.9 
Historical  Relation  5.1  46.2  25.6  17.9 
*Common  Political  &  41  17.9  20.5  12.8 
Social  Characteristics 
*  8%  of  the  total  answers  are  missing  value 
A  more  detailed  statement  of  Table  8.1  in  Appendix  B  shows  the  breakdown 
of  officials'  perceptions  by  nationality.  The  majority  of  Bahraini,  Omani  and  Saudi 
officials  ranked  the  'desire  of  rulers  (Sheikhs)'  as  the  'most  important'  factor,  while  the 
Qataris  saw  the  'desire  of  sheikhs'  as  the  second  most  important.  Since  the  sample 
was  made  up  entirely  of  GCC  officials,  these  findings  could  hardly  be  unexpected  and 
could  be  viewed  as  confirming  the  general  tendency  among  Gulf  civil  servants  -  and 
political  elite  in  general-  to  show  total  loyalty  and  allegiance  to  the  political  systems 
and  heads  of  their  states. 
B.  External  Motivations: 
Turning  to  the  regional  factors  considered  important  to  the  emergence  of  the 
GCC,  Qassim  (1993),  among  others,  cited  several  factors.  Chief  among  these  were 
the  security  threats  posed  by  the  Iranian  revolution,  Iraqi  ambitions  for  territorial 
expansion,  the  Iran/Iraq  war,  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict,  and  the  USSR's  manoeuvres 
for  political  influence  in  the  region. 
From  the  elite  survey,  the  most  crucial  external  reason  for  the  creation  of  the 
GCC  was  the  'Iran/Iraq  war';  69.2%  of  the  sample  thought  this  critical.  It  is  not 
difficult  to  understand  why  the  1979  Iran/Iraq  was  perceived  by  many  in  the  Arabian 
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The  outbreak  of  the  Iran/Iraq  war  and  the  protracted  nature  of  the  conflict  led  to  a 
genuine  fear  amongst  the  Arabian  Gulf  states  that  it  might  spill  over  and  envelop  the 
whole  region.  The  Iran/Iraq  war  brought  home  to  the  political  regimes  of  the  GCC 
countries  the  dangerously  volatile  nature  of  the  region's  politics  and  the  potential  and 
real  dangers  that  small  and  vulnerable  states  were  facing  as  a  consequence  of  the 
political  instability  in  the  region.  In  the  words  of  one  GCC  official  from  Kuwait  (Gulf 
Elite.  1):  "Fear  of  the  threat  of  the  Iran/Iraq  war  spread  out  within  the  GCC 
governments.,  and  I  think  that  it  was  one  of  the  main  reasons  why  the  GCC  came 
about.  " 
The  second  most  important  factor  in  the  establishment  of  the  GCC,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  GCC  officials  surveyed  in  this  study,  was  the  'Iranian  threat'. 
Shuriedeh  (1995)  argued  that  the  outbreak  of  the  Iranian  revolution  made  the  issue  of 
security  a  top  priority  for  all  of  the  Arabian  Gulf  states  and  that  the  GCC  as  a  regional 
alliance  was  born  out  of  a  genuine  concern  of  the  member  states  for  their  security  and 
political  stability.  Fear  of  the  Iranian  revolution  spilling  over  to  the  littoral  Gulf  states 
was  not  unfounded:  Iranian  leaders  made  no  secret  of  their  ambitions  to  export  their 
revolution  to  neighbouring  countries,  and  others  beyond.  The  revolution  was  also 
feared  on  account  of  the  sectarian  divisions  it  was  perceived  to  foster  in  the  midst  of 
the  Muslim  'uniniah'.  Ramadan  (1993)  argued  that  since  it  began,  the  February  1979 
Khomaini  revolution  was  looked  upon  by  the  political  systems  of  the  Gulf  states  as  a 
threat  far  exceeding  those  from  Iran  spelling  during  the  Shah's  regime.  The  Iranian 
revolution  inflamed  the  ShPite  ideology,  threatening  thereby  not  only  the  political 
regimes  and  stability  of  the  Gulf  states  but  much  of  the  Arab  world.  (Tables  (8.2) 
presents  the  political  elite's  perceptions  of  the  role  of  external  factors  in  the  creation 
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an/  Iraq  \\ar,  tbe  VS,  Table  8.2  The  Policy-Makers  Perceptions  of  the  h  ýS;  R  HII-cat  and 
other  factors  in  the  GCC  Establishment  ýPercentage 
...... 
.........  ....  . 
........................ 
.  GCC  Rcasorls  for  Very  Important  Less  Least 
... 
Important 
.................................  ............................... 
Important 
................................. 
Important 
...................................  ine'li  51.3  5.1  0  5.2 
IraniIraq  War  69.2  7.7  5.2  5.2 
Iraqi  Threat  30.8  41  2.1  2.6 
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Arab  Support  7.7  2.6  38.6  20.6 
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All  of  the  GCC  officials,  regardless  of  nationality,  viewed  the  'Iranian  threat'  as 
the  most  important  factor  in  the  establishment  of  the  GCC.  The  Qatari  officials  were 
the  only  sub-sample  who  put  the  'Iraqi  threat'  as  second. 
Elite  perceptions  of  what  accounts  for  the  most  important  regional  factor  in 
the  emergence  of  the  GCC  confirms  the  largely  acknowledged  fact  that  the  GCC  was 
created  as  a  first  step  towards  counterbalancing  regional  threats  and  addressing  the 
security  concerns  of  the  member  states.  Writing  in  the  Gulf  daily  al-Qabas,  al-'Esa 
(1985)  asserted  that  ".  security  (concerns)  justifiably  emerged  as  a  result  of  the 
situation  in  the  (Gulo  area  ...  political  and  military  developments 
...  the  US 
intervention  and  its  manoeuvres  to  protect  American  interests, 
...  the  presence  of  the 
oil  (and)  the  outbreak  of  the  Iranian  revolution  (are)  all  reasons  that  made  concern  for 
security  justifiable.  " 
C.  Other  Motivating  Factors  in  the  Creation  of  the  GCC: 
Several  other  factor  are  significant  in  explaining  the  creation  of  the  GCC, 
notably  'regional  disputes'  including  not  only  the  Iran/Iraq  war,  but  also  the 
Palestinian-Israeli  conflict  and  the  Israeli  invasion  of  south  Lebanon.  Halliday  (1980) 
argued  that  the  potential  spread  of  the  Iranian  revolution,  coupled  with  overt 
expansionist  policies  of  the  Iranian  fundamentalist  regime  and  a  determination  on  the 
part  of  such  a  regime  to  subvert  Shi'ite  minorities  in  the  area,  presented  the  Gulf 
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spreading  to  other  states  in  the  Gulf,  a  fear  that  was  made  even  more  immediate 
owing  to  the  geographical  proximity  of  the  Arabian  Gulf  states  to  both  parties  to  the 
conflict,  was  found  to  be  perceived  by  most  of  the  sample  to  constitute  the  most 
important  regional  conflict  contributing  to  the  emergence  of  the  GCC. 
Four  'push  factors'  were  identifiable  from  the  survey: 
(1)  Citizen  demand:  Responses  subsumed  under  this  category  made  reference  to  such 
factors  as  the  cultural  and  societal  affinities  among  the  GCC  countries  as  well  as 
the  intimate  and  long-standing  historical  relations  between  the  Arabian  Gulf 
citizens. 
(2)  Economic  Similarities  -  the  fact  that  all  GCC  countries  are  oil  producing  countries, 
have  similar  economies  totally  dependent  on  oil,  are  all  members  of  OPEC  and 
AOPC  -  is  the  second  category  of  regional  factors  pointed  out  in  the  responses  of 
the  sample. 
(3)  Common  Ethnicity  &  Cultural  affinities:  Responses  specifying  common  ethnicity 
and  cultural  affinities  as  an  important  factor  in  the  establishment  of  the  GCC 
emphasised  the  role  of  a  common  religion,  race,  language,  common  culture  in 
facilitating  and  prompting  the  creation  of  the  GCC. 
(4)  Political  affinities:  subsuming  references  to  the  geographic  and  demographic  size 
of  the  Gulf  states,  similarities  in  political  regimes,  desire  of  ruling  sheikhs,  and  the 
strong  historical  relations  between  the  Arabian  Gulf  monarchies. 
(5)  Common  Security  Concerns:  in  reference  to  security  concerns  deriving  from  such 
regional  disputes  as  Iran/Iraq  war  and  such  regional  threats  as  the  Iranian 
revolution  and  the  need  for  the  GCC  member  states  to  collectively  strengthen  the 
internal  front  through  military  cooperation  and  enhancement  of  military 
capabilities,  was  a  fifth  category  of  factors  specified  in  the  responses  of  the 
sample.  Security  and  security  concerns:  was  perceived  by  the  sample  to  have  been 
the  most  important  regional  reason  for  the  creation  of  the  GCC;  as  many  as 
36.9%  of  the  total  responses  saw  security  as  the  most  important  factor  in  the 
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Clearly  'security'  was  regarded  by  the  majority  of  the  elite  GCC  officials  as  the 
most  important  regional  factor  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC (Figure  8.1).  This  is  not 
difficult  to  comprehend  in  view  of  the  strained  relations  between  the  various  countries 
of  the  region  and  the  hostility  that  has  long  characterised  the  region;  Iran's  persistent 
claims  to  Bahraini  territory,  the  assassination  attempt  on  the  Amir  of  Kuwait  in  the 
early  1980s  by  a  Lebanese  pro-Iranian  militant,  the  Iranian  revolution  together  with 
the  Iran/Iraq  war  have  all  contributed  to  insecurity,  in  the  region.  The  important  role 
of  'security'  and  security-related  issues  in  the  establishment  of  the  GCC  was  discussed 
by  a  great  many  scholars.  Al-Hawari  (1993)  argued  that  Iran,  under  revolutionary 
leadership,  continues  to  represent  a  permanent  threat  to  the  security  of  the  Gulf  states 
and  that  Israel,  equipped  with  a  superior  military  arsenal  and  unmatched  nuclear 
capabilities,  constituted  a  real  threat  to  the  Gulf  state  and  to  the  countries  of  the 
whole  region. 
A  second  'push'  factor  is  represented  by  common  ethnicity  and  identity 
affinities;  21.6%  of  the  sample  noted  the  common  ethnic  origins  of  the  peoples  of  the 
Arabian  Gulf  states  as  being  an  important  factor  in  the  creation  of  the  GCC  alliance. 
Some  differences  were  apparent  by  nationality. 
In  an  interview  for  the  newspaper  al-Siyyasa  (24/11/1993)  Bishara,  the  GCC 
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threats  ftom  neighbouring  regional  powers  during  the  1980s  and  that  the  GCC  was 
created  with  two  main  purposes  in  mind,  namely,  (i)  to  maintain  the  status  quo  in  the 
Gulf  area  and  counteract  the  Iranian  revolution  and  thwart  its  leaders'  attempts  to 
export  it  fo  neighbouring  countries,  and  (ii)  to  strengthen  the  ability  of  the  GCC 
member  states  to  counter  any  regional  threats. 
The  ex-Secretary-General's  assertion  confirms  the  claim  that  regional  factors 
were  critical  in  the  establishment  of  the  GCC.  He  noted,  as  an  example  of  the  threats 
that  the  GCC  countries  faced  from  external  powers,  the  immense  pressures  exerted  by 
Iraq  during  and  subsequent  to  the  1978  Baghdad  Summit  on  the  Arabian  Gulf 
countries  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with  Egypt.  Braun  (1988)  pointed  out  that  the 
GCC  states'  weakness  and  vulnerability  in  the  face  of  other  regional  powers  derives 
from  their  much  limited  military  means  and  capabilities. 
International  Factors  and  the  Emergence  of  the  GCC 
There  is  considerable  agreement  in  the  literature  on  the  fact  that  international 
(i.  e.  extra-  regional)  factors  have  played  a  much  less  important  role  than  regional 
factors  in  the  creation  of  the  GCC.  International  factors  connected,  in  one  way  or 
another,  to  the  emergence  of  the  GCC  have  been  classified  into  the  two  broad 
categories  'international  support'  (i.  e.  backing  and  encouragement  from  the  major 
members  of  the  international  community)  and  'international  threats'. 
A.  International  Support 
The  role  of  international  support  in  the  emergence  of  the  regional  alliance  have 
been  discussed  by  many  scholars  (see,  for  instance,  Ommer  (1993)  and  Qassim 
(1993)).  According  to  much  of  this  literature,  the  struggle  between  the  two 
superpowers,  the  USA  and  the  USSR,  in  their  manoeuvres  for  supremacy  in  the  Gulf 
region  ultimately  speeded  up  the  GCC-formation  process.  Discussing  the  situation  of 
the  GCC  states  in  an  increasingly  unstable  world,  al-Alkim  (1994:  125)  wrote  that  "In Chapter  Eight:  GCC  Cooperation:  Elite  Perceptions  147 
the  past,  the  GCC  states  pursued  the  GCC's  policy  of  non-alignment.  However,  their 
fear  of  the  USSR  and  of  the  radical  governments  in  the  region  led  them  to  pursue  a 
more  conciliatory  policy  toward  the  USA"  and  that  "The  GCC  are  totally  dependent 
on  the  West,  especially  the  USA,  for  their  security.  This  dependence  is  increased  by 
the  fact  that  Western  nations  supply  most  of  the  GCC  states'  arms..  "  (P:  74) 
The  GCC  officials  expressed  somewhat  different  opinions  as  to  the  factors 
which  assisted  the  establishment  of  GCC.  As  Table  8.3,  Appendix  B  indicates,  some 
33.3%  and  25.6%  of  the  GCC  officials  cited  the  emergence  of  'regional  blocs'  like 
EEC  and  NATO  and  the  'manoeuvres  of  the  superpowers  (USA  and  USSR)  and  their 
struggle  to  consolidate  their  political  influence  in  the  Gulf  area  respectively  as  a  'very 
important'  factor  in  the  creation  of  the  GCC.  For  some  18%,  the  geo-political 
importance  of  the  Gulf  region  was  the  second  most  important  factor  in  the  creation  of 
the  GCC,  while,  5.1%  of  the  sample  saw  the  American  and  Soviet  struggle  to  control 
oil  resources  as  an  important  international  factor  in  the  arise  of  the  GCC.  Qassim 
(1993)  argued  that  because  of  the  pro-west  nature  of  the  GCC  governments  and  the 
conspicuous  American  support  for  this  alliance  the  USSR  dismissed  the  GCC  as  a 
pro-  western  organisation.  Wenner  (1988)  affirmed  that  the  Soviet  Union's 
intervention  in  the  1986  South  Yemen  events  was  undertaken  with  the  aim  of  making 
its  existence  felt  in  the  region.  With  the  exception  of  Kuwait,  most  of  the  Gulf  states 
were  opposed  at  the  time  to  the  establishment  of  any  diplomatic  relations  with  the 
USSR  because  of  its  invasion  of  Afghanistan.  In  the  meantime,  they  pursued  close 
political  relations  with  USA  and  the  Western  bloc  (Qassim  1993).  Kuwait's  decision 
to  break  with  the  other  Arabian  Gulf  states  and  entertain  diplomatic  relations  with 
USSR  was  a  reaction  to  the  USA!  s  alignment  with  Israel  in  its  conflict  with  the  Arabs. 
In  their  responses  to  the  question  bearing  on  the  nature  and  importance  of 
external  factors  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC,  the  officials  considered  Arab  support  as 
of  less  importance  than  other  external  factors  in  the  establishment  of  the  GCC  (see 
Table  8.4,  Appendix  B).  Several  factors  help  explain  the  trend,  most  notably  the 
failure  of  the  Arab  states  to  prevent,  or  react  firmly,  to  the  escalation  of  the  Iranian 
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standing  disputes  between  a  number  of  Arab  states.  Having  said  that,  it  should  be 
noted  that  notwithstanding  the  political  conflict  between  the  states  of  the  GCC  and 
some  Arab  radical  regimes,  most  Arab  countries  have  always  supported  the  Gulf 
states  and  their  efforts  to  forge  an  alliance  in  the  face  of  external  threats  to  their 
security. 
Overall,  the  elite  sample  considered  the  role  of  external  factors  as  being  more 
important  than  other  internal  factors  to  the  materialisation  of  the  GCC.  Qassim  (1993) 
and  al-Alkim  1994,  as  others,  explained  how  the  Arabian  Gulf  states  sought  the 
support  of  the  Western  bloc,  led  by  the  USA,  in  their  efforts  to  form  the  GCC. 
Predictably,  the  United  States'  reaction  to  the  establishment  of  the  GCC  was  positive. 
To  protect  and  ensure  non-interrupted  oil  shipment  during  the  Iran/Iraq  war,  the 
United  States'  deployed  warships  in  the  Gulf  sea.  The  establishment  of  the  GCC  was 
also  supported  by  the  British,  French  and  other  Western  governments.  The  Gulf 
states'  moves  towards  a  self-dependent  defence  policy  was  both  welcomed  and 
supported  by  the  USA  and  the  Western  bloc  which  saw  in  these  moves  the  reduction 
of  their  own  role  in  protecting  impotent  Arab  oil-producing  countries.  Rajab  (1989) 
asserted  that  it  was  only  through  coordination  between  the  US  government  and  the 
GCC  member  states  was  the  Iranian  threat  to  these  Gulf  countries  was  thwarted. 
B.  Other  International  factors: 
The  threats  inherent  in  the  communist  ideology,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Israel's 
perceived  expansionist  policies  and  continuous  flaunting  of  international  statues,  on 
the  other,  have  for  long  been  seen  to  be  in  most  of  the  Arab  countries,  and  especially 
in  the  traditional  monarchies,  as  the  most  serious  international  challenges  to  their 
security  and  political  stability.  Al-'Idarous  (1993)  argued  that  the  GCC  member  states 
were  divided  in  their  reactions  to,  and  perceptions  of,  the  origin  and  nature  of  the 
serious  challenges  facing  them.  While  some  of  these  states  regarded  the  Soviet  threat 
as  the  major  challenge  to  their  security,  others  saw  the  US  and  its  manoeuvres  to 
affirm  its  hegemony  in  the  region  as  the  real  threat.  Tripp  (1995)  claimed  that  the 
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Islamic  movement  as  well  as  the  growing  strength  of  national  oppositions  in  some 
other  Arab  states. 
The  GCC  states'  uneasiness  towards  the  threats  posed  by  the  Communist  bloc 
and  Islamic  movements  was  also  cited  by  the  elite  sample  in  their  reactions  to 
questions  bearing  on  the  rise  of  the  GCC.  Nearly  40%  of  the  GCC  officials  citing  the 
role  of  'other  international  factors'  in  the  arise  of  the  GCC,  included  such  political 
factors  as  the  emergence  of  regional  and  international  blocs,  the  power-politics  of  a 
new  world  order,  and  the  ineffectiveness  of  the  Arab  League.  More  than  58.1%  of 
this  same  sub-sample  thought  that  security  concerns  ensuing  from  the  superpowers' 
struggle  for  supremacy  in  the  Gulf  and  the  Soviet's  invasion  of  Afghanistan  were 
involved  in  the  establishment  of  the  GCC. 
To  recapitulate  so  far,  the  majority  of  the  GCC  political  elite  in  this  study 
considered  internal  reasons  as  having  played  a  much  more  important  role  than  external 
factors  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC  as  a  regional  alliance.  In  terms  of  the  internal 
factors,  the  elite  were  mostly  of  the  opinion  that  it  was  the  desire  of  the  rulers 
(sheikhs)  that  was  the  most  significant  reason  for  the  creation  of  the  GCC;  conversely, 
the  desire  of  citizens  was  seen  as  of  much  less  importance.  Of  external  'push'  factors, 
the  sample  was  largely  agreed  on  the  Iranian  threat  as  the  most  effective  factor  in  the 
establishment  of  the  GCC  and  on  the  emergence  of  Western  and  other  regional  blocs 
and  alliances  (e.  g.,  NATO,  EEC,  etc.  ),  while  the  Cold  War  confrontation  between  the 
two  superpowers,  the  USA  and  the  USSR,  in  pursuit  of  political  influence  and 
leverage  in  the  region  was  considered  a  second  important  'push'  factor. 
8.3  The  GCC's  Achievements:  Elite  Perceptions 
This  part  examines  the  elite  perceptions  of  and  attitudes  towards  the  aims  of 
GCC,  the  organisation's  achievements  so  far  and  the  various  problems  facing  it.  It  will 
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Aims  of  GCC: 
As  is  outlined  in  the  organisation's  charter  and  as  pointed  out  in  a  great  deal  of 
the  literature  dealing  with  the  GCC  (see,  among  others,  Angell  (1987)),  the  GCC's 
central  goals  is  to  create  a  supranational  organisation  with  independent  judicial  and 
legislative  entities  and  bodies.  The  basic  objectives  of  the  GCC  as  per  charter  Article 
4  are: 
I.  To  work  towards  ensuring  coordination  and  integration  among  the  peoples  and 
institutions  of  the  member  states. 
111.  To  intensify  and  strengthen  relations,  links  and  cooperation  among  the  member 
states  in  various  fields. 
III.  To  harmonise  policies  in  various  fields  including,  most  notably,  the  following: 
1.  Economic  and  financial  sectors. 
2.  Commerce,  customs  and  communications. 
3.  Education  and  culture. 
4.  Social  and  health  sectors. 
5.  Information  and  tourism. 
6.  Legislative  and  administrative  affairs. 
IV.  To  stimulate  scientific  and  technological  progress  in  the  fields  of  industry, 
mining,  agriculture,  water  and  animal  resources;  to  cooperate  in  scientific 
research;  to  establish  joint  ventures  in  economic,  educational  and  scientific 
sectors  and  encourage  cooperation  by  the  private  sector  for  the  good  of  the 
member  states'  peoples. 
Angell  (1987)  asserted  that  the  GCC  objectives  were  ambitious  and  to  that 
extent  would  be  difficult  to  realise.  Others  were  critical  of  the  progress  that  the  GCC 
has  made  so  far  in  pursuit  of  its  charter  objectives.  According  to  al-Kuwari  (1992), 
for  instance,  the  GCC  has  yet  to  achieve  any  of  the  aims  outlined  in  the  founding 
charter  of  the  organisation.  He  also  noted  that  part  of  the  difficulty  in  achieving  any  of 
these  aims  lies  in  the  fact  that  its  aims  are  inherently  ill-defined  and  somewhat  vague. 
The  GCC  political  elite's  responses  to  the  question  'What  do  you  think  are  the 
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pooled,  and  classified  into  four  major  categories.  Answers  listing  such  matters  as 
cooperation  in  the  field  of  foreign  affairs,  coordination  of  foreign  policies  and  the 
harmonisation  of  foreign  policy  positions  were  grouped  under  the  broad  category  of 
'political  cooperation'.  A  second  broad  category  of  objectives  is  "social  and  cultural 
cooperation7,  grouping  answers  listing  such  concerns  as  cooperation  in  scientific 
fields,  establishment  ofjoint  scientific  and  technological  ventures,  and  coordination  of 
education,  health,  and  communications  policies.  A  third  category  is  "economic 
cooperation",  grouping  answers  listing  cooperation  in  the  fields  of  imports,  exports, 
oil  policies  and  customs.  A  fourth  and  final  category  of  GCC  objectives  was  'security 
cooperation'.  Grouped  under  this  category  were  answers  citing  coordination  in 
military  and  security  fields,  organisation  of  joint  military  exercises,  and  exchange  of 
intelligence  information  about  terrorist  and  subversive  groups. 
As  is  illustrated  by  Figure  (8.2),  slightly  over  half  (51%)  of  elite's  responses 
listed  'political  cooperation'  as  the  most  important  aim  of  the  GCC.  26.2%  of  the 
sample's  responses  identified  'social  cooperation'  as  the  most  important  objectives  of 
the  GCC  and  14.1  %  perceived  'economic  cooperation'  as  a  ma  or  priority  objective  of  j 
this  organisation.  Only  8.7%  of  the  sample  thought  of  "security  cooperatiorf'  as  a 
major  aim  of  the  GCC. 
Most  notable  about  the  responses  of  the  sample  as  to  what  the  GCC's  officials 
regard  as  the  most  important  aim  of  the  GCC  is  a  general  reluctance  to  explicitly 
admit  to  the  fact  that  security  and  security  concerns  are  and  remain  at  the  heart  of  this 
organisation's  objectives  and  creation.  In  his  discussion  of  official  reluctance  to 
publicly  acknowledge  security  cooperation  as  one  of  the  main  GCC  concerns, 
Nakhleh(1986:  6)  stated  that  "[t]he  primary  focus  in  the  GCC  agreement  was  on 
economic  cooperation;  security  was  not,  at  least  publicly,  a  concern  uppermost  in  the 
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Fi2ure  8.2  The  Political  Elite's  Perceptions  of  Aims  of  GCC 
Security  Cooperation 
8.7% 
Social  Cooperation 
26.2%  r,  cononue  L;  ooperation 
14.1% 
Table  8.3  The  most  imoortant  Goals  of  the  GCC  bv  Nationali 
MIX 
Bahrain  15.6  18.8  15.6  50 
Oman  44.6  55.6  00 
Qatar  40  60  00 
Saudi  Arabia  52  26.5  13.3  8.4 
*The  respondents  were  asked  to  rank  their  Answers  1.  Very  Important  .........  4.  Least  Important 
As  is  evident  from  Table  (8.3),  the  various  sub-samples  differ  in  terms  of  what 
they  perceive  to  be  the  most  important  aim(s)  of  the  GCC.  While  the  Bahraini  officials 
perceived  cooperation  in  the  'security'  field  as  the  most  important  of  the  GCC 
objectives,  the  Saudi  officials  saw  cooperation  in  the  'political'  field  as  the  most 
important.  The  Omani  and  Qatari  officials  differ  from  both  the  Saudis  and  Bahrainis  in 
that  they  saw  cooperation  in  the  'social'  sectors  to  be  the  most  important  of  the  aims 
of  the  GCC. 
Clearly,  perceptions  of  the  GCC  aims  vary.  This  variation  might  be  attributed  to  a 
tendency  on  the  part  of  the  GCC  officials'  to  endorse  their  governments'  official 
positions  and,  perhaps  also,  to  reflect  the  somewhat  vague  nature  of  the  GCC  aims. 
For  example,  one  GCC  official  (Gulf  Elite  (2))  asserted  that  the  GCC  aims  are  not  a 
C4  fail  accompli"  and  that  there  could  be  no  long-term  GCC  aims  because,  on  the  one 
Political  Cooperation 
51% Chapter  Eight:  GCC  Cooperation:  Elite  Perceptions  153 
hand,  the  region's  continually  changing  circumstances  require  a  continuous 
redefinition  of  these  aims  and,  on  the  other,  individual  member  states  tend  to  interpret 
and  understand  the  GCC  charter  aims  in  a  manner  best  compatible  with  their  own 
interests.  Another  top  executive  (Gulf  Elite  (1))  argued  that  the  GCC  aims  were 
defined  at  a  critical  era  and  that  both  the  aims  and  mechanisms  of  this  organisation  are 
bound  to  inevitably  change  and  adapt  in  line  with  the  transformations  of,  and  changes 
imposed  by,  the  new  world  order,  and  the  shifting  politics  of  the  region. 
The  GCC's  pursuit  of  its  charter  aims  and  objectives  continue  to  be  bedevilled 
by  the  long-standing  and  unresolved  conflict  between  member  states.  Disputes  among 
several  of  the  GCC  member  countries,  including  border  conflicts  between  Bahrain  and 
Qatar,  Qatar  and  Saudi  Arabia  and  between  Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait,  remain  an 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  achieving  these  aims.  McLachlan  (1994)  claimed  that  external 
intervention  and  involvement  in  these  disputes,  such  as  that  of  Iran  during  the  1992 
border  dispute  between  Qatar  and  Saudi  Arabia,  compounded  and  marred  inter-state 
relations  within  the  GCC.  He  also  pointed  out  that  the  border  disputes  between  the 
two  countries  opened  the  way  for  political  rapprochement  between  Qatar,  a  GCC 
member  state,  and  Iran,  an  avowed  adversary  of  the  GCC.  The  political 
rapprochement  between  Qatar  and  Iran  in  1993  was  seen  by  some  GCC  members  as  a 
threat  and  as  conflicting  with  and  undercutting  the  GCC  aims.  Border  disputes  among 
the  GCC  member  states  continues  to  be  a  source  of  much  tension  among  these  states 
and  a  clear  obstacle  to  the  realisation  of  the  GCC  charter  objectives. 
GCC  Accomplishments: 
As  part  of  measuring  the  overall  achievements  of  the  GCC,  the  survey 
questionnaire  required  the  political  elite  to  specify  in  what  way  the  member  states  had 
benefited  from  the  establishment  of  the  GCC. 
The  responses  obtained  from  the  sample  with  regard  to  the  question  'What  do 
you  think  are  the  (main)  benefits  of  the  GCC  (for  the  member  states)  and  in  what 
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into  several  broad  categories  (of  perceived  benefits).  A  first  broad  category  was  that 
of  "economic  cooperation",  under  which  category  were  subsumed  answers  citing  the 
signing  of  an  economic  treaty,  coordination  in  the  economic  sector,  the  setting  up  of 
joint  economic  ventures,  and  the  ratification  of  policies  related  to  export  and  import 
issues,  including  the  establishment  of  a  free  trade  zone.  A  second  category  was  that  of 
"social  cooperation".  Grouped  under  this  category  were  the  sample's  answers  listing 
policies  and  ventures  designed  to  increase  the  rapprochement  and  reinforce  the  ties 
between  the  various  peoples  of  the  GCC  community.  "Security  coordination  and 
cooperation7,  grouping  answers  citing  the  member  states'  cooperation  in  the  military 
field  and  coordination  of  internal  and  external  security  policies,  was  the  third  major 
category  of  perceived  benefits.  The  fourth  category,  "political  cooperation",  grouped 
answers  citing  cooperation  in  the  various  political  fields  and  coordination  of  policies 
with  the  aim  of  harmonising  the  stance  to  international  affairs  and  political  institutions. 
Under  the  fifth  category  of  perceived  benefits,  "other  cooperation",  included  such 
matters  as  cooperation  on  issues  related  to  domestic  legislation  and  Islamic  common 
law,  and  the  exchange  of  expertise. 
As  Figure  (8.3)  reveals,  over  30%  of  the  total  sample  thought  the  main  benefit 
of  the  GCC  for  member  states  was  "coordination  in  the  economic  sector".  For  25%  of 
the  total  responses,  "coordination  in  political"  fields  emerged  as  the  second  main 
benefit  perceived  by  the  sample  to  have  followed  from  the  establishment  of  the  GCC- 
The  third  main  benefit  to  the  member  states  from  the  creation  of  the  GCC,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  GCC  officials,  was  "other  cooperation".  19.6%  of  the  total 
responses  listed  'other  cooperation!  as  the  area  in  which  the  GCC  has  benefited  the 
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Clearly,  the  agreement  on  'economic  cooperation'  as  the  most  important 
achievement  of  the  GCC  is  understandable  in  view  of  some  prominent  characteristics 
of  the  member  states  of  the  organisation:  as  most  of  the  GCC  member  states  are 
major  oil-producing  countries  and  totally  dependent  on  oil  production,  it  is  only 
natural  that  coordination  of  policies  bearing  on  oil  production,  prices  and  other 
related  issues  would  be  seen  as  a  priority. 
GCC  Problems: 
Like  any  regional  or  international  organisation,  the  GCC  is  faced  with 
considerable  problems  and  challenges.  The  nature  and  gravity  of  the  internal,  regional, 
and  international  problems  that  has  faced  the  GCC  in  the  past,  and  which  continue  to 
face  it,  have  been  the  subject  of  much  discussion.  While  the  majority  of  political 
analysts  argue  that  the  problems  that  have  afflicted  the  GCC  since  its  inception  are 
thwarting  it  from  extending  cooperation  among  the  member  states,  a  few  have 
asserted  that,  unless  resolved  quickly,  some  of  the  problems  facing  the  GCC  are  so 
grave  that  they  could  j  eopardise  the  GCC  itself  (see  among  others,  Ommer  (1993),  al- 
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To  the  elite  sample  the  most  important  problem  hindering  the  GCC  in  its 
pursuit  of  political  cooperation  and  the  harmonisation  of  policies  among  its  member 
states,  has  been  the  failure  to  evolve  a  "collective  sovereignty"  among  the  states.  This 
reflects  in  turn  the  persistence  of  state  sovereignty  and  the  prioritisation  of  self- 
interests  over  common  interests  and  concerns  (e.  g.,  al-Kuwari  1992).  Each  country 
has,  at  one  time  or  another,  tried  to  impose  it  own  policies  on  the  rest  of  the 
organisation's  members  in  the  belief  that  these  policies  would  benefit  them  all. 
According  to  many  of  the  political  elite,  the  prioritisation  of  'individual 
sovereignty'  over  all  other  concerns  by  each  GCC  country  and  the  reluctance  of  these 
states  to  moderate  their  policies  in  light  of  the  interests  of  other  GCC  countries  has 
been  at  the  root  of  many  of  the  problems  hampering  coordination.  For  one  GCC 
official  (Gulf  Elite  (3)),  sovereignty-related  problems  are  some  of  the  most  intractable 
dilemmas  confronting  the  GCC:  "no  one  state  is  ready  to  relinquish  part  of  its 
sovereignty  for  the  sake  of  the  [greater]  union,  and,  as  a  consequence,  questions  of 
sovereignty  and  related  problems  have  excluded  the  adoption  of  many  significant  and 
cooperation-enhancing  decisions.  "  For  the  same  official,  'collective  sovereignty'  is  a 
prerequisite  for  meaningful  and  extensive  cooperation.  For  another  GCC  official, 
(Gulf  Elite  (1)),  the  GCC  countries  need  to  evolve  and  develop  the  sense  of  a 
'collective  sovereignty'  for  they  "have  to  bear  in  mind  that,  individually,  the 
sovereignty  of  each  Gulf  state  is  not  tenable". 
The  second  most  important  problem  encountered  by  the  GCC,  is  the  Voting 
System.  The  right  of  veto  and  its  exercise  by  member  states  of  the  GCC  undermines 
the  feasibility  of  cooperation.  According  to  one  GCC  official  (Gulf  Elite  (4j),  the 
insistence  on  unanimity  has  prevented  the  GCC  from  reaching  major  decisions  or 
resolutions:  "One  of  the  obstacles  encountered  [by  the  GCC]  is  the  insistence  on 
unanimity  which  always  impedes  adoption  of  major  resolutions.  "  According  to 
another  official  (Gulf  Elite  (2)),  because  of  the  distinction  made  within  the  GCC 
between  advisory  and  mandatory  resolutions,  some  of  the  resolutions  adopted  by  this 
political  body  have  never  been  implemented  or  are  yet  to  be  implemented  by  the 
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As  noted  in  chapter  4,  implementation  of  GCC  resolutions  and  policies  are  left 
to  the  discretion  of  the  member  states;  members  are  not  under  any  obligation  to  carry 
out  all  or  any  of  the  GCC  resolutions.  'Failure  to  implement  the  organisation's  policies 
and  resolutions'  on  the  part  of  the  member  states  is,  as  the  sample  elite  is  concerned,  is 
a  major  problem. 
The  fourth  most  important  perceived  problem  are  the  "incompatibility  of 
interests"  among  the  member  states  of  the  organisation  and  the  conflict  that  inevitably 
result  from  these  differences.  The  advantage  of  grouping  a  number  of  member  states, 
the  majority  of  which  are  major  oil  producing  countries,  has  in  fact  at  times  proven  a 
liability  owing  to  the  GCC  states'  failure  to  adopt  or  subscribe  to  a  unified  oil  policy, 
especially  with  regard  to  oil  prices.  One  GCC  official  (Gulf  Elite  (2))  also  argued  that 
one  of  the  problems  facing  the  GCC  is  the  failure  to  agree  on  and  fix  a  common  tariff 
rate  among  the  member  states.  'Aggressive  economic  competition'  among  the  member 
states  and  their  pursuit  of  national  interests  also  constitute,  in  the  view  of  the  GCC 
sample,  a  major  problem  for  the  GCC.  According  to  one  GCC  official  (Gulf  Elite  (2)), 
incompatibility  of  economic  interests  is  one  of  the  major  problems  that  will  continue 
to  hamper  the  GCC;  he  stated  that  "Qatar  and  Oman,  for  example,  are  concerned  that 
oil  prices  should  remain  constantly  high,  while  other  bigger  GCC  oil  producing 
countries  are  mainly  concerned  that  oil  prices  should  remain  stable".  The  view  that 
emerged  from  the  attitudes  obtained  from  the  sample  was  that,  unless  each  member 
state  is  willing,  even  to  a  degree,  to  subordinate  national  interests  to  the  common 
interests  of  all  member  states,  the  GCC  will  continue  to  face  intractable  problems. 
Figure  (8.4)  schernatises  the  perceived  problems  facing  the  GCC.  42.4%  of  the 
elite  sample  were  of  the  view  that  the  most  prominent  of  the  problems  facing  the  GCC 
have  been  of  a  political  nature  and  include,  most  notably,  border  disputes,  questions 
of  sovereignty,  differences  in  internal  policies,  and  variation  in  political 
predispositions.  The  second  most  important  problem  confronting  the  organisation  is 
the  persistent  failure  of  the  member  states  to  implement  the  organisation's  policies  and 
resolutions.  Nearly  a  third  of  the  sample  subscribed  to  the  view  that  a  major  block  (in 
the  way  of  the  organisation)  is  the  GCC  Charter's  requirement  for  unanimity  to  pass 
resolutions  as  well  as  the  lack  of  any  effective  machinery  to  ensure  implementation  of Chapter  Eight:  GCC  Cooperation:  Elite  Perceptions  158 
those  few  resolutions  which  have  been  adopted.  "Economic  policies  and  economic 
cooperation"  -related  obstacles  are,  according  to  the  GCC  officials,  the  third  most 
important  problem  impeding  the  progress  of  the  GCC.  13.1%  of  the  total  sample 
thought  that  the  major  problem  lies  in  the  field  of  economic  cooperation  and 
coordination  of  economic  policies  and  that  such  a  problem  is  a  result  of  an 
incompatibility  of  interests,  aggressive  economic  competition  among  the  various 
member  states  and  a  failure  on  the  part  of  these  states  to  reach  agreements  on,  among 
others,  common  custom  tariffs.  Overall,  these  perceptions  were  shared  regardless  of 
nationality  (Table  8.4). 
Figure  8.4  Sample's  Perceptions  of  GCC  Problems 
Political  Fields 
42.4% 
Hconomic  Policies 
13.1% 
Social  Policie..,, 
4.6% 
Security  Policie.,, 
5.2% 
WWI 
Ensuring  Policy  hnplementation 
32.6% 
Nationaliti,  n  tconomic  vonticat  ý)ociai  ýiecunty  trisuring  voncy 
Implementation 
7  7.2  46.4  0  0  46.4 
Oman  3  15.2  62.5  0  12.5  12.5 
Qatar  2  28.6  28.6  14.2  0  28.6 
Saudi  Arabia  26  4.2  40.6  4.2  8.3  42.7 
*The  resoondents  were  asked  to  rank  their  Answers  1.  Verv  Important 
.........  4.  Least  Imnortant 
As  is  clear  from  Table  (8.4),  the  Saudi  officials  ranked  problems  in  the 
"Ensuring  Policy  Implementation"  as  the  most  important  of  the  problems  facing  the 
GCC.  According  to  the  Qatari  and  Bahraini  officials  also  the  major  problem 
confronting  the  GCC  as  an  organisation  is  failure  of  the  member  states  to  "implement Chapter  Eight:  GCC  Cooperation:  Elite  Perceptions  159 
the  GCC  Charter".  All  other  problems  featuring  in  Table  8.8  were  regarded  by  the 
GCC  officials  as  less  important  than  either  the  political  or  the  economic  problems.  All 
officials  interviewed  claimed  that  most  of  the  serious  problems  arose  especially  after 
the  Gulf  war  and  that  the  most  serious  of  all  these  problems  were  the  "border 
disputee'  and  the  conflicts  these  had  generated  over  the  years  among  the  member 
states.  Yet  these  border  disputes,  it  is  worth  noting,  have  been  of  long  standing  and 
were  a  legacy  of  the  colonial  period  if  not  before. 
The  intractability  of  the  border  question  has  often  strained  relations  among  the 
GCC  member  states.  The  confrontation  between  Qatar  and  Saudi  Arabia  over  al- 
Khafus  in  late  1992  raised  serious  questions  about  the  authority  of  the  GCC. 
McLachlan  (1994:  235)  argued  that  the  Qatari-Saudi  clash  over  unresolved  border 
questions  led  to  a  shift  in  Qatari  politics  towards  a  tacit  support  for  Iran  in  areas 
where  it  felt  it  could  and  would  disadvantage  other  GCC  partners.  Certainly,  the 
conflicts  and  problems  stemming  from  "border  disputes"  have  dogged  the  GCC  since 
its  inception.  It  was  pointed  out  in  the  literature  (see,  for  instance,  Schofield  (1994)) 
that  Qatar  did  not  sign  the  GCC  security  treaty  (submitted  to  the  GCC  in  1982) 
because  of  its  border  dispute  with  Saudi  Arabia  and  that  the  persistence  of  these 
disputes  is  both  a  reflection  and  a  result  of  the  conflict  and  tension  that  characterise 
inter-state  relations  within  the  GCC. 
Some  GCC  Policies:  An  Assessment 
This  final  section  considers  the  political  elite's  evaluation  of  a  variety  of  GCC  policies. 
It  will,  in  particular,  consider  the  sample's  evaluation  of  the  policies  listed  in  the 
survey  questionnaire,  i.  e.  foreign  policies,  economic  policies,  and  social  policies,  with 
the  aim  of  establishing  the  extent  of  cooperation  and  level  of  policy  coordination 
among  the  member  states  in  the  various  fields. 
Evaluation  of  GCC  Policies: 
The  policies  cover  nearly  all  fields  of  cooperation  among  the  GCC  member 
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headings,  those  dealing  with  global  issues  (e.  g.,  policies  bearing  on  oil  production, 
international  crises,  relations  with  the  USA,  Russia,  the  CIS,  and  with  such  economic 
alliances  as  EEC)  and,  those  at  the  regional  scale  (e.  g.,  policies  bearing  on  internal 
security  and  defence,  the  Israeli  question,  Iranian  threat,  Iraq  before  the  Second  Gulf 
War  and  after,  and  the  Yemeni  crisis).  The  respondents  were  asked  also  to  evaluate  a 
number  of  GCC  'internal'  policies,  including,  in  particular,  social  policies  (e.  g., 
policies  in  regard  to  health,  education  and  immigration),  economic  policies  (e.  g., 
common  tariffs  agreements,  and  export  and  import  policies)  and,  finally, 
environmental  polices  (e.  g.,  policies  on  pollution  and  environment  protection). 
Forej&i  Policies: 
On  the  whole,  the  GCC  officials  found  the  general  level  of  cooperation  among 
the  GCC  member  states  in  the  field  of  foreign  policy'highly  satisfactory'.  According  to 
67.4%  of  the  total  political  elite  sample  investigated  in  this  work,  there  has  been 
'considerable'  cooperation  among  the  GCC  member  states  in  the  field  of  foreign 
policies  with  a  global  perspective.  Such  a  relatively  high  level  of  satisfaction  among 
the  GCC  officials  is  not  entirely  unexpected;  the  Gulf  political  elite  is  known  for  its 
conservatism,  conformity  and  strong  sense  of  loyalty  to  political  leadership.  As  is 
clear  from  Table  8.5  in  Appendix  B,  66.5%  of  the  total  sample  of  GCC  officials 
characterised  cooperation  among  the  GCC  member  states  in  the  area  of  foreign  policy 
with  a  regional  perspective  as  "considerable"  and  75.5%  of  these  officials  thought  that 
there  has  been  'considerable'  cooperation  among  these  states  in  the  area  of  GCC 
internal  policies. 
According  to  the  GCC  officials,  cooperation  among  the  GCC  member  states 
in  all  fields  of  foreign  policy  has  been  fruitful.  A  similar  evaluation  of  the  level  and 
significance  of  cooperation  among  the  GCC  state  is  generally  projected  by  the  Gulf 
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Economic  Policies: 
According  to  most  of  the  GCC  officials,  only  "some"  cooperation  (see  Figure 
(8.5))  among  the  G-CC  member  states  in  the  area  of  economic  policies  relating  to  such 
matters  as  a  common  tariff  (e.  g.,  rate  tax  on  foreign  products)  and  common 
regulations  on  export  (e.  g.  oil,  gas,  other  chemical  products)  and  import  (food,  cars, 
electrical  and  mechanical  goods)  has  been  achieved  to  date.  In  general,  GCC  officials 
argued  that  economic  cooperation  had  been  limited  -  as  one  said  "Each  GCC  state  is 
strongly  seeking  to  convince  its  partners  of  the  viability  of  its  economic  policies". 
Another  official  (Gulf  Elite  (3))  asserted  that  the  member  states  had  failed  to 
capitalise  on  the  positive  aspects  and  advantages  of  the  GCC,  especially  in  regard  to 
economic  cooperation  and  coordination  of  economic  policies.  He  also  asserted  that 
indeed  the  economic  problems  facing  member  states  have  often  not  been  brought  up 
for  collective  discussion. 
Fi2ure  8.5  Political  Elite's  Perceptions  of  Certain 
GCC  Economic  Policies 
Little  Cooperation 
Some  Cooperation 
Considerable  Cooperation 
The  attitudinal  patterns  of  the  sample  revealed  significant  variation  in  terms  of 
the  nationality  of  the  officials.  While  Bahraini  officials  agreed  that  there  has  been  'little 
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cooperation'  among  the  GCC  member  states,  especially  in  regard  to  common  tariffs, 
the  Omani  officials  thought  that  cooperation  in  this  area  has  been  "considerable". 
Social  Policies: 
The  GCC  officials'  attitudes  towards  the  GCC  social  policies  were  varied.  The 
sample  thought  that  there  has  been  only  'some'  cooperation  among  the  member  states 
in  the  two  sectors  of  education  and  immigration.  In  contrast,  and  as  figure  (8.6) 
indicates,  the  political  elite  assumed  that  'considerable'  cooperation  had  been  achieved 
by  the  GCC  states  in  the  sector  of  health. 
Figure  8.6  The  GCC  Political  Elite's  Perceptions  of  Social  Policies 
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The  majority  of  the  Saudi  officials  thought  that  "some"  cooperation  has  been 
achieved  among  the  GCC  countries  with  regard  to  health  policies.  The  Qatari  officials 
were  evenly  divided  in  their  views  as  to  how  much  cooperation  had  been  achieved  in 
the  education  sector:  one  half  of  the  Qatari  officials  believed  that  there  had  been 
"considerable"  cooperation  among  the  GCC  member  states  in  the  education  domain 
whereas  the  other  half  thought  that  only  'some'  cooperation  had  been  achieved  in  this 
sector.  Both  Bahraini  and  Qatari  officials  thought  that  the  cooperation  achieved  in 
matters  relating  to  immigration  had  been  "considerable"  (see  Table  (8.5)). Chapter  Eight:  GCC  Cooperation:  Elite  Perceptions  163 
Table  8.5  Described  the  Assessment  of  Social  Policies  by  Nationality: 
Nationalilli,  n  Little 
Cooperation 
Some 
Cooperation 
Considerable 
Cooperation 
Balmun  6  16.7  33.3  50 
Oman  2  0  0  100 
Qatar  2  0  0  100 
Saudi  Arabia  24  8.3  50  41.7 
Naliemalkv  n  Little 
Cooperation 
Some 
Cooperation 
Considerable 
Cooperation 
Baluain  6  0  66.7  33.3 
Oman  3  0  50  50 
Qatar  2  0  50  50 
Sauch  Arabia  24  4.5  59.1  36.4 
Nationaliti,  n  Little 
Cooperation 
Some 
Cooperation 
Considerable 
Cooperation 
Bahrain  6  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Oman  3  66.7  33.3  0 
Qatar  2  0  50  50 
Saudi  Arabia  24  34.8  39.1  26.1 
B.  Four  Important  Policies 
Just  over  a  third  of  the  sample's  (38.5%)  regarded  GCC  policies  in  the  area  of 
"political  affairs"  as  the  organisation's  'most  important'  policies.  The  same  proportion 
identified  "economic  policy"  as  an  'important'  GCC  policy.  As  'political  affairs'  were 
perceived  by  the  GCC  officials  as  the  area  presenting  the  most  intractable  problems 
for  the  GCC,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  same  officials  would  choose  'political  affairs' 
as  the  organisation's  most  important  area  of  policy.  Over  half  (56.4%)  of  the  sample 
rated  social  policy  as  a  'least  important'  area  of  GCC  policy.  The  interesting  thing  in 
this  regard  is  that  though  the  GCC  officials  deemed  security  policy  as  one  of  the  most 
important  policies,  they  never  ranked  it  as  one  of  the  four  most  important  GCC 
policies.  Figure  (8.7)  shows  the  sample's  perceptions  of  the  importance  of  the  four 
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Figure  8.7  Political  Elite's  Perceptions  of  the  Importance  of  the  Four  Selected  GCC 
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The  GCC  political  elite's  concern  with  political  affairs  and  cooperation  in  this 
area  could  be  understood  as  part  of  an  awareness  on  the  part  of  this  class  of  Gulf 
citizenry  that  successful  and  fruitful  cooperation  in  other  fields  is  totally  dependent  on 
and  only  possible  within  an  environment  of  political  cooperation  and  political  entente. 
8.4  Conclusions: 
This  chapter  has  focused  on  the  attitudes  and  perceptions  of  the  political  elite 
to  the  GCC,  its  political  machinery,  the  'push'  factors  contributing  to  its  emergence,  its 
policies,  its  accomplishments  and  the  problems  it  has  faced  in  the  past  or  has  been 
facing  since  its  inception.  Focusing  on  a  sample  drawn  from  Saudi,  Omani,  Qatari  and 
Bahraini  GCC  officials,  and  using  both  face-to-face  interviews  and  survey 
questionnaires  as  methods  of  data  gathering,  it  was  found  that  the  political  elites' 
perceptions  of  and  attitudes  towards  the  organisation  and  the  other  issues  cited  above 
are  substantially  different  from  those  expressed  by  Gulf  citizens  (see  Chapters  II  and 
12).  Critical  here  is  that  the'desire  of  the  GCC leadership'  played  the  most  important 
factor  in  the  rise  of  the  regional  alliance  for  the  elite.  This,  as  will  become  apparent 
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the  majority  of  the  citizens'  sample.  According  to  the  latter,  it  is  the  factor  of  'social 
similarities',  rather  than  the  "desire"  of  the  GCC  leadership  that  has  played  a  most 
significant  role  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC. 
As  to  the  role  of  external  factors  in  the  establishment  of  the  GCC,  it  was  found 
that  the  majority  of  the  political  elite  sample  was  agreed  that  the  security  factor  and 
concerns  for  external  security  was  the  most  important  and  effective  factor  in  the  arise 
of  the  GCC  and  that  the  Iranian/Iraqi  war  was  the  most  important  factor  behind  the 
Arabian  Gulf  leadership's  resolution  to  create  the  GCC.  This,  as  will  become  obvious 
from  chapter  II  and  12,  contrasts  somewhat  markedly  with  the  perceptions  and 
attitudes  of  the  citizens'  sample.  Only  a  minority  of  this  sample  considered  that 
(concerns  over)  external  security  were  of  critical  importance  in  inducing  the 
emergence  of  the  GCC. 
An  important  point  to  note  is  how  markedly  different  the  views  and 
perceptions  of  the  elite  sample  investigated  here  are  from  what  is  judged  to  be  true  by 
independent  political  observers  of  the  GCC  and  its  evolution.  While  they  agree  that 
inter-state  border  disputes  and  member  states'  persistent  prioritisation  of  their  national 
interests  over  collective  interests,  are  the  most  prominent  and  intractable  of  the  major 
problems  that  have  faced  the  GCC  in  the  past  and  continue  to  frustrate  greater 
cooperation  and  coordination  of  policies  among  its  members,  the  views  of  our 
political  elite  sample  and  those  expressed  by  numerous  political  observers  (see,  e.  g.  al- 
Kuwari  (1992),  Obeid  (1996))  were  nevertheless  found  to  diverge  considerably.  First, 
the  political  elite's  views  that  the  GCC's  main  concern  should  be  extensive  economic 
cooperation  conflicts  with  the  view  widely  held  among  independent  researchers  (and 
citizens  for  that  matter)  that  the  GCC's  function  should  be  mainly  oriented  towards 
political  and  social  cooperation.  Second,  the  political  elite's  view  that  'some 
cooperation'  has  been  attained  in  the  various  economic,  political,  social,  and  cultural 
sectors  does  not  tally  with  the  widely  accepted  view  among  scholars  of  the  GCC. 
According  to  many  (see,  e.  g.  al-'Esa,  (1993),  Abdul-Ruhman  (1997)),  hardly  any 
significant  progress  has  been  achieved  so  far  in  any  of  the  most  important  fields  of 
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resolutions  adopted  by  the  GCC  have  not  been  enforced  across  the  board  or  have  yet 
to  be  implemented  by  any  of  the  member  states. 
This  gulf  between  the  political  elite  and  the  citizens'  views  raises  important 
questions  about  the  nature  of  the  policy-making  process  in  the  Arabian  Gulf  states, 
and  the  separation  of  the  leadership  from  the  concerns  of  citizens.  AVEsa  (1981) 
stressed  that  confining  the  GCC  political  processes  to  the  political  elite  will  continue 
to  rob  it  of  the  broad  popular  support  that  it  needs  to  achieve  its  aims.  Al-Alkim 
(1994)  argued  that  the  GCC  faces  two  alternatives;  either  to  continue  to  ignore  the 
wishes  of  the  Gulf  citizens  and  exclude  them  from  the  political  process  and,  as  a 
result,  continue  to  face  the  same  intractable  problems  it  has  met  with  since  its 
inception,  or  open  the  door  for  the  Gulf  citizens  to  play  an  active  role  in  the  decision- 
and  policy-making  process,  gaining  thereby  the  wider  support  it  necessarily  requires 
to  ensure  its  continuity  and  utility. Chapter  Nine: 
Citizen  Knowledge  of  and  Interest  in  GCC  Institutions 
9.1  Introduction: 
T  his  chapter  explores  how  well  informed  are  the  sample  of  citizens  of  the  GCC 
and  its  working.  It  will  assess,  first,  the  sample's  basic  knowledge  of  the 
GCC-  its  date  of  establishment,  the  countries  constituting  this  organisation, 
the  location  of  its  headquarters,  the  makeup  of  its  General  Secretariat,  its  policies,  and 
how  often  the  heads  of  member  states  convene.  It  will  also  consider  the  sample's  level 
of  awareness  and  perceptions  of  these  matters  and  their  level  of  interest  in  the 
institution  and  the  sources  relied  on  for  obtaining  information  about  it.  An  evaluation 
of  how  knowledgeable  the  sample  is  about  the  GCC  and  its  operation  will  enable  us  to 
(i)  determine  how  much  interaction  and  interplay  there  is  between  such  a  political 
institution  and  the  citizens  of  its  member  states,  (ii)  how  much  importance  is  given  to 
it,  and,  finally,  (iii)  how  open  the  GCC  is  about  its  policies  and  how  effective  it  is  in 
disseminating  information  bearing  on  its  activities. 
9.2.  Knowledge  &  its  Importance  in  Study  of  Perceptions,: 
A  person's  knowledge  of  a  political  issue  or  institution  is  widely  assumed  to 
act  as  a  barometer  of  their  interest  and/or  concern.  Assessment  of  our  sample's 
perceptions  and  knowledge  of  the  GCC  and  matters  connected  with  this  regional 
grouping  will  allow  us  to  specify,  on  the  one  hand,  the  level  of  importance  this 
institution  has  among  citizens  and,  on  the  other,  their  level  of  interest  in  it. Chapter  Nine:  Citizen  knowledge  ofand  Interest  in  GCC  Institutions  168 
Assessment  of  how  people  are  affected  (or  disaffected)  by  political  institutions 
is initially  measured  by  their  basic  knowledge  of  how  such  institutions  work,  e.  g.,  by 
the  citizens'  ability  to  name  leading  politicians,  headquarters  of  the  most  important 
institutions,  and,  most  importantly,  its  policies.  Oppenheim  (1992)  emphasised  the 
role  of  'knowledge  questions'  as  an  important  tool  for  studies  seeking  to  uncover 
perceptions  and  awareness. 
We  focus  here  on  the  sample's  awareness  of  various  aspects  of  the  GCC's 
history  and  make-up  for  two  main  related  reasons.  First,  knowledge  is  a  measure  of 
awareness.  The  sample's  awareness  of  the  GCC's  history,  constituency,  leadership, 
and  other  related  matters,  will,  in  turn,  provide  a  reference  point  in  terms  of  which  it 
is  possible  to  gauge  the  importance  of  this  political  institution  to  the  selected  sample. 
The  basic  research  strategy  was  to  obtain  people's  awareness  of  certain  GCC  issues 
prior  to  seeking  their  perceptions  of  those  issues  so  that  the  relationship  between  the 
level  of  awareness,  and  the  nature  and  types  of  perceptions  could  be  systematised  and 
foregrounded. 
9.3.  Basic  Citizen  Knowlefte  of  the  GCC: 
Basic  knowledge  of  the  GCC  was  tested  through  asking  questions  on  the 
organisation's  date  of  establishment,  its  constituent  members,  the  location  of  its 
Secretariat  General,  the  number  of  its  summits  held  each  year,  and,  finally,  the 
nationality  of  its  current  Secretary  General. 
Not  unexpectedly,  the  sample's  awareness  of  the  six  constituent  members  of 
the  GCC  was  very  high  indeed.  99%  of  the  total  sample  identified  correctly  the  six 
countries  making  up  the  organisation.  Moreover,  the  sample  was  aware  of  the 
nationality  of  the  GCC  Secretary  General;  with  three  quarters  able  to  identify  his 
nationality  correctly.  Given  that  the  sample  consisted  wholly  of  university  students  - 
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not  in  any  way  unexpected.  The  role  of  information  sources,  as  detailed  below,  is  also 
largely  responsible  for  our  sample's  high  awareness  of  the  various  aspects  of  the  GCC 
as  a  political  institution.  Table  (9.1)  illustrates. 
Table  9.1  The  knowled2e  of  the  Sample  Measured: 
Variables 
Fvq 
Yes  No 
IVID 
Yes  No 
GCC  SiX  COUntries  584  5  99  0.8 
Nationality  of  Secretary  445  140  75.4  23.7 
General 
Interest  in  News  about  the  378  211  64.1  35.8 
GCC 
The  location  of  the  GCC  Secretariat  General  was  queried  as  part  of  an  effort 
to  determine  how  detailed  was  the  sample's  knowledge  of  the  GCC  institutions.  As 
figure  (9.1)  shows,  no  less  than  65.6%  of  the  total  sample  knew  where  the  GCC 
headquarters  (i.  e.,  GCC Secretariat  General)  were  based.  Contributing  to  the  sample's 
high  level  of  awareness  of  the  location  of  this  institution  is  probably  the  fact  that  the 
regular  GCC  meetings  at  this  organisation's  Secretariat  General  in  Riyadh,  the  capital 
of  Saudi  Arabia,  tend  to  be  highly  publicised  in  the  local  media.  Riyadh  was  chosen  as 
a  location  for  the  GCC  Secretariat  General  largely  on  account  of  Saudi  Arabia  being 
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Since  its  inception,  the  GCC  has  hardly  been  out  of  the  news  within  the  GCC 
states;  its  progress,  policies,  committee  meetings,  summits,  and  problems  are 
frequently  covered  by  the  local  media.  The  appointment  of  the  Secretary  General  in 
1995  gave  rise  to  a  dispute  between  member  states  and  was  widely  reported  upon. 
The  dispute  was  eventually  solved  through  Omani  mediation,  with  Saudi  Arabia 
assuming  the  post  for  the  next  four  years.  Referring  to  the  atmosphere  of  conflict  that 
characterised  the  GCC  during  the  dispute  between  Qatar  and  Saudi  Arabia  as  to  who 
should  be  appointed  Secretary  General  during  the  1995  summit  in  Muscat,  Ali  (in 
issues  and  Opinions  (1996)  wrote  that  "During  more  than  three  months,  the  Gulf 
citizens  closely  followed  the  conflict  over  the  appointing  of  a  new  Secretary  General 
[ 
... 
]".  It  was  in  the  aftermath  of  the  settlement  of  this  dispute,  and  at  a  time  when  the 
newly  appointed  Secretary  General  was  being  widely  reported  upon  by  the  media 
throughout  the  Gulf  region,  that  the  sample  was  asked  about  the  nationality  of  the 
Secretariat  General.  In  view  of  these  considerations,  it  is  not  surprising  that  as  many 
as  75.4%  of  the  total  sample  were  able  to  determine  the  correct  nationality  of  the 
newly  anointed  Secretary  General.  These  results  shed  some  interesting  light  on  two 
important  issues.  First,  they  show  that  there  may  be  a  high  level  of  awareness  among 
citizens  of  the  GCC  institutions,  signalling  the  potential  for  a  positive  relationship 
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questions'  have  providing  awareness  of  the  various  aspects  associated  with  the  GCC 
(see,  for  instance,  Oppenheim  1992). 
More  difficulty  was  evident  amongst  the  sample  in  correctly  identifying  the 
date  of  the  GCC's  establishment.  Some  62.2%  of  the  total  sample  were  able  to 
identify  the  correct  answer,  (indicated  in  the  questionnaire  as  [1980-1985]).  In  part 
this  is  no  doubt  because  of  the  sample,  particularly  at  the  time  the  GCC  was 
established;  even  so  a  clear  majority  associated  with  the  political  events  of  the  early 
1980s. 
The  part  of  the  questionnaire  bearing  on  the  sample's  knowledge  of  the  GCC 
and  its  institutions  included  one  last  question  requiring  the  sample  to  specify  exactly 
how  many  GCC  meetings  are  held  every  year.  As  Figure  (9.3)  illustrates,  most 
(87.8%)  of  the  total  sample  provided  correct  answers  to  this  question.  Such  meetings 
are  widely  reported  in  the  media,  though  the  proportion  giving  the  correct  answer  is 
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9.4  Source  of  Information  on  and  Interest  in  the  GCC: 
The  sample  was  asked  about  their  interest  in  GCC  news,  with  the  objective  of 
shedding  light  on  the  level  of  importance  attached  to  the  organisation.  More  than 
64.1%  of  the  total  sample  followed  the  GCC  news  (e.  g.,  of  Supreme  Council 
summits,  Ministerial  Council  meetings,  GCC  decisions  and  events,  etc.  )  on  a  regular 
basis.  Again  it  is  necessary  to  take  account  of  the  characteristics  of  the  sample,  most 
being  keen  to  learn  about  the  progress  of  the  organisation. 
The  media  has  an  important  role  in  shaping  people's  perceptions.  In  his 
discussion  of  the  media  in  the  Gulf  states,  Melikian  (1988)  asserted  that,  with  the 
exception  of  Kuwait,  there  is  little  press  freedom  in  the  GCC  countries.  However,  the 
media  in  the  GCC  member  states  has  witnessed  significant  changes  since  1990.  Some 
of  the  GCC  members  changed  their  policies  to  cope  with  the  new  information 
technology.  Increasing  ownership  of  satellite  dishes  and  the  availability  of  foreign 
media  sources  caused  most  of  the  GCC  states  to  change  their  media  policies  in  an 
attempt  to  maintain  credibility.  A  consequence  of  the  availability  of  so-called  'free 
media'  is  that  citizens  began  to  discuss  GCC  issues  much  more  freely  in  male 
gatherings  (known,  for  instance,  in  Qatar  as  maj1is  and  in  Kuwait  as  Dewaniyah),  held 
at  either  places  of  study  or  at  the  work  place.  The  newly  acquired  freedom  of  the 
media  helped  people  know  more  about  GCC  developments,  problems,  and  internal 
disputes.  The  media  has  in  fact  become  a  vital  source  of  information  for  citizens.  As  is 
clear  from  Table  (9.2),  many  depend  heavily  on  it  for  information  on  the  GCC.  Al- 
Watan  (1997),  a  Kuwaiti  newspaper,  asserted  that  the  press  constitutes  the  most 
essential  source  of  information  for  Kuwaiti  citizens,  with  TV  and  radio  coming  second 
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Family  103  13.2 
Friends  86  11 
Majhs  79  10.1 
(Dewaniyah) 
Media  364  46.7 
Place  of  Study  98  12.6 
Place  of  Work  30  3.8 
Other  20  2.6 
Not  all  were  concerned  with  or  interested  in  the  GCC.  Those  of  the  sample 
who  pointed  out  that  they  were  not  interested  in  news  of  the  GCC  provided  several 
reasons  for  their  lack  of  interest  in  the  organisation  and  information  bearing  on  it.  The 
most  typical  reasons  put  forward  were: 
*  The  boring  nature  of  GCC  news. 
*  The  GCC's  lack  of  credibility. 
*  The  political  bias  (non-independence)  of  all  sources  of  information. 
*  The  failure  of  the  GCC  to  realise  any  tangible  achievements  benefiting  the 
citizens  of  the  region. 
Nearly  35.8%  of  the  total  sample  showed  no  interest  whatsoever  in  GCC 
news.  For  some  the  above  reasons  might  be  interpreted  as  indicative  of  level  of 
alienation  from  the  GCC  as  a  political  institution;  certainly  some  were  disillusioned 
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9.5fitizen  Perceptions  of  GCC  Main  Policy  Concerns: 
To  determine  how  much  interest  the  sample  sustains  in  the  GCC,  its  evolution 
as  a  political  institution  and  what  are  generally  perceived  within  Gulf  society  to  be 
main  GCC  agenda,  the  sample  was  presented  with  a  broad  list  of  policies  relating  to 
different  domains  of  cooperation.  They  were  asked  to  specify  which  of  these  policies 
they  think  is  a  major  concern  of  the  GCC.  The  list  of  policies  presented  to  the  sample 
to  evaluate  included:  defence  and  security,  foreign  affairs,  health,  Immigration,  and 
education. 
As  Table  (9.3)  shows,  the  overwhelming  majority  -just  short  of  90%-  of  the 
sample  thought  of  common  defence  and  security  as  a  main  concern  of  the  GCC.  The 
1990  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  was  a  key  factor  here.  The  assumption  among  the 
sample  is  that  because  of  its  failure  to  initially  react  militarily  to  avert  the  Iraqi 
aggression  against  one  of  its  member  states,  the  GCC  would  naturally  be  pursuing 
extensive  cooperation  on  matters  of  common  defence  and  security  with  a  view  to 
protecting  the  member  states  from  similar  future  aggression. 
Similarly,  a  clear  majority  of  the  sample  Oust  under  75%)  considered 
education  policy  to  form  one  of  the  GCC  concerns,  Education  is  in  fact  one  of  the  few 
areas  in  which  the  GCC  might  be  said  to  have  made  some  definite  progress.  Besides 
encouraging  and  promoting  substantial  cooperation  among  GCC  universities  in  the 
form  of,  among  others,  regular  colloquia,  the  GCC  states  have  unified  university 
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in  GCC  Policies: 
Policy  Yes  No  Don't  Know  Yes  No  Don't  Know 
Comiiion  Det'cticc  517  45  16  89.4  7.8  2.8 
Foreign  Affairs  346  144  73  61.4  25.6  13 
Health  304  142  109  54.8  25.6  19.6 
Immigration  185  201  159  33.9  36.9  29.2 
Education  416  88  57  74.1  15.7  10.2 
While  just  over  51.5%  of  the  sample  saw  health  policy  as  a  major  area  of 
concern  for  the  GCC,  only  34.1%  thought  of  immigration  policy  as  a  main  area  of 
interest  for  the  organisation.  The  results  bearing  on  the  issue  of  immigration  policy 
might  be  interpreted  as  indicative  of  the  general  conviction  that  the  GCC  has  yet  to 
realise  the  full  impact  of  immigration  on  the  economic,  political,  social  and  cultural 
domains  in  the  Gulf  states  as  well  as  the  widespread  feeling  that  the  GCC  is  not  doing 
much  to  resolve  the  problem  of  heavy  reliance  on  an  inordinately  large  and  ever- 
increasing  foreign  workforce.  A]-Rumaihi  (1983)  pointed  out  in  this  regard  that  the 
magnitude  of  the  foreign  workforce  can  be  the  source  of  major  problems  for  the  GCC 
member  states,  exerting  an  impact  not  only  on  the  geo-political  and  security  aspects  of 
the  region,  but  on  its  cultural  aspects  as  well. 
The  sample  was  also  asked  to  express  its  views  as  to  whether  'foreign  policy 
policies'  should  be  binding  on  all  member  states.  49.8%  of  the  sample  were  of  the 
view  that  the  organisation's  foreign  policies  should  indeed  be  binding  on  the  member 
states,  while  only  29%  thought  that  the  GCC  member  states  should  not  be  under  any 
obligation  to  subscribe  to  or  implement  these  policies.  These  results  are  indicative  of 
the  relatively  widespread  popular  desire  within  Gulf  society  to  see  the  organisation 
equipped  with  effective  institutions  and  mechanisms,  thereby  transforming  it  into  a 
fully  functioning  political  institution  from  its  current  status  of  a  somewhat  'symbolic' 
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9.6  Overview: 
This  chapter  focused  on  the  citizens  sample's  attitudes  towards  and 
knowledge  of  the  GCC,  its  political  institutions  and  policies,  with  the  aim  of 
determining  the  level  of  interest  in  this  organisation  as  well  as  the  level  of  importance 
attributed  to  it  within  Gulf  society.  It  was  found  that  the  sample  was  highly  informed 
about  the  different  aspects  of  the  GCC  including  its  policies  and  that  the  sample's 
main  source  of  information  on  the  organisation  is  the  local  media.  The  high  level  of 
informadness  displayed  by  the  sample  with  regard  to  the  GCC  could  reflected  the  high 
level  of  interest  shown  towards  the  organisation  and  the  similarly  high  level  of  the 
importance  attributed  to  it  within  Gulf  society. 
These  results  are  interesting  in  two  particular  respects.  First,  they  reveal  a 
clear  preoccupation  among  the  sample  with  issues  of  military  defence  and  security. 
The  sample's  concern,  symptomatic  of  a  wider  concern  within  Gulf  society,  with  these 
questions  is  understandable  and  predictable  in  view  of  the  recent  troubled  history  of 
the  region.  The  contemporary  history  of  the  region  has  been  characterised  by  a  series 
of  wars  (e.  g.,  Arabo-Israeli  wars  of  1948,1967,  and  1973;  the  Iran/Iraq  war  of  1979) 
and  invasions  (e.  g.,  Israeli  invasion  of  South  Lebanon,  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait)  that 
contributed  to  heightening  tensions  in  what  is  already  a  highly  volatile  region.  Second, 
the  results  also  indicate  a  clear  desire  among  Gulf  citizens  to  see  the  GCC  political 
institutions  invested  with  full  authority  to  formulate  policies  of  cooperation  and 
political  integration  and  for  its  political  institutions  to  be  capable  of  ensuring 
compliance  with  the  organisation's  policies  and  resolutions. Chapter  Ten: 
Cross-Cutting  Social  and  Cultural  Factors  &  the  GCC: 
Social  Ties  and  Cultural  Identity  within  the  Arabian  Gulf 
10.1  Introduction: 
The  effect  of  the  major  'push  factors'  which  led  to  the  emergence  of  the  GCC 
have  been  addressed  previously  in  this  study.  It  is  argued  in  the  relevant  literature  (e.  g. 
Ramadan,  1993;  Qassim,  1993)  that,  besides  these  immediate  internal  and  external 
factors,  the  formation  of  the  GCC  has  been  assisted  by  a  number  of  cross-cutting, 
integrative  social,  cultural,  ethnic  and  historical  factors.  Thus,  in  this  argument  the 
underlying  cultural  unity  of  the  region,  the  sense  of  social  solidarity  and  of  a  common 
distinctive  'identity'  among  the  citizens  of  the  Arabian  Gulf,  have  played  an  'integrative' 
role  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC. 
The  Islamic  world,  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  Arab  world,  is  a  conglomerate  of 
different  cultures,  ethnicities  and  societies,  in  which  it  is  argued  that  its  identity  can 
only  be  understood  in  terms  of  its  cultural  diversity  and  geographic  variation.  While 
this  may  be  true,  it  is  also  the  case  that  certain  regions  of  the  Arab  world  manifest 
considerable  cross-state  cultural  unity  and  'societal  commonalties'.  In  this  sense  to 
speak  of  different  societies  or  different  cultures  is  something  of  a  misnomer.  This  is 
perhaps  nowhere  more  true  than  in  the  states  of  the  Arabian  peninsula  (i.  e.,  Qatar, 
Oman,  Kuwait,  UAE,  Saudi  Arabia,  Bahrain)  -  the  geo-cultural  entity  broadly  known 
as  the  "Arabian  Gulf'.  As  a  group,  the  states  of  this  region  have  been  argued  to  exhibit 
a  distinctive  'identity'  within  the  Gulf  area  and  to  form  a  single,  and  distinctive,  cultural 
unit,  distinct  from  both  Arab  and  non-Arab  neighbouring  states.  There  is  an  underlying 
unity  to  the  area  and  a  strong  sense  of  fraternity  and  solidarity  among  its  peoples,  a 
unity  and  solidarity  that  is  grounded  in  their  strong  ethnic,  societal,  cultural  and 
historical  affinities,  even  if  the  exact  nature  of  such  unity  is  difficult  to  define. Chapter  Ten:  Cross-Cutting  Integrative  Social  and  Cultural  Ractors  &  the  GCC  178 
This  chapter  evaluates  some  of  the  'cross-cutting  social  and  cultural  factors' 
that  can  be  linked  to  the  emergence  of  the  GCC  through  an  examination  of  the 
intricate  network  of  (socio-cultural)  affinities  operating  across  state  boundaries  in  the 
Gulf  region.  Besides  helping  to  understand  the  complex  network  of  cross-GCC  social 
and  cultural  ties,  an  evaluation  of  these  'integrative  factors'  will  go  some  way  towards 
explaining  the  underlying  'unity'  and  'solidarity'  of  the  region. 
The  discussion  in  this  chapter,  based  on  a  sample  survey  drawn  primarily  from 
the  two  GCC  countries  of  Kuwait  and  Qatar,  is  not  meant  to  make  any  value 
judgements  about  the  exact  role  that  socio-cultural  unity,  solidarity  and  common 
identity  have  played  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC.  Regional  politics,  much  like 
international  politics,  are  intricate  and  complex  and  all  inter-state  relations  are,  more 
or  less,  controlled  by  considerations  of  perceived  and  potential  self-interest.  Whether 
this  is  valid  (or  otherwise)  in  the  context  of  the  GCC  is  not  the  concern  of  this 
discussion.  Rather,  the  discussion  is  essentially  concerned  with  noting  some  aspects  of 
the  Arabian  Gulf  societal  and  cultural  unity  and  examining  the  network  of  social  ties, 
and  cultural  affinities,  that  account  for  this  unity. 
The  discussion  is  organised  as  follows.  The  first  part  examines  the  network  of 
cross-GCC  social  and  cultural  relations  through  an  evaluation  of  the  nature  and  extent 
of  cross-border  societal  and  cultural  ties  that  exist  among  the  GCC  citizens.  The 
discussion  in  this  first  part  looks  at  the  strength  and  scope  of  cross-border  family  ties, 
tribal  bonds  and  affiliations  and  relations  of  fellowship  among  the  GCC  citizens,  and 
the  implications  and  significance  of  the  observed  patterns.  The  network  of  social 
relations  is  adopted  as  a  measure  of  the  level  of  cultural  unity  and  cohesion  within  the 
social  fabric  of  the  GCC.  The  second  part  is  concerned  with  issues  bearing  on  mobility 
of  Gulf  citizens  across  GCC  borders.  The  discussion  in  the  third  part  relates  to 
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10.2  Social  Ties  among  GCC  Citizens:  Importance  and  Implications: 
The  structuring  of  social  and  cultural  ties,  including  familial  (blood)  relations, 
across  the  GCC  societies  have  been  extensively  discussed  elsewhere,  (i.  e.  EI-Solh 
1997).  Most  of  the  studies,  however,  have  approached  the  importance  of  these 
networks  of  social  relations  from  either  an  exclusively  anthropological  or  historical 
perspective.  Cole  (1975),  for  instance,  discussed  the  relations  between  the  al-Murrah 
tribe  of  the  Empty  Quarter  with  the  Saudi  royal  family  both  before  and  after  the 
discovery  of  oil,  and  found  that  inter-marriages  have  long  existed.  Noting  the  social 
and  cultural  bonds  and  the  sense  of  solidarity  prevalent  among  the  people  of  the  GCC, 
Christie  (1987)  stated  that  "perhaps  among  the  important  factors  in  the  composition 
of  the  GCC,  the  people  of  the  six  nations  recognise  and  understand  their  fraternity  in 
the  wider  implications  of  Arab  nationality.  "  (pp.  7-8).  On  the  other  hand,  cross-state 
tribal  affiliations  and  family  ties  in  the  context  of  the  GCC  and  how  they  affect  the 
GCC  have  not  been  discussed.  Highlighting  the  importance  and  role  of  such 
connections  helps  to  identify  the  social  basis  for  integration  among  the  GCC  member 
states. 
10.3  Cross-Border  Ties  and  Affiliations  among  GCC  Citizens: 
The  ties  that  unite  the  GCC  citizens  have  generally  been  addressed  in  the 
literature  from  a  historical  perspective.  Another  way  of  examing  this  issue  is  to  look  at 
the  cross-territorial  networks  of  social  relations,  such  as  these  of  the  family  and  tribal 
affiliations,  that  exists  among  GCC  citizens.  To  do  so,  the  sample  respondents  were 
asked  to  specify  the  sorts  of  relationship  they  had  with  citizens  of  other  GCC 
countries,  including  family  ties,  tribal  affiliations,  and  fiiendship  networks.  Most  of  the 
sample  did  have  cross-border  relationships  of  one  kind  or  another,  as  many  85.3% 
confirming  the  intuitive  impression  that  there  are  strong  social  ties  between  the 
peoples  of  the  Arabian  Gulf.  These  social  ties  complement  the  similarities  of  language, Chapter  Ten:  Cross-Cutting  Integrative  Social  and  Cultural  Factors  &  the  GCC  180 
religion,  and  other  aspects  of  culture  which  characterise  the  population  of  the  GCC 
states. 
Most  of  the  historical  literature  has  focused  exclusively  on  the  family/tribal 
relations  that  existed  before  the  oil  discovery  in  the  Gulf  states.  In  his  discussion  the 
historico-cultural  origins  of  the  GCC  population  and  its  ruling  royal  families,  Saudi 
(1993)  stressed  two  main  points:  first,  that  the  GCC  population  is  purely  Arab,  hailing 
from  a  number  of  tribes  who  either  migrated  from  Yemen  or  from  Najed  in  Saudi 
Arabia,  and  second,  that  the  ruling  royal  families  in  the  Gulf  states  stem  from  the  same 
tribe(s)  and  are,  to  that  effect,  united  by  ties  of  clan. 
Crucial  to  the  social  hierarchy  of  the  Gulf  states  are  two  types  of  relationships: 
first,  closer  relationships  such  as  'family  ties';  and  second,  the  wider  circle  of  'tribal 
relations'.  Of  concern  to  us  here  is  the  strength  and  scope  of  these  two  types  of 
relations  among  the  GCC  citizens  across  boundaries  of  the  member  states  of  the  GCC. 
Each  respondent  was  asked  about  two  issues:  the  types  of  social  relationship  they  had 
with  citizens  of  other  GCC  states,  and,  complementing  this,  the  number  and  type  of 
visits  he/she  undertook  to  the  other  GCC  states  during  the  last  year.  With  respect  to 
the  first,  three  types  of  relationships  are  examined,  viz.  family  ties,  clan/tribe  bonds 
and  affiliations,  and  fhendships. 
A.  Family  Ties: 
While  it  is  perhaps  inevitable  in  a  region  which  has  changed  from  being  a  colonised 
traditional  society  to  independent  modernising  states  in  a  short  time  that  social  change 
should  also  occur,  it  cannot  be  emphasised  too  strongly  that  the  fundamental  social 
unit  in  Gulf  society,  much  as  is  the  case  in  the  Arab  society  as  a  whole,  remains  the 
(extended)  family.  The  importance  of  the  'family'  in  the  context  of  the  Arab  countries 
has  been  widely  discussed.  In  his  discussion  of  the  extended  family  in  the  Arab  world, 
Dawisha  (1990:  287)  stated  that  11[ 
... 
]  the  extended  family  has  traditionally  been 
hierarchically  structured  with  authority  resting  in  the  hands  of  the  oldest  member. 
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Arab  family  than  is  usually  the  case  in  the  Western  family,  where  intra-family 
relationships  are  less  hierarchical". 
'Family'  ties  were  found  to  be  the  second  most  numerous  type  of  social 
relation  between  our  sample  and  citizens  of  other  GCC  countries,  ties  of  'friendship' 
being  quantitatively  the  most  common.  As  Table  (10.1)  illustrates,  39.1%  of  the 
sample  have  family  members  or  relatives  in  other  GCC  states.  With  as  many  as  255 
cases,  it  was  found  that  the  core  of  the  sample's  'family'  ties  is  concentrated  in  Saudi 
Arabia,  with  the  UAE  coming  second  with  150  cases.  A  ma  or  factor  in  this  uneven  i 
distribution  is  the  comparatively  larger  sizes  of  both  Saudi  Arabia  and  UAE  among  the 
countries  of  the  GCC. 
By  nationality,  however,  the  results  of  the  survey  show  an  important 
distinction  in  the  distribution  of  social  relations.  The  Qatari  sample  has  larger  and 
more  widespread  family  links  with  UAE  than  the  other  samples  have  with  any  one 
GCC  country.  This  pronounced  level  of  'family'  ties  between  Qatar  and  the  UAE 
might  be  attributed  to  a  combination  of  factors:  besides  the  close  geographical 
proximity  of  the  two  countries,  the  citizens  of  the  two  countries  generally  hail  from 
what  are  the  same  tribes.  Some  55%  (107  responses)  of  the  Qatari  sample  have  family 
ties  of  one  sort  or  another  with  UAE  citizens  (X2  :  51.13,  df.  4,  or.  0.000).  Similarly,  the 
Qatari  sample  has  strong  familial  links  with  Bahrain 
Table  10.1  Distribution  of  Social  Relationships  Across  the  GCC  Territories: 
Colintrv  Family 
1-,  'req  % 
Type  of  Sticial  Relationship 
Tribal  Friend 
Ereq  %  Freq  %  Freq 
Total 
% 
Whrain  118  7.5  42  2.7  161  10.2  321  20.4 
Kuwait  58  3.7  24  1.5  86  5.5  168  10.7 
Oman  18  1.1  10  0.6  160  10.2  188  12 
Qatar  46  3  18  1.1  79  5  143  9.1 
Saudi  Arabia  225  14.3  73  4.6  100  6.4  398  25.3 
UAE  150  9.5  48  3.1  156  9.9  354  22.5 
Total  615  10,  ,1  215  13.1  742  41,  T*  I'M  loo 
The  Kuwaiti  sample  has  somewhat  different,  distribution  of  'family' 
relationships;  the  majority  (67.5%)  have  ties  with  Saudi  Arabian  citizens  (X2  :  41.34, 
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emigrating  from  the  Arabian  peninsula  especially  after  the  oil  boom.  The  majority 
(56.5%)  of  the  Kuwaiti  sample  have  'over  5'  'family  relatives'  in  Saudi  Arabia.  The 
Second  Gulf  war  played  an  important  role  in  widening  and  strengthening  the  network 
of  Kuwaitis'  'family'  ties  with  other  GCC  citizens,  especially  Saudi  citizens  (see  also 
table  10.4).  The  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  and  the  mass  exodus  of  Kuwaiti  citizens  (see 
below)  from  Kuwait  to  other  GCC  countries  in  search  of  a  safe  haven,  increased, 
particularly  through  marriage,  Kuwaiti  'family  ties'  with  other  GCC  countries.  It  is 
reported  (al-Balla'  &  al-Murshid  (1993))  that  as  many  as  500,000  Kuwaiti  fled  their 
country  following  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait. 
Tahle  10.2  1  lie  Samole's  Network  of  social  ties  Across  GCC  Countries: 
.............  I..,  ..........  ........  ..  .............  .......................  M.  M.  .....  ....  Kuwaiti  Qatari  Other  GCC 
Bahrain: 
Family  29  83  6 
Tribal  Relatives  13  29  0 
Freinds  87  61  13 
x  34.984  df.  4  Cr  0.000 
Saudi  Arahia: 
Family  129  90  6 
Tribal  Relatives  30  38  5 
Frehids  32  47  21 
xz  41.343  df.  4  Cr  0.000 
UAE: 
Family  33  107  10 
Tribal  Relatives  9  34  5 
Frcijids  85  53  18 
x2  51.134  df-  4  or  0.000 
A.  1  Geographical  Spread  of  'Family'  Ties: 
Examination  of  the  survey  data  shows  that  most  of  the  sample  have  family 
relations  of  one  sort  or  another  with  other  GCC  member  states.  This  can  be  attributed 
to  two  main  factors:  the  common  culture  and  the  geographical  proximity  of  the  GCC 
countries.  The  common  historico-cultural  origins  of  the  peoples  of  the  Gulf  has  been 
at  the  root  of  the  strong  relations  binding  the  societies  of  this  part  of  the  Arab  world. 
Much  of  the  literature  affirms  that  the  common  history  and  culture  of  the  GCC  states 
has  acted  as  an  integrating  force  underpinning  the  emergence  of  the  GCC,  (see  among 
others  Christie,  1986,  Shafiq,  1989).  Geographical  proximity  between  the  member 
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states  not  only  supported  union  among  these  states  but  was  also  reflected  in  the  social 
ties  among  their  societies. 
The  results  of  the  survey  bearing  on  cross-territorial  family  ties  in  the  GCC 
show  that  a  sizeable  proportion  of  the  sample  have  'family  relatives'  in  one  or  other  of 
the  GCC  member  states  (Table  10.3).  Saudi  Arabia  is  the  locus  of  most  of  the  family 
ties  that  the  sample  has  with  other  GCC  countries;  29.9%  of  the  total  sample  indicated 
that  they  have  a  'relative'  in  this  state.  The  second  highest  number  of  'family  relatives' 
was  found  to  concentrated  in  the  UAE,  24.3%  of  the  total  sample  have  a  'relative'  in 
this  country.  Finally,  Bahrain  was  the  third  most  important  GCC  country  in  terms  of 
clustering  of  cross-territorial  family  ties,  with  19.8%  of  the  total  sample  having  family 
ties  with  this  GCC  state. 
Table  10.3  Nuinher  offitmilv  Relations  acro"",  the  GCC  states: 
CountiI  1-2 
Np..  of  F;  kinily 
3-  0%  Fotal 
......  ..... 
% 
Bahrain  144  32  52  228  19.8 
Kuwait  83  24  24  131  11.4 
Oman  55  11  14  80  7 
Qatar  56  8  23  87  7.6 
Saudi  Arabia  125  37  182  344  29.9 
UAE  136  47  96  279  24.3 
*Number  of  Relationships 
T 
Couotry  Kuwaiti  Qatari 
',  Bahrain: 
1-2  59  80 
3-5  13  12 
Over  7  40 
Saudi  Arabia: 
1-2  60  53 
3-5  17  20 
Over  5  100  75 
UAE: 
1-2  51  76 
3-5  17  26 
ON  cr  -ý  19  (M 
'A 
Siv,.  lxý  cl:  ----------------  ýf.  4 
ile  By  Nation; 
Other  GCC 
5 
2 
5 
12 
0 
7 
9 
4 
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B.  Clan  Relationships: 
Tribalism  and  tribal  relations  are  a  prominent  cultural  and  demographic 
cleavage  within  the  Arab  Gulf  states.  The  Gulf  states  have  generally  been 
characterised  as  'sheikhdoms'  signifying  the  role  that  tribes  and  tribal  relations  play 
within  Gulf  society  and  the  part  tribes  play  within  the  political  systems  of  the  region. 
Most  of  the  major  tribes  such  as  al-Murrah,  Ajman,  Bani  HaJer,  Otabah,  Bani  Khalid, 
and  Qahtan  have  either  clans  or  sub-clans  in  other  GCC  states.  I-Estorical  research  has 
revealed  the  role  tribe  played  in  the  emergence  of  the  littoral  Gulf  states  which  were 
subsequently  to  become  separate  states. 
Cross-state  tribal  relations  give  a  measure  of  the  extent  to  which  members  of 
the  GCC  are  demographically  homogeneous  and  of  their  cultural  unity.  Also  important 
here  is  the  extent  to  which  such  cross-border  ties  are  considered  significant  to  a  sense 
of  the  unity  of  the  Gulf.  Most  (61.7%)  considered  tribal  relationships  to  be  a  positive 
and  an  integrating  factor  to  the  emergence  of  the  GCC.  These  results  affirm  the 
important  role  tribal  relations  and  tribal  affiliations  still  exercise  within  the  GCC 
societies  despite  the  continuous  efforts  of  GCC  to  modemise  social  structures  and 
dissolve  the  'old',  traditional  social  hierarchies.  Overall,  tribal  relations  account  for 
13.7%  of  the  total  social  relationships  that  exist  among  the  sample.  This  is  hardly 
surprising  in  view  of  what  we  know  about  the  origins  of  the  modem  states  that  make 
up  the  GCC:  the  majority  of  GCC  citizens,  as  has  been  discussed  in  chapter  6,  trace 
their  origins  to  one  of  a  few  tribes  now  spread  out  over  more  one  GCC  country.  The 
statistical  analysis  revealed  that  tribal  relations  are  concentrated  on  Saudi  Arabia- 
18.4%  of  the  total  sample  assert  an  affiliation  with  a  Saudi  tribe  or  clan  of  a  Saudi 
tribe,  a  function,  as  has  been  noted,  of  its  size  and  of  the  role  of  Saudi  Arabia  as  the 
heartland  of  a  number  of  the  tribes. 
In  the  case  of  the  Qatari  sample,  family  ties  outnumber  'tribal'  ties  with  other  GCC 
countries.  51.4%  (90  informants  out  of  a  total  175)  of  the  total  Qatari  sample  claimed 
family  ties  with  Saudi  Arabia,  in  contrast  to  21.7%  (38  informants  out  of  a  total  of Chapter  Ten:  Cross-Cutting  Integrative  Social  and  Cultural  Factors  &  the  GCC  185 
175)  of  the  sample  who  claimed  a  tribal  affiliation  with  a  Saudi  tribe.  Also,  as  many  as 
67.5%  (129  informants  out  of  a  sample  of  19  1)  of  the  Kuwaiti  sample  reported  'family' 
ties  with  Saudi  Arabia  and  15.7%  (30  informants  out  of  a  sample  of  191)  of  the 
Kuwaiti  sample  assert  'tribal'  relations  with  Saudi  Arabia.  Thus,  'family'  relations,  in 
the  case  of  both  the  Qatari  and  the  Kuwaiti  sub-samples,  is  stronger  than  other 
relations  such  as  tribal  ties. 
A  number  of  factors  could  be  put  forward  as  plausible  explanations  for  this 
phenomenon.  As  pointed  out  in  chapter  6,  though  tribal  relations  and  structures  still 
continue  to  play  an  important  role  within  modem  Gulf  society,  this  role  is  not  as 
pervasive  nor  as  effective  as  it  was  in  the  past  owing  to  the  radical  process  of 
modernisation  on  which  the  modem  states  of  the  GCC  have  embarked  in  recent  years. 
In  an  anthropological  study  of  marriage  among  the  young  Qataris  in  Doha,  Qatar's 
capital,  al-Maliki  and  Ismeal  (1993)  found  that  both  extended  family  and  tribal 
affiliations  have  less  and  less  a  role  to  play  in  deciding  marriages.  Marriage  among  this 
category  of  Qatari  citizens  is increasingly  less  influenced  by  considerations  of  tribal 
ties  and/or  family  wishes  where  young  Qataris  are  showing  more  and  more 
independence  in  the  choice  of  marriage  partner.  The  decline  in  the  role  of  cultural  and 
traditional  relations  within  modem  Gulf  society  might  thus  go  some  way  towards 
explaining  the  relatively  weak  level  of  tribal  ties  that  the  two  samples  in  questions 
have  with  other  GCC  countries.  On  the  other  hand,  the  higher  level  of  family  ties  that 
they  have  with  other  GCC  countries  might  be  due,  in  part,  to  the  greater  freedom  of 
movement  across  borders  that  GCC  citizens  have  enjoyed  since  the  establishment  of 
the  GCC  and,  in  part,  to  the  reported  increasing  independence  shown  by  young  GCC 
citizens  in  matters  of  marriage. 
C.  Fellowship  and  Fraternity: 
Friendship  as  a  sense  of  fraternity  can  exist  at  different  levels,  between 
individuals,  groups,  communities,  nations.  Common  cultural  (linguistic,  etc.  )  factors 
coupled  with  geographical  proximity,  are  generally  at  the  root  of  the  close  relations 
that  exist  among  the  GCC  citizens  and  the  sense  of  fraternity  and  solidarity  that  exist Chapter  Ten:  Cross-Cutting  Integrative  Social  and  Cultural  Ractors  &  the  GCC  186 
among  the  citizens  of  these  states.  The  strong  sense  of  fraternity  and  solidarity  among 
the  GCC  citizens  is  generally  perceived  within  Gulf  society  as  an  important  'push' 
factor  in  the  emergence  of  GCC.  The  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  reinforced  this  sense  of 
fraternity  and  solidarity.  Fleeing  the  Iraqi  invasion  army,  Kuwait  citizens  found  not 
only  a  safe  haven  in  neighbouring  GCC  countries,  but  unanimous  support  for  their 
cause.  It  is  reported  (see,  among  others,  al-Balla'  &  al-Murshid  (1993))  that  more 
than  500,000  Kuwaiti  citizens  left  Kuwait  following  the  invasion  of  the  Iraqi  army  and 
sought  temporary  refuge  in  GCC  countries,  with  Saudi  Arabia  hosting  the 
predominant  majority  of  these  refugees.  According  to  al-Balla'  &  al-Murshid  (1993), 
over  350,000  Kuwaiti  refugees  entered  Saudi  Arabia  where  they  were  provided  with 
housing,  financial  assistance,  health  care,  and  schooling  facilities  for  the  entire  period 
of  the  invasion.  Other  GCC  countries  provided  similar  help  to  Kuwaiti  refugees. 
Besides  mobilising  their  resources  to  accommodate  and  assist  the  large  numbers  of 
Kuwaiti  refugees,  the  GCC  states  were  unanimous  in  their  condemnation  of  the  Iraqi 
invasion  of  Kuwait.  In  addition  to  denouncing  the  illegality  of  Iraqi  claims  on  Kuwait 
and  the  invasion,  supporting  all  international  resolutions  calling  for  the  unconditional 
and  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  Iraqi  army,  the  GCC  states  were  either  instrumental 
in  organising  the  coalition  against  Iraq  or  the  first  to  join  this  coalition. 
Friendship  ties  too  frequently  cross  political  boundaries.  Indeed,  such  ties  of 
are  numerically  the  dominant  type  of  social  relation  among  our  sample.  In  all  47.2% 
of  the  sample  claimed  to  have  friends  in  other  GCC  countries.  In  some  cases  these  ties 
were  particularly  strong  between  certain  countries.  Thus,  the  Kuwaiti  sample's 
'friendships'  was  strongest  with  Bahrain,  for  which  there  are  two  plausible  reasons. 
First,  the  historical  social  and  economic  relations  between  Kuwait  and  Bahrain  have 
been  stronger  than  between  any  other  two  GCC  countries.  Bahrain  is  widely 
perceived  among  Gulf  citizens  as  a  more  open  and  therefore  more  liberal  society 
where  social  contacts  and  relations  (including  fiiendship)  are  not  as  difficult  to 
establish  as  in  the  rest  of  the  GCC  countries.  In  addition,  Bahrain  is  geographically 
one  of  the  nearest  GCC  countries  to  Kuwait,  second  only  to  Saudi  Arabia  which 
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10.4,  Cross-border  Mobility  among  GCC  Citizens: 
A  great  deal  of  the  research  on  Gulf  society  focuses  on  the  tribal  structures, 
tribal  hierarchies  and  the  nomadic  patterns  that  characterise(d)  the  societies  of  the 
Arab  Gulf  states.  Cottrell  (1980)  examined  the  spread  of  tribes  across  the  Gulf  states' 
boundaries.  Before  the  oil  boom,  tribes  frequently  migrated  from  one  region  to 
another,  in  search  of  a  better  plot  of  grass  and  water  sources.  However,  the  mobility 
of  the  tribes  changed  after  the  discovery  of  oil  and  the  economic  boom  that  followed 
in  the  aftermath  of  its  exploitation.  According  to  Eickleman  (1989:  78)  "The  most 
telling  sign  of  the  changed  political  role  of  the  tribes  in  the  Arabian  Peninsula  is  their 
increasing  urbanisation  and  sedentarisarion.  By  the  1970s,  only  around  10  percent  of 
the  Saudi  population  lived  a  nomadic  lifestyle,  as  opposed  to  roughly  40  percent  in  the 
1950s.  "  Cole  (1975:  146-63)  "[t]he  oil  boom  of  the  1970s  decreased  that  percentage 
even  further.  In  the  smaller  states  as  well  there  have  been  sustained  efforts,  based  on 
oil  wealth,  to  settle  tribesmen.  Even  without  direct  government  efforts,  the  move  from 
the  desert  to  the  city  has  been  an  inevitable  by-product  of  the  economic  changes 
brought  about  by  oil  wealth.  Also  according  to  Gause  111  (1994:  24),  "Sedentarisation 
means  that  tribesmen  are  directly  dependent  economically  on  the  state  for  their 
houses,  probably  for  their  jobs  (if  they  take  jobs),  and  for  social  services.  Motivated 
by  social  and  economic  impetuses  (e.  g.  search  for  jobs),  and  assisted  by  such  changes 
as  the  introduction  of  modem  transport,  mobility  of  citizens  across  GCC  states, 
especially  after  the  creation  of  the  GCC,  increased  even  more  substantially. 
One  of  the  more  significant  steps  undertaken  by  the  member  states  of  the  GCC 
was  reaching  an  agreement  on  the  necessity  of  allowing  their  nationals  the  freedom  to 
move  across  GCC  borders,  free  of  all  visa  controls.  However,  this  agreement  did  not 
go  as  far  as  ensuring  the  freedom  of  these  nationals  to  move  across  GCC  borders  free 
of  all  passports  controls.  Most  of  this  movement  across  GCC  boundaries  takes  place 
by  air  -  in  which  there  has  been  a  substantial  build  up  in  the  number  of  flights 
connecting  centres  in  the  Gulf  -  and  by  road.  Both  are  widely  accessible  and 
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relatively  cheap;  it  costs  as  little  as  1100  to  travel  from,  say,  Muscat  in  the  most 
southern  GCC  state  to  Kuwait  city  the  most  northerly  of  the  GCC  states. 
The  pattern  of  mobility  in  the  Gulf  was  explored  in  the  sample  survey.  This 
was  investigated  by  computing  the  visits  that  each  of  the  two  samples  had  made  to 
one  or  more  GCC  countries  during  the  past  year  and  the  reasons  for  the  visit(s). 
The  results  of  the  survey  of  the  Kuwaiti  sample  (figure  10.1),  show  that  visits 
to  other  GCC  states  were  unevenly  distributed  the  majority  being  made  to  three 
countries,  namely,  (in  descending  order  of  importance)  Saudi  Arabia,  UAE  and 
Bahrain.  Overall,  a  quarter  of  the  sample  had  made  from  one  to  two  visits  to  another 
GCC  country  in  the  past  year,  while  only  small  minority  had  made  more  than  two 
visits,  and  that  an  even  smaller  minority  (less  than  4%)  had  made  five  or  more  than 
five  visits  to  one  or more  of  the  GCC  countries. 
Examination  of  the  survey  data  bearing  on  the  Qatari  sample'  patterns  of 
mobility  across  GCC-borders  revealed  a  basically  somewhat  similar  pattern.  As  was 
the  case  with  the  Kuwaiti  sample,  the  results  of  the  survey  showed  that  the  movement 
of  the  Qatari  students  were  not  distributed  equally  among  the  GCC  member  states. 
The  large  majority  of  these  visits  were  made  to  the  three  GCC  countries  already  noted 
for  the  Kuwaiti  sample,  the  only  difference  being  that  the  UAE,  rather  than  Saudi 
Arabia,  was  found  to  have  been  the  most  visited  GCC  country  for  the  Qatari  sample. 
Slightly  more  Qataris  than  Kuwaitis  were  found  to  have  made  one  or  two  visits  to  a 
GCC  country  (cf.  percentages  provided  in  Table  10.5),  but,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Kuwaiti  sample,  only  a  small  minority  of  the  Qatari  sample  had  made  more  than  two 
visits  to  a  GCC  country. 
Several  explanations  can  be  advanced  as  to  why  Saudi  Arabia,  the  UAE  and 
Bahrain  are  the  most  visited  GCC  countries  by  both  samples.  Saudi  Arabia  was  found 
previously  (cf  Table  10.1)  to  be  the  country  with  the  largest  concentration  of  cross- 
territorial  'family'  and  'tribal'ties  within  the  GCC.  In  regard  to  the  UAE,  there  are  at 
least  two  reasons  as  to  why  it  is  also  one  of  the  most  visited  GCC  countries  by  both 
samples.  In  addition  to  having  a  high  concentration  of  cross-territorial  'family'  and Chapter  Ten:  Cross-Cutting  Integrative  Social  and  Cultural  Factors  &  the  GCC  189 
'tribal'  ties  within  the  GCC  (see  Table  10.1),  the  UAE  is  one  of  the  biggest  economic 
centres  and  major  tourist  points  in  the  Gulf  region. 
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Mobility  Across  GCC  Territories:  Motivations  &  Reasons 
The  reasons  for  cross-border  movement  varied,  though  most  trips  could  be 
grouped  into  one  or more  of  5  main  reasons: 
1.  Social,  especially  visiting  relatives  or  friends. 
2.  Educational  reasons  (e.  g.  to  attend  a  summer  course,  field  trip). 
3.  Business. 
4.  Tourism. 
5.  Other  (e.  g.,  Umrah  (pilgrimage)...  etc.  ). 
Of  the  reasons  (underlying  the  two  sample's  mobility  across  GCC  territories),  visiting 
friends  and  relations  reflecting  the  number  of  such  ties  that  exist  cross-nationally. 
Tourism  was  an  equally  significant  reason  for  mobility  across  GCC  territories.  Since 
the  GCC  countries  are,  in  general,  traditional  societies,  most  the  GCC  citizens  prefer 
to  spend  their  vacations  in  one  of  the  GCC  countries,  rather  than  head  for  a  foreign 
destination.  Furthermore,  through  the  organisation  of  major  international  sporting 
tournaments  and/or  major  cultural  festivals,  some  of  the  GCC  countries  are 
increasingly  developing  into  major  touristic  destinations.  The  Doha  Open  in  tennis, 
hosted  by  Qatar,  the  Dubai  Open  tennis  tournament,  the  One-Month-  Shopping 
festival  held  annually  in  Dubai,  the  annual  Janadriyyah  cultural  festival  in  Saudi 
Arabia,  and  the  annual  book  fair  in  Kuwait  City,  are  among  major  events  that  are 
proving  hugely  popular  with  the  GCC  citizens.  According  to  the  Kuwaiti  daily,  41- 
Anba'  (14/4/1998,  p.  9),  the  majority  of  visitors  to  this  year's  annual  One-Month- 
Shopping  festival  in  Dubai  were  from  the  Arabian  Gulf  states. 
Table  10.6  The  samole's  twes  of  Visits  to  GCC  Countries: 
Tvpc  of  Visit 
Country  Relatives  Fri  ends  B(Isiness  Tourism  Other  0.  Total 
I(I  1ý4,  1,1  ki  I  1-(J  1,  rq  11/1)  1-1(1  0/1  Fr(I 
Bahrain  69  5.2  75  5.7  12  0.9  93  7.1  18  1.3  267  20.2 
Kuwait  22  1.7  15  1.1  1  0.07  6  0.5  12  0.9  56  4.2 
Oman  11  0.9  13  1  3  0.2  19  1.4  6  0.5  52  4 
Qatar  18  1.3  15  1.1  2  0.1  15  1.1  12  0.9  62  4.7 
Saudi  Arabia  175  13.3  79  6  16  1.2  108  8.2  69  5.2  447  33.9 
UAE  96  7.3  83  6.3  28  2.1  137  10.4  22  1.7  366  27.8 
Other  6  0.5  7  0.5  0  0  50  3.7  6  0.5  69  5.2 
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.7 
...  ...  ..  ... 
....... 
0 
Total  number  of  visits. Chapter  Ten:  Cross-Cutting  Integrative  Social  and  Cultural  Ractors  &  the  GCC  191 
10.5  Identitv  and  Perceptions  of  Identitv  amon  GCC  Citizens: 
Most  accounts  of  political  identity  suggest  that  for  the  individual  these  co-exist 
along  several  dimensions,  and  that  in  politico-territorial  terms,  they  function  at 
different  spatial  scales,  local,  state,  and  possibly  at  the  supra-state  (regional)  level.  Of 
the  latter,  several  major  factors  have  stimulated  and  reinforced  the  perception  of  a 
common  distinctive  'Gulf  identity'  amongst  the  peoples  of  the  GCC  countries.  One  is 
their  shared  ethnicity  where;  as  noted  earlier,  most  of  the  GCC  population  can  trace 
its  origins  to  one  of  a  few  tribes  now  spread  all  over  the  Arabian  Gulf.  The  other  is  the 
strong  affinities  in  religious  orthodoxy,  systems  of  governance  and  societal  hierarchies 
and  structures;  all  the  GCC  countries  are  principally  'Sunni'  states,  ruled  by  traditional 
monarchies  and  with  societies  largely  and  dominated  by  tribal  loyalties,  and  relations. 
Both  of  these  factors  emphasise  common  and  distinctive  affinities  and  affirm  a 
common  cultural  and  societal  identity  in  the  Gulf  region.  Thus,  besides  negative 
factors  (i.  e.  external  threats,  regional  unsuitability  and  conflicts,  etc.  )  there  are  several 
positive  integrating  factors  that  'unite'  the  states  of  the  Arab  peninsular  and  benefit 
integrationist  policies  and  developments  on  the  part  of  these  states. 
Politico-territorial  identities  are  significant  in  underwriting  the  legitimacy  and 
authority  of  political  organisation.  Here  we  focus  on  questions  of  identity,  and  their 
perception  among  Gulf  citizens,  exploring  such  issues  as  the  multiple  loyalties  of 
citizens  to  their  local  area,  tribal  group,  extended  family  unit,  country,  regional 
grouping  and  to  such  wider  notions  as  the  Arab  nation. 
Politico-  Territorial  Identities: 
Scrution  (1982:  213)  characterised  the  concept  of  national  identity  as 
involving  "a  growing  sense  among  people  that  they  belong  naturally  together,  that 
they  share  common  interests,  a  common  destiny.  The  search  for  an  'identity'  in  this 
sense  is  a  major  political  motive.  "  National  identity  is  linked  to  individual  loyalty  to  a 
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examined  the  issue  of  identity  in  the  context  of  the  Gulf  region.  In  his  study  of  the 
question  of  'Arab  identity'  in  the  Gulf  region  from  historical  perspectives,  Morony 
(1988)  identified  "Arab  identity"  in  terms  of  such  issues  as  historical  changes  and 
developments,  the  make  up  of  the  society,  Bedouin  life,  and  Arabic  language,  while 
Salamah  (1982)  recognised  four  types  of  identities  in  the  context  of  the  Arab  world, 
religious,  regional,  local  (e.  g.,  GCC  alliance),  and  group  identities  (e.  g.  'camps'  within 
the  Arab  League). 
To  examine  the  question  of  identity  in  the  context  of  the  GCC,  the  survey 
questionnaire  looked  at  the  order  of  importance  attached  by  citizens  to  their: 
-*.  -  Local  Area; 
-*.  -  Tribal  Group; 
4.  -  Extended  Family  (that  is,  family  spread  across  one  or  more  Gulf  states); 
-*.  -  State; 
Supra-  state  regional  organisation  (the  GCC  countries); 
-*.  -  Arab  Nation; 
-*.  -  Other  Identities  such  as  (Islam,  Middle  East). 
The  most  prominent  identities  tend  to  be  familial  or  where  they  are  more 
overtly  territorial,  to  the  state  or  local  area.  Over  70%  indicated  'family'  was 
important  or  very  important  to  their  identity  (Table  10.7),  while  42.5%  ranked  the 
'country'  (of  origin)  as  of  most  importance  to  their  identity  (27.8%  ranked  it  "very 
important"  14.7%  ranked  it  as  'important)).  Finally,  nearly  40%  of  the  sample 
specified  'the  local  area'  as  a  most  important  element  in  their  identity  while  some  33% 
saw  'the  tribal  group'  unit  as  of  importance  to  their  identity.  This  evidence  affirms  the 
notion  that  ethnic  affiliations  are  not  only  a  common  phenomenon  of  Gulf  society  but 
that  they  in  fact  lay  at  the  very  heart  of  societal  relations  and  organisation  in  the  GCC 
countries. 
In  contrast  only  some  10%  of  the  sample  ranked  the  category  specified  in  the 
survey  as  'the  GCC  countries'  as  of  importance  to  their  identity.  Significantly,  nearly 
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important  in  self-identity  terms.  On  the  one  hand,  this  reflects  the  importance  of  the 
state  -  only  10%  didn't  know  whether  the  state  was  important  to  them.  Equally,  it  may 
reflect  the  perception  recorded  elsewhere  in  this  study  that  as  a  politico-  territorial 
identity  the  GCC  has  been  largely  ineffective  in  representing  the  regional  dimension. 
Loyalty  to  and  identifications  with  such  notions  as  'Arab  Nation'  were  almost 
absent  among  the  sample.  As  little  as  3.6%  of  the  total  sample  ranked  such  cultural 
construct  as  the  'Arab  nation'  as  of  some  importance  to  their  identities  and  affiliations. 
It  is  not  difficult  to  understand  why  this  is  the  case.  Both  the  failure  of  Pan-Arabism  as 
a  uniting  ideology  among  the  Arab  peoples  and  the  more  recent  collapse  of  a  sense  of 
Arab  unity  and  solidarity  as  a  result  of  the  1990  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  are  important 
factors  in  this  regard.  Given  that  half  of  the  sample  are  Kuwaiti  citizens  and  that 
certain  Arab  countries  either  supported  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  or  remained 
neutral  vis-d-vis  the  conflict,  it  is  perhaps  not  surprising  that  such  'notions  of  a  larger 
Arab  identity'  have  little  support  among  the  sample. 
Table  10.7  Citizen  Identities  (Percenta2e): 
Identitv  to: 
...... 
1:  'Orv 
.. 
.........  . 
::  X.  M.  P.  Ormw  Vol 
.  ...  ...... 
.  .  .  Local  arca  14.1  ..  ....  ...  ..  30.5  16.4  13.1 
Tribal  Group  5.8  27.1  28  19.7  17.5 
Extended  Family  45.4  25.1  13.1  9.3  5.8 
State  27.8  14.7  16.8  26.6  10.2 
Supra-  state  regional  organisation  (the  3.4  6.6  8.3  20.2  59.2 
GCC  countries) 
Arab  Nation  3.4  2  2.7  6.3  80.3 
Other  Identity  1.7  0.5  0.3  0.2  11.5 
Note:  Missing  values  account  for  difference  between  100%  and  row  total. 
Kinship  as  an  important  element  of  identity: 
Identification  with  'the  extended  family'  evidently  far  outweighs  the  association 
with  any  other  local,  regional  or  national  identities.  Both  for  the  Kuwaiti  sample  and 
the  total  Qatari  sample  a  plurality  saw  the  'extended  family'  as  "very  important"  to 
(X2. 
their  identity 
. 
16.3  3  6,  df.  8,  cr.  0.03  78)  (Table  (10.8)).  On  the  other  hand,  8.1  %  of 
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mirrored  by  the  Qatari  sample,  while  4.4%  of  the  total  Kuwaiti  saw  the  'tribal  group' 
identity  as  'very  important'. 
a 
Local.  I  rea: 
Very  Important  22  54  7 
Important  54  68  21 
Less  Important  85  81  14 
Not  Important  60  35  2 
Don't  Know 
............................................................... 
49  27  1 
.  Tribal  Group: 
Very  Important  12  20  2 
Important  68  82  10 
Less  Important  63  87  15 
Not  Important  63  43  10 
Don't  Know 
................................................................ 
64  31  8 
Your  Extended  Family: 
Very  Important  113  125  30 
Important  78  65  5 
Less  Important  35  36  6 
Not  Important  26  29  0 
Don't  Know  17  13  4 
Uvels  of  Sign.: 
Local  A  rea:  XI:  47.159  df.  8  Or.  0.0000 
Tribal  Group:  XI:  23.479  df.  8  cy.  0.0028 
Your  Extended  Faniilv:  -YI:  16.336  df  8  or.  0.0378 
Importance  of  'Country'  and  Broader  Geo-cultural  Units  in  Gulf  Identity: 
Territorial  identities  focus  mainly  on  the  state  and  the  'local  area'.  Though, 
there  are  variations  in  the  way  Gulf  citizens  express  their  national  and  supra-national 
loyalties,  national  identities  are  markedly  stronger  than  those  the  Gulf  region 
generally.  While  more  than  half  of  the  Kuwaiti  sample  (56%)  tie  their  identity 
primarily  with  the  'state',  only  a  little  more  than  a  third  of  the  Qatari  sample  (35%) 
displayed  a  similar  pattern  of  identification  and  loyalty.  Given  the  recent  history  of 
Kuwait  and  the  failure  of  the  GCC  and  other  Arab  nations  to  counter  the  Iraqi 
invasion  (without  appeal  to  help  from  outside  powers),  the  Kuwaitis'  sense  of  loyalty 
is  hardly  surprising  and  is  interpretable  as  a  masked  criticism  and  rejection  of  such 
grand  but  ineffective  slogans  as  'Arab  nationhood'  and  'Gulf  identity.  '  Even  so,  more 
than  half  of  the  Qataris  and  more  than  a  third  of  the  Kuwaitis  have  indicated  that  the 
1state'is  not  an  important  component  of  their  identity.  Arguably,  either  sub-national  or 
supra-riational  identities  are  likely  to  fill  the  'vacuum'  for  this  type  of  respondent. Chapier  Ten.  -  Cross-Cu  fling  Integrative  Social  and  Cultural  Pactors  &  the  GCC  195 
Table  10.9  Chi-  Sciuare  for  Samvle's  perceptions  of  Identity  by  Nationali 
T3  lie  of  Ideality,  killsviti 
Nationalitv 
Oatari  Other  Total 
State: 
Very  Important  108  53  3  164 
Important  44  39  4  87 
Less  Important  46  46  7  99 
Not  Important  54  88  15  157 
Don't  Know 
..  .............................. 
18  30  12  60 
.  ...................................  GCC  Countries: 
Very  Important  9  10  1  20 
Important  23  12  4  39 
Less  Important  28  18  3  49 
Not  Important  60  46  13  119 
Don't  Know  150  176  23  349 
SijTn.  Levels  of: 
)  Olu.  Coullit-v"  X2:  53.938  df.  8  cr.  0.000 
10.6,  Overview: 
Earlier  chapters  in  this  thesis  have  been  concerned  with  the  factors  leading  to 
the  creation  of  an  alliance  in  the  shape  of  the  GCC  in  an  effort  to  establish  greater 
political  and  economic  cooperation  between  the  member  states.  Fear  of  regional 
conflicts  (e.  g.,  the  Iran/Iraq  war,  the  Arabo-Israeli  conflict)  threatening  the  stability  of 
these  states  from  hostile  neighbouring  countries  were  critical  to  the  creation  of  the 
GCC.  However,  it  is  not  only  'negative'  factors  that  'unite'  the  Arabian  peninsula 
states.  The  discussion  in  this  chapter  suggests  that  the  states  of  the  Arabian  peninsula 
are  also  united  by  positive,  integrating  factors  linked  to  their  cultural  and  social 
solidarity.  This  unity  and  solidarity  is  underpinned  by  a  broad  network  of  social  and 
cultural  relations  and  grounded  in  strong  linguistic,  religious,  and  ethnic  affinities  as 
well  as  conspicuous  similarities  in  political,  cultural  and  societal  institutions. 
The  chapter  did  not  seek  to  examine  the  precise  role  that  the  broad  network  of 
family,  tribal,  and  other  ties  and  relations  have  played  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC. 
Rather,  it  sought  to  evaluate  the  scope  and  nature  of  these  relations  and  ties  with  a 
view  to  understanding  what  lies  at  the  heart  of  a  widely  acknowledged  cultural  unity 
and  social  solidarity  within  the  region  and  what  accounts  for  perceptions  of  a  common 
distinctive  identity  among  the  GCC  citizens.  Analysis  of  the  survey  reveals  results Chapter  Ten:  Cross-Cutting  Integrative  Social  and  Cultural  Pactors  &  the  GCC  196 
bearing  on  the  intricate  network  of  cross-cutting  and  cross-border  ties  operating 
across  the  regiods  state  boundaries. 
While  these  'sources  of  solidarity'  themselves  cannot  be  the  major  reasons  for 
the  emergence  of  the  GCC,  no  doubt  they  have  acted  as  incentives  to  its 
establishment.  Yet,  caution  needs  to  applied  here  in  linking  societal  factors  to  political 
outcomes.  Like  international  politics,  regional  politics  are  complex  and  inter  state 
relationships  often  reduce  to  considerations  of  potential  self-interest.  As  Mattews 
(1993)  argues,  "[a]ction  by  states  in  the  international  arena  may  be  seen  as  the 
resultant  of  the  balance  of  incentives  and  disincentives  for  taking  it.  Not  only  does  it 
require  the  existence  of  positive  incentives  for  action  to  take  place  but  also  a  weakness 
of  disincentives  or restraining  influences.  "  (p.  44). Chapter  Eleven: 
GCC  Inception,  Function  and  Political  Machinery:  Citizen  Perceptions 
11.1  Introduction: 
w  hile  previous  chapters  have  established  that  on  the  one  hand  the  citizen  - 
using  the  student  sample  as  surrogate  -  is  relatively  knowledgeable  about 
the  GCC,  what  is  important  to  establish  is how  perceptions  both  of  the 
creation  of  the  GCC  and  its  functioning  are  structured.  What  kinds  of  factors  are 
considered  as  having  been  important  to  the  founding  of  the  GCC?  How  effective  has 
it  been  as  a  supra-national  organisation?  What  are  the  major  problems  hindering  the 
greater  effectiveness  of  the  organisation?  To  the  extent  that  such  questions  have  been 
posed  to  the  elite  sample,  this  chapter  counterpoises  the  views  of  the  citizen. 
11.2  Factors  Underiving  the  Formation  of  the  GCC: 
Much  of  the  existing  literature  addressing  the  broad  question  of  what  underlies 
the  establishment  of  the  GCC  emphasises  the  crucial  role  of  two  basic  factors-  the 
external  threats  to  the  political  stability  and  military  security  of  the  GCC  member 
states  particularly  following  the  Iranian  revolution  and  the  outbreak  of  the  Iraq/Iran 
war,  and  the  need  to  build  strong  political,  institutional,  cultural  and  economic 
commonalities  between  the  several  'small'  nations  which  share  borders  and  occupy 
the  Gulf  region  certain  problems  in  common.  Both  kinds  of  factors  will  be  examined 
here  with  a  view  to  determining  which  consideration  or  set  of  considerations  is 
perceived  by  citizens  as  having  been  crucial  to  the  emergence  of  the  GCC. Chapter  Eleven:  GCC  Inception,  Function  and  Political  Machinery:  Citizen  Perceptions  198 
A.  External  Factors: 
The  two  types  of  external  factor  with  which  are  of  concern  here  are  those 
which  have  commonly  been  assumed  to  be  the  most  important  in  the  formation  of  the 
GCC,  viz.  the  eruption  of  the  Iranian  revolution  and  the  outbreak  of  the  Iran/Iraq  war. 
The  Iranian  revolution  in  1979  posed  a  major  threat  to  both  the  political 
stability  and  military  security  of  the  various  Gulf  states.  There  was  much  apprehension 
among  the  Arab  Gulf  regimes  that  the  Iranian  revolution  might  spill  over  to 
themselves,  stimulating  acts  of  insurgency  and  destabilisation  by  local  minority  Shi'ite 
populations.  Salame  (1988)  argued  that  revolutionary  Iran  posed  the  characteristic 
threat  of  an  expansionist  force  in  the  Gulf  region.  He  also  asserts  that  even  during  the 
period  of  the  Shah,  Iran  pursued  an  expansionist  policy  that  targeted  Iraq  and  the  Gulf 
states,  but  that  since  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  Iran  has  become  more 
conspicuously  aggressive  in  its  attitudes  towards  the  Gulf  states.  El-Rayyes  (1988) 
also  affirmed  the  negative  impact  of  the  Iranian  revolution  on  the  GCC  member  states, 
asserting  that  the  Iran  revolution  had  represented  a  considerable  challenge  to  the  GCC 
countries,  especially  those  with  a  sizeable  Shi'ite  population.  Iran,  it  was  argued,  had 
provoked  turmoil  within  some  of  the  smaller  GCC  member  states,  such  as  Bahrain,  by 
precipitating  a  coip  in  the  latter  part  of  1981.  Addressing  the  effects  the  Iranian 
revolution  has  had  on  its  neighbouring  Gulf  states  and  the  factors  which  brought  the 
GCC  into  existence,  Anthony  (1988)  argued  that  the  main  reason  behind  Iran's 
aggressive  policy  towards  the  Gulf  states  was  a  determined  effort  to  export  the 
revolution  to  its  neighbouring  Gulf  states.  Much  of  the  available  literature,  then, 
highlights  the  widespread  fear  felt  by  the  Gulf  political  establishment  that  the 
revolutionary  zeal  of  Iranian  radicalism  could  inspire  or  incite  a  Shi'ite  destabilisation 
of  the  political  situation  in  the  Gulf  states.  With  a  view  to  verifying  these  arguments, 
we  will  assess  how  citizens'  perceive  the  importance  of  these  threats  and  their  impact 
on  the  formation  of  the  GCC. 
The  distribution  of  attitudinal  patterns  across  the  two  groups  -  citizens  and  the 
political  elite  -  illustrates  the  importance  of  this  factor  to  the  creation  of  the  GCC.  The Chapter  Eleven:  GCC  Inception,  Function  and  Political  Machinery:  Citizen  Perceptions  199 
results  can  usefully  be  compared  alongside  these  of  al-'Esa  &  al-Manofi's  (1985) 
study  with  a  view  to  gauging  the  shift  in  attitudinal  and  perception  patterns  before  and 
after  1990.  Surprisingly,  the  results  of  the  citizen  survey  show  that  the  Iranian 
revolution  was  not  perceived  as  a  critical  factor  in  the  formation  of  the  GCC.  Over 
40%  of  the  total  sample  believed  that  the  Iranian  revolution  was  not  one  of  the  most 
important  factors  underlying  the  establishment  of  the  GCC,  while  only  20%  of  the 
total  sample  believed  otherwise  (Figure  11.1).  In  contrast,  among  the  GCC  elite,  the 
Iranian  revolution  was  perceived  as  the  most  significant  factor  behind  the 
establishment  of  the  GCC.  In  part  the  reason  why  there  is  such  a  difference  between 
the  two  samples  arises  from  the  censorship  imposed  on  the  GCC  media  on  matters 
connected  with  the  Iranian  Revolution.  Further,  where  the  export  of  the  Revolution 
was  a  potentially  destabilising  force,  the  elite  were  the  more  obviously  threatened. 
Iranian  Revolution 
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Source:  Survey 
These  patterns  were  broadly  replicated  by  nationality  between  the  Kuwaiti  and 
Qatari  samples.  Thus,  only  23.3%  of  the  total  Kuwaiti  sample  regarded  the  Iranian 
revolution  as  the  most  important  factor  behind  the  creation  of  the  GCC,  a  figure 
matched  by  the  Qatari  sample  (18%).  In  contrast  some  37%  of  the  Kuwaiti  sample 
perceived  the  'Iran  factor'  as  of  no  relevance  to  the  formation  of  the  GCC.  As  far  as 
the  Kuwaiti  differences  are  concerned  a  plausible  explanation  might  lie  in  the 
hostilities  between  their  government  and  that  of  Iran  in  the  early  1980s.  The  Qatari Chapter  Eleven:  GCC  Inception,  Function  and  Political  Machinery:  Citizen  Perceptions  200 
sample's  perceptions  revealed  a  stronger  rejection  of  the  Iranian  revolution  as  a 
relevant  factor  in  the  establishment  of  the  GCC.  Over  half  (51.4%)  of  the  Qatari 
sample  perceived  it  as  cnot  relevant'  to  the  formation  of  the  GCC  (Table  (11.1)). 
As  is  clear  from  the  attitudinal  differences  shown  in  Table  (11.1),  the 
importance  of  the  Iranian  revolution  threat  is  perceived  differently  by  Kuwaiti,  Qatari, 
and  Other  GCC  samples.  In  Kuwait  the  Iranian  revolution  was  perceived  as 
important,  for  which  several  reasons  may  be  suggested.  First  is  the  geographical 
proximity  of  Iran,  which  not  only  created  the  need  for  the  establishment  GCC  but  also 
speeded  it  up.  Ghabra  (1996)  explains  the  reasons  which  encouraged  Kuwait  to  speed 
up  the  formation  of  the  GCC.  The  former  Secretary-General  of  the  GCC  argued  that 
the  decision  to  support  Iraq  (in  its  war  with  Iran)  was  a  policy  designed  to  weaken  the 
revolutionary  Iran.  Since  the  outbreak  of  the  Iranian  revolution,  Kuwait  had  been 
constantly  living  in  the  shadow  of  Iranian  terrorist  attacks,  especially  attempts  at 
assassinating  the  emir.  These  threats  which  Kuwait  faced  from  Iran  in  the  aftermath  of 
the  Iranian  revolution,  were  the  more  immediate  precisely  because  of  its  geographical 
proximity.  A  further  reason  was  the  fear  of  a  Shi'ite  uprising  in  Kuwait  as  well  as 
other  GCC  states. 
Table  11.1  The  GCC  Reasons  for  Establishment  By  Nationality:  (Frequenc 
GCIC 
R"son  Kimaiti  Qatiri  Other  GCC  Total 
Iranian  Revolution: 
Very  Important  63  48  7  118  20.5 
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Not  Important  38  39  7  84  14.6 
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Yet,  it  is  clear  that  the  Iranian  revolution  was  not  the  sole  (or  always  the 
major)  factor  that  influenced  the  creation  of  the  GCC.  Indeed,  Kuwait  and  Bahrain 
were  the  only  two  GCC  state  members  that  were  to  be  really affected  by  the  Iranian Chapter  Eleven:  GCC  Inception,  Function  and  Political  Machinery:  Citizen  Perceptions  201 
revolution.  The  greater  'distance'  of  Qatar  and  other  GCC  member  states  from  the 
Iranian  threat  is  reflected  -  in  the  case  of  Qatar  -  by  the  sample  statistics.  Overall,  such 
a  threat  was  greater  in  the  years  immediately  after  the  Revolution,  and  had  lessened 
somewhat  by  the  1990s. 
The  outbreak  of  the  Iran/Iraq  war  has  also  been  seen  widely  as  one  of  the 
external  factors  which  led  to  the  emergence  of  GCC.  The  possibility  of  the  war 
spreading  to  other  parts  of  the  Gulf  created  an  obvious  threat,  particularly/to  the 
smaller  GCC  member  states.  Demographically  and  militarily,  the  size  of  Iran  is far 
larger  than  any  of  the  GCC  member  states.  None  of  the  GCC  member  states  would 
have  been  able  to  counteract  Iran  on  its  own  in  the  event  of  a  war.  Also,  the  Iranian 
revolutionary  zeal  and  the  fear  of  its  potential  spillover  to  minority  Shi'ite  Muslims 
within  the  Gulf  state  territories  created  pressures  on  the  GCC  governments  to  seek 
possible  ways  of  averting  the  crisis.  El-Rayyes  (1988)  argued  that  the  outbreak  of 
Iran/Iraq  war  signalled  the  imminent  danger  of  Islamic  Shi'ite  insurgency  and  the 
expansion  of  Persian  nationalism.  Clearly,  the  Iran/Iraq  war  event  undoubtedly  drove 
the  Gulf  states  to  react  (Braun,  1988).  Squeezed  by  the  two  strong  powers  of  Iran 
and  Iraq,  the  Gulf  states  realised  that,  unless  they  united,  they  had  no  choice  but  to 
adopt  a  nonbelligerent  position.  Drysdale  &  Blake  (1985)  viewed  the  formation  of  the 
GCC  as  a  regional  response  to  a  regional  conflict.  Yet,  if  these  studies  have 
emphasised  the  importance  of  the  Iran/Iraq  war,  this  is  not  supported  necessarily  by 
public  opinion  in  the  Gulf  society,  as  measured  in  the  survey  of  citizen  attitudes. 
Nearly  half  of  the  total  sample  rejected  it  as  one  of  the  relevant  factors  underlying  the 
formation  of  the  GCC,  a  figure  which  was  reported  in  both  Kuwait  and  Qatar.  These 
figures  were  broadly  similar  to  these  identified  in  an  earlier  study  by  al-'Esa  &  al- 
Manofi  (1985).  Figure  (11.2)  shows  the  distribution  of  attitudinal  patterns  among  the 
al-'Esa  &  al-Manofi  Kuwaiti  sample  with  regard  to  whether  the  Iran/Iraq  conflict  had 
any  impact  on  the  emergence  of  the  GCC. Chapter  Eleven:  GCC  Inception,  Function  and  Political  Machinery:  Citizen  Perceptions  202 
Fieure  11.2  Distribution  of  the  Iran/  Irag  Factor 
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The  sample's  decision  to  reject  both  the  'Iran/Iraq  war'  as  well  as  the  'Iranian 
revolution'  as  two  of  the  major  external  driving  forces  behind  the  formation  of  the 
GCC  might  reflect  their  preference  to  emphasise  their  societal  and  cultural  affinities, 
rather  than  dwell  on  what  they  consider  the  less  important,  or  more  negative,  external 
factors.  Much  of  the  literature  and  most  of  the  GCC  political  elite  surveyed  here  have 
insisted  on  the  importance  these  two  external  conflicts. Chapter  Eleven:  GCC  Inception,  Function  and  Political  Machinery:  Citizen  Perceptions  203 
B.  Internal  Factors: 
Four  factors  are  commonly  cited  as  playing  a  crucial  role  in  the  creation  of  the 
GCC:  the  common  social  structures  of  the  member  states,  the  similarity  of  their 
political  systems,  their  economic  status,  in  particular,  their  dependency  on  oil,  and, 
finally,  the  common  aspiration  of  Gulf  citizens  to  see  the  emergence  of  an  integrated 
regional  organisation.  The  importance  of  these,  as  drawn  from  the  survey,  is  shown  in 
Figure  11.3. 
Fi2ure  11.3  GCC  Reasons  By  Importance  Level 
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As  regard  previously,  the  existence  of  common  societal  bonds  among  GCC 
member  states  have  been  the  focus  of  attention  by  a  number  of  scholars  (Hay,  1959); 
Christie,  1986).  In  an  historically  -  based  study  of  the  GCC,  Christie  (1986) 
differentiated  between  the  GCC  and  supra-riational  organisation  such  as  the  EU  in 
terms  of  the  strong  affinities  existing  among  the  member  states  of  the  GCC.  He 
argued  that  while  most  alliances  would  have  to  accommodate  for  different  languages, 
cultures,  and  political  systems,  the  GCC  does  not  face  such  obstacles.  Highlighting 
L  another  common  social  characteristic  binding  the  GCC  member  states  together,  Bah'a 
A2  MEW  w 
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al-Deen  (1989)  argues  that  the  strength  of  the  GCC  lies  in  the  social  and  cultural 
affinities  (customs,  language,  religion,  ..  etc.  )  found  among  the  populations  of  the  its 
member  states. 
Al-Rumaihi  (1975)  emphasised  the  role  of  the  tribal  background  of  the  Gulf 
societies  arguing  that  "[flhe  nationals  of  these  states  (GCC)  came  from  tribal 
backgrounds  (and  often  from  the  same  tribal  origins)  which  has  contributed  to  their 
having  similar  social  and  family  structures,  legal  systems,  inter-personal  relationships, 
values,  housing  arrangements,  marital  customs  and  art  forms.  "  (see  also  Melikian 
(1988)  on  this  point).  The  GCC  Charter  itself  emphasises  the  importance  of  these 
social  similarities  and  "of  the  ties  of  special  relations,  common  characteristics  and 
similar  systems  founded  on  the  creed  Islam  which  bind  [member  states]  [and  the] 
common  destiny  and  the  unity  aim  which  link  their  people  ....... 
(GCC  Charter,  p.  3). 
These  sentiments  were  broadly  supported  by  the  findings  of  the  survey;  nearly  60% 
thought  that  the  social  similarities  between  the  member  states  were  either  'very 
important'  or  'important'  in  the  founding  and  operation  of  the  GCC. 
Similarities  in  the  nature  of  their  political  systems  characterise  the  member 
states,  and  these  too  have  helped  contribute  to  the  formation  of  the  GCC.  Peterson 
(1988a)  noted  that  the  GCC  states  have  evolved  from  tribal  polities  and  that  even  the 
post-independence  GCC  states  are  in  fact  widely  accepted  as  a  continuation  of  the 
pre-modern  state  systems.  The  current  regimes  are  largely  traditional  authorities 
govemed  by  ruling  families.  With  the  exception  of  Kuwait,  all  of  the  GCC  states  rely 
on  similar  consultative  public  councils  (Majlis)  as  a  way  of  political  representation 
and  public  participation  in  the  (Political  life  of  the  country). 
Despite  their  prominence,  these  affinities  and  similarities  in  the  political 
systems  and  type  of  governance  were  largely  underplayed  by  the  sample  as  significant 
factors  in  the  creation  of  the  GCC.  While  only  7%  of  the  sample  were  of  the  view  that 
Political  systems  similarities'  were  a  Every  important'  factor  in  the  founding  of  the 
GCC  and  another  23%  thought  these  similarities  were  'important'  factor,  more  than 
4101o  claimed  that  similarities  Of  Political  systems  were  of  no  importance  whatsoever 
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Figure  11.4  The  Sample's  Perceptions  of  Importance 
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Obviously,  these  views  contrast  with  those  of  the  elite.  Citizen  perceptions  in 
this  regard  are  not  difficult  to  understand  or  rationalise.  The  concrete  achievements  of 
the  GC  in  most  fields  of  cooperation  have  so  far  been  very  modest  indeed,  betraying 
the  large  gap  that  obtains  between  the  reality  of  the  GCC  and  the  rhetoric  of  the 
organisation's  officials  and  leadership.  Furthermore,  the  GCC  member  states  have  so 
far  failed  to  capitalise  on  the  similarities  existing  between  their  political  systems  so  as 
to  establish  meaningful  levels  of  political,  cultural  and  economic  cooperation  and  to 
eliminate  such  sources  of  tension  and  conflict  as  the  long-standing  problem  of  border 
disputes. 
With  the  exception  of  Bahrain  and  Oman,  the  GCC  member  states  are  all  oil 
rich  countries  and  highly  dependent  on  oil  revenues  and  associated  industries  (e.  g. 
petrochemicals).  Many  scholars  have  identified  the  common  economic  problem 
deriving  from  this  heavy  dependency  on  oil  and  oil  revenues.  In  his  examination  of  the 
consequences  of  fluctuation  in  oil  prices  on  the  economies  of  GCC  countries  during 
the  1970s  and  1980s,  Hunter  (1986)  argued  that  "[flalling  revenues  have  reduced  the 
level  of  spending  by  Gulf  governments,  forcing  cutbacks  in  development  projects, 
reductions  in  the  number  and  salaries  of  government  employees  and  delays  in  payment 
to  contractors"  (p.  593)  and  that  "Declining  revenues  have  had  a  significant  impact  on 
[the  GCC  states]  budgets,  spending  patterns,  financial  assets,  and  economic 
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budget  deficit  and  has  had  one  ever  since"  (pp.  596-97).  Henderson  (1987)  also 
emphasised  the  impact  of  loss  of  oil  revenues  on  the  economies  of  these  states, 
arguing  that  "[t]he  recent  collapse  of  oil  prices  has  caused  substantial  conjecture 
among  economists  about  the  ffiture  of  the  oil  industry  and  the  effects  of  possible  price 
scenarios  on  the  Gulf  produces  [GCC]"  (p.  69).  Al-Rumaihi  (1983)  and  Obeid  (1996) 
even  argue  that  the  common  problem  of  dependency  on  oil  and  the  loss  of  revenues  as 
a  result  of  decline  in  oil  prices  during  the  1980s  drove  the  Arabian  Gulf  states  to  set 
up  the  GCC  as  an  economic  alliance  with  a  view  to  overcoming  their  economic 
difficulties  through  cooperation  and  coordination  of  policies  in  both  the  economic  and 
other  sectors. 
These  arguments  are  not  necessarily  reflected  in  the  sample  survey.  Asked  as 
to  whether  they  believe  common  economic  problems,  the  dependency  on  oil,  had  had 
a  role  in  the  formation  of  the  GCC,  the  sample  expressed  somewhat  divided  opinions. 
Just  over  a  third  were  of  the  view  that  common  economic  problems  had  played  an 
important  role  though  this  was  matched  by  a  roughly  similar  proportion  who 
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the  GCC.  While  the  perceived  unimportance  of  these  common  economic  problems 
might  be  linked  to  the  assumption  among  the  majority  of  the  sample  that  social  and 
cultural  similarities  are  primarily  responsible  for  the  emergence  of  the  GCC,  a  more 
plausible  explanation  might  have  to  do  with  the  censorship  imposed  on  any  sensitive 
problems,  including  economic  ones. 
Finally,  the  aspiration  of  Gulf  citizens  for  some  form  of  political  unity  is  also 
widely  regarded  as  one  of  the  factors  that  motivated  the  formation  of  the  GCC. 
Christie  (1986)  recognised  the  importance  of  this  factor  in  explaining  the  creation  of 
the  GCC,  while  Shafeeq  (1989)  alleged  that  the  existence  of  the  GCC  is  a  result  of  the 
long-existing  aspiration  among  the  Gulf  citizens  for  unity.  As  an  argument  it  has  been 
used  by  the  GCC  elite  to  justify  the  existence  of  the  organisation.  Thus,  according  to 
'the  fonner  Secretary-General,  the  formation  of  the  GCC  represents  the  culmination 
of  the  long-standing  desire  of  the  Gulf  people  for  a  regional  alliance  pursuing  political 
and  economic  integration'  (Al-Riyadh  newspaper,  12.  Dec.  1981). 
Paradoxically,  as  al-'Esa  (1993)  noted,  "the  GCC  experiment  was  not  based 
on  any  grassroots  participation.  The  governments  reserved  the  right  to  take  political 
decisions  and  determine  aspects  of  cooperation  and  alliance.  The  non-involvement  of 
the  citizens  in  the  political  process  ... 
led  [ultimately]  to  their  disillusionment  and 
diminished  support  for  the  organisation",  (al-Siyasah,  21  Dec.,  1993).  The  GCC 
organisation  has  no  direct  contacts  with  citizens,  the  elite  having  appropriated  the 
decision-making  process. 
Not  surprisingly,  then,  a  substantial  proportion  of  those  replying  to  the 
questionnaire  (46.8%)  felt  that  the  'demands  of  the  Gulf  people'  were  'not  relevant' 
to  the  existence  of  the  GCC,  while  a  further  25%  described  it  as  'not  important'  as 
such  a  factor.  These  responses  represent  another  dimension  to  the  disaffection  held 
toward  the  organisation. 
It  should  be  noted  at  this  point  that  the  GCC  has  so  far  failed  to  meet  the 
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wider  and  more  direct  participation  in  the  politics  of  the  region,  where  the  status  quo 
restricts  the  decision-making  process  to  the  political  elite.  These  demands  have  been 
regularly  voiced  on  the  local  media,  and,  particularly,  in  the  pages  of  Kuwaiti 
newspapers.  The  fact  that  these  demands  persist  is  a  clear  indication  that  the  GCC  has 
so  far  made  no  major  efforts  to  meet  citizen  demands.  In  an  extensive  series  of 
interviews  with  the  educated  elite,  the  Kuwaiti  newspaper  al-Qabase  reported  a 
citizen  as  declaring:  "[t]he  GCC  should  aim  at  realising  the  citizens'  hopes  and 
fulfilling  their  aspirations  by  allowing  them  to  participate  in  the  decision-making 
process  much  as  in  Kuwaiti"  (4.  Nov.  1985).  Kuwait  is  presently  the  only  state  among 
the  GCC  members  that  has  a  fully  elected  house  of  parliament.  Elections  are  held 
every  4  years  to  choose  members  of  the  Kuwaiti  Parliament.  The  failure  of  the  GCC 
to  discuss  those  issues  of  direct  importance  to  the  citizen  has  inevitably  exacerbated 
their  dissatisfaction  with  the  organisation  and  increased  the  demand  for  a  radical 
rethink  of  the  objectives  of  it. 
The  1990  crisis  brought  to  the  fore  the  necessity  for  more  solidarity  within  the 
GCC  (Quassim,  1993).  Arguably,  such  solidarity  will  only  materialise  if  the  GCC  is 
prepared  to  grant  its  citizens  a  more  active  role,  or  at  least  greater  transparency  in  the 
decision-making  process.  The  demands  by  the  GCC  citizens  for  a  broadening  of  the 
GCC's  activities  and  the  widespread  dissatisfaction  with  the  GCC's  response  to  these 
demands  represents  a  brake  on  the  extent  to  which  the  GCC  has  been  able  to  establish 
itself  in  the  Gulf  as  a  regional  organisation. 
Overview: 
Of  all  the  factors  generally  cited  as  motivating  the  creation  of  the  GCC  the  one 
factor  perceived  as  the  most  significant  is  that  linked  to  the  social  similarities  existing 
among  the  Gulf  societies.  There  is  a  strong  awareness  of  these  similarities  among 
citizens  and  real  importance  is  attached  to  them  in  binding  the  Gulf  societies  together. 
Yet,  precisely  because  of  this  importance,  there  is  a  sense  of  dissatisfaction  with  the 
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factor  in  the  existence  of  the  GCC  has  become  a  reaction  against  the  non-democratic 
nature  of  the  GCC  machinery  and  the  political  elite's  total  control  over  this  and  other 
institutions.  Most  of  the  GCC  states  exclude  their  citizens  from  participation  in  the 
process  of  decision-making.  Apparently,  this  exclusion  has  negatively  affected  the 
sample's  attitudes.  These  attitudes  also  signal  the  common  sentiment  among  the 
citizens  that,  in  so  far  as  its  mode  of  operation  is  concerned,  the  GCC  remains  similar 
to  the  politics  of  the  governments  of  its  member  states,  and  that  its  governing  style  is 
essentially  an  endorsement  of  the  political  status  quo.  From  the  citizen's  perspective, 
the  GCC  was  established  for  certain  purposes  but  has  failed  to  fulfil  its  role.  The 
formation  of  the  GCC  may  have  met  a  real  need  and  might  even  have  anticipated 
popular  aspiration,  but  no  popular  votes  were  cast  for  its  establishment  and  no  tests  of 
public  opinion  have  been  conducted  in  order  to  assess  the  citizens'  attitudes  towards 
the  institution  (Christie,  1987). 
The  absence  of  any  democratic  basis  has  been  frequently  commented  on  both 
in  the  press  and  by  academics.  Al-Kuwari  (1992)  argued:  "[t]he  [  ... 
]  political 
frameworks  [  ... 
]  do  not  allow  for  my  voice  and  those  of  the  likes  of  me  to  be  heard  so 
as  to  influence  crucial  policy  decisions.  "  Commenting  on  how  a  proposal  outlining  a 
strategy  for  development  and  integration,  submitted  to  the  GCC  Secretariat-General 
in  1984,  was  never  brought  to  the  attention  to  either  the  Supreme  or  Ministerial 
Council,  he  pointed  out  that  the  proposal  was  objected  to  and  ultimately  rejected 
because  it  called  for  "the  instituting  of  a  federal  structure,  capable  of  allowing  the 
people  of  the  region  a  more  active  and  effective  political  role.  "  Such  a  lack  of 
participation  has  affected  the  attitudes  of  the  sample  respondents  towards  the  GCC  to 
a  considerable  degree.  An  integration  process  seeking  to  achieve  supra-state 
regionalism  is  the  more  likely  to  realise  its  potential  when  the  alliance  is  grounded  in 
the  demands  of  civil  society.  Such  an  alliance  may  achieve  a  higher  level  of 
'integration',  where  both  the  political  elite  and  the  citizens  share  in  the  process  of 
decision-making. Chapter  Eleven:  GCC  Inception,  Function  and  Political  Machinery:  Citizen  Perceptions  210 
11.3.  Evaluation  of  the  GCC  Political  Machinerv: 
This  section  investigates  the  citizen  perceptions  of  the  GCC  functions,  then 
examines  the  problems  facing  the  GCC  and,  finally,  addresses  the  issues  of  GCC 
membership,  the  type  of  voting  practices  within  the  GCC,  and  the  function  and  role  of 
the  Commission  for  Settlement  of  Disputes  within  the  organisation. 
I.  Citizens'  Perceptions  &  GCC  Function: 
Most  of  the  literature  describes  the  GCC  as  a  security-motivated  organisation. 
Bishara,  an  Ex-GCC  Secretary-General,  highlighted  the  nature  of  the  GCC  in  an 
interview  with,  al-Siyasah  newspaper  (Nov.  24,1993).  He  argued  that  the  GCC  has 
concentrated  on,  firstly,  pursuing  certain  security  objectives  and  enforcing  defence 
arrangements,  and,  secondly,  establishing  and  maintaining  a  'desert  shield'.  Shuriedeh 
(1995)  emphasised  the  importance  that  the  leaders  of  the  GCC  attach  to  the  defence 
function  of  the  organisation,  arguing  that  they  were  most  anxious  about  the  security 
of  their  countries.  There  are  several  dimensions  to  such  security,  where  as  Nakhlah 
(1986)  noted  the  GCC  provides  for  three  types  of  multilateral  security  cooperation: 
domestic  (against  any  internal  coup  d'dtat  or  local  insurgency),  regional,  and 
international. 
In  view  of  the  great  importance  the  elite  gives  to  a  common  defence  policy  as 
a  GCC  function,  it  is  important  to  evaluate  whether  this  is  matched  by  citizen 
perceptions.  The  latter  does  not  necessarily  follow:  it  is  plausible  that  citizens  give 
greater  priority  to  other  objectives  of  the  GCC  as  defined  by  the  Charter. 
Indeed,  nearly  two-thirds  (64%)  rejected  the  notion  that  the  function  of  the 
GCC  should  be  limited  to  common  defence  policy  and  arrangements,  suggesting  that 
the  interests  of  the  Gulf  states  would  be  better  met  by  an  alliance  that  pursues  multi- 
sectoral  cooperation  rather  than  being  limited  to  questions  of  defence.  This  is  not  to 
deny  that  defence  is  not  a  key  aspect;  rather,  that  the  aspirations  citizens  have  of  the 
GCC  extend  beyond  security  concerns. Chapter  Eleven:  GCC  Inception,  Function  and  Political  Machinery:  Citizen  Perceptions  211 
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The  sample  were  asked  about  the  type  of  functions  they  would  like  to  see  the 
GCC  fulfil.  In  their  responses,  they  ranked  what  they  perceived  as  the  priority 
functions  of  the  GCC  i.  e.: 
Issues  related  to  citizenship  such  as  the  use  of  one  passport  within  the  GCC, 
free  movement  among  the  member  states,  equal  citizenship  among  the 
nationals  of  the  various  GCC  countries. 
Social  issues. 
Political  issues  (including  defence) 
Economic  issues. 
Immigration  issues. 
a  Common  Market. 
Such  agenda  differ  significantly  from  that  of  the  elite.  Citizenship  and  social 
issues  are  viewed  as  more  significant  than  those  of  defence  and  security.  Indeed,  some 
of  the  dissatisfaction  with  the  GCC  arose  from  the  feeling  that  the  organisation  has 
concentrated  too  much  on  questions  of  security. 
Whatever  have  been,  or  should  be,  the  main  policy  concerns  of  the  GCC  in 
practice  its  functioning  and  effectiveness  has  been  affected  by  ongoing  disputes 
between  member  states.  These  problems  are  widely  recognised  -  indeed  in  the  citizen 
survey  most  were  aware  of  how  these  problems  affected  the  GCC's  capacity  to  meet 
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A  number  of  earlier  studies  have  looked  at  the  attitudes  towards  the  problems 
of  the  GCC.  Al-'Esa  &  al-Manofi  (1984)  studied  public  opinions  towards  the 
problems  encountered  by  the  GCC.  They  found  that  nearly  one-third  of  the  sample 
that  they  studied  believed  that  border  disputes  constituted  a  stumbling  block  to  the 
GCC  and  that  nearly  half  of  the  same  sample  believed  that  citizens  dare  not  criticise 
the  GCC  owing  to  the  absence  of  political  freedom  and  liberties  within  the  Gulf  states. 
Obied  (1996)  also  studied  elite  attitudes  towards  the  GCC's  foreign  policies.  Several 
other  studies  have  provide  a  descriptive  account  of  the  GCC  problems  (e.  g.  al-Alkim 
(1994),  Nakhleh  (1986),  Schofield  (1994), 
...  etc.  ). 
Of  the  different  specific  problems  confronting  the  GCC  some  in  particular  are 
identified  in  the  survey  as  being  of  especial  importance  (Figure  11.7).  Politico- 
geographical  problems  are  critical,  the  persistence  of  boundary  disputes  between 
member  states,  and  sovereignty.  The  latter  is  expressed  in  terms  of  the  striving  for 
'individual  interests'  by  member  states,  preventing  greater  cooperation.  Specifically 
these  differences  become  reflected  in  conflicts  over  foreign  policy  between  the  states. 
R!  ure  11.7  Samt)le  Attitudes  toward  the  GCC  Problems  bv  Percenta2e: 
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1.  Border  Disputes: 
The  lack  of  any  sense  of  political  unity  was  the  major  factor  that  hindered  the 
Gulf  states  from  becoming  one  integrated  state  following  the  end  of  the  British 
protection.  Part  of  the  region's  disunity  stemmed  from  the  various  border  problems 
which  continue  to  be  one  of  the  major  challenges  facing  the  member  states  of  the 
G,  CC.  In  some  cases  these  problems  have  led  to  direct  confrontation  between  the 
member  states,  while  it  remain  true  that  each  of  the  GCC  member  states  is  presently 
involved  in  a  border  dispute  with  one  or  more  of  its  neighbours  (Map  11.1). 
Mushkour  (1993)  argued  that  a  look  at  the  historical  role  of  the  British  empire 
in  drawing  up  the  area's  borders  would  help  in  understanding  the  current  boundary 
problems.  Numerous  historical  treaties  were  signed  under  the  British  protection.  The 
escalation  of  the  border  disputes  stems  from  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  Gulf  states  to 
expand  their  sovereignties.  Key  here  is  that  control  of  more  oil  resources  lies  at  the 
root  of  most  of  the  border  disputes;  as  Schofield  (1997)  points  out  that  [d]ifficulties 
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have  arisen  in  the  recent  years  in  those  instances  where  oil  fields  straddle  international 
boundaries  or  where,  in  the  case  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  Yemen,  no  international 
boundary  exists.  [ 
... 
I  In  November  1992  Saudi  Arabia  decided  to  proceed  with  [the] 
development  of  the  Shaibah  oil  field  (referred  to  as  Zarara  by  the  UAE),  which 
straddles  the  kingdom's  border  with  the  principle  shaikhdom  of  the  UAE,  and  Abu 
Dhabi"  (p.  133).  Paradoxically,  the  emergence  of  the  GCC  seems  to  have  exacerbated 
the  border  problems  because  of  its  reassertion  of  the  sovereignty  rights  of  members 
states.  Discussing  the  persistence  of  border  disputes  among  several  of  the  GCC 
member  states,  Gause  111  (1994),  argues 
"The  fact  remains  that  the  GCC  states,  united  by  similar 
political  systems  and  many  common  interests  towards  the 
outside  world,  perceive  their  interests  differently  on  a  number 
of  questions.  They  come  together  in  a  crisis,  like  the 
combination  of  the  Iranian  Revolution  and  the  Iran-Iraq  War 
that  gave  birth  to  the  organization  in  1981,  and  the  Iraqi 
invasion  of  Kuwait  in  1990.  But  when  the  crisis  passes,  the 
differing  perspectives  and  disputes  among  them  creep  back 
into  the  foreground.  Each  of  the  states  clearly  prefer  to  deal 
with  external  powers  on  security  issues  directly,  not  through 
the  GCC.  Each  of  the  member  states  is  extremely  hesitant  to 
give  up  any  aspect  of  its  sovereignty  [ 
... 
].  Most  noticeably, 
border  disputes  that  shrink  into  the  background  in  the  face  of 
immediate  threats  tend  to  resurface  when  the  regional  scene 
quiets  down.  "  (Gause  111:  130). 
The  issue  of  sovereignty  has  been  favoured  at  the  expense  of  inter-state 
cooperation  and  specifically  of  establishing  'open  borders'.  Mushkour  (1993)  and 
Schofield  (1994)  tie  the  persistent  border  disputes  among  the  member  states  of  the 
GCC  to  their  inordinate  preoccupation  with  issues  of  national  sovereignty.  This 
concern  has  led  the  GCC  member  states  to  prioritise  their  own  interests,  giving 
thereby  rise  to  intense  rivalries  within  the  organisation  and  ruling  out  the  possibility  of 
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(1992),  the  Ex-GCC  Secretary-General  Assistant  for  Economic  Affairs,  has  (recently) 
expressed  his  disappointment  at  the  failure  of  the  GCC  to  sort  out  its  border  disputes. 
As  can  be  recalled  from  the  discussion  in  Chapter  8,  the  political  elite  also  affirmed 
the  negative  impact  that  the  persistence  of  such  problems  has  had  on  the  GCC's 
efforts  to  establish  extensive  cooperation  among  the  member  states. 
Not  unexpectedly  then  of  the  citizens  surveyed,  the  majority  (83%)  were 
agreed  that  border  disputes  between  member  states  are  a  major  source  of  conflict 
inside  the  organisation.  These  results  reflect  the  level  of  awareness  of  one  of  the  more 
intractable  dilemmas  hindering  GCC  progress  and  which  threaten  the  existence  of  the 
organisation.  They  also  highlight  and  emphasise  the  magnitude  and  spread  of  the 
border  disputes  problem  over  the  GCC  territories. 
Table  11.2  Attitudes  to  the  Border  Dismites,  bv  Nationali 
Natioitalitv 
Value  Label  KwcaW  Qolari  Other  (A'("  7,0101 
Strongly  Disagree  11  6  2  19 
Disagree  16  9  3  28 
Neutral  20  12  2  34 
Agree  133  99  21  253 
Strongly  Agree  77  144  18  239 
Don't  Know  13  4  0  17 
Total 
...................................................... 
270 
........................ 
274 
...................................... 
46 
................................... 
590 
.....  .  Level  of  Siz:  ..  ...................... 
X2  :  38.087  df.  -  10  Oc  0.000 
2.  Economic  Competition: 
Not  unexpectedly,  as  all  its  member  states,  with  the  exception  of  Bahrain,  are 
oil  rich  and,  by  implication,  oil  dependent  economies,  economic  cooperation  figures 
highly  on  the  GCC's  agenda  of  priorities.  Where  one  of  the  main  factors  that 
motivated  the  creation  of  the  GCC  was  the  similarity  of  their  economies,  for  a  third  of 
the  political  elite  economic  cooperation  is  seen  as  the  most  beneficial  area  of 
cooperation  among  the  member  states  of  the  GCC.  Under  the  GCC  charter,  economic 
cooperation  among  the  member  states  of  the  organisation  is  set  within  the  objective  of 
coordinating,  and  even  more  importantly,  integrating  the  policies  of  the  member  states 
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states  into  a  single  economic  entity.  However,  this  must  be  seen  as  a  long-term  goal,  if 
not  possibly  rhetoric. 
Much  of  the  literature  (al-Rumaihi  (1983),  al-Kuwari  (1986))  argues  that 
aggressive  economic  competition  and  rivalry  among  the  member  states  is  one  of  the 
main  obstacles  confronting  the  GCC  and  hindering  its  aim  of  full  integration.  This 
aggressive  competition  continues  to  go  unabated  due,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  failure  of 
the  GCC  member  states  to  implement  the  Economic  and  Tariff  Agreement  signed  as 
long  ago  as  1981  (see  Appendix  Q.  In  regard  to  the  inability  of  the  GCC  states  to 
agree  on  a  single  tariff  structure  and  the  underlying  causes  of  such  problems,  Guase 
111  (1994)  argues  According  to  Gause  111,1996,  "In  trade  and  industrial  policy,  the 
Gulf  states  also  act  to  protect  certain  economic  interests  and  to  accomplish  political 
goals  as  well.  The  difficulties  that  have  been  encountered  in  negotiating  a  single  tariff 
structure  and  a  common  market  among  the  Gulf  monarchies  through  the  GCC  are 
attributable  in  large  measure  to  individual  governments  efforts  to  protect  certain 
industries  and  interests  in  their  countries.  "  (p.  56).  However,  only  6.5%  of  the 
political  elite  believed  that  economic  rivalry  within  the  GCC  hampers  cooperation 
among  the  member  states  of  this  organisation.  Reflecting  the  view  portrayed  more 
usually  in  a  senior  civil  servant  in  the  GCC  Secretariat-  General  (Elite  2)  argued  that 
economic  competition  among  the  member  states  is  one  of  the  main  problems  that  the 
GCC  faces,  stressing  that  "every  member  state  is  trying  to  compete  by  adopting  the 
same  project  that  another  state  has  already  adopted  [ 
... 
]  Therefore,  economic 
competition  is  one  of  the  main  obstacles  and  it  is  only  by  the  adoption  of  the  Unified 
Economic  Treaty  that  this  problem  will  be  solved  ...  provided  the  GCC  members 
implement  it". 
One  example  of  competition  is  that,  in  stead  of  cooperating  on  joint  economic 
programmes  that  would  help  ensure  greater  economic  complementarity,  most  of  the 
GCC  members  have  embarked  on  similar  industrial  programmes  grouped  around 
activities  such  as  petrochemicals,  the  gas  industry,  etc..  In  an  interview  with  Radio 
Qatar  (The  Issues  and  Views  Programme  (1996)),  al-Nafaisi  (a  Kuwaiti  academic  and 
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cooperation  within  the  GCC  thus:  "[ 
... 
]I  think  that  there  is  no  integration  whatsoever 
in  the  economic  and  political  fields  [ 
.... 
]  And  my  evidence  [in  support  of  this  claim]  is 
the  spread  of  identical  economic  projects  in  the  GCC  states".  (The  Issues  and  Views 
Programme,  p.  261).  What  is  lacking  are  joint  enterprises  which  stress  coordination 
rather  than  competition  among  the  member  states  (Angell,  1987).  Clearly,  these 
problems  of  economic  competition  are  widely  perceived  as  obstacles  to  GCC 
cooperation  by  citizens,  and  that  these  attitudes  are  broadly  similar  regardless  of 
nationality  (Table  11.3). 
Table  11.3  Sample's  Attitudes  towards  the  Economic  Rivalry  within  the  GCC  & 
Differences  in  Forei  gn  Policy  bv  Nationality: 
Economic  C()Illl)Ctiti(),  ) 
T*Diffcrcnce8  in  Fo  *D  reign  Polic,. 
Value  Libel  KuNvaifi  Q'Itari  Other  GCC  Kuwaiti  Other  GCC 
Citizens  citi/011", 
Strongly  Disagree  13  13  1  14  4  1 
Disagree  38  40  8  29  18  5 
Neutral  49  56  10  32  39  4 
Agree  114  109  16  98  121  14 
Strongly  Agree  27  27  6  69  67  18 
Don't  Know  29  29  5  28  24  4 
(41  T-0  ...  ...  ..... 
3.  Foreign  Policy  Conflicts  between  Member  States: 
Coordination  of  the  foreign  policies  of  the  member  states  in  pursuit  of  a 
integrated  foreign  policy  is,  under  the  terms  of  the  GCC  charter,  a  major  objective  of 
the  organisation.  Though  the  GCC  has  shown  more  concern  for  policy  coordination  in 
the  foreign  affairs  field  after  1990,  foreign  policies  amongst  Gulf  states  remain, 
according  to  most  observers,  largely  contradictory.  Thus,  Oudah  (1993)  asserted  that 
the  most  noticeable  aspect  of  the  GCC's  foreign  policy  is its  fragmentation;  and  most 
scholars  have  characterised  the  foreign  policies  of  the  organisation  as  lacking 
consensus.  Al-Jasser  (1994)  criticised  the  GCC's  'foreign  policy',  arguing  that 
differences  in  policies  gave  rise  to  bilateral  cooperation  between  some  GCC  member 
states,  undermining  the  overall  unity  of  the  organisation.  He  also  argued  that  outside 
observers  (see,  for  instance,  al-Kuwari  (1992))  expected  the  disintegration  of  the 
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broadly  true  that  the  level  of  inter-state  policy  coordination  has  been  very  low,  owing 
often  to  the  persistent  border  disputes  between  member  states  and  the  insistence  on 
their  sovereignty.  Incompatibility  of  policy  positions  among  GCC  member  countries 
are  perhaps  best  evident  in  the  foreign  affairs  field.  Thus,  while  some  of  the  GCC 
states  have  established  diplomatic  relations  with  Israel,  some  still  refuse  to  do  so,  and 
while  some  of  the  GCC  states  maintain  diplomatic  relations  with  either  Iraq  or  Iran, 
some  do  not.  The  insistence  of  member  states  on  pursuing  independent  policies  has 
been  and  remains  a  divisive  factor  that  threatens  the  unity  (and  effectiveness)  of  the 
GCC.  The  lack  of  harmonisation  of  policy  was  commonly  cited  by  citizens,  directly 
refuting  the  opinion  of  the  elite. 
4.  Member  State  Parochialism: 
Member  state  parochialism  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  stumbling  blocks  in  the 
way  of  GCC  progress.  One  member  of  the  elite  accepted  that  the  emergence  of 
conflicting  member  states'  interests  has  been  one  of  the  main  problems  facing  the 
GCC,  stating  that:  "[e]very  member  state  is  convinced  that  its  own  agenda  is  fight  for 
the  rest  of  the  member  states,  whereas  in  fact  it  reflects  only  the  interests  of  that 
member  state"  (Elite  1).  Nour-al-Deen  (1993)  argued  that  the  GCC  has  been  shackled 
by  the  problem  of  this  parochialism.  This  parochialism  has  had  a  clear  effect  on  the 
perceptions  of  the  GCC.  According  to  the  interviews  with  GCC  scholars  reported  in 
the  Gulf  newspapers  before  every  summit,  the  interests  the  Gulf  region  at  large  are 
generally  overlooked  by  member  states,  where  these  are  more  concerned  with  forcing 
their  own  agenda  on  fellow  member  states. 
Clearly,  Gulf  citizens  are  acutely  aware  of  the  problem  (Figure  (11.8).  Nearly 
40%  of  the  sample  alone  'strongly  agreed'  that  the  existence  of  state  parochialism 
within  the  GCC  was  a  problem  for  the  organisation,  while  in  all  nearly  three-quarters 
considered  it  a  problem  at  all.  These  results  suggest  that  there  is  a  strong  awareness 
among  citizens  of  state  parochialism,  that  it  tends  to  dominate  the  politics  of  the 
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Fieure  11.8  Perception  of  State  Parochialism 
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Strongly  Agree 
Don't  Know 
% 
Funcdon 
Ouestion:  Are  the  GCC  member  states  concerned  more  about  their  own  individual  interests  rather  about  the  collective  ones? 
B.  GCC  Membership: 
According  to  Article  5  of  the  GCC  Charter,  "The  Cooperation  Council  shall 
be  formed  of  the  six  states  that  participated  in  the  foreign  ministers  meeting  held  in 
Riyadh  on  February  4,198  L"  No  article  in  the  GCC  Charter  addresses  the  matter  of 
potential  additional  membership.  The  provisions  of  Article  20,  bearing  on  the  possible 
amendment  of  the  Charter,  do  not,  however,  preclude  the  possibility  of  the  member 
states  agreeing  unanimously  to  include  other  states  in  the  GCC.  Shafeeq  (1989) 
criticised  the  political  decision  to  limit  membership  to  the  original  six  member  states 
and  exclude  neighbouring  Arab  Gulf  states. 
Nevertheless,  the  GCC  Charter  did  not  mention  the  possibility  of  accepting 
other  members  in  the  organisation,  and  insisted  that  the  amendment  of  Article  20 
could  be  undertaken  only  in  the  case  of  a  unanimous  decision  by  the  original  member 
states.  Nakhlah  (1986)  attributed  the  'closed'  membership  of  the  GCC  to  the  fact  that 
only  these  states  share  a  similar  political  system,  have  similar  economies  and  are 
largely  populated  by  the  same  Islamic  sect.  Shuriedeh  (1995)  affin-ned  that  the  GCC 
member  states  think  that  the  closed-membership  of  only  six  countries  gives  them  a 
better  chance  of  achieving  desirable  levels  of  cooperation.  Media  in  the  other  Arab 
countries,  however,  characterise  the  organisation  as  simply  a  'club  of  the  rich'. 
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Turning  to  the  citizen  sample  most  opposed  an  open-membership  policy  by  the 
GCC;  nearly  two-third  of  the  total  respondents  insist  that  the  GCC  should  have  a 
closed-membership,  while  only  15.4%  favoured  expanding  its  membership.  Of  those 
who  answered  the  question  as  to  which  countries  might  join  the  GCC,  the  most 
frequently  chosen  was  Egypt.  This  is  not  surprising  given  that  the  survey  was  in  part 
conducted  in  Kuwait,  in  which  Egyptian  military  aid  had  played  such  a  key  part 
(among  Arab  countries)  in  1990.  In  another  study  of  Kuwaiti  perceptions  towards  the 
GCC,  al-'Essa  &  al-Manofi  (1985)  found  that  27.5%  of  their  total  sample  chose 
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Fi2ure  11.10  The  Kuwaiti  Attitudes  toward  *  oining 
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Source:  Al-'Essa  &  AI-Manofi  (1985) 
While  al-'Esa  and  al-Manofi's  earlier  (1985)  study  showed  that  more  than  half 
of  their  sample  would  like  to  see  Iraq  join  the  GCC,  only  14.7%  of  this  study's  total 
sample  approved  of  a  GCC  open-membership  policy  and  as  few  as  a  quarter  of  this 
number  approved  of  the  idea  of  Iraq  joining  the  GCC.  Similarly,  while  the  1985  study 
revealed  that  as  many  as  59%  of  their  total  sample  chose  Yemen  (as  the  Arab  state 
they  would  like  to  see  join  the  GCC),  only  22.7%  in  this  survey  showed  a  preference 
for  this  country.  Figures  (11.9)  and  (11.10)  show  the  marked  shift  that  seems  to  have 
affected  the  attitudes  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Second  Gulf  war.  Clearly,  where  half  of 
the  study  sample  were  Kuwaiti  citizens,  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  and  Yemen's 
support  for  the  invasion,  explained  the  shift  in  attitudes. 
C.  The  Voting  System: 
The  Supreme  Council  of  the  GCC  is  the  highest  and  only  authority  that  takes 
decisive  decisions.  Hence,  power  is  centralised  in  the  hands  of  this  Supreme  Council, 
despite  the  fact  that  the  GCC  Charter  is  vague  regarding  the  voting  system.  Articles  9 
and  13  elaborate  on  the  nature  of  the  voting  system  in  the  Supreme  and  Ministerial 
councils  thus:  "Resolution  of  the  Supreme  Council  on  substantive  matters  shall  be 
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resolution  on  procedural  matters  shall  be  carried  by  a  majority  vote.  "  (p.  6).  Thus,  in 
both  Supreme  and  Ministerial  councils,  unanimity  is  required  for  resolutions  bearing 
on  substantive  matters  and  a  majority  vote  for  procedural  matters.  Nakleh  (1986) 
argued  that  the  unanimity  requirement  can  only  serve  to  undermine  the  process  of 
decision-making,  as  not  all  policies  and  resolutions  are  bound  to  satisfy  each  and 
every  member  state.  In  a  study  of  Arab  League,  which  also  insists  on  unanimity,  al- 
Baharnah  (1993)  argued  that  it  regularly  hindered  the  adoption  of  crucial  resolutions, 
as  in  the  case  of  adopting  a  unified  stand  against  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait. 
Attitudes  of  the  Gulf  citizens  towards  the  insistence  on  unanimity  is  complex. 
Most  did  favour  changing  the  system  to  a  majority  one,  though  by  a  slim  margin 
(53%).  Yet  many  of  these  would  like  to  see  the  voting  system  changed  into  a  majority 
one  only  under  some  special  circumstances  (e.  g.,  internal  or  external  threats).  On  the 
whole,  there  seems  to  be  a  pronounced  perception  among  the  sample  that  the 
unanimity  requirement  adopted  by  the  GCC  is  both  an  undesirable  (and  problematic) 
procedure  and  that  this  particular  aspect  of  the  organisation's  political  machinery 
should  be  changed  or  at  least  amended. 
A  Commission  for  Settlement  of  Disputes: 
One  of  the  GCC  pro  forma  institutions  is  the  Commission  for  Settlement  of 
Disputes  whose  function  was  defined  under  the  terms  of  Article  10  of  the  GCC 
Charter  thus:  "If  a  dispute  arises  over  interpretation  or  implementation  of  the  Charter 
and  such  a  dispute  is  not  resolved  within  the  Mnisterial  or  the  Supreme  Council,  the 
Supreme  Council  may  refer  such  dispute  to  the  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of 
Disputes.  "  (p.  6).  Article  10  further  specifies  that  the  Supreme  Council  shall  establish 
the  composition  of  the  Commission  for  every  case  on  an  'ad  hoc'  basis  in  accordance 
with  the  nature  of  the  dispute.  '  (p.  6). 
Clearly,  the  often  reiterated  claim  among  GCC  officials  that  there  are  no 
disputes  between  the  member  states  is  evidently  false.  For  example,  Qatar  took  its 
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failure  of  the  GCC  to  find  a  solution  satisfactory  to  both  sides.  In  an  interview  with 
Radio  Qatar,  al-Obaidly  (the  former  Head  of  Section  of  International  Organisations  at 
Qatari  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs)  argued  that  Qatar  took  its  case  to  the  international 
court  only  after  the  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes  failed  to  settle  it  (to 
the  satisfaction  of  both  parties)  (see,  The  Issues  and  Views  Programme  (1996)).  The 
case  demonstrates  the  weakness  of  the  Commission  and  the  ability  of  member  states 
to  ignore  its  deliberations,  if  they  wish.  Many  of  the  citizen  responses  (40%)  indicate 
the  need  for  strengthening  the  Commission,  though  a  slightly  higher  proportion  were 
unsure  on  the  point-  perhaps  not  surprising  when  it  is  remembered  that  the  CSD  is  a 
somewhat  shadowy  organisation. 
In  an  interview  with  the  London-based  Middle-East  Broadcasting  Centre 
(MBC)  about  the  role  of  the  CSD  in  solving  disputes  among  the  GCC  member  states, 
Sheikh  Jameel  al-Hojailan,  the  new  Secretary-General,  insisted  that  the  authority  of 
the  SCD  depends  crucially  on  the  commitment  of  the  member  states  to  abide  by 
whatever  decisions  it  might  take.  He  argued  that  "Any  decision  taken  by  the  CSD 
should  be  accepted  [by  all  parties  involved  in  the  dispute].  For  example,  in  the  case  of 
the  Bahraini/Qatari  dispute,  both  countries  preferred  to  accept  the  Saudi  mediation. 
Such  mediation  will  allow  for  more  flexibility  and  a  speedy  resolution  for  their 
dispute.  For  in  so  far  as  they  accepted  the  mediation  they  should  also  [be  willing  to] 
accept  the  decision  of  the  mediating  party".  Clearly,  as  this  declaration  of  the 
Secretary-General  implies  the  decisions  of  the  CSD  are  too  easily  ignored.  One  way 
would  be  to  raise  the  status  of  the  CSD  to  ajuridical  institution. 
11.4.  Conclusions: 
The  sample's  perceptions  of  the  GCC  shows  a  keen  awareness  of  the 
existence  and  nature  of  the  problems  limiting  the  GCC's  drive  towards  greater 
integration  of  the  politics  and  economies  of  the  member  states.  The  majority  of  the 
sample  agreed  that  these  problems  are  not  only  hampering  meaningful  cooperation 
between  the  member  states,  but  are  actually  threatening  the  unity  of  this  organisation. Chapter  Eleven:  GCC  Inception,  Function  and  Political  Machinery:  Citizen  Perceptions  224 
It  was  also  perceived  that  the  existence  of  the  above  problems  could  affect  the  internal 
and  external  security  of  the  GCC  member  states  and  that  inter-state  border  disputes 
and  the  failure  to  resolve  them  are  limiting  cooperation. 
Compared  with  the  results  obtained  by  studies  conducted  prior  to  1990,  the 
investigation  here  has  revealed  a  shift  in  citizen  attitudes  towards  the  possibility 
and/or  necessity  of  admitting  new  Arab  countries  into  the  GCC.  al-'Esa  &  al-Manofi's 
(1985)  study  showed  that  Iraq  and  Yemen  were  the  two  countries  most  preferred  by 
Kuwaiti  citizens  to  join  the  GCC.  However,  this  study  showed  that  most  of  the 
sample  would  not  like  to  see  the  GCC  membership  made  open  to  new  countries.  Such 
a  shift  in  attitudes  towards  a  more  hardened  position  could  be  attributed  to  the  impact 
of  the  second  Gulf  war. 
Respondents  also  showed  a  fairly  common  stance  towards  the  'unanimity 
voting'  adopted  by  the  GCC  and  the  need  to  amend  such  a  voting  system  on  account 
of  it  creating  unnecessary  obstacles  for  the  GCC's  in  its  efforts  to  achieve  greater 
cooperation  between  the  member  states.  The  political  crisis  which,  for  instance, 
erupted  between  Qatar  and  Saudi  Arabia  over  the  appointment  of  a  new  GCC 
Secretary-General  in  1995  could  never  have  emerged  if  the  GCC  did  not  insist  on 
unanimity.  Moreover,  where  there  are  disputes  between  member  states,  mediation 
should  be  achieved  'locally'  through  bolstering  the  CSD. 
It  might  be  argued  that  the  lack  of  member  state  cooperation  is  the  product  of 
an  unnecessarily  complicated  bureaucracy  and  the  political  elite's  lack  of  appreciation 
of  the  challenges  facing  the  organisation.  While  the  elite  consider  that  the  GCC  is  not 
facing  any  critical  problems,  the  citizens  believe  otherwise.  The  political  elite's  efforts 
to  censor  the  organisation's  internal  problems  and  divisions  -  in  an  effort  to  suggest 
the  unity  of  the  organisation  -  have  been  ineffective,  and  seem  only  to  have 
accentuated  the  citizens'  sense  of  alienation  from  and  distrust  of  the  GCC. Chapter  Twelve: 
Evaluation  of  GCC  Member  State  Cooperation:  Citizen  Perceptions 
This  chapter  looks  at  citizens  perceptions  of  the  GCC's  attempts  to  formulate 
coordinated  policies  between  member  states,  as  well  as  whether  there  has  been  any 
perceptible  changes  in  the  policies  and  objectives  of  the  organisation  over  the  last  few 
years,  and,  in  particular,  in  the  wake  of  the  Gulf  war.  The  first  aspect  looks  at  specific 
policies  -  those  affecting  the  environment,  the  economies,  foreign  affairs  and  education. 
The  second  asks  whether  citizens  consider  that  since  the  1990  Gulf  crisis  a  greater  sense 
of  unity  among  Gulf  states  has  become  apparent  through  the  activities  of  the  GCC. 
12.2.  Policy  Cooperation: 
From  its  creation,  the  GCC  emphasised  the  need  for  cooperation  between  the 
member  states  in  a  number  of  spheres.  Though  security  is  a  prominent  concern  of  all 
GCC  member  states,  the  GCC  Charter  did  not  make  any  explicit  reference  to  it.  Some 
commentators  have  argued  that  significant  cooperation  had  been  achieved  in  the  political, 
diplomatic,  military,  and  economic  fields  (Peterson,  1988).  But  while  such  claims  have 
been  made,  citizen  attitudes  have  been  critical  of  the  efforts  of  the  organisation.  In  a 
reaction  to  an  interview  given  by  Bishara,  the  GCC  Ex-Secretary-General,  to  Radio 
Qatar  before  the  GCC  summit  in  November  1995,  one  concerned  GCC  citizen  protested: 
"Bishara  said  that  during  the  last  14  years  the  GCC  was  mainly  concerned  with  the 
Iran/Iraq  war....  Assuming  that  is  indeed  the  case,  then  why  the  unrelenting  insistence 
that  the  council  has  made  solid  achievements?  It  is  pointless  [ 
... 
]  for  Mr.  Bishara  to  keep 
reiterating  claims  about  the  GCC  achievements....  Are  these  achievements  no  more  than 
an  illusion?  ",  (p.  293).  Another  citizen  stated  that  "[m]ost  of  the  GCC's  citizens  are 
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that  there  has  been  nothing  concrete  about  these  achievements.  "  (Issues  and  Opinions 
Programme,  p.  295,1996) 
Citizen  perceptions  of  GCC  policy  cooperation  reflect  the  perceived  success  that 
the  organisation  has  had  in  the  implementation  of  the  Charter's  objectives.  The  relevant 
goals  of  the  Charter  are  defined  in  Article  4,  emphasising  the  need  to  draw  up  compatible 
policies  among  the  member  states  in  such  areas  as  the  economy,  finance,  commerce, 
customs,  communications,  education,  social  welfare,  health,  information,  tourism, 
legislation  and  administration.  Citizen  attitudes  towards  some  of  these  policy  fields  were 
assessed,  beginning  by  ranking  their  importance. 
Political  cooperation  (e.  g.,  harmonising  foreign  policies  position  towards 
developments  in  the  international  arena)  was  seen  as  a  top  priority  for  the  GCC,  far 
outweighing  the  significance  of  the  next  most  important  policy  field,  economic 
cooperation  (Table  (12.1).  Both  the  environment  and  'other'  sectors  came  low  as  a 
priority,  where  60.2%  of  the  total  responses  perceived  the  environment  sector  as  a  'not 
important'  field  of  cooperation.  These  findings  are  not  difficult  to  rationalise.  Political 
cooperation  is  not  only  central  to  any  form  of  integration  but  a  prerequisite  to  all  other 
types  of  cooperation.  As  was  reported  in  previous  chapters  (chapters  8  and  11)  a 
majority  of  the  citizens  were  aware  of  the  tensions  that  persist  among  the  member  states 
as  a  result  of  still  unresolved  border  disputes  and  were  of  the  view  that  border  disputes 
have  been  a  stumbling  block  in  the  way  of  extending  cooperation  between  the 
organisation's  members.  It  was  also  found  that  the  majority  of  the  citizens  sample 
thought  that  the  major  problems  facing  the  GCC  are  caused  by  a  failure  of  the  GCC 
members  to  harmonise  foreign  policies  (see  section  11.3,  chapter  11).  In  view  of  this,  it 
is  not  surprising  that  political  cooperation  was  viewed  as  a  priority. 
Table  12.1  Citizen  Attitudes  ofthe  Sitgnificance  of  PolicN  Fields  for  GCC  Cooperation: 
Level  of  lim)ortance 
very  Don't  Know  Less  Not  Imp  ortant 
Cooperatke  Important  Important  Important 
Sector  Frq  6  Iiq  %  Frq  %  Frq 
Environment  -13  7.3  42  7.1  27  4.6  11  7  19.8  355  60.2 
Economic  117  19.8  313  53.1  1  0.2  115  19.5  40  6.8 
Social  63  10.7  94  15.9  8  1.4  280  47.5  139  23.6 
Political  354  60  136  23.1  3  0.5  64  10.8  29  4.9 
Other  13  2.2  10  1.7  100  16.9  8  1.4  8  1.4 Chapter  Twelve:  Evaluation  of  GCC Member  State  Cooperation:  Citizen  Perceptions  227 
12.3.  Attitudes  Towards  Kev  Policies: 
Foreign  Policy  and  foreign  policy  issues  are  normally  the  preserve  of  political 
elites.  For  the  GCC,  foreign  policy  coordination  is  arguably  one  of  the  most  challenging 
tasks  because  of  the  inevitable  conflict  between  member  states'  interests.  Certainly,  the 
political  elite  perceived  such  conflicts  in  foreign  policies  to  be  one  of  the  main  problems 
facing  the  GCC  (Chapter  8).  Citizens  too  express  similar  attitudes,  as  is  clear  from  the 
Gulf  newspapers  before  every  summit.  Political  sensitivity  of  the  specific  issues  has 
hindered  Arab  scholars  from  discussing  them  openly.  Some  of  the  literature  has 
discussed  the  foreign  policies  of  the  GCC.  Thus,  Guase  (1994)  asserted  that  "[t]he  sense 
of  frustration  within  the  GCC  secretariat  on  the  lack  of  progress  in  a  number  of  areas  is 
also  evident  in  Gulf  public  opinion"  (p.  132).  He  also  argued  that  the  GCC foreign  policy 
has  often  been  undermined  by  the  conflicting  positions  adopted  by  the  member  states. 
Yet,  as  Table  12.2  emphasises  public  attitudes  favour  the  production  of  common  foreign 
policy  stances  by  member  states,  and  that  the  GCC  is  looked  at  as  the  organisation  which 
should  be  meeting  this  need. 
Table  12.2  Citizen  Attitudes  to  the  Sip-nificance  of  Specific  GCC  Policv  Fields: 
PoliCN, 
Field 
Important 
Level  of  Importance 
Don't 
Important  Know 
Fr. 
Not 
Important 
q 
Don't 
Know 
Foreign  467  79.2  103  17.5  5  0.8  8  1.4  5  0.8 
Affairs 
Economic  415  70.3  162  27.5  1  0.2  3  0.5  4  0.7 
Education  326  55.3  240  40.7  3  0.5  17  2.9  2  0.3 
Health  283  48  266  45.1  5  0.8  23  3.9  6  1 
Immigration  151  25.6  259  43.9  42  7.1  109  18.5  20  3.4 
Security  &  550  93.2  33  5.6  1  0.2  1  0.2  4  0.7 
Military  I 
Clearly,  as  Table  (12.2)  also  indicates  considerable  importance  is  attached  to 
economic  cooperation.  This  derives  essentially  ftom  the  fact  that  member  states  share 
similar  types  of  economies.  Yet,  as  one  member  of  the  elite  sample  asserted,  the  member 
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competitiveness.  According  to  al-Kuwaiz  (1988),  the  ex-GCC  Assistant  Secretary 
General  for  Economic  Affairs,  "[flhe  structural  make-up  of  the  economies  of  GCC  states 
necessitates  embarking  on  a  set  of  projects  that  would  enable  the  [GCC  states']  to 
enlarge  productivity  and  provide  more  job  opportunities  for  citizens,  [as  well  as] 
minimise  the  negative  effects  and  aspects  of  cooperation  ... 
"  and  that  cooperation 
"required  strengthening  the  effectiveness  of  the  provisions  and  resolutions  of  [GCC] 
ministerial  committees.  This  means  activating  the  executive  branches  of  those 
committees  [ 
... 
]  in  each  of  the  member  states  ...... 
(p.  5). 
Discussing  how  the  GCC  resolutions  and  politicise  remain  largely 
urnimplemented  by  the  member  states  as  a  results  of  lack  of  institutional  mechanisms 
ensuring  that  all  states  abide  and  enforce  these  resolutions  and  policies,  al-Kuwaiz  (1992) 
also  argued  "[flhough  time  and  effort  consuming,  the  discretionary  nature  [of  GCC 
policies  and  resolutions]  do  not  lead  to  desired  results  [ 
... 
]  should  it  not  be  better,  in  so 
far  as  the  aim  is  closer  ties  and  integration,  that  these  statues  and  resolutions  are  made 
compulsory  and  binding  [on  all  member  states]"  (p.  5) 
The  importance  of  education  policy  was  appreciated  by  most  of  the  student 
sample.  As  Table  (12.2)  indicates,  more  than  55%  categorised  educational  policies  within 
the  GCC  as  'extremely  important'  and  as  many  as  40%  of  the  total  responses  thought  of 
it  as  "important". 
Article  (4)  of  the  GCC  charter  describes  the  benefits  of  coordinating  education 
policies  and  emphasises  the  importance  of  formulating  uniform  education  regulations 
(e.  g.,  adoption  of  unified  curricula  at  all  levels  of  education,  and  similar  university 
admission  requirements).  However,  cooperation  in  the  field  of  education  remains  so  far 
largely  a  secondary  concern  for  the  GCC  member  states  and  cooperation  of  policies  in 
this  important  field  remain  all  but  marginal. 
Following  the  Gulf  states  Ministers  of  Education  in  1979,  the  'Gulf  University' 
was  initiated  in  Bahrain.  However,  this  educational  projecý  too  faced  many  problems 
owing  to  the  political  conflicts  that  plagued  the  region  and  following  the  Iraqi  invasion  of 
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any  case  a  failure  to  allocate  any  money  to  the  project.  Cooperation  in  the  field  of 
education  has  proved  a  challenging  task  for  the  GCC  owing  to  the  failure  of  the  member 
states  to  agree  on  a  single  uniform  educational  system,  notably  on  such  issues  as  a 
uniform  curricula  at  the  various  school  levels  as  well  on  a  unified  admission  system  to 
universities. 
In  a  study  of  health  care  and  health  services  in  the  state  of  Qatar,  al-Thani  et.  al. 
(1993)  found  that  53.3%  of  the  total  sample  they  studied  perceived  the  level  of  health 
care  and  health  services  to  be  'satisfactory  enough!  Their  study  also  found  that  65%  of 
their  total  sample  assumed  that  treatment  overseas  (i.  e.  Europe  and  North  America)  is 
much  superior  than  it  is  locally  and  that  only  28.4%  of  the  sample  believed  local  health 
care  to  be  as  good  as  that  available  overseas. 
The  issue  of  health  and  health  policy  is  considered  important  as  is  clear  from  the 
survey  -  48%  of  the  total  sample  regarded  it  as  a  'very  important'  area  of  concern  for  the 
GCC. 
All  GCC  citizens  have  access  to  a  free  medical  care  in  their  respective  countries 
and,  owing  to  this,  the  financial  cost  of  this  sector  is  very  high  and  rapidly  increasing. 
Chatelus  (1990)  discussed  the  problem  of  expenditure  in  the  health  sector  in  the  Arab 
world,  pointing  out  that  the  health  expenditure  ratio  in  oil  countries  is  much  higher  than 
anywhere  else  in  the  Arab  world  and  that  state  expenditure  on  health  among  GCC 
member  states  is  more  than  half  that  on  education. 
While  citizens  have  a  right  to  free  medical  care  in  their  own  state,  the  GCC  has 
sought  to  extend  this  so  as  to  give  citizens  reciprocal  fights  between  the  member  states. 
This  has  important  implications  because  while  standards  of  health  care  provision  are 
broadly  similar  between  member  states,  specialist  provision  varies.  Yet,  partly  because  of 
bureaucratic  problems,  these  reciprocal  rights  have  yet  to  be  implemented.  While  citizens 
have  expressed  a  clear  demand  for  such  fights,  their  implementation  has  yet  to  be 
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Establishing  greater  military  cooperation  is  one  of  the  most  challenging  objectives 
of  the  GCC.  Cooperation  in  this  field  has  obviously  become  more  important  after  the 
1990  war,  and  takes  a  variety  of  forms.  As  far  as  security  cooperation  is  concerned  this  is 
divisible  by  'scale',  domestic,  regional,  and  international  (Nakhleh  (1986).  Domestic 
security  cooperation  involves  the  exchange  of  data  on  the  numbers  and  activities  of 
foreign  workers,  citizens,  and  organisations  in  GCC  member  states,  and  on  political, 
ideological,  and  religious  dissidents.  Regional  security  cooperation  centres  on  the 
organising  of  joint  military  exercises,  the  exchange  of  military  information  about  troops 
and  training  as  well  as  the  coordination  of  a  common  position  towards  any  regional 
threats.  Finally,  international  security  cooperation  involves  the  establishment  of  common 
approaches  to  arms  acquisition  and  the  coordination  of  the  member  states'  foreign  and 
defence  policies. 
While,  as  Table  (12.2)  shows,  the  greatest  importance  was  attached  to  this  form 
of  cooperation  among  all  the  policy  fields,  in  fact  such  cooperation  is  far  from  being 
achieved.  This  is  not  to  say  that  there  has  been  no  progress,  Nakhleh  (1986)  stressed  that 
the  GCC  member  states  have  in  fact  agreed  on  some  of  the  important  issues  (like  the 
creation  of  'Desert  Shield',  a  GCC  army  made  up  of  divisions  from  all  member  states), 
but  have,  nevertheless,  disagreed  on  others.  Kuwait  and  Qatar's  disagreement  on  the 
Security  Treaty  best  illustrates  the  level  of  disunity  and  the  lack  of  consensus  that  often 
constrain  the  GCC.  Qatar  refused  to  sign  the  agreement  on  account  of  its  border  disputes 
with  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  Kuwaiti  parliament  took  objection  to  a  clause  in  the  treaty 
granting  the  right  of  'hot-pursuit'  of  GCC  citizens  to  other  member  states,  deeming  this 
right  a  violation  of  its  national  constitution  and  national  sovereignty  of  each  of  the  states. 
Yet,  nearly  all  sample  respondents  agreed  that  'If  one  of  the  GCC  member  states  is  under 
a  major  external  threat,  the  other  members  should  assist',  and  that  member  states  should 
have  the  support  of  the  rest  of  the  constituent  members  of  the  GCC  (see  Table  (12.3) 
below).  In  part  this  reflects  the  advantages  membership  should  have  on  the  defence  of 
the  small  state,  whose  vulnerability  was  clearly  evident  in  the  1990  war.  The  feeling  was 
that  most  considered  that  the  GCC had  moved  towards  a  more  coherent  defense  policy 
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12.4  Perceptions  of,  the  GCC,  Political  and  Economic  Integration: 
This  section  assesses  and  examines  two  types  of  issues:  what  citizens  perceive  to 
be  the  nature  of  the  union  the  GCC  should  pursue,  on  the  one  hand,  and  whether  there  is 
a  perceived  need  for  much  wider  cooperation  in  the  political  and  economic  fields. 
Attitudes  to  these  questions  will  throw  some  light  on  the  level  and  nature  of  cooperation 
among  the  member  states  of  the  council,  and,  by  implication,  on  the  degree  of  success 
the  GCC  has  had  in  pursuing  its  guiding  objectives. 
Closer  political  and  economic  cooperation  between  the  GCC  member  states  is  of 
importance  not  only  to  the  economic  security  and  political  stability  of  these  states  but  to 
the  political  stability  of  the  region  as  a  whole.  An  economic  union  would  benefit  each  in 
overcoming  such  problems  as  the  economic  recession  that  hit  the  Gulf  states  in  the  mid 
1980s  (see,  among  others,  Nakhleh  (1986))  and  would  also  facilitate  a  uniform  economic 
policy  in  such  areas  as  oil  prices,  etc.  A  political  union  would  enable  them  to  counter  any 
attempts  at  destabilisation  and  any  acts  of  outside  aggression. 
In  their  reaction  to  the  question  of  what  kind  of  union  the  GCC  should  pursue, 
over  60%  of  the  total  sample  endorsed  the  idea  that  the  GCC  should  aim  at  a  political 
union  (i.  e.  move  towards  one  state).  Noting  the  GCC's  failure  to  make  distinct  positive 
moves  towards  political  unity,  al-Kuwari  argues  that  "[b]y  1990,  [ 
... 
]a  decade  after  the 
establishment  of  the  GCC,  the  reformers  recognise  that  their  hopes  have  been  frustrated, 
and  that  the  GCC  is  not  aiming  at  (attaining)  a  single  state.  [ 
... 
]  [where]  [ 
... 
]  the  council 
member  states  are  today  even  further  removed  [than  previously]  from  achieving  such 
unity.  "  (ql-Khaleejj;  4th  Nov.,  1992).  Such  support  for  the  greater  political  unity  of  the 
GCC  member  states  reflects  the  strong  historical  and  social  ties  and  bonds  that  have 
always  united  them.  This  call  for  unity  can  also  be  seen  as  the  result  of  a  sense  of 
frustration  on  the  part  of  citizens  with  an  organisation  whose  efforts  continue  to  be 
undermined  by  such  long-standing  problems  as  border  disputes,  and  foreign  policy 
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The  preference  for  political  unity  is  matched  by  a  clear  demand  for  greater 
political  and  economic  cooperation.  Nearly  90%  of  the  sample  'agreed'  that  the  'GCC 
should  proceed  much  further  than  it  has  so  far  towards  economic  and  political  union', 
indicating  that  the  majority  are  far  from  satisfied  with  the  efforts  undertaken  by  the  GCC 
to  date.  al-Kuwari  (al-Khaleej;  4th  Nov.,  1992.  )  asserted  the  GCC  citizens  have  waited 
patiently  for  the  GCC  leaders  to  orientate  the  organisation  more  towards  the  unity  of  its 
member  states.  al-Kuwaiz  (1987),  an  ex-Secretary  General  for  economic  affairs, 
attributes  the  slow  process  in  the  area  of  economic  cooperation  to  a  number  of  reasons. 
First,  the  necessary  harmonisation  of  governmental  institutions  in  the  member  states 
requires  more  time  so  that  the  local  implications  of  such  changes  can  be  more  fully 
evaluated. 
Table  12.3  Citizen  Attitudes  towards  the  GGC  political  and  economic  Inte2ration,  by 
Issue  1  7.8  10.5 
Issue  2  3.9  5.9 
Issue  3  7.8  11.9 
Issue  4  2.5  1.9 
Issue  5  2.4  0 
Issue  6  5.8  7.1 
Issue  7  4.1  9.3 
Issue  8  7.8  17.1 
Issue  9  2.5  2.9 
Attitude  Level 
Neutral 
. /\gl-cc 
......  .....  I  ....  16.8  ........  -  .....  -  34.3 
10.7  45.9 
12.9  27.1 
4.7  33.7 
1.4  16.4 
10.3  28.8 
16.9  30.2 
18.5  33.7 
10.7  41.4 
Strongly  Don't 
.... 
Agree  Kjio\N- 
25.1  5, 
-') 
29.2  3.9 
34.4  5.9 
55.9  1.2 
78.8  1 
29  19 
25.3  14.1 
13.9  8.8 
31  11.5 
Key  to  Table: 
Issue  1:  For  Qatar  and  Kuwait,  as  small  countries,  membership  of  the  GCC  is  essential  to  meet  their 
defence/security  needs. 
Issue  2:  There  are  more  similarities  than  differences  amongst  the  citizens  of  member  states  of  the  GCC. 
Issue  3:  The  long  term  goal  of  cooperation  between  Gulf  states  should  be  political  union,  i.  e.  one  state. 
Issue  4:  The  GCC  should  proceed  much  further  than  it  has  so  far  towards  economic  and  political  union. 
Issue  5:  If  one  of  the  GCC  member  states  is  under  a  major external  threat,  the  other  members  should  assist. 
Issue  6:  Following  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait,  the  GCC  adopted  a  common  defence  policy  to  counter  such  a  threat 
Issue  7:  Being  a  member  of  the  GCC  has  become  more  important  following  the  1990  war. 
Issue  8:  Owing  to  the  establishment  of  the  GCC,  relations  between  members  states  have  improved. 
Issue  9:  A  common  GCC  set  of  immigration  policies  would  strengthen  the  ability  of  member  states  to  control  the 
numbers  of  foreign  workers  entering  the  country. 
In  their  response  to  the  question  of  whether  the  emergence  of  the  GCC  has 
brought  improved  relations  among  the  Gulf  states,  only  47.6%  of  the  total  sample  were 
of  the  view  that  the  relations  among  the  member  states  of  the  GCC  have  indeed  changed 
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question  showed  a  significantly  differentiated  distribution;  while  59.6%  of  the  total 
Kuwaiti  sample  subscribe  to  the  view  that  relations  among  the  member  states  have 
actually  taken  a  turn  for  the  better,  only  34.1%  of  the  total  Qatari  sample  adhere  to  the 
same  opinion  (.  X  2:  67.994  df.  10  cr  0.000).  The  relatively  higher  level  of  scepticism 
shown  by  Qatari  respondents  towards  the  nature  of  relations  among  the  member  states 
might  be  rooted  in  the  border  disputes  that  have  only  been  partially  resolved  between 
Qatar  and  Saudi  Arabia. 
What  is  revealing  is  that  there  are  substantial  differences  in  the  strength  of 
attitudes  towards  the  various  issues  reflected  in  the  variations  between  those  recording 
'don't  know'.  Least  uncertainty  was  apparent  towards  the  need  for  member  states  to 
assist  one  another  during  periods  of  major  external  threat.  Yet,  there  was  a  much  higher 
degree  of  uncertainty  that  the  GCC  had  been  able  to  live  up  to  expectations  in  this 
respect  (issue  6),  or  that  the  experience  of  the  GCC  since  the  Iraqi  invasion  had  actually 
brought  the  member  states  closer  together  (issue  7).  Yet,  significantly,  few  were 
uncertain  as  whether  the  long  term  goal  of  Gulf  cooperation  should  be  towards  the 
establishment  of  political  union  (issue  3). 
12.5  Evaluation  of  GCC  Immigration  Policies: 
Though  the  general  question  of  immigration  had  been  discussed  by  many 
scholars,  only  a  few  studies  have  examined  citizen  perceptions  of  the  issue  and  its 
importance.  Al-Kuwari  (1992)  emphasised  the  importance  of  the  immigration  problem  to 
the  political  stability  of  the  GCC  member  states  and  that  it  has  important  implications  for 
the  cultural,  social,  economic,  and  political  aspects  of  Gulf  states. 
Immigration  in  the  Gulf  is  a  contentious  issue,  but  one  which  has  different 
impacts  on  the  separate  states  of  the  region.  The  key  question  for  the  GCC  is  whether  it 
should  develop  common  policies  controlling  the  rate  of  immigration.  Here,  citizen 
reactions  are  examined  to  the  proposition  that  'a  common  set  of  GCC  immigration 
policies  would  strengthen  the  ability  of  member  states  to  control  the  numbers  of  foreign 
workers  entering  the  country',  their  perceptions  of  the  importance  of  an  immigration Chapter  Twelve:  Evaluation  of  GCC  Member  State  Cooperation:  Citizen  Perceptions  234 
policy  to  the  member  states  of  the  GCC,  whether  if  the  latter  treats  immigration  as  a 
serious  issue,  and,  finally,  citizen  perceptions  of  the  magnitude  of  the  foreign  workforce 
in  their  countries. 
Clearly,  immigration  policy  is  viewed  as  important.  Nearly  70%  of  the  sample 
characterised  the  issue  as  "important",  Table  (12.3).  The  importance  of  immigration 
policy  has  been  made  even  more  urgent  by  the  sheer  size  of  the  expatriate  community  in 
the  GCC  states.  Little  differences  in  these  basic  opinions  was  apparent  between  the 
Kuwaiti  and  Qatari  samples. 
The  question  of  manpower  shortages,  both  quantitative  and  qualitative,  in  the 
labour  market  of  the  GCC  member  states  has  been  the  subject  of  considerable  research 
(see,  e.  g.,  al-Kuwari  (1996),  Findlay  (1994);  Birks  et  al  (1986),  Birks  &  Sinclair  (1989)) 
reflecting  the  concern  of  the  GCC  countries.  In  a  recent  sociological  study  of  the 
interaction  between  Qatari  nationals  and  immigrants  within  the  Qatari  society,  al-Kadhim 
(1991)  examined  the  social  impact  of  immigration  showing  how  divisive  was  the  issue. 
Discussing  the  issue  of  labour  shortages,  al-Kuwari  (1985)  warned  of  the  potential 
implications  of  the  immigration  policies  that  the  GCC  countries  was  adopting.  In  a  much 
more  recent  article,  published  in  the  UAE  daily  al-Khaleei  (Nov.  4th,  1992),  al-Kuwari 
considers  the  absence  of  a  population  policy  among  the  GCC  states  one  of  the  main 
future  problems  for  the  Gulf  rich  countries,  noting,  that  "the  danger  of  immigration  is  no 
longer  a  cultural,  social,  and  economic  threat,  but  has  nowadays  become  most 
fundamentally  a  political  threat.  In  the  majority  of  the  countries  of  the  region, 
immigration  is  a  danger  threatening  the  very  existence  of  these  states  and  spells  the 
imminent  loss  of  the  Arabo-Islamic  identity  uniting  their  citizens.  "  The  ever-  increasing 
size  of  the  foreign  workforce  and  the  perceived  detrimental  impact  of  immigration  on  the 
indigenous  populations  of  the  member  states  renders  a  more  concerted  GCC  effort  in 
tackling  immigration  problems  an  even  more  pressing  concern. 
Controlling  the  rate  of  immigration  is  a  key  factor.  Asked  whether  'a  common 
GCC  set  of  immigration  policies  would  strengthen  the  ability  of  member  states  to  control 
the  numbers  of  foreign  workers  entering  the  country',  72.4%  of  the  total  sample  'agreed' 
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great  majority  of  the  sample  were  agreed  on  the  importance  of  an  immigration  policy  not 
only  in  the  context  of  individual  member  states  but  also  of  the  GCC  as  an  entity. 
While  most  considered  the  GCC  should  adopt  a  robust  stance  towards 
immigration,  the  reality  is  seen  otherwise.  Asked  whether  immigration  policy  is  a  serious 
concern  of  the  GCC,  over  40%  of  the  total  sample  were  convinced  that  the  organisation 
is  not  taking  immigration  policy  as  seriously  as  it  should,  while  only  18%  were  satisfied 
with  the  efforts  of  the  GCC  in  this  area  (see  table  12.4,  issue  2). 
The  widespread  concern  about  the  impact  of  foreign  workforce  on  the  various 
aspects  of  the  Gulf  society  was  echoed  by  citizens'  perceptions  of  the  size  of  the  foreign 
labour  element  in  their  countries.  Over  71%  of  the  total  sample  quantified  the  number  of 
foreign  workers  in  their  countries  as  'too  many',  testifying,  thus,  to  the  fact  that  the 
foreign  workforce  has  become,  by  virtue  of  its  sheer  size,  a  visible  'problem'  in  the  GCC 
states.  The  results  also  testify  to  the  fact  that,  in  spite  of  the  censorship  imposed  by  the 
GCC  member  states  on  the  number  of  immigrants,  there  is  a  high  level  of  awareness 
amongst  the  educated  class  of  the  large  numbers  of  foreign  workers  in  the  GCC  (Figure 
12.1). 
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................... ...  ...  ....  A  ..................  .....................  Issue  IV 
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12.6.  Citizen  Perceptions  of  Internal  Movement,  Education  &  Medical  Care 
entitlement: 
This  section  examines  citizen  perceptions  of  internal  movement  within  the  GCC 
states,  mutual  rights  to  education  and  health  entitlements  within  member  states  and, 
finally,  the  GCC's  health  and  education  policies. 
A.  Internal  movement: 
A  recent  Precis  of  GCC  Achievements  (1995:  19-20)  stated  that  the  GCC  13th 
Summit  held  in  Riyadh  adopted  a  resolution  replacing  passports  with  identity  cards, 
enabling  greater  freedom  of  movement  between  Gulf  states.  The  task  of  studying  the 
various  aspects  of  this  project,  including  what  the  intended  Identity  Card  should  be  like, 
was  entrusted  to  the  General  Secretariat  and  the  UAE,  the  member  state  chairing  the 
Council  at  the  time.  Al-Bin'ali  (1990)  pointed  out  that  the  GCC  citizens  would  see  such 
a  move  as  helping  to  crystalise  the  sense  of  unity  among  member  states  ways.  In  an 
interview  published  in  the  daily  al-Khaleei  (of  3rd  of  Nov.  1985),  a  GCC  citizen  voiced 
the  argument:  "What  I  want  from  the  GCC  is  [for  this  organisation]  to  facilitate  the 
movement  for  GCC  citizens  [between  member  states]  without  any  unnecessary 
restrictions  [i.  e.,  delays  at  border  posts,  customs  controls,  etc.  ]  and  the  [need  for) 
passports,  [ 
... 
]  [what  I  want  from  the  GCC  is]  one  unified  passport,  and  one  flag 
...... 
Yet, 
despite  the  efforts  exerted  by  the  GCC  and  because  of  the  apprehension  shown  by 
member  states  anxious  to  safeguard  their  sovereignty,  the  relaxation  of  border  controls 
for  GCC  citizens  remains  one  of  the  demands  that  has  been  voiced  consistently  since  the 
inception  of  the  organisation,  but  which  has  yet  to  materialise  into  a  reality  (Table  12.5). 
B.  Education  &  Health  Policies: 
The  provision  of  educational  opportunities  and  the  increase  in  the  availability  of 
higher  education  and  of  education  generally  is  one  of  the  most  important  benefits 
provided  by  the  GCC  states  to  their  citizens.  The  vast  oil  resources  at  the  disposal  of 
most  of  the  GCC  states  and  the  oil  boom  of  the  1970s  has  allowed  the  Gulf  states  to Chapter  Twelve:  Evaluation  of  GCC  Member  State  Cooperation:  Citizen  Perceptions  237. 
develop  an  impressive  educational  infrastructure  and  maintain  a  high  level  of  spending  in 
this  area.  According  to  Gause  (1993),  "it  in  the  areas  of  education  and  health  that  the 
[GCC]  governments'  provision  of  services  to  citizens  through  large  and  elaborate 
bureaucracies  is  most  evident.  [ 
.... 
]  The  increase  in  the  availability  of  education  at 
primary  -  and  secondary-  school  levels  over  the  past  twenty-five  years  in  all  the  [GCC] 
states  is  remarkable.  "  (63)  Besides  providing  the  educational  facilities  (schools,  colleges, 
institutes  and  universities),  hiring  the  teaching  personnel,  the  GCC  states  actively 
encourage  education  through  secondary  school  and  provide  education  through  to 
university  level  free  of  charge.  The  Gulf  states'  commitment  to  state  education 
programmes  and  their  investment  in  education  has  widened  its  availability  to  citizens  and 
allowed  the  development  of  an  impressive  local  university  infrastructure  (see  map  12.1). 
The  number  of  national  universities  continues  to  grow  and  each  state  pays  tuition  fees  for 
citizen  students  and  provides  grants  for  those  who  wish  to  continue  their  studies  abroad. 
Though  the  education  sector  in  the  GCC  states  has  seen  an  impressive  expansion 
over  the  last  three  decades  and  though  government  policies  in  this  sector  have  worked  to 
benefit  the  majority  of  the  Gulf  citizens,  certain  aspects  of  the  local  educational  system 
have  been  a  matter  of  contention.  The  governments'  role  in  the  state  educational  system 
is  incontrovertibly  pervasive;  they  not  only  hire  personnel  and  provide  facilities,  but  also 
provide  and  supervise  the  curriculum  taught  at  all  levels  of  education.  The  states'  strong 
control  over  education  has  been  seen  by  some  observers  (including  academics)  as  having 
a  damaging  effect  on  the  standard  of  higher  education  (see  the  report  published  in  Gulf 
States  Newsletter,  1996,  for  a  discussion  of  the  problems  faced  in  higher  education  in  the 
Gulf  states). Chapter  Twelve:  Evaluation  of  GCC  Member  State  Cooperation:  Citizen  Perceptions  238 
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The  1985  GCC  Sixth  Summit  agreed  on  the  need  for  putting  in  place  an 
educational  policy  aiming  at  unifying  the  different  educational  systems  of  the  six  member 
states  of  the  organisation.  Some  of  the  most  notable  steps  made  towards  unifying  the 
educational  system  include:  (a)  coordination  of  the  qualifications  necessary  to  enter 
higher  education;  (b)  equal  access  to  basic  education  to  all  GCC  citizens;  (c)  the 
harmonisation  of  education  certificates  and  degrees  issued  by  institutions  within  member 
states;  (d)  equal  access  to  higher  education  and  equal  treatment  of  GCC  students  in 
terms  of  accommodation,  medical  care  and  grants;  (e)  promotion  of  joint  research  and 
projects  between  academics;  (f)  greater  interaction  in  technical  and  vocational  and  other 
educational  fields;  and  (g)  organisation  of  regular  conferences  and  training  courses 
(Abstract  of  GCC  Achievements,  1995:  54-8). 
While  these  initiatives  have  contributed  substantially  towards  bridging  the  gap 
between  the  various  educational  systems  of  the  member  states,  a  uniform  educational 
system  has  yet  to  materialise  owing  to  a  set  of  limitations,  e.  g.,  (a)  the  implementation  of 
GCC  educational  policies  by  member  states  is  still  a  matter  of  discretion;  (b)  universities 
still  adhere  to  a  policy  whereby  priority  in  admission  is  given  to  nationals;  (c)  quotas  are 
still  imposed  by  universities  on  number  of  students  originating  from  other  GCC  states. 
The  right  to  study  in  an  institution  of  one's  choice  in  any  one  GCC  member  state 
has  been  frequently  mentioned  as  important  to  the  general  efforts  of  harmonising  the 
different  educational  systems  of  the  GCC  states.  Clearly,  the  citizen  survey  provides 
supportive  evidence,  with  over  90%  arguing  that  there  should  be  no  restrictions  on 
students  entering  any  Gulf  university  (Table  12.5).  Cross-boundary  movement  for 
educational  purposes  remains  quite  limited  owing  to  a  set  of  factors.  Only  nationals  of 
each  member  state  could  benefit  from  higher  education  grants  and  the  scholarships 
offered  to  students  wishing  to  pursue  their  higher  education  in  other  GCC  states  are 
considerably  small.  Besides,  universities  in  the  GCC  states  would  accept  only  students 
sponsored  by  their  governments  reducing  thereby  the  number  of  their  potential  GCC 
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Table  12.5  Citizen  Attitudes  towards  Common  Gulf'Policies 
Type 
of 
Statement  Fr 
Yes 
Value  Label 
No  Maý  be 
_q 
0 
, 
ýo 
Don't  Know 
Fj(  00  q  K 
Free  Movement  Without  430  72.9  84  14.2  71  12  __  4  _  __  0.7 
Passport 
Unrestricted  entrance  to  552  93.6  11  1.9  18  3.1  8  1.4 
GCC  Universities 
Equal  entitlement  to  497  84.2  36  6.1  41  6.9  16  2.7 
medical  care 
Need  for  Common  Health/  555  94.1  6  1  24  4.1  4  0.7 
Education  Policies  I 
Immense  oil  resources  and  the  oil  boom  of  the  1970s  have  also  allowed  the  Gulf 
states  to  develop  an  impressive  infrastructure  in  the  health  care  sector.  The  state  has 
always  been  and  continues  to  operate  as  the  major  provider  of  health  facilities  and  social 
welfare  programmes.  Provision  of  health  services  and  health  programs  is  a  priority  for  all 
GCC  governments  being  "cited  by  government  officials  as  among  the  most  important 
benefits  provided  by  the  regimes  to  their  people"  (Gause  111,1993:  65).  The  last  three 
decades  have  been  a  marked  decline  in  infant  mortality  rates  and  a  marked  increase  in  life 
expectancy  rates.  According  to  Gause  111,  'these  advances  result  in  large  part  from 
commitment  by  these  states  to  provide  health  care  to  their  citizens,  from  the  most  basic 
level  of  services  to  expensive  experimental  procedures  performed  overseas,  free  of 
charge.  "  The  late  1980s  depression  in  oil  prices,  however,  marked  a  decrease  in  large 
spending  on  health  care,  but  it  remains  "undoubtedly  true  that  all  Gulf  citizens  have 
access  to  better,  more  modern  health  care  than  has  been  the  case  in  the  past.  "  (Gause  111, 
1993-  65). 
The  GCCs  Ninth  Summit  held  in  Bahrain  decreed  that  GCC  citizens  visiting  the 
member  states  shall  be  treated  the  same  as  the  nationals  of  the  host  country  in  benefiting 
from  the  services  of  medical  centres  and  public  hospitals  starting  from  March  1989  (see 
Common  Decisions  and  Decrees,  1993,  p.  422  for  more  details  bearing  on  this  policy). 
Again,  most  respondents  in  the  survey  (84%)  agreed  with  the  policy.  Yet,  as  noted 
previous,  such  right  are  by  no  means  automatic  for  Gulf  citizens.  Indeed,  looking  at  the 
GCC  decisions  over  the  sixteen  years  since  its  first  inception,  the  GCC  has  yet  to  develop 
integrated  health  and  education  policies. Chapter  Twelve:  Evaluation  of  GCC  Member  State  Coopemtion:  Citizen  Perceptions  241 
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12.7.  Perceptions  of  the  Status  of  GCC: 
On  the  whole,  the  achievements  to  date  of  the  GCC  have  tended  to  receive  a 
lukewarm  reception  among  political  observers  and  commentators  (e.  g.,  Quassim  1993, 
al-Rumaihi  1984).  In  an  editorial  in  the  Gulf  daily  al-Khaleei,  Hamdan  (1992)  pointed  out 
that  'when  we  measure  the  achievement  of  the  Gulf  Cooperation  Council  ....  we  find 
... 
[that  this  achievement]  is  a  modest  one,  [in  fact]  a  very  modest  one  indeed.  '  In  an 
important  discussion  of  the  various  challenges  which  either  faced  the  GCC  in  the  past  or 
which  are  still  facing  this  organisation  today,  al-Kuwari  (1992)  drew  attention  to  the 
slow  progress  in  the  GCC's  efforts  towards  cooperation  in  this  regard  that  "the  GCC  has 
failed  to  overcome  [ 
... 
]  the  challenges  [foreign  labour,  population  imbalance,  border 
disputes,  threats  of  foreign  hegemony;  regional  threats,  loss  of  Arabo-Islamic  identity, 
lack  of  democracy]  facing  each  of  its  member  states.  Each  of  these  member  states  stands 
alone,  incapable  of  facing  these  challenges  on  its  own.  [  ... 
]  What,  then,  is  the  best  way  to 
put  the  GCC  train  back  on  its  tracks  and  begin  the  serious  task  of  building  a  unified 
political  entity?  [ 
... 
]  and  what  is  the  best  way  [to  do  so,  especially]  in  light  of  the 
impotence  of  each  state  on  its  own  to  face  [these]  decisive  challenges  [ 
... 
].  " 
While  both  popular  perceptions  together  with  the  rationale  for  its  creation 
highlight  the  role  of  the  GCC  as  a  force  for  stability  -  warding  off  regional  aggression 
from  powerful  neighbours,  such  as  Iran  and  Iraq  -  there  is  a  question  mark  over  its  ability 
to  meet  such  an  objective.  In  the  sample  survey  most  (71%)  did  agree  that  the 
organisation  did  further  the  cause  of  political  stability  in  the  region.  Yet,  the  reactions  to 
the  claim  that  "the  GCC  is  unlikely  to  ever  be  strong  enough  militarily  to  be  able  to 
counter  regional  threats  (i.  e.  threats  coming  from  within  the  Gulf  region)"  were  more 
evenly  divided.  While  3  8.1  %  of  the  total  sample  disagree  with  this  claim,  the  'optimists', 
nearly  as  many  (33%)  were  'pessimists'  -  concurring  with  the  notion  that  the  GCC  was 
unlikely  to  ever  evolve  into  a  regional  grouping  militarily  capable  of  withstanding  any 
transgression  against  the  sovereignty  of  its  member  states.  These  results  echo  the 
lukewarm  reception  with  which  political  observers  have  tended  to  give  the  GCC's  efforts Chapter  Twelve:  Evaluation  of  GCC  Member  State  Cooperation:  Citizen  Perceptions  242 
to  attain  greater  military  cooperation.  In  spite  of  some  improvements,  the  security 
arrangements  and  military  cooperation  are  not  enough  to  stop  any  external  threat  (al- 
Baharnah,  1994).  Thus,  while  defence  and  security  cooperation  "has  received  more 
attention  from  GCC  leadership,  resulting  in  the  creation  of  a  Desert  Shield  power  [ 
... 
]  the 
recent  expansionist  ambitions  within  the  Gulf  region  [e.  g.,  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait] 
have  demonstrated  that  the  GCC  security  arrangements  and  military  cooperation  among 
the  GCC  member  states  are  not  sufficient  enough  to  repel  any  aggression  against  one  or 
all  such  member  states"  (Al-Baharnah  (1994:  41)). 
12.8.  Overview: 
Citizen  perceptions  of  the  most  important  policies  of  the  GCC  differ  from  those 
of  the  elite.  These  differences  reflect  greater  citizen  scepticism  in  the  extent  to  which  the 
GCC  has  been  able  to  meet  its  objectives,  particularly  of  achieving  greater  political 
integration.  Equally,  these  differences  also  highlight  the  isolation  of  the  citizens  from  the 
decision-making  processes  of  the  GCC  which  continue  to  be  the  exclusive  preserve  of 
the  political  elite. 
Citizen  perceptions  of  some  of  the  important  policies  of  the  GCC  showed  not 
only  an  awareness  of  the  objectives  and  machinery  of  the  organisation,  on  the  one  hand, 
but  a  sense  of  frustration  with  its  lack  of  achievement  to  date  and  with  the  manner  in 
which  it  has  been  pursuing  its  objectives.  These  attitudes  point  to  the  relative  failure  of 
the  GCC  to  deliver  on  its  initial  promises  of  greater  cooperation  and  to  achieve  popular 
demands  in  areas  such  as  the  economy,  education,  environment,  health,  foreign  and 
internal  politics,  and  immigration. 
Simultaneously,  there  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  predispositions  exist  for  a 
more  unified  Gulf  society.  Its  achievement  means  that  the  GCC  should  overcome  its 
internal  divisions  and  conflicts  which  continue  to  shackle  the  organisation  and  which,  in 
turn,  continue  to  hinder  each  member  state  from  implementing  the  GCC  decisions.  In  the 
post-1990  Gulf  there  is  even  greater  support  'from  below'  for  a  more  effective  GCC, Chapter  Twelve:  Evaluation  of  GCC  Member  State  Cooperation:  Citizen  Perceptions  243 
_ 
emphasising  the  need  for  member  states  to  resolve  their  internal  differences  and  for  the 
GCC  to  make  its  decision-making  more  transparent. Chapter  Thirteen: 
Summarv  &  Conclusion 
13.1  Introduction: 
T  he  main  aim  of  this  research  has  been  to  explore  the  social  and  political  basis 
of  cooperation  among  the  member  states  of  the  Gulf  Cooperation  Council 
(GCC)  in  light  of  the  perceptions  and  attitudes  of  two  different  samples.  Such 
a  study  fills  a  gap  in  the  literature,  specifically  the  relationship  between  attitudinal 
patterns  and  the  policies  of  this  organisation,  on  the  one  hand,  and  recent 
developments  within  the  GCC  and  the  Gulf  region,  on  the  other.  Using  both 
questionnaires  and  face-to-face  interviews  as  primary  methods  for  eliciting  empirical 
data,  the  study  hoped  to  redress  this  gap  and  arrive  at  some  conclusions. 
Discussion  in  this  last  chapter  falls  into  six  sections.  The  first  reviews  the 
research  objectives  and  the  results  obtained  from  an  analysis  of  the  data  elicited  from 
the  main  characteristics  of  the  two  samples.  Subsequently  the  theoretical  framework 
of  the  study  is  summarised.  The  main  findings  of  the  two  surveys  are  highlighted  in 
the  following  sections,  while  the  last  section  reviews  the  study's  main  limitations  and 
presents  some  recommendations  for  future  research. 
13.2,0b*ectives  of  this  Study: 
This  study  sought  to  evaluate  the  nature,  type,  level  and  basis  of  cooperation 
among  the  GCC  member  states  and  perceptions  and  attitudes  of  these  by  respondents Thirteen:  Summary  &  Conclusion  245 
in  the  two  contrasting  sample  surveys.  In  general,  this  study  pursued  answers  to  the 
following  questions  and  issues: 
i.  What  considerations,  internal  or  external  factors,  do  Gulf  citizens  and  GCC 
officials  perceive  as  having  been  instrumental  to  the  creation  of  the  GCC? 
ii.  How  informed  are  Gulf  citizens  about  the  GCC  and  how  extensive  is  their 
interest  in  this  organisation? 
iii.  What  is  the  nature  and  seriousness  of  problems  that  Gulf  citizens  and  GCC 
officials  perceive  as  obstructing  the  progress  of  the  GCC? 
iv.  In  what  areas  of  cooperation  (if  any)  do  Gulf  citizens  and  GCC  officials 
perceive  the  GCC  to  have  made  substantial  progress? 
v.  What  kind  of  social  relations  and  ties  prevails  among  GCC  citizens? 
The  specific  objectives  of  this  research  project  were: 
...............  .........  I  .......  .................  -  .......  .....  ...  ...  ....  .  ..... 
.......... ..........  I.  How  useful  are  theories  of  federalism  in  understanding  the  processes  of 
cooperation  between  GCC  member  states,  including  those  which  continue  to 
provide  an  obstacle  to  greater  political  cooperation  between  the  member 
states? 
2.  The  structure  and  policies  of  the  GCC;  in  particular  how  certain  common 
policies  bearing  on  foreign  affairs,  defence/security,  health,  education,  and 
immigration  have  been  derived  and  whether  they  have  been  implemented? 
3.  What  is  the  role  of  such  social  and  political  factors  as  Tribalism  and  Arab 
Nationalism  in  the  emergence  of  the  GCC. 
4.  What  is  the  civil  basis  of  a  federal  Gulf  society. 
5.  Citizen  and  political  elite  attitudes  on  and  perceptions  of  the  formation, 
nature,  and  function  of  the  GCC-  based  on  a  randomly  selected  sample 
from  university  students  as  well  as  a  second  and  equally  randomly  selected 
sample  of  GCC  policy-makers. 
6.  'Me  status  of  the  GCC  as  a  political  and  economic  regional  grouping  in  the 
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13.3  Review  of  the  Studv's  Theoretical  Framework: 
In  the  discussion  bearing  on  federalism  in  the  context  of  the  Arab  world,  the 
analysis  began  by  noting  the  lack  of  studies  that  either  address  or  explore  the  concepts 
and  ideas  of  federalism  in  this  context  and  moved  on  to  justify  this  gap  in  terms  of  the 
virtual  absence  of  federal  or  confederal  associations  in  the  Arab  world,  the  UAE  and 
Yemen  being  the  only  exceptions. 
Appeal  to  concepts  of  federalism,  in  particular  to  the  process  of  federalisation 
was  made  with  an  explicit  view  to  understanding  and  evaluating  the  presence  (or 
absence)  of  such  process  in  the  case  of  the  GCC.  Though  the  GCC  is  not  itself  a 
federal  body,  it  was  argued  that  many  of  the  factors  used  to  explain  the  integrative 
process  involved  in  the  emergence  of  a  federation  are  detectable  in  the  context  of  the 
GCC  and  that  such  factors  persist  as  the  fundamental  elements  binding  the  GCC 
member  states.  In  addition  to  testing  and  confirming  the  validity  and  usefulness  of 
some  theoretical  approaches  (and  inadequacy  of  others),  the  discussion  of  the  various 
aspects  of  the  federalising  process  in  the  context  of  the  GCC  case  examined  how  this 
regional  grouping  came  into  existence  and  how  far  it  has  progressed  in  its  pursuit  of 
an  integrated  alliance  capable  of  facing,  and  successfully  resolving,  such  persistent 
obstacles  as  border  disputes  among  some  of  its  member  states,  politico-economic 
disagreements  and  conflicts  of  economic  interests. 
The  study,  in  particular,  showed  the  utility  of  the  two  theoretical  concepts  of 
'symmetry'  and  'asymmetry'  in  understanding  many  aspects  of  the  GCC  and,  especially, 
the  level  of  harmony  (i.  e.  compatibility)  and  differences  within  this  regional  alliance.  It 
was  shown  that,  in  the  case  of  the  GCC,  pervasive  and  long-standing  societal, 
religious,  linguistic  and  ethnic  affinities  account  for  the  symmetrical  elements  and,  in 
one  way  or  another,  the  integrative  factors  in  the  emergence  and  persistence  of  this 
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states  are  royal  monarchies  and  the  GCC  population  is  bound  by  strong  ties  of  blood 
owing,  in  part,  to  the  expansion  of  a  few  tribes  across  the  GCC  states.  Two  other 
symmetrical  factors  binding  the  GCC  states  relate  to  foreign  workforce-dependency, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  oil  dependency,  on  the  other.  Each  of  the  GCC  states  has  a 
rather  small  native  population  and  has  had  to  rely  heavily  on  a  foreign  workforce.  The 
magnitude  of  this  foreign  workforce  is  in  fact  such  that  it  would  not  be  an 
exaggeration  to  claim  that  the  native  population  constitute  a  minority  in  each  of  the 
GCC  states  (see  chapter  4  for  a  discussion  of  this  issue).  The  GCC  states  are  all  oil- 
dependent  countries,  with  oil  accounting  for  their  only  economic  resource  and 
commodity,  with  the  exception  of  Qatar  and  Oman,  which  are  also  gas-rich  countries. 
The  study  showed  that  there  are  several  other  factors,  described  as 
asymmetrical  elements,  which  continue  to  seriously  hamper  the  GCCs  progress 
towards  a  comprehensive  union  among  its  member  states.  Differences  in  terms  of 
territorial  size,  economic  power  or  military  capability  have,  at  times,  either  triggered 
serious  tension  in  relations  between  the  member  states,  or  strained  these  relations.  The 
more  economically  powerful,  geographically  larger,  or  militarily  stronger  states  have 
sought  to  politically  dominate  smaller  GCC  states  and  affirm  their  supremacy  within 
the  organisation.  Member  states  with  larger  and  more  powerful  economies  (like  Saudi 
Arabia)  saw  their  economic  superiority  as  entitling  them  to  a  leadership  role  within  the 
GCC.  Similarly,  imbalance  in  military  size  and  military  capability,  another  element  of 
'asymmetry'  among  the  GCC  countries,  has  triggered  rivalries  and  hostilities  that 
soured  relations  within  the  Council.  While  some  GCC  states,  such  as  Saudi  Arabia, 
possess  considerable  military  capability,  other  states,  owing  to  the  very  small  size  of 
both  the  country  and  the  native  population,  are  extremely  vulnerable  militarily.  The 
Iraqi  army,  for  instance,  swept  through  Kuwait  within  six  hours  during  the  1990 
invasion. 
The  Cold  War,  originating  in  irreconcilable  ideologies  and  rivalries  between 
USA  and  USSR  in  their  pursuit  of  areas  of  political  influence  and  leverage,  was  one Chapter  Thirteen:  Summary  &  Conchision  248 
of  the  hallmarks  of  the  old  world  order.  The  impact  of  the  cold  war  on  the  politics  of 
the  Gulf  region  and  the  role  such  politico-ideological  war  played  in  the  emergence  of 
the  GCC  were  the  focal  point  of  discussion  in  chapter  5.  However,  in  the  new  World 
Order,  the  GCC's  policies  have  been  characterised  by  a  dogged  pursuit  of  potential  or 
immediate  self-interests  on  the  part  of  individual  member  states,  sometimes  in  total 
disregard  of  the  nefarious  effects  this  might  have  on  other  GCC  member  states.  The 
conflicts  that,  from  time to  time,  emerge  among  the  GCC  states  in  their  internal  and 
external  policies  are  principally  due  to  the  GCC  states'  prioritisation  of  national 
interests  to  common  interests  as  well  as  to  the  persistently  unresolved  border  disputes. 
In  the  field  of  foreign  policy,  for  instance,  while  some  GCC  states  (e.  g.,  Oman  and 
Qatar)  have,  in  recent  years,  either  opened  or  resumed  diplomatic  relations  with 
Israel,  other  member  states  are  still  fundamentally  opposed  to  any  form  of 
rapprochement  with  Israel. 
The  GCC's  policies,  during  the  era  of  the  old  world  order,  were  especially 
oriented  towards  on  the  various  external  threats  which  the  GCC  states  faced  at  the 
time  either  individually  or  collectively.  Pre-1990  and  especially  during  the  old  world 
era,  the  GCC  states  faced  continued  threats  from  such  hostile  and  more  powerful 
regional  neighbours  as  Iran,  Iraq  and  Israel,  as  well  as  from  such  adversaries  outside 
the  Gulf  region  as  the  Soviet  Union.  Post-1990  GCC  politics  have,  however,  become 
somewhat  fragmented  and  less  focused,  partly  as  a  consequence  of  the  various 
conflicts  of  interests  and  border  disputes  which  persist  between  the  member  states  of 
this  organisation.  Border  disputes  and  'statism'  continue  to  persist  in  the  post  -1990 
era  as  the  main  two  problems  straining  relations  between  GCC  states  and  hampering 
cooperation  among  them. 
The  GCC  countries  must  realise  that  their  survival  and  both  internal  and 
external  security  resides  in  more  cooperation  and  unity,  especially  with  the  continuous 
persistence  of  the  threat  of  hostility  from  Iran  and  Iraq,  the  two  major  powers  in  the 
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of  these  threats  and  the  instability  of  the  region.  The  end  of  the  cold  war  and  the 
collapse  of  the  old  USSR  resulted  in  a  new  world  order  where  the  US  is  the  sole 
superpower.  At  least  for  now  and  in  the  near  future,  the  interests  of  the  super-power 
demand  that  it  has  to  back  and  protect  the  GCC  member  states.  It  would  not  be 
unreasonable  to  imagine  that,  at  some  point  in  the  future,  US  protection  and  support 
will  shift  to  other  parties  in  the  region  in  pursuit  of  maximum  interests,  leaving  the 
GCC  countries  vulnerable  and  open  to  threats  from  old  foes  and  probably  even  new 
ones.  The  GCC  states  need  to  understand  that  regional  and  international  politics  are 
governed  by  immediate  or  potential  economic  interests  and  that,  to  that  extent,  the 
US  would  not  hesitate  to  change  its  policies  and  loyalties  if  its  interests  so  dictated. 
Extensive  cooperation  and  unity  is  the  only  way  that  the  GCC  could  secure  and 
ensure  their  existence  and  safety  in  a  troubled  region  and  break  out  of  the  cycle  of 
precarious  dependency  on  foreign  powers. 
Chapter  six examined  how  the  role  that  the  tribal  organisation  of  the  Gulf 
society  and  tribal  relations  and  structures  within  the  Arabian  Gulf  states  has  affected 
the  emergence  of  the  GCC.  It  was  shown  that  strong  tribal  affinities  -  assuming  the 
form  of  a  complex  network  of  family  and  clan  ties  cutting  across  the  various  levels  of 
Gulf  society  and  spanning  the  whole  area  known  as  the  GCC  -  existing  among  the 
citizens  of  the  various  Gulf  states  has  played  a  facilitating  role  in  the  creation  of  the 
GCC.  Yet,  it  was  also  argued  that  the  impact  of  tribalism  and  tribal  relations  on  the 
political  life  in  the  Gulf  states  has  been  gradually  diminishing  on  account  of  the 
growing  gap  developing  between  the  political  regimes  and  tribes  and  tribal  structures; 
the  consultative  councils  established  by  governments  throughout  the  Gulf  states  have 
taken  over  most  of  the  roles  and  functions  previously  in  the  hands  of  tribal  councils 
and  authorities. 
The  study  examined  the  relation  between  the  ideology  of  Pan-Arabism  and  the 
creation  of  the  GCC  and  why  such  ideology  failed  to  prevent  GCC  from  emerging  as 
a  regional  alliance  of  Arab  states.  The  failure  of  Pan-Arabism  to  take  a  strong  hold  in Chapter  Thirteen:  Summary  &  Conchision  250 
Gulf  society  was  argued  to  be  on  account  of  the  social  conservatism  of  Gulf  society 
and  the  revolutionary  nature  of  the  nature  of  the  Pan-Arabist  ideology.  It  is  also  clear 
that  the  GCC  states  often  tend  to  prioritise  national  sovereignty  over  the  collective 
concerns  of  the  member  states,  a  tendency  which  is  an  important  stumbling  block  to 
the  building  of  greater  cooperation  among  the  countries  of  the  organisation. 
13.4.  Assessin2  the  GCC:  The  Survey  Analysis: 
The  study  explored  the  attitudes  of  both  a  political  elite  sample  as  well  as  a 
student  sample  towards  various  aspects  of  the  GCC,  including  the  level  and  nature  of 
cooperation  pursued  by  the  GCC  member  states.  The  empirical  data  on  which  this 
study  draws  was  gathered  through  two  surveys,  one  for  each  sample.  The  analysis  of 
the  data  was  carried  out  in  chapters  8,9,10,11,  and  12  of  this  thesis.  The  citizens' 
(represented  in  this  work  by  students)  perceptions  and  attitudes  were  analysed  in 
chapters  nine,  ten,  and  eleven,  whereas  those  of  the  political  elite  were  considered  in 
chapter  eight.  The  students'  evaluation  of  cooperation  within  the  GCC  was  the  focus 
of  discussion  in  chapters  eleven  and  twelve.  Chapter  ten  reported  on  and  evaluated 
the  results  of  the  survey  bearing  on  social  relations  and  issues  of  identity  within  the 
GCC  society. 
In  chapter  eight,  examination  of  the  reactions  of  the  political  elite  to  the 
reasons  underlying  the  creation  of  the  GCC  showed  that  their  perceptions  tally  with 
the  reasons  widely  reported  and  discussed  in  the  literature  discussing  the 
organisation's  inception.  According  to  the  political  elite  surveyed  in  this  study,  the 
goals  of  the  GCC  rulers  themselves  were  critical  to  the  emergence  of  the  GCC.  Other 
reasons  given  by  the  sample  were  citizen  preference,  threats  originating  in  the 
Iran/Iraq  war,  and  threats  presented  by  the  Iranian  revolution.  In  regard  to  the  aims  of 
the  GCC,  the  elite  sample  ranked  cooperation  in  the  political  field  as  the  most 
important  aim  on  the  GCC  agenda.  GCC  officials  claimed  that  the  organisation  had  so Chapter  Thirteen:  Summary  &  Conchision  251 
far  realised  tangible  achievements  but  that  the  organisation  has  been  and  is  still  facing 
many  problems.  In  particular,  they  perceived  such  problems  as  unresolved  border 
disputes  and  the  conflict  of  political  and  economic  interests  as  the  main  obstacles  that 
continue  to  prevent  the  GCC  from  achieving  its  charter  objectives.  In  respect  to  the 
cooperation  and  coordination  of  policies,  the  political  elite  sample  perceived  a 
"significant"  level  of  cooperation  among  the  GCC  member  states  in  all  fields. 
The  results  of  chapter  nine  revealed  that  citizens  (i.  e.  students)  were  informed 
about  and  interested  in  the  GCC  as  an  organisation.  The  students  were  highly 
informed  as  to  the  nature  of  the  GCC's  Charter,  and  the  majority  of  the  sample  agreed 
on  what  constitutes  the  main  present  day  concerns  of  this  institution.  The  students 
also  proved  well-informed  about  'basic  facts'  relating  to  the  GCC,  the  organisation's 
constituent  member  states,  the  year  of  its  establishment  and  the  site  of  its 
headquarters.  It  was  found  that  the  student  sampl&s  main  source  of  information  about 
the  GCC  was  the  regional/local  media.  Students  at  a  tertiary  level  institution  could  be 
expected  to  be  informed  politically;  the  study  also  showed  that  their  interest  in  the 
GCC  extended  to  a  common  aspiration  that  the  GCC  would  lead  to  some  form  of 
political  union  in  the  Gulf. 
In  regard  to  the  GCC's  agenda  of  priorities  and  aims,  nearly  90%  of  the 
students  thought  common  defense  to  be  the  main  priority  on  the  GCC  agenda,  while 
more  than  half  considered  foreign  affairs,  health  and  education  policies  to  be  very 
significant  priorities  for  the  GCC.  However,  only  31.4%  listed  immigration  and 
immigration  policies  as  one  of  the  main  GCC  concerns. 
Of  the  'integrative'  conditions  leading  to  the  creation  of  the  GCC,  analysis  of 
the  data  obtained  from  our  survey  among  students  revealed  two  important  results. 
First,  Gulf  citizens  are  linked  by  an  extensive  network  of  family  and  tribal  bonds  as 
well  as  relations  of  fliendship  which  cut  across  state  boundaries.  Such  ties  should,  at 
least  in  theory,  provide  a  basis  for  cross-national  ties  among  the  GCC  member  states, Chapter  Yhirteen:  Summary  &  Conchision  252 
which  the  GCC  political  elite  could  capitalise  on  them  in  their  pursuit  of  extensive 
cooperation  and  union  among  the  member  states.  The  research  also  revealed  that  the 
students'  loyalty  to  either  their  tribes  or  extended  families  takes  precedence  over  their 
loyalties  to  their  countries  or  the  GCC  as  a  union  of  states. 
It  was  clear  from  the  two  samples  that  there  are  differing  perceptions  of  the 
reasons  leading  to  the  creation  of  the  GCC.  While  the  political  elite  sample  saw 
political  similarities  among  the  member  states  as  the  most  important  factor  in  the 
emergence  of  the  GCC,  the  student  sample  argued  that  societal  and  cultural 
similarities  among  the  GCC  states  the  most  effective  factor. 
How  the  GCC  adopts  policies  is  determined  by  the  voting  method  used  within 
the  Council.  The  students  were  highly  critical  of  the  existing  insistence  on  unanimity, 
and  expressed  the  belief  that  it  has  hindered  meaningful  and  comprehensive 
cooperation  among  the  states  of  the  GCC.  According  to  a  majority  of  both  the 
students  as  well  as  the  GCC  officials,  the  system  of  voting,  dependent  on  unanimity,  is 
undesirable  and  is  primarily  responsible  for  the  failure  in  the  implementation  of  many 
policies  as  well  as  its  slow  progress. 
Though  the  GCC  charter  never  specified  in  any  explicit  terms  what  form  of 
integration  the  GCC  is  pursuing,  it  has  been  characterised  by  many  political  analysts 
as  a  'confederation'.  In  any  case  to  date,  the  GCC  might  be  said  to  have  been  a 
partially  successful  experiment  in  regional  alliance  and  integration,  if  only  because  it 
has  stopped  (for  example)  the  border  disputes  among  some  of  its  member  states  from 
developing  into  major  crises.  While  the  emergence  of  this  organisation  has  not  lead  to 
a  conclusive  resolution  of  all  the  border  disputes,  which  have  flared  on  and  off  for 
years  both  prior  to  and  after  the  creation  of  the  GCC,  the  GCC  has  'contained'  the 
problem,  averting  major  crises  which  would  have  plunged  what  is  already  a  troubled 
region  into  more  turmoil. Chapter  Thirteen:  Summary  &  Conchision  253 
According  to  many  of  those  (see,  among  others,  al-Rumaihi  (1983),  al-Naflasi 
(1983,1995),  and  al-Kuwari  (1992))  who  have  considered  the  structure  of  the  GCC 
and  its  political  institutions,  the  Council  remains  an  elite  organisation.  It  has  been 
argued  that  though  the  GCC  charter  emphasises  the  importance  of  unity  among  its 
member  states,  it  has  not  take  any  critical  steps  towards  this  goal  and,  most 
importantly,  has  not  seen  fit  to  ensure  that  the  necessary  political  machinery  are  in 
place  to  achieve  either  unity  or  integration.  In  this  connection,  the  majority  of  the 
citizen  sample  considered  that  the  institutions  are  incapable  of  addressing  the 
problems  dividing  member  states  and  overseeing  the  implementations  of  policies 
bearing  on  these  problems.  For  the  majority  of  this  sample,  the  resolving  of  the 
bilateral  conflicts  which  emerge  from  time  to  time  between  GCC  countries  is  possible 
only  if  the  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes  is  transformed  into  a  political 
body  with  real  power  and  authority. 
One  of  the  criticisms  levelled  against  the  GCC  in  this  study  is  the  'distancing' 
of  its  interests  and  functions  from  the  predominant  concerns  of  the  Gulf  citizenry.  The 
GCC  structure  and  institutions,  it  has  been  argued,  continue  to  mirror  the  political 
institutions  of  the  member  states  in  not  addressing  the  real  concerns  of  the  citizens.  It 
is  only  as  recently  as  1997,  during  a  summit  in  Kuwait,  that  the  political  elite  has 
eventually  acceded  to  the  creation  of  a  new  consultative  body  to  represent  the  Gulf 
people  within  the  Council.  These  criticisms  have  been  mirrored  among  the  sample 
surveyed  in  this  study:  over  half  of  the  citizen  sample  saw  the  GCC  as  a  governmental 
body,  run  by  a  very  small  political  elite  and  operating  largely  if  not  entirely 
independently  from  the  concerns  and  desires  of  the  majority  of  citizens,  and  to  that 
extent  no  different  from  any  other  governmental  institution  within  the  member  states. 
Equally  there  is  considerable  awareness,  and  concern,  among  both  samples 
about  the  wrangles  within  the  GCC  over  the  implementation  of  its  policies  and 
resolutions.  According  to  a  majority  of  both  samples,  some  of  the  economic  and 
political  problems  that  the  GCC  continues  to  face  are  the  result  of  a  failure  of  the Chapter  Yhirteen:  Summary  &  Conchision  254 
member  states  to  arrive  at  common  agreement.  These  problems  included  border 
disputes,  a  common  defence  and  uniform  foreign  policy  and  (though  given  less 
weighting),  a  uniform  and  effective  immigration  policy. 
Even  among  those  common  policies  agreed  by  the  GCC  implementation  is  left 
to  the  discretion  of  the  member  states.  This  was  one  of  the  important  criticisms  raised 
against  the  GCC,  that  implementation  of  policies  and  compliance  with  its  resolutions 
on  the  part  of  the  GCC  member  states  remains  fundamentally  discretionary.  The  GCC 
Charter  leaves  it  open  for  the  member  states  to  choose  whether  to  cooperate,  or  not, 
in  enforcing  the  organisation's  policies  and  in  complying  with  its  resolutions.  Clearly, 
this  will  not  help  the  development  of  the  GCC;  a  commitment  to  enforce  and  comply 
with  its  policies  is  a  crucial  prerequisite  not  only  for  closer  integration  of  the 
economic,  cultural  and  political  systems  of  the  member  states  but  for  fruitful 
cooperation  among  these  states  as  well. 
The  survey  evidence  suggests  that  there  is  support  'from  below'  for  such 
cooperation.  In  their  responses  to  the  survey  questionnaire,  the  students  affirmed  the 
symmetrical  components  attested  among  the  GCC  societies;  75%  of  the  sample 
thought  that  the  similarities  existing  among  the  GCC  citizens  far  outweigh  the 
differences.  More  significantly,  over  60%  considered  that  the  GCC  should  be  aiming 
towards  'political  merger'  -  towards  a  more  federal  -  like  operation,  or  at  least  greater 
political  cooperation.  Indeed,  no  less  than  89%  of  the  citizen  sample  thought  that  'the 
GCC  should  move  much  closer  than  it  has  so  far  towards  economic  and  political 
union',  in  marked  contrast  to  the  47%  who  believed  that  the  creation  of  the  GCC had 
lead  to  a  new  era  of  improved  relations  among  the  Gulf  states.  Both  results  could  be 
interpreted  as  affirming  dissatisfaction  among  citizens  with  the  GCC  as  it  exists  and 
with  the  progress  it  has  made  so  far  in  pursuit  of  its  charter  aims. 
Cftizen  attitudes  towards  immigration  and  the  GCC's  immigration  policies 
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large  foreign  workforce  has  had  on  the  economic,  political  and  cultural  life  of  the 
GCC  countries.  Over  80%  of  the  total  number  of  students  surveyed  agreed  on  the 
importance  of  an  adequate  and  effective  immigration  policy,  not  only  in  the  context  of 
individual  member  states  but  also  for  the  GCC  as  a  regional  alliance.  Some  44%  of 
the  students  thought  that,  so  far,  cooperation  on  immigration  issues  and  coordination 
of  immigration  policies  among  the  member  states  has  been  insufficient.  The  ma  ority 
of  the  student  sample  saw  defense  as  the  area  of  policy  of  most  critical  importance  for 
the  states  of  the  GCC.  The  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  on  August  1990  and  the  failure  of 
the  GCC  states  to  either  prevent  it  or  counter  it  seems  to  have  reinforced  the  idea  that 
effective  coordination  of  defense  policies  has  yet  to  be  achieved. 
What  is  also  clear  is  that  the  GCC  has  been  unable  to  respond  to  the  demands 
affecting  the  daily  life  worlds  of  Gulf  society.  Again  the  study  highlighted  the  nature 
of  these  demands.  One  of  the  persistent  demands  is  the  need  to  move  freely  across 
GCC  borders  free  of  any  restrictions,  a  notion  opposed  by  many  of  the  member  states. 
Others  were  the  right  of  citizens  to  study  at  any  GCC  university  as  well  as  the  right  of 
citizens  from  one  GCC  country  to  medical  care  in  any  other  GCC  country.  These 
demands  affirm  the  failure  of  the  GCC  to  deliver  on  its  promises.  While  such  demands 
have  not  been  ignored  by  the  GCC  in  its  deliberations,  it  has  not  been  able  to  come  to 
their  satisfactory  resolution.  As  apparent  elsewhere  in  this  study  societal  factors 
linking  Gulf  states  are  in  advance  of  political  arrangements  able  to  reduce  cross- 
national  barriers. 
13.5  The  Main  Findings  of  the  Study: 
While,  in  their  evaluation  of  the  GCC,  the  political  elite  insist  that  a 
satisfactory  level  of  cooperation  among  the  member  states  has  been  achieved,  this  was 
not  endorsed  by  the  Gulf  citizens,  at  least  as  represented  here  by  the  sample  of 
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perceptions  of  and  attitudes  towards  the  GCC,  its  policies  and  its  machinery  reveal  a 
considerable  level  of  frustration  with  its  political  institutions,  policies  and  progress. 
What  clearly  emerges  from  the  perceptions  and  attitudes  of  the  Gulf  citizens  is  that 
until  the  GCC  decides  to  meet  the  demand  for  some  form  of  public  participation  in  the 
governing-process  through  a  GCC  'parliament'  and  similar  committees  or  bodies,  the 
organisation  will  continue  to  exist  as  a  political  body  perceived  as  remote  from  the 
concerns  of  the  Gulf  citizenry. 
The  research  has  shown  that,  in  the  evaluation  of  some  of  the  most  important 
policies  of  the  GCC,  the  attitudinal  patterns  evident  among  the  students  sample 
differed,  sometimes  widely,  from  those  of  the  political  elite.  While  the  GCC  officials 
insisted,  as  they  have  frequently  done  on  Gulf  media,  that  as  a  regional  grouping  in 
pursuit  of  extensive  cooperation  in  various  fields  and  coordination  of  various  policies, 
it  has  realised  tangible  achievements  since  its  inception  some  17  years  ago,  the 
students  insisted  otherwise.  Whereas  the  GCC  officials  claimed  that  major  progress 
has  been  made  in  all  sectors  of  cooperation,  the  majority  of  students  were  convinced 
that  cooperation  remains  limited  owing  to  the  various  problems  that  continue  to  strain 
relations  between  them.  The  students'  attitudes  and  criticisms  point  to  the  relative 
failure  of  the  GCC  to  deliver  on  its  initial  promises  and  to  meet  the  citizen 
expectations  in  such  areas  as  foreign  and  internal  policies,  education,  the  economy, 
immigration,  the  environment,  and  health.  The  general  feeling  among  the  student  was 
. that  for  the  member  states  to  achieve  such  cooperation,  the  GCC  needs  to  overcome 
the  internal  conflicts  which  continue  to  shackle  it,  institute  political  bodies  responsive 
to  popular  demands,  and  put  in  place  institutions  with  the  authority  and  power  to 
enforce  the  organisation's  resolutions  and  policies. 
The  general  dissatisfaction  and  sense  of  frustration  voiced  by  the  students, 
itself  is  perhaps  representative  of  attitudes  amongst  the  wider  Gulf  populace,  should 
be  seen  within  its  wider  context  of  frustration  with  the  minimal  progress  in  the 
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and  democratic  societies.  Whether  it  is  in  relation  to  the  GCC  or  the  individual 
member  states  (with  the  exception  of  Kuwait  where  measures  have  recently  been 
undertaken  to  democratise  its  institutions),  political  power  has  been  and  remains  in  the 
exclusive  hands  of  political  elites.  The  expectations  of  Gulf  citizens  will  not  be 
fulfilled  without  their  participation  in  the  political  process  (see  also  al-Otaby  (1990)). 
The  large  majority  of  the  students  expressed  the  urgent  need  for  the  citizens  to  be 
permitted  the  right  to  participate  in  the  decision-making  process,  insisting  that  the 
future  of  GCC  and  the  peoples  it  brings  together  should  not  remain  the  exclusive 
concern  of  the  political  elite.  It  seems  that,  at  last,  the  GCC  leadership  is  heeding 
some  the  criticisms  that  have  been  levelled  against  it,  for  during  the  GCC  summit  held 
between  the  19th  and  22nd  of  December,  1997,  the  member  states  approved  the 
establishment  of  a  new  'Gulf  assembly',  in  which  each  of  the  GCC  states  will  be 
represented  by  five  members  elected  from  expert  and  qualified  citizens.  This  thirty 
member  assembly  will  be  able  to  interact  with  the  GCC  Supreme  Council.  It  is  to  be 
hoped  that  this  new  assembly  will  not  only  bring  the  citizens  closer  to  the  decision- 
making  process  but,  perhaps,  most  importantly,  guide  the  GCC  and  its  leadership 
towards  the  issues  and  problems  that  really  matter  to  the  citizens  of  the  region. 
13.6  Limitations  of  this  Studv  and  Recommendations  for  Further  Research: 
Empirically-oriented  studies  inevitably  confront  difficulties  and,  therefore, 
inevitably  have  limitations.  Several  major  problems  were  faced  in  this  research.  In 
term  of  its  methodology,  and  particularly  with  relation  to  the  survey  of  the  political 
elite,  the  researcher  depended  on  open-ended  rather  than  closed  questions  as  the 
sample  was  small  and  the  time  to  conduct  the  survey  limited.  As  a  consequence  of 
these  limitations,  usage  of  statistical  analysis  in  connection  with  the  data  obtained 
from  the  GCC  officials  questionnaire  was  also  limited.  It  is  considered  that  such 
limitations  did  not  affect  the  study  results  in  any  major  manner.  As  is  often  the  case  in 
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secure  official  documents  or  interview  government  officials.  Numerous  difficulties 
were  met  in  the  attempt  to  obtain  data  bearing  on  population,  immigration,  military 
and  security  policies.  Similarly,  where  the  researcher  had  hoped  to  interview  the 
Kuwaiti  and  Qatari  representatives  and  obtain  their  attitudes  towards  the  GCC,  time 
limitation  and  a  general  reluctance  on  the  part  of  many  officials  to  be  interviewed 
prevented  this  from  happening. 
In  spite  of  these  problems,  the  study  has  been  able  to  address  the  research 
objectives  it  set  out  to  pursue.  Further,  the  study  has  raised  some  important  questions 
and  lines  of  inquiry  that  could  be  pursued  in  future  projects.  It  would  be  gratifying  if 
this  work  could  provide  other  researchers  some  insight  into  the  issues  raised  here,  and 
help  them  avoid  some  of  the  limitations  and  difficulties  inherent  of  a  research  project 
of  this  kind.  Some  of  the  key  questions  for  future  study  addressing  issues  related  to 
the  GCC  and  attitudinal  patterns  bearing  on  this  organisation:  include: 
*A  similar  study  to  this  research  to  be  conducted  in  Bahrain,  Oman,  Saudi  Arabia, 
and  UAE  among  Gulf  citizens  at  large. 
Investigation  of  the  attitudes  of  civil  servants  in  the  member  states,  mapping  of  their 
perceptions  of  the  GCC  in  general  and  its  effectiveness  in  different  policy  fields.  The 
results  of  such  a  study  could  be  compared  with  the  findings  of  the  present  study  so 
as  to  determine  what  similarities  (or  differences)  there  are  in  attitudinal  patterns 
between  civil  servants  and  the  educated  elite. 
Separate  and  detailed  studies  are  required  into  the  effect  of  GCC  decisions  on  tile 
constitution  of  each  member  state.  Mapping  the  decisions  taken  by  the  GCC  and 
studying  the  reasons  and  the  difficulties  precluding  the  implementation  of  these 
decisions  would  reveal  the  real  causes  behind  the  limited  progress  attained  by  tile 
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e  Attitudes  towards  the  new  'Gulf  assembly'  need  to  be  investigated  in  a  separate 
study  to  identify  what  the  intellectuals  and  citizens  of  the  GCC  expect  from  the  new 
institution  and  to  what  extent  its  establishment  has  helped  to  modify  (if  at  all)  the 
attitudes  of  citizens  towards  the  GCC. APPENDICES: 
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APPENDIX  (A):  THE  QUESTIONNAIRES 
A.  I  The  Political  Elite  Questionnaire: 
1.  Nationality: 
BAHRAfN 
QATAR 
SAUDI  ARABIA 
KUWAIT 
OMAN 
U.  A.  E. 
2.  Position: 
3.  Department: 
4.  Years  of  Working  within  GCC  Secretariat: 
1-4  5-9 
Over  10 
11 
A.  Reasons  for  the  Establishment  of  the  GCC: 
1.  What  Factors  do  you  think  were  the  most  important  for  the  creation  of  the 
GCC  establishment?  (Please  rank  them  according  to  the  importance) 
A.  Regional  Factors  (i.  e.  within  the  Gulf  Area)- 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
B.  International  Factors  (arising  outside  the  Gulf  Area): 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 APPENDIX  (A):  THE  QUESTIONNAIRES  262 
B.  Functioning  of  the  GCC  : 
1.  What  do  you  think  are  the  main  aims  of  the  GCC  ?  (Rank  them  in  order  of 
importance): 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
2.  What  are  the  main  Problems  preventing  the  GCC  achieving  its  aims  ?  (Please 
rank  them  in  order  of  importance): 
1. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
3.  What  are  the  main  benefits  which  have  been  achieved  so  far  by  the  GCC  ? 
(Please  rank  in  order  of  importance): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
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4.  Looking  at  the  different  policy  fields  with  which  the  GCC  is  concerned,  do  you 
think  that  policies  of  the  member  states  have  been  devised  cooperatively  or  not  ? 
(Please  evaluate  them  by  the  rank  order  in  which  10  indicates  member  states 
have  acted  very  cooperatively  and  a  common  policy  has  been  concluded,  I 
0 
indicates  the  exact  opposite) 
L-iII-tI  soilw  Consideiable 
operation  Cooperation  Cooperation 
A.  Global  Perspective: 
1.  Common  Policies  towards  US  as  Superpower 
3.  Common  Policies  towards  Russia/CIS 
4.  Reaction  to  Crisis  (e.  g.  Yugoslavia,  Somalia.  etc.  )( 
B.  Reizional  Level: 
1.  Issues  of  Internal  Security  (Military/  Defence) 
2.  Israeli  Question 
3.  Iranian  threat 
4.  Iraqi  threat  before  the  Gulf  War 
5.  Iraqi  threat  after  the  Gulf  War 
6.  Yemeni  Crisis  of  1994 
C.  GCC  Level: 
1.  Foreign  Policies  (e.  g.  EC) 
2.  Social/  Domestic  Policies: 
Health  Policies 
Education  Policies 
Immigration  Policies 
3.  Economic  Policies: 
Common  Tariff  agreements 
Export  Policies 
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4.  Environmental  Polices: 
Pollution  Policies 
Marine  Pollution 
5.  What  do  you  think  are  the  four  policies  which  are  most  important  for  GCC 
member  states  over  which  a  common  policy  has  been  devised? 
I. 
3.4. 
6.  How  important  do  you  think  the  following  factors  were  to  the  creation  of  the 
GCC  ?  (Please  rank  the  following  boxes  in  order  of  importance  from  1-4,1 
indicates  most  important,  4  indicates  least  important): 
Desire  of  the  GCC  Sheikhs  Desire  of  the  GCC  citizens 
Historical  relations  Common  Political,  Social 
I 
Characteristic 
7.  How  important  do  you  think  the  following  factors  were  to  was  the  creation  of 
the  GCC  (Please  rank  the  following  box  from  1-4  in  order  of  importance,  I 
indicates  most  important,  and  4  indicates  least  important): 
Iranian  threat 
Iraqi  threat 
Israeli  threat 
Western  Support 
Iran-Iraq  war  threat 
USSR  threat 
Arab  Support 
Others  (Please  indicate) 
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A.  2  The  Citizen's  Questionnaire: 
Dear  Sir  /  Madam; 
This  Survey  forms  an  essential  part  of  research  I  am  currently  undertaking 
for  the  degree  of  Ph.  D.  in  Geography  from  Glasgow  University,  under  the  support  of 
Qatar  University. 
The  main  aim  of  my  study  is  to  examine  citizen  attitudes  towards  political 
cooperation  in  the  Gulf.  In  particular,  this  research  assumes  that  there  is  a  political  and 
social  basis  for  greater  cooperation  between  Gulf  States  that  are  a  support  or  hinder 
its  progress.  Your  participation  in  this  questionnaire  will  help  to  assess  the  GCC 
organisation. 
Information  obtained  by  this  questionnaire  will  be  treated  with  strict 
confidentiality. 
Thank  you  in  anticipation  of  your  help. 
Khalid  al-Zamat. 
University  of  Glasgow 
Department  of  Geography 
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............  ...........  ................  ......................  Questionnaire 
Knowledge  o'f'i`t,:....:  J  M"ý*:  ýi"':  iýý  ................. 
I.  Do  you  think  the  GCC  was  established: 
Before  1970  ]  1970-1980  1980-  85 
1985-90  ]After  1990  Don't  Know 
2.  What  the  six  countries  does  the  GCC  consist  of 
I.  2.3. 
4.5.6. 
3.  In  which  city  do  you  think  the  Headquarters  of  the  GCC  is  located: 
Doha  Manama  []  Muscat  Abu  Dhabi 
Riyadh  []  Kuwait  Others  (Please  state 
4.  What  is  the  nationality  of  the  new  Secretary  General  of  the  GCC: 
5.  How  often  do  the  heads  of  state  of  the  GCC  meet: 
]Once  a  Week  Once  a  Month  ]  Twice  a  month 
]  Once  a  year  Twice  a  year  ]Don't  Know 
6.  Over  which  kinds  of  issue  do  you  think  the  GCC  is  concerned 
Yes  No  Don't  K_n_ow__] 
Common  defence: 
Foreign  Affairs: 
Health: 
Immigration. 
Education: 
Security: 
7.  Foreign  Policy  decisions  taken  by  the  GCC  are  binding  on  member  state'. 
[]  True  []  False  [  ]Don't  Know 
8.  Do  you  follow  the  GCC  news-  Yes  (Go  to  next  question  10) 
No  (Go  to  question  11) 
9.  If  Yes:  What  are  your  main  sources  of  news  of  the  GCC: 
]  Media  Majli  (Dewaniyah)  []  Place  of  study  Place  of  work 
]Family  Friends  []  Other  (Please  specify 
10.  If  No.  Why: 
I.  2.3. 
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Politics  of  the  Gulf  : 
GCC  Establishment:  LReasons  for  establishmeno.. 
In  your  view  what  do  you  think  are  the  most  important  reasons  which  led  to  the 
establishment  of  the  GCC:  (Rank  in  order  of  importance,  1,2,3...  etc.  ): 
The  Iranian  Revolution  as  a  threat  to  the  Gulf  states 
Common  Social  similarities  (e.  g.  Religion  and  Language) 
Similarities  of  Political  systems(e.  g.  Sheikhdoms) 
The  common  Economic  problems  of  Gulf  states  (e.  g.  Oil  as  the  only 
source  for  their  economy,  ) 
The  Gulf  people's  demand  for  the  creation  of  the  GCC: 
The  Iran/  Iraq  War 
GCC  Function: 
1.  Do  you  think  that  the  function  of  the  GCC  should  be  limited  to  that  of  the  mutual 
defence  interests  of  the  Gulf  states: 
[]  Yes  []  No  Maybe  Don't  Know 
If  No:.  What  kind  of  other  functions  do  you  think  the  GCC  should  have:  Please  State 
2.  Are  you  personally  interested  in  the  problems  which  encountering  the  GCC: 
[]  Yes  (Go  to  the  next  Question)  []  No  []  Don't  Know 
3.  Please  indicate  whether  you  agree  or  disagre  with  the  following  statements: 
Strongly  Strongly  don't 
disuXec  e  w4l;:  Di  aw 
..  ut  O.  W. 
i.  Border  Disputes  between  member  states  are  a  major  source  of  conflict: 
IIIIIIIII 
ii.  Gulf  states  Compete  with  each  other  for  economic  growth: 
iii.  GCC  Cooperation  is  likely  to  be  hindered  by  the  different  foreign  policies  of  the 
Gulf  states: 
v.  The  GCC  member  states  are  concerned  more  about  their  own  individual  interests 
rather  than  the  collective  one: 
II[IIIIIIIII 
4.  Do  you  think  that  the  membership  of  the  GCC  should  be  widened  to  include  any 
other  Arab  countries: 
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5.  If  Yes:  Can  you  state  the  other  countries  that  you  think  they  should  include  in  the 
GCC  membership:  (Please  tick  to  the  country,  you  would  like  it  to  join  the  GCC) 
Egypt  Syria  []  Yemen 
Iraq  Other  (Please  State  it) 
6.  According  to  the  GCC  Charter  (Article  9),  the  type  of  voting  over  substantive 
matters  requires  unanimous  approval  from  the  member  states.  Do  you  agree  that 
the  unanimous  type  of  voting  should  be  changed  to  a  majority  type  one  in  order  to 
achieve  more  cooperation? 
[]  Yes  No  Maybe  Don't  Know 
7.  One  of  the  GCC  institution  which  isn't  yet  established  is  the  "Commission  for  the 
establishment  of  the  Disputes",  Do  you  think  that  establishment  of  it  will  help  in 
solving  the  border  disputes  among  the  member  states: 
[]  Yes  []  No  []  Maybe  []  Don't  Know 
Policy  Evaluation: 
1.  Which  of  the  following  co-operative  sectors  do  you  consider  are  the  most 
important:  Please  Rank  them  according  to  the  importance:  No.  I  as  the  most 
important  one. 
]  Environment  Social  Economic 
]Political  Other  (Please  specify 
2.  The  following  part  is  seeking  opinions  on  different  issues,  especially  the  most 
important  policies  from  your  point  of  view:  (Please  indicate  how  important  you 
think  they  are): 
Very  Not  Not  at  Don't 
Important 
I 
Important 
I 
Important 
I 
all 
I 
Know 
i.  Foreign  policy 
ii.  Social  policy:  especially 
-  Education 
-  Health 
-  Immigration 
iii.  Economic  Aspects 
iv.  Security  and  Military  Aspects 
I........  .................  ...................  x3t  ,  un  :::  Affini  amon.,  t  Cj 
1.  Do  you  have  any  independent  relatives  or  friends  in  the  other  GCC  countries: 
Yes  (Go  to  Question  2,3  &  4)  No  (Go  to  Question  4) 
Don't  Know 
2.  What  tvve  of  relations  do  vou  have  in  other  GCC  countries:  (Please  fill  the  table) 
Bahrain 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi  Arabia 
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3.  How  manv  familv  relatives  do  vou  have  from  the  other  GCC  countries:  (Please  fill 
4  Tnkinc,  the  lqqt  ve..  qr  whir.  h  nf  tht-.  fnllnwinc,  muntrip.  q  hive.  vou  vi,;  ited-  (Pleme  fill 
Thiles  (Please  till  by  tick)  I  (Please  fill  by  tick)  I 
Imalives  I  l,  'I-jeijds  I  Business  I  lburism  I  Olher 
Bahrain 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi  Arabia 
UAE 
Other  Country 
(Please  state 
5.  Do  you  think  that  tribal  relationships  are  an  enhancing  factor  for  the  GCC 
organisation: 
[]  Yes  No  Maybe  Don't  Know 
With  which  of  the  following  do  you  identify  with.  Give  No.  I  to  the  most  important, 
then  2,3 
.......  etc.  ): 
The  local  area  in  which  you  live 
The  tribal  group  that  you  belong  to 
Your  extended  family  that  you  share  relations  with 
Your  country  (Kuwait  or  Qatar) 
The  GCC  countries  generally 
As  a  member  of  the  Arab  nation 
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.............. .............. ..............  Attitude  befoiW 
...............  .  ..............  ........  ............  .  ......  .............. 
A.  Please  indicate  how  strongly  or  otherwise  you  agree  /  disagree  with  the  following 
statements: 
Sti-ongly  Stroll 
'g  clon't 
disagree 
I 
Disaý;  ree 
I 
Neutral 
ý 
A-gree 
I 
Agreey  Know 
For  Qatar  /  Kuwait,  as  small  countries,  membership  of  the  GCC  is  essential  to  meet 
their  defence/  security 
needs: 
2.  There  are  more  similarities  than  differences  amongst  the  citizens  of  member  states 
of  the  GCC:  [I[IIIII[I11 
3.  The  long  term  goal  of  cooperation  between  Gulf  states  should  be  political  union,  i.  e. 
one  state:  II[IIIIIII11 
4.  The  GCC  should  proceed  much  further  than  it  has  so  far  towards  economic  and 
political  union:  IIIIIIIIII11 
5.  If  one  of  the  GCC  members  is  under  a  major  external  threat  the  other  members 
should  assist:  IIIIIIIIII[1 
6.  Following  the  Iraq  invasion  of  Kuwait,  the  GCC  adopted  a  common  defence  policy 
to  counter  the  threat::  []IIIIII[I11 
7.  Being  a  member  of  the  GCC  has  become  more  important  following  the  1990 
war:  II[IIIIIII[1 
8.  Owing  to  the  establishment  of  the  GCC,  the  relations  between  member  states  have 
improved:  [IIIIIIIII11 
9.  A  common  GCC  set  of  Immigration  policies  would  strengthen  the  ability  of  member 
states  to  control  the  numbers  of  foreign  workers  entering  the 
country:  IIIIIIIIIIII 
10.  Immigration  policy  towards  the  foreign  workers  is  a  very  important  issue  not  just 
for  separate  countries  but  also  for  the  GCC  as  a  whole: 
[]  Yes  (  go  to  the  next  Question  11)  []  No  Don't  Know 
11.  If  Yes-  Do  you  think  that  the  GCC  is  not  taking  this  issue  seriously: 
[]  Yes  []  No  Don't  Know 
12.  If  No:  Why: 
B.  What  would  you  say  to  the  following  statements.  Please  indicate  your  opinion: 
Yes  No  I  Mayle  Don't  1. 
Know 
-  Citizens  of  GCC  countries  should  be  able  to  move  freely  between  the  member 
states  of  this  organisation  (free  of  passport  controls,  etc.  ): APPENDIX  (A):  THE  QUESTIONNAIRES  271 
Don't  No  I  Maybe 
Know 
IIIIIIII 
Students  from  any  of  GCC  country  should  be  able  to  attend  a  university  of 
their  choice  in  any  other  GCC  member  state:  [][I[]II 
GCC  citizens  should  be  entitled  to  the  same  rights  of  medical  care  as  the 
nationals  of  any  one  member  state: 
II[IIIII 
The  GCC  should  develop  more  common  health/  education  policies: 
IIIIIIII 
Concerning  the  security  of  the  Gulf  area  which  become 
binding  on  member  on  member  states:  [IIIIIII 
C.  According  to  latest  census  the  foreign  workers  were  estimated  at  9  million  in  the 
GCC  states.  Do  you  think  that  the  number  of  foreign  workers  in  your  country  is: 
[]  Too  many  []A  lot  but  not  too  many  []  Not  many  [  ]Don't  Care 
Tem.  t*.  IO::,:  R::::  S:  *:::::  *: *f:  th  el  ;i 
I....  ....  I  .............  .................... 
What  would  vou  sav  toward  the  followinQ  statements'. 
Strongly  Strongly  Don't 
disagree  Disagree 
ý 
NeUtral  Aoree  Agreý  Know 
1.  Do  you  think  that  the  GCC's  existence  has  hindered  the  role  of  the  Arab  League: 
IIIIIIII[I[1 
2.  The  GCC  is  beneficial  for  the  political  stability  of  the  member  states  the  of  Gulf 
region  :IIIIIIIIII11 
3.  When  it  come  to  foreign  policies  it  would  normally  be  better  for  member  states  to 
forgo  their  own  interests  to  the  collective  interest  of  the  Gulf  states: 
IIIIIIIIII[1 
4.  The  GCC  is  unlikely  to  ever  be  strong  enough  militarily  to  be  able  to  counter 
regional  threats  (i.  e.  threats  coming  from  within  the  Gulf  region): 
II[IIIII[I11 
5.  The  GCC  is basically  a  governmental  body  with  little  concern  with  the  citizens  of 
member  states: 
II[IIIII[III 
1.  Nationality:  Kuwaiti 
Other  GCC  citizen(PI 
Other  (Pleas  specify) 
2.  S  ex:  []  Male 
3.  Age  Group:  Under  25 
30  -  35 
45  -  50 
[]  Qatari 
eas  specify) 
Female 
25  -  30 
35  -  40 
Over  50 APPENDIX  (A):  THE  QUESTIONNAIRES  272 
......  ...  .  .............. 
F.  Finally: 
...............  ...  ...............  Do  You  have  any  comments  you  would  like  to  make  on  a  political  &  other  forms  of APPENDIX  (B) 
Table  8.1  The  Internal  Factors  of  underlying  the  GCC's  Creation,  by  Elite  NationjfiL- 
(Percentage) 
Desire  of  Rulers: 
n  Very  Important  Important  Less  Important  Least  Important 
Bahrain  7  42.8  14.4  0  42.8 
Oman  3  100  0  0  0 
Qatar  2  0  100  0  0 
Saudi  Arabia  25  52  24  12  12 
Desire  of  Citizens: 
Nationaliti,  n  Very  Important  Important  Less  Important  Least  Important 
6  0  16.7  50  33.3 
Oman  3  0  33.3  0  66.7 
Qatar  2  50  0  0  50 
Saudi  Arabia  24  8.3  20.9  20.8  37.5 
Historical  Relations: 
Nqlion.  qWý,  n  Very  Important  lilipol  talit  I  c"s  1111pollant  Least  Important 
Bahrain  6  16.7  66.6  16.7  0 
Oman  3  0  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Qatar  2  0  0  100  0 
Saudi  Arabia  26  3.8  50  23.1  23.1 
Nationality  n  Very  Important  Important  Less  Important  Least  Important 
Bahrain  7  42.9  14.2  28.7  14.2 
Oman  3  0  33.3  66.6  0 
Qatar  2  50  0  0  50 
Saudi  Arabia  24  50  20.8  16.7  12.7 
*The  respondents  were  asked  to  rank  their  Amwers  1.  Very  Important  ....  .....  4.  Least  Important 
Table  8.2  The  Regional  Reasons  underivinp-  the  creation  of  the  GCC,  b  y  Nationality: 
(Percentage) 
*Imporuince  by  franl  Iraq  War  Iranian  Thmat 
CWgorN  Bahrain  Oman  Qatar  S.  A.  Bahrain  Oman  Qatar  S.  A. 
Very  Important  85.7  66.7  0  86.5  100  100  100  75 
Important  14.3  0  50  4.5  0  0  0  12.5 
Less  Important  0  33.3  0  4.5  0  0  0  0 
Least  Important  0  0  50  4.5  0  0  0  12.5 
Amportance  by  Irtqi  Threat  Israeli  Threat 
Category  Bahrain  Oman  Qatar  S.  A.  Bahrain  Oman  Qatar  S.  A. 
Vciý,  Important  20  33.3  100  38  0  50  0  5.3 
Important  60  66.7  0  52.4  50  50  100  57.8 
Less  Important  0  0  0  9.6  50  0  0  26.4 
Least  Important  20  0  0  0  0  0  0  10.5 
Category  Bahrain  Oman  Qatar  S.  A. 
Vct%  linporlant  50  14.4 
huportant  57.1  50  0  28.5 
Less  hnportant  28.6  50  50  42.8 
Least  hnportant  14.3  0  0  14.3 
*The  respondents  were  asked  to  rank  their  Answer.,  1.  Very  Important  ..  ....... 
4.  Least  Important APPENDIX  (B)  274 
Table  8.3  Elite  Opinions  on  the  Most  Important  Problems  of  the  GCC,  by  Nationality: 
n  Border  No  Shared 
Disputes  sovereignty 
Bahrain  7  10.7  7.1 
Oman  2  0  28.5 
Qatar  2  14.3  0 
udi  Arabia  26  9.4  11.5 
ferences  in  Regional  Economic  Absciicc  of 
Internal  Ilireats  &  Competition  imposed 
Policies  Crisis  Decisions 
10.7  0  3.6  14.3 
0  14.3  14.3  0 
14.3  0  14.3  14.3 
6.3  9.3  3.1  13.5 
Nationality  n  Procedure  for  Absence  Variation  in  Customs  lnconipatibilitý  Týpcofvotiii,  ( 
adopting  a  of  Media  Perspectives  Tariff  of  Interests  as  unanimous 
Resolution  vote 
Bahrain  7  0  0  7.1  3.6  14.3 
Oman  12  0  0  14.3  0  14.3  14.3 
Qatar  2  0  0  0  14.3  0  14.3 
Saudi  Arabia  :  26  6.3  3.1  2.1  1  7.3  10.4 
Table  8.4  External  Factors  supporting  the  GCC's  Establishment,  By  Nationalitv: 
(Percentage) 
1.  Arab  Support: 
N040nOU4,  n  Very  Important  Important  Less  Important  Least  Important 
Bahrain  5  0  0  80  20 
Oman  2  50  0  50  0 
Qatar  2  0  0  100  0 
Saudi  Arabia  19  15.8  5.3  42.1  36.8 
2.  Western  Sunnort: 
Nufionali4,  n  Very  Important  huportant  Less  important  Least  Irar, 
I  iallraill  5  20  20  40  20 
Onian  2  0  0  50  50 
Qatar  2  0  50  50  0 
Saudi  Arabia  23  13  34.8  43.4  8.8 
rThe  respondents  were  asked  to  rank  their  Answers  1.  Verv  Important  .....  ....  4.  Lzast  Imnortant 4"'  Jj  0  x0i 
APPENDIX  (B)  275 
Table  8.5  Foreign  Policy  Cooperation,  from  the  GCC  elite  views,  By  Nationality: 
(Percentage) 
n  'y 
Little  Cooperation  Some  Cooperation  Considerable  Cooperation 
Bahrain  7  21.4  28.6  50 
Oman  3  0  25  75 
Qatar  2  0  15  85 
Saudi  Arabia  25  4.5  36  59.5 
lti,  onaliýp  in  Little  Cooperation  Some  Cooperation  Considerable  Cooperation 
Hahram  7  0  50  50 
Oman  3  11.1  11.1  77.8 
Qatar  2  0  16.7  83.3 
udi  Arabia  25  7.4  37.8  54.8 
adow/4  n  Little  Cooperation  Some  Cooperation  Considerable  Cooperation 
Bahrain  7  0  28.6  71.4 
Oman  3  0  33.3  66.7 
Qatar  2  0  0  100 
udi  Arabia  25  4  32  64 APPENDIX(  ) 
DOCUMENTATION: 
I.  GCC  CHARTER: 
Cooperation  Council  For  The  Arab  States  of  The  Gulf 
The  United  Arab  Emirates 
The  State  of  Bahrain 
The  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia 
The  Sultanate  of  Oman 
The  State  of  Qatar  and 
The  State  of  Kuwait 
Being  fully  aware  of  the  ties  of  special  relations,  common  characteristics  and  similar 
systems  founded  on  the  Creed  of  Islam  which  bind  them;  and  Believing  in  the  common 
destiny  and  the  unity  of  aim  which  link  their  peoples;  and 
In  view  of  their  desire  to  effect  coordination,  integration  and  interconnection  between 
them  in  all  fields;  and  Having  the  conviction  that  coordination,  cooperation,  and 
integration  between  them  serve  the  sublime  objectives  of  the  Arab  Nation;  and,  In  pursuit 
of  the  goal  of  strengthening  cooperation  and  reinforcement  or  the  links  between  them; 
and 
In  an  endeavor  to  complement  efforts  already  begun  in  all  essential  areas  that  concern 
their  peoples  and  realize  their  hopes  for  a  better  future  on  the  path  to  unity  of  their 
States;  and  In  conformity  with  the  Charter  of  the  League  of  Arab  States  which  calls  for 
the  realization  of  closer  relations  and  stronger  bonds;  and 
In  order  to  channel  their  efforts  to  reinforce  and  serve  Arab  and  Islamic  causes,  Have 
agreed  as  follows: 
(Article  One) 
The  Establishment  of  the  Council: 
A  Council  shall  be  established  hereby  to  be  named  The  Cooperation  Council  for  the  Arab 
States  of  the  Gulf  hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  Cooperation  Council  (G.  C.  C.  ). 
(Artide  Two) 
Headquarters: 
The  Cooperation  Council  shall  have  its  headquarters  in  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia. APPENDIX  (C)  277 
(Article  Three) 
Cooperation  Council  Meetings: 
The  Council  shall  hold  its  meetings  in  the  state  where  it  has  its  headquarters,  and  may 
convene  in  any  member  state. 
(Article  Four) 
Obj  ectives: 
The  basic  Objectives  of  the  Cooperation  Council  are: 
1.  To  effect  coordination,  integration  and  inter-connection  between  Member  States  in  all 
fields  in  order  to  achieve  unity  between  them. 
2.  To  deepen  and  strengthen  relations,  links  and  areas  of  cooperation  now  prevailing 
between  their  peoples  in  various  fields. 
3.  To  formulate  similar  regulations  in  various  fields  including  the  following: 
a.  Economic  and  financial  affairs 
b.  Commerce,  customs  and  communications 
c.  Education  and  culture 
d.  Social  and  health  affairs 
e.  Information  and  tourism 
f.  Legislative  and  administrative  affairs. 
4.  To  stimulate  scientific  and  technological  progress  in  the  fields  of  industry,  mining, 
agriculture,  water  and  animal  resources;  to  establish  scientific  research;  to  establish 
joint  ventures  and  encourage  cooperation  by  the  private  sector  for  the  good  of  their 
peoples. 
(Article  Five) 
Council  Membership: 
The  Cooperation  Council  shall  be  formed  of  the  six  states  that  participated  in  the  Foreign 
Ministers'  meeting  held  at  Riyadh  on  4  February  198  1. 
(Article  Six) 
Organizations  of  the  Cooperation  Council 
The  Cooperation  Council  shall  have  the  following  main  organisations: 
1.  The  Supreme  Council  to  which  shall  be  attached  the  Commission  for  Settlement  of 
Disputes. 
2.  The  Ministerial  Council. 
3.  The  Secretariat-General. 
Each  of  these  organisations  may  establish  sub-agencies  as  may  be  necessary. APPENDIX  (C)  278 
(Article  Seven) 
Supreme  Council: 
1.  The  Supreme  Council  is  the  highest  authority  of  the  Cooperation  Council  and  shall  be 
formed  of  heads  of  member  states.  Its  presidency  shall  be  rotatory  based  on  the 
Alphabetical  order  of  the  names  of  the  member  states. 
2.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  hold  one  regular  session  every  year.  Extraordinary  sessions 
may  be  convened  at  the  request  of  any  member  seconded  by  another  member. 
3.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  hold  its  sessions  in  the  territories  of  member  states. 
4.  A  Supreme  Council's  meeting  shall  be  considered  valid  if  attended  by  two-thirds  of  the 
member  states. 
(Article  Eight) 
The  Functions  of  the  Supreme  Council: 
The  Supreme  Council  shall  endeavour  to  realize  the  objectives  of  the  Cooperation 
Council,  particularly  as  concerns  the  following: 
1.  Review  matters  of  interest  to  the  member  states. 
2.  Lay  down  the  higher  policy  for  the  Cooperation  Council  and  the  basic  lines  it  should 
follow. 
3.  Review  the  recommendations,  reports,  studies  and  joint  ventures  submitted  by  the 
Ministerial  Council  for  approval. 
4.  Review  reports  and  studies  which  the  Secretary-General  is  charged  to  prepare. 
5.  Approve  the  bases  for  dealing  with  other  states  and  international  organisations. 
6.  Approve  the  rules  of  procedure  of  the  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes  and 
nominate  its  members. 
7.  Appoint  the  Secretary-General. 
8.  Amend  the  Charter  of  the  Cooperation  Council. 
9.  Approve  the  Council's  internal  rules  of  procedure. 
10.  Approve  the  budget  of  the  Secretariat-General. 
(Article  Nine) 
Voting  In  the  Supreme  Council: 
1.  Each  member  of  the  Supreme  Council  shall  have  one  vote. 
2.  Resolutions  of  the  Supreme  Council  in  substantive  matters  shall  be  carried  by 
unanimous  approval  of  the  member  states  participating  in  the  voting,  while  resolutions 
on  procedural  matters  shall  be  carried  by  majority  vote. 
(Article  Ten) 
Commission  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes: 
1.  The  Cooperation  Council  shall  have  a  commission  called  "The  Commission  for  the 
Settlement  of  Disputes"  which  shall  be  attached  to  the  Supreme  Council. A  PPEATDIX  (C)  279 
2.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  establish  the  composition  of  the  Commission  for  every 
case  on  an  "ad  hoc"  basis  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  the  dispute. 
3.  If  a  dispute  arises  over  interpretation  or  implementation  of  the  Charter  and  such 
dispute  is  not  resolved  within  the  Ministerial  Council  or  the  Supreme  Council,  the 
Supreme  Council  may  refer  such  dispute  to  the  Commission  for  the  Settlement  of 
Disputes. 
4.  The  Commission  shall  submit  its  recommendations  or  opinion,  as  applicable,  to  the 
Supreme  Council  for  such  action  as  the  Supreme  Council  deems  appropriate. 
(Article  Eleven) 
Ministerial  Council: 
1.  The  Ministerial  Council  shall  be  formed  of  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  member  states 
or  other  delegated  Ministers.  The  Council  presidency  shall  he  for  the  member  state 
which  presided  the  last  ordinary  session  of  the  Supreme  Council,  or  if  necessary  for 
the  state  which  is  next  to  preside  the  Supreme  Council. 
2.  The  Ministerial  Council  shall  convene  every  three  months  and  may  hold  extraordinary 
sessions  at  the  invitation  of  any  member  seconded  by  another  member. 
3.  The  Ministerial  Council  shall  determine  the  venue  of  its  next  session. 
4.  A  Council's  meeting  shall  be  deemed  valid  if  attended  by  two-thirds  of  the  member 
states. 
(Article  Twelve) 
Functions  of  the  Ministerial  Council: 
1.  Propose  policies,  prepare  recommendations,  studies  and  projects  aimed  at  developing 
cooperation  and  coordination  between  member  states  in  various  fields  and  adopt  the 
resolutions  or  recommendations  required  in  this  regard. 
2.  Endeavour  to  encourage,  develop  and  coordinate  activities  existing  between  member 
states  in  all  fields.  Resolutions  adopted  in  such  matters  shall  be  referred  to  the 
Ministerial  Council  for  further  submission,  with  recommendations,  to  the  Supreme 
Council  for  appropriate  action. 
3.  Submit  recommendations  to  the  Ministers  concerned  to  formulate  policies  whereby 
the  Cooperation  Council's  resolutions  may  be  put  into  effect. 
4.  Encourage  means  of  cooperation  and  coordination  between  the  various  private  sector 
activities,  develop  existing  cooperation  between  the  member  states'  Chamber  of 
Commerce  and  industry,  and  encourage  the  movement  within  the  G.  C.  C.  of  workers 
who  are  citizens  of  the  member  states. 
5.  Refer  any  of  the  various  aspects  of  cooperation  to  one  or  more  technical  or  specialised 
committee  for  study  and  presentation  of  appropriate  recommendations. 
6.  Review  proposals  related  to  amendments  to  this  Charter  and  submit  appropriate 
recommendations  to  the  Supreme  Council. 
7.  Approve  Rules  of  Procedure  of  both  the  Ministerial  Council  and  the  Secretariat- 
General. 
8.  Appoint  the  Assistant  Secretaries-General,  as  nominated  by  the  Secretary-General,  for 
a  period  of  three  years,  renewable. APPENDIX  (C)  280 
9.  Approve  periodic  reports  as  well  as  internal  rules  and  regulations  relating  to 
administrative  and  financial  affairs  proposed  by  the  Secretary-General,  and  submit 
recommendations  to  the  Supreme  Council  for  approval  of  the  budget  of  the 
Secretariat-General. 
10.  Make  arrangements  for  meetings  of  the  Supreme  Council  and  prepare  its  agenda. 
11.  Review  matters  referred  to  it  by  the  Supreme  Council. 
(Article  Thirteen) 
Voting  in  the  Ministerial  Council: 
1.  Every  member  of  the  Ministerial  Council  shall  have  one  vote. 
2.  Resolutions  of  the  Ministerial  Council  in  substantive  matters  shall  be  carried  by 
unanimous  vote  of  the  member  states  present  and  participating  in  the  vote,  and  in 
procedural  matters  by  majority  vote. 
(Article  Fourteen) 
The  Secretariat-General: 
1.  The  Secretariat-General  shall  be  composed  of  a  Secretary-General  who  shall  be 
assisted  by  assistants  and  a  number  of  staff  as  required. 
2.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  appoint  the  Secretary-General,  who  shall  be  a  citizen  of 
one  of  the  Cooperation  Council  states,  for  a  period  of  three  years  which  may  be 
renewed  once  only. 
3.  The  Secretary-General  shall  nominate  the  Assistant  Secretaries-General. 
4.  The  Secretary-General  shall  appoint  the  Secretariat-General's  staff  from  among  the 
citizens  of  member  states,  and  may  not  make  exceptions  without  the  approval  of  the 
Ministerial  Council. 
5.  The  Secretary-General  shall  be  directly  responsible  for  the  work  of  the  Secretariat- 
General  and  the  smooth  flow  of  work  in  its  various  organisations.  He  shall  represent 
the  Cooperation  Council  with  other  parties  within  the  limits  of  the  authority  vested  in 
him. 
(Article  Fifteen) 
Functions  of  the  Secretariat-General: 
The  Secretariat-General  shall: 
1.  Prepare  studies  related  to  cooperation  and  coordination,  and  to  integrated  plans  and 
programmes  for  member  states'  action. 
2.  Prepare  periodic  reports  on  the  work  of  the  Cooperation  Council. 
3.  Follow  up  the  implementation  by  the  member  states  of  the  resolutions  and 
recommendations  of  the  Supreme  Council  and  Ministerial  Council. 
4.  Prepare  reports  and  studies  requested  by  the  Supreme  Council  or  Ministerial  Council. 
5.  Prepare  the  draft  of  administrative  and  financial  regulations  commensurate  with  the 
growth  of  the  Cooperation  Council  and  its  expanding  responsibilities. 
6..  Prepare  the  budgets  and  closing  accounts  of  the  Cooperation  Council. 
7.  Make  preparations  for  meetings  and  prepare  agendas  and  draft  resolutions  for  the 
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S.  Recommend  to  the  Chairman  of  the  Mnisterial  Council  the  convening  of  an 
extraordinary  session  of  the  Council  when  necessary. 
9.  Any  other  tasks  entrusted  to  it  by  the  Supreme  Council  or  Mnisterial  Council. 
(Article  Sixteen) 
The  Secretary-General  and  the  Assistant  Secretaries-General  and  all  the  Secretariat- 
General's  staff  shall  carry  out  their  duties  in  complete  independence  and  for  the  joint 
benefit  of  the  member  states.  They  shall  refrain  from  any  action  or  behaviour  that  is 
incompatible  with  their  duties  and  from  divulging  confidential  matters  relating  to  their 
appointments  either  during  or  after  their  tenure  of  office. 
(Article  Seventeen) 
Privileges  and  Immunities: 
1.  The  Cooperation  Council  and  its  organisations  shall  enjoy  on  the  territories  of  all 
member  states  such  legal  competence,  privileges  and  immunities  as  are  required  to 
realize  their  objectives  and  carry  out  their  functions. 
2.  Representatives  of  the  member  states  on  the  Council,  and  the  Council's  employees, 
shall  enjoy  such  privileges  and  immunities  as  are  specified  in  agreements  to  be 
concluded  for  this  purpose  between  the  member  states.  A  special  agreement  shall 
organize  the  relation  between  the  Council  and  the  state  in  which  it  has  its 
headquarters. 
3.  Until  such  time  as  the  two  agreements  mentioned  in  item  2  above  are  prepared  and  put 
into  effect,  the  representatives  of  the  member  states  in  the  Cooperation  Council  and 
its  staff  shall  enjoy  the  diplomatic  privileges  and  immunities  established  for  similar 
organisations. 
(Article  Eighteen) 
Budget  of  the  Secretariat-General: 
The  Secretariat-General  shall  have  a  budget  to  which  the  member  states  shall  contribute 
in  equal  amounts. 
(Article  Nineteen) 
The  Implementation  of  the  Charter: 
1.  This  Charter  shall  go  into  effect  as  of  the  date  it  is  signed  by  the  Heads  of  States  of  the 
six  member  states  named  in  this  Charter's  preamble. 
2.  The  original  copy  of  this  Charter  shall  be  deposited  with  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs  of  the  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia  which  shall  act  as  custodian  and  shall  deliver 
a  true  copy  thereof  to  every  member  state,  pending  the  establishment  of  the 
Secretariat-General,  at  which  time  the  latter  shall  become  depository. APPENDIX  (C)  282 
(Article  Twenty) 
Amendments  to  the  Charter: 
1.  Any  member  state  may  request  an  amendment  of  this  Charter. 
2.  Request  for  Charter  amendments  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Secretary-General  who 
shall  refer  them  to  the  member  states  at  least  four  months  prior  to  submission  to  the 
Ministerial  Council. 
3.  An  amendment  shall  become  effective  if  unanimously  approved  by  the  Supreme 
Council. 
(Article  Twenty-one) 
Closing  Provisions 
No  reservations  may  be  voiced  in  respect  of  the  provisions  of  this  Charter. 
(Article  Twenty-two) 
The  Secretariat-General  shall  arrange  to  deposit  and  register  copies  of  this  Charter  with 
the  League  of  Arab  States  and  the  United  Nations,  by  resolution  of  the  Ministerial 
Council. 
This  Charter  is  signed  on  one  copy  in  the  Arabic  language  at  Abu  Dhabi  City,  United 
Arab  Emirates,  on  21  Rajab  1401  corresponding  to  25  May  1981. 
The  United  Arab  Emirates 
The  State  of  Bahrain 
The  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia 
The  Sultanate  of  Oman 
The  State  of  Qatar 
The  State  of  Kuwait 
Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  Supreme  Council: 
(Article  One) 
Definitions: 
These  regulations  shall  be  called  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Gulf 
Arab  States  Cooperation  Council  and  shall  encompass  the  rules  that  govern  procedures 
for  convening  the  Council  and  the  exercise  of  its  functions. 
(Article  Two) 
Membership: 
1.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  be  composed  of  the  Heads  of  State  of  the  member  states 
of  the  Cooperation  Council.  The  Presidency  shall  rotate  or.  the  basis  of  the 
alphabetical  order  of  the  names  of  the  member  states. APPENDIX  (C)  283 
2.  Each  member  state  shall  notify  the  Secretary-General  of  the  names  of  the  members  of 
its  delegation  to  the  Council  meeting,  at  least  seven  days  prior  to  the  date  set  for 
opening  the  meeting. 
(Article  Three) 
With  due  regard  to  the  objectives  of  the  Cooperation  Council  and  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Supreme  Council  as  specified  in  Articles  4  and  8  of  the  Charter,  the  Supreme  Council 
may: 
1.  Form  technical  committees  and  select  their  members  from  member  states'  nominees 
who  specialize  in  the  committees'  respective  fields. 
2.  Call  upon  one  or  more  of  its  members  to  study  a  specific  subject  and  submit  a  report 
thereon  to  be  distributed  to  the  members  sufficiently  in  advance  of  the  meeting 
arranged  to  discuss  that  subject. 
(Article  Four) 
Convening  the  Supreme  Council: 
1.  a.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  hold  one  regular  session  every  year,  and  may  hold 
extraordinary  sessions  at  the  request  of  any  one  member  seconded  by  another  member. 
b.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  hold  its  sessions  at  the  level  of  Heads  of  State. 
c.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  hold  its  sessions  in  the  member  states'  territories. 
d.  Prior  to  convening  the  Supreme  Council,  the  Secretary-General  shall  hold  a  meeting  to 
be  attended  by  delegates  of  the  member 
states  for  consultation  on  matters  related  to  the  agenda  of  the  said 
meeting. 
2.  a.  The  Secretary-General  shall  set  the  opening  date  of  the  Council's  session  and 
suggest  a  closing  date. 
b.  The  Secretary-General  shall  issue  the  invitations  for  convening  a  regular  session  no 
less  than  thirty  days  in  advance,  and  for  convening  an  extraordinary  session,  within 
no  more  than  five  days. 
(Article  Five) 
1.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  at  the  start  of  every  session  decide  whether  the  meetings 
shall  be  in  closed  or  open  session. 
2.  A  meeting  shall  be  considered  valid  if  attended  by  the  Heads  of  State  of  two-thirds  of 
the  member  states.  Its  resolutions  in  substantive  matters  shall  be  carried  by  unanimous 
agreement  of  the  member  states  present  and  participating  in  the  vote,  while 
resolutions  in  procedural  matters  shall  be  carried  by  majority  vote.  Any  member 
abstaining  shall  record  that  he  is  not  bound  by  the  resolution. 
(Article  Six) 
1.  The  Council  shall  hold  an  extraordinary  session  in  the  event  of: 
a.  A  resolution  passed  in  a  previous  session. 
b.  A  request  by  a  member  state  seconded  by  another  state.  In  this  case,  the  Council 
shall  convene  within  no  more  than  five  days  from  the  date  of  issue  of  the  invitation 
for  holding  the  extraordinary  session. APPENDIX  (C)  284 
2.  The  draft  agenda  shall  include  the  following: 
a.  A  report  by  the  Secretary-General  on  the  activities  of  the  Supreme  Council  between 
the  two  sessions,  and  actions  taken  to  carry  out  its  resolutions. 
b.  Reports  and  matters  received  from  the  Ministerial  Council  and  the  Secretariat- 
General. 
c.  Matters  which  the  Supreme  Council  had  previously  decided  to  include  on  the 
agenda. 
d.  Matters  suggested  by  a  member  state  as  being  in  need  of  review  by  the  Supreme 
Council. 
3.  Every  member  state  may  request  inclusion  of  additional  items  on  the  draft  agenda 
provided  such  request  is  tabled  at  least  fifteen  days  prior  to  the  date  set  for  opening 
the  session.  Such  matters  shall  be  listed  in  an  additional  agenda  which  shall  be  sent, 
along  with  relevant  documentation,  to  the  member  states,  at  least  five  days  before  the 
date  set  for  the  session. 
4.  Any  member  state  may  request  inclusion  of  extra  items  on  the  draft  agenda  as  late  as 
the  date  set  for  opening  a  session,  if  such  matters  are  considered  both  important  and 
urgent. 
5.  The  Council  shall  approve  its  agenda  at  the  start  of  every  session. 
6.  The  Council  may,  during  the  session,  add  new  items  that  are  considered  urgent. 
7.  The  ordinary  session  shall  be  adjourned  after  completion  of  discussions  of  the  items 
placed  on  the  agenda.  The  Supreme  Council  may  decide  to  suspend  the  session's 
meetings  before  completion  of  discussions  on  agenda  items,  and  resume  such 
meetings  at  a  later  date. 
(Article  Nine) 
Office  and  Committees  of  the  Supreme  Council: 
1.  The  Supreme  Council  Office  shall  comprise,  in  every  session,  the  Council  President, 
the  Chairman  of  the  Ministerial  Council  and  the  Secretary-General.  The  Office  shall 
be  headed  by  the  Supreme  Council  President. 
2.  The  Office  shall  carry  out  the  following  functions: 
a.  Review  the  form  of  resolutions  passed  by  the  Supreme  Council  I  without  affecting 
their  contents. 
b.  Assist  the  President  of  the  Supreme  Council  in  directing  the  activities  of  the  session 
in  general. 
c.  Other  tasks  indicated  in  these  Rules  of  Procedure  or  other  matters  entrusted  to  it  by 
the  Supreme  Council. 
(Article  Ten) 
1.  The  Council  may,  at  the  start  of  every  session,  create  any  committees 
that  it  deems  necessary  to  allow  adequate  study  of  matters  listed  on  the  agenda. 
Delegates  of  member  states  shall  take  part  in  the  activities  of  such  committees. 
2.  Meetings  of  committees  shall  continue  until  they  complete  their  tasks,  with  due  regard 
for  the  date  set  for  closing  the  session.  Their  resolutions  shall  be  carried  by  majority 
vote. 
3.  Every  committee  shall  start  its  work  by  selecting  a  chairman  and  a  reporter  from 
among  its  members.  The  reporter  of  the  committee  shall  act  for  the  chairman  in A  PPENDIX  (C)  285 
directing  the  meeting  in  the  absence  of  the  chairman.  The  chairman,  or  the  reporter  in 
the  chairman's  absence,  shall  submit  to  the  Council  all  explanations  that  it  requests  on 
the  committee's  reports.  The  chairman  may,  with  the  approval  of  the  session's 
President,  take  part  in  the  discussions,  without  voting,  so  long  as  he  is  not  a  member 
of  the  Supreme  Council. 
4.  The  Council  may  refer  any  of  the  matters  included  in  the  agenda  to  the  committees, 
based  on  their  specialisation  for  study  and  reporting.  Any  one  item  may  be  referred  to 
more  than  one  committee. 
5.  Committee  may  neither  discuss  any  matter  not  referred  to  them  by  the  Council,  nor 
adopt  any  recommendation  which,  if  approved  by  the  Council,  may  entail  a  financial 
obligation,  before  the  committee  receives  a  report  from  the  Secretary  General 
regarding  the  financial  and  administrative  results  that  may  ensue  from  adopting  the 
resolution. 
(Article  Eleven) 
The  Process  of  Deliberation  and  Putting  Forward  Proposals: 
1.  Every  member  state  may  participate  in  the  deliberation  of  the  Supreme  Council  and  its 
committees  in  the  manner  provided  for  in  these  Rules  of  Procedure. 
2.  The  president  shall  direct  discussion  of  the  items  as  presented  in  order  on  the  agenda 
of  the  meeting  and  may,  when  necessary,  call  upon  the  Secretary-General  or  his 
representative  in  the  meeting  to  provide  such  clarification  as  he  sees  fit. 
3.  The  President  shall  give  the  floor  to  speakers  in  the  order  of  their  requests.  He  may 
give  priority  to  the  chairman  or  reporter  of  a  committee  to  submit  a  report  or  explain 
specific  points. 
4.  Every  member  may,  during  deliberations,  raise  points  of  order  on  which  the  President 
shall  pronounce  immediately  and  his  decisions  shall  have  effect  unless  voted  by  a 
majority  of  the  Supreme  Council  member  states. 
(Article  Twelve) 
1.  Every  member  may,  during  the  discussion  of  any  subject,  request  suspension  or 
adjournment  of  the  meeting  or  discussion  of  the  subject.  or  closure.  Such  requests 
may  not  be  discussed  but  the  President  shall  put  them  to  the  vote,  if  duty  seconded, 
and  decision  shall  be  by  majority  of  the  member  states. 
2.  With  due  regard  to  provisions  of  item  4  of  the  preceding  Article,  suggestions  indicated 
in  item  I  of  this  Article  shall  be  given  priority  over  all  others  based  on  the  following 
order: 
a-  Suspension  of  the  meeting 
b-  Adjournment  of  the  meeting 
c-  Postponement  of  discussion  of  the  matter  in  hand. 
d-  Closure  of  discussion  of  the  matter  in  hand. 
3.  Apart  from  suggestions  on  formulation  or  procedural  matters  draft  resolutions  and 
substantive  amendments  shall  be  submitted  in  writing  to  the  Secretary-General  or  his 
representative  who  shall  distribute  them  as  soon  as  possible  to  the  delegations.  No 
draft  resolution  may  be  submitted  for  discussion  or  voting  before  the  text  thereof  is 
distributed  to  all  the  delegations. APPENDIX  (C)  286 
4.  A  proposal  on  which  a  decision  has  been  taken  may  not  be  reconsidered  in  the  same 
session  unless  the  Council  decides  otherwise. 
(Article  Thirteen) 
The  President  shall  follow  up  on  the  activities  of  the  committees,  inform  the  Supreme 
Council  of  correspondence  received,  and  formally  announce  before  members  all  the 
resolutions  and  recommendations  arrived  at. 
(Article  Fourteen) 
Voting: 
Every  member  state  shall  have  one  vote  and  no  state  may  represent  another  state  or  vote 
on  its  behalf 
(Artide  Fifteen) 
1.  Voting  shall  be  by  calling  the  names  in  the  alphabetical  order  of  the  states'  names,  or 
by  raising  hands.  Voting  shall  be  secret  if  so  requested  by  a  member  or  by  decision  of 
the  President. 
The  Supreme  Council  may  decide  otherwise.  The  vote  of  every  member  shall  be 
documented  in  the  minutes  of  the  meeting  if  voting  is  effected  by  calling  the  names. 
The  minutes  shall  indicate  the  result  of  voting,  if  the  vote  is  secret  or  by  show  of 
hands. 
2.  A  member  may  abstain  from  a  vote  or  express  reservations  over  a  procedural  matter 
or  part  thereof,  in  which  case  the  reservation  shall  be  read  at  the  time  the  resolution  is 
announced  and  shall  be  duly  documented  in  writing.  Members  may  present 
explanations  about  their  stand  in  the  voting  after  voting  is  completed. 
3.  Once  the  President  announces  that  voting  has  started,  no  interruption  may  be  made 
unless  the  matter  relates  to  a  point  of  order  relevant  to  the  vote. 
(Article  Sixteen) 
1.  If  a  member  request  amendment  of  a  proposal,  voting  on  the  amendment  shall  be 
carried  out  first.  If  there  is  more  than  one  amendment,  voting  shall  first  be  made  on 
the  amendment  which  in  the  President's  opinion  is  farthest  from  the  original  proposal, 
then  on  the  next  farthest,  and  so  on  until  voting  is  completed  on  all  proposed 
amendments.  If  one  or  more  such  amendments  is  passed,  then  voting  shall  be  made  on 
the  original  proposal  as  amended. 
2.  Any  new  proposal  shall  be  deemed  to  be  an  amendment  to  the  original  proposal  if  it 
merely  entails  an  addition  to,  omission  or  change  to  a  part  of  the  original  proposal. 
(Article  Seventeen) 
1.  The  Supreme  Council  may  create  technical  committees  charged  with  giving  advice  on 
the  design  and  implementation  of  Supreme  Council  programmes  in  specific  fields. 
2.  The  Supreme  Council  shall  appoint  the  members  of  the  technical  committees  from 
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3.  The  technical  committees  shall  meet  at  the  invitation  of  the  Secretary-General  and 
shall  draw  up  their  work  plans  in  consultation  with  him. 
4.  The  Secretary-General  shall  prepare  the  agenda  of  the  committees  after  consultation 
with  the  chairman  of  the  committee  concerned. 
(Article  Eighteen) 
Amendment  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure: 
1.  Any  member  state  may  propose  amendments  to  the  Rules  of  Procedure. 
2.  No  proposed  amendments  may  be  considered  unless  the  relevant  proposal  has  been 
circulated  to  the  member  states  by  the  Secretariat-General  at  least  thirty  days  prior  to 
submission  to  the  Ministerial  Council. 
3.  No  basic  changes  may  be  introduced  to  the  proposed  amendment  mentioned  in  the 
preceding  paragraph  unless  the  text  of  such  proposed  changes  has  been  circulated  to 
the  member  states  by  the  Secretariat-General  at  least  fifteen  days  before  submission  to 
the  Ministerial  Council. 
4.  Except  for  items  based  on  the  provisions  of  the  Charter,  and  with  due  regard  to  the 
provisions  of  preceding  paragraphs  these  Rules  of  procedure  shall  be  amended  by  a 
resolution  of  the  Supreme  Council  approved  by  a  majority  of  the  members. 
(Article  Nineteen) 
Effective  Date: 
These  Rules  of  Procedure  shall  go  into  effect  as  of  the  date  of  approval  by  the  Supreme 
Council  and  may  not  be  amended  except  in  accordance  with  procedures  set  forth  in  the 
preceding  Article. 
These  Rules  of  Procedure  are  signed  at  Abu  Dhabi  City,  United  Arab  Emirates  on  21 
Rajab  1401  AH  Corresponding  to  25  May  1981  AD. 
The  United  Arab  Emirates 
The  State  of  Bahrain 
The  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia 
The  Sultanate  of  Oman 
The  State  of  Qatar 
The  State  of  Kuwait 
Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  Ministerial  Council: 
(Article  One) 
1.  These  regulations  shall  be  called  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  Ministerial  Council  of  the 
Gulf  Arab  States  Cooperation  Council  and  shall  encompass  rules  governing  meetings 
of  the  Council  and  the  exercise  of  its  functions. 
2.  The  following  terms  as  used  herein  shall  have  the  meanings  indicated  opposite  each: 
Cooperation  Council:  The  Gulf  Arab  States  Cooperation  Council 
Charter:  Statute  establishing  the  Gulf  Arab  States  Cooperation  Council APPENDIX  (C)  288 
Supreme  Council:  The  highest  body  of  the  Gulf  Arab  States  Cooperation  Council 
Council:  Nfinisterial  Council  of  the  Gulf  Arab  States  Cooperation  Council 
Secretary-General:  The  Secretary-General  of  the  Gulf  Arab  States  Cooperation 
Council 
Chairman:  The  Chairman  of  the  Mnisterial  Council  of  the  Gulf  Arab  States 
Cooperation  Council 
(Article  Two) 
States  Representation: 
1.  The  Mnisterial  Council  shall  be  composed  of  the  member  states'  Foreign  Mnisters  or 
other  delegated  Ministers. 
2.  Every  member  state  shall,  at  least  one  week  prior  to  the  convening  of  every  ordinary 
session  of  the  Mnisterial  Council  convey  to  the  Secretary-General  a  list  of  the  name 
of  the  members  of  its  delegation.  For  extraordinary  sessions,  the  list  shall  be  submitted 
three  days  before  the  date  set  for  the  session. 
(Article  Three) 
Convening  the  Sessions: 
1.  The  Ministerial  Council  shall  decide  in  every  meeting  the  venue  of  its  next  regular 
session. 
2.  The  Secretary-General  shall  decide,  in  consultation  with  the  member  states,  the  venues 
of  extraordinary  sessions. 
3.  If  circumstances  should  arise  that  preclude  the  convening  of  an  ordinary  or 
extraordinary  session  at  the  place  set  for  it,  the  Secretary-General  shall  so  inform  the 
member  states  and  shall  set  another  place  for  the  meeting  after  consultation  with 
them. 
(Article  Four) 
Ordinary  Sessions: 
1.  The  Council  shall  convene  in  ordinary  session  once  every  three  months. 
2.  The  Secretary-General  shall  set  the  date  for  opening  the  session  and  suggest  the  date 
of  its  closing. 
3.  The  Secretary-General  shall  address  the  invitation  to  attend  a  Council  ordinary  session 
at  least  fifteen  days  in  advance,  and  shall  indicate  therein  the  date  and  place  set  for  the 
meeting,  as  well  as  attaching  thereto  the  agenda  of  the  session,  explanatory  notes  and 
other  documentation. 
(Article  Five) 
Extraordinary  Sessions: 
1.  The  Council  shall  hold  an  extraordinary  session  at  the  request  of  any  member  state 
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2.  The  Secretary-General  shall  address  the  invitation  to  the  Council's  extraordinary 
session  and  attach  a  memorandum  containing  the  request  of  the  member  state  which 
has  requested  the  meeting. 
3.  The  Secretary-General  shall  specify  in  the  invitation  the  place,  date  and  agenda  of  the 
session. 
(Article  Six) 
1.  The  Council  may  itself  decide  to  hold  extraordinary  sessions,  in  which  case  it  shall 
specify  the  agenda,  time  and  place  of  the  session. 
2.  The  Secretary-General  shall  send  out  to  the  member  states  the  invitation  to  attend  the 
extraordinary  meeting  of  the  Council  along  with  a  memorandum  containing  the 
resolution  of  the  Council  to  this  effect,  and  specifying  the  date  and  agenda  of  the 
session. 
3.  The  extraordinary  session  shall  be  convened  within  a  maximum  of  five  days  from  the 
date  of  issue  of  the  invitation. 
(Article  Seven) 
No  matters,  other  than  those  for  which  the  extraordinary  session  was  called,  may  be 
included  on  its  agenda. 
(Article  Eight) 
Agenda: 
The  Secretary-General  shall  prepare  a  draft  agenda  for  a  Council's  ordinary  session  and 
such  draft  shall  include  the  following: 
1.  The  report  of  the  Secretary-General  on  the  work  of  the  Cooperation  Council. 
2.  Matters  referred  to  him  by  the  Supreme  Council. 
3.  Matters  which  the  Council  had  previously  decided  to  include  on  the  agenda. 
4.  Matters  which  the  Secretary-General  believes  should  be  reviewed  by  the  Council. 
5.  Matters  suggested  by  a  member  state. 
(Article  Nine) 
Member  states  shall  convey  to  the  Secretary-General  their  suggestions  on  matters  they 
wish  to  include  on  the  Council's  agenda  at  least  thirty  days  prior  to  the  date  of  the 
Council's  ordinary  session. 
(Article  Ten) 
Member  states  or  the  Secretary-General  may  request  the  inclusion  of  additional  items  on 
the  Council's  draft  agenda  at  least  ten  days  prior  to  the  date  set  for  opening  an  ordinary 
session.  Such  items  shall  be  listed  on  an  additional  schedule  which  shall  be  conveyed 
along  with  relevant  documentation  to  the  member  states  at  least  five  days  prior  to  the 
date  of  the  session. APPENDIX  (C)  290 
(Article  Eleven) 
Member  states  or  the  Secretary-General  may  request  inclusion  of  additional  items  on  the 
agenda  for  the  Council's  ordinary  session  up  to  the  date  set  for  opening  the  session  if 
such  matters  are  both  important  and  urgent. 
(Article  Twelve) 
The  Council  shall  approve  its  agenda  at  the  beginning  of  every  session. 
(Article  Thirteen) 
A  Council's  ordinary  session  shall  end  upon  completion  of  discussion  of  matters  listed  on 
the  agenda.  The  Council  may,  when  necessary,  decide  to  suspend  its  meetings 
temporarily  before  discussion  of  agenda  items  is  completed  and  resume  its  meetings  at  a 
later  date. 
(Article  Fourteen) 
The  Council  may  defer  discussion  of  certain  items  on  its  agenda  and  decide  to  include 
them  with  the  others,  when  necessary,  on  the  agenda  of  a  subsequent  session. 
(Article  Fifteen) 
Chairmanship  of  the  Council: 
1.  Chairmanship  of  the  Council  shall  be  entrusted  to  the  member  state  which  presided  the 
last  ordinary  session  of  the  Supreme  Council,  or,  if  necessary,  to  the  state  which  is 
next  to  preside  the  Supreme  Council. 
2.  The  Chairman  shall  exercise  his  functions  until  he  passes  his  post  on  to  his  successor. 
3.  The  Chairman  shall  also  preside  over  extraordinary  sessions. 
4.  The  representative  of  a  state  that  is  party  to  an  outstanding  dispute  may  not  chair  the 
session  or  meeting  assigned  for  discussing  such  dispute,  in  which  case  the  Council 
shall  name  a  temporary  Chairman. 
(Article  Sixteen) 
1.  The  Chairman  shall  announce  the  opening  and  closing  of  sessions  and  meetings,  the 
suspension  of  meetings  and  closure  of  discussions,  and  shall  ensure  respect  for  the 
provisions  of  the  Charter  and  these  Rules  of  Procedure. 
2.  The  Chairman  may  participate  in  the  Council's  deliberations  and  vote  in  the  name  of 
the  state  he  represents.  He  may,  for  such  purpose,  delegate  another  member  of  his 
delegation  to  act  on  his  behalf APPENDIX  (C) 
(Article  Seventeen) 
Office  of  the  Council: 
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1.  The  Office  of  the  Council  shall  include  the  Chairman,  Secretary-General,  and  heads  of 
working  sub-committees  which  the  Council  has  resolved  to  set  up. 
2.  The  Chairman  of  the  Council  shall  preside  over  the  Office. 
(Article  Eighteen) 
The  Office  shall  carry  out  the  following  tasks: 
1.  Assist  the  Chairman  to  direct  the  proceedings  of  the  Session. 
2.  Coordinate  the  work  of  the  Council  and  the  sub-comn-ýttees. 
3.  Supervise  the  drafting  of  the  resolutions  passed  by  the  Council. 
4.  Other  tasks  indicated  in  these  Rules  of  Procedure  or  entrusted  to  it  by  the  Council. 
(Article  Nineteen) 
Sub-committees: 
1.  The  Council  shall  call  upon  preparatory  and  working  committees  to  assist  in 
accomplishing  its  tasks. 
2.  The  Secretariat-General  shall  participate  in  the  work  of  the  committees. 
(Article  Twenty) 
1.  The  Secretary-General  may,  in  consultation  with  the  Chairman  of  the  session,  form 
preparatory  committees  charged  with  the  study  of  matters  listed  on  the  agenda. 
2.  Preparatory  committees  shall  be  composed  of  delegates  of  member  states  and  may, 
when  necessary,  seek  the  help  of  such  experts  as  they  may  deem  appropriate. 
3.  Each  preparatory  committee  shall  meet  at  least  three  days  prior  to  the  opening  of  the 
session  by  invitation  of  the  Secretary-General.  The  work  of  the  committee  shall  end  at 
the  close  of  the  session. 
(Article  Twenty-one) 
1.  The  Council  may,  at  the  start  of  each  session,  form  working  committees  and  charge 
them  with  specific  tasks. 
2.  The  work  of  the  working  committees  shall  continue  until  the  date  set  for  closing  the 
session. 
(Article  Twenty-Two) 
1.  Each  sub-committee  shall  start  its  work  by  electing  a  chairman  and  a  reporter  from 
among  its  members.  When  the  chairman  is  absent,  the  reporter  shall  act  for  him  in 
directing  the  meetings. 
2.  The  chairman  or  reporter  of  each  sub-committee  shall  submit  a  report  on  its  work  to 
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3.  The  chairman  or  reporter  of  a  sub-committee  shall  present  to  the  Council  all 
explanations  required  regarding  the  contents  of  the  sub-committees  report. 
(Article  Twenty-three) 
1.  The  Secretariat-General  shall  organize  the  technical  secretariat  and  sub-committees  of 
the  Council. 
2.  The  Secretariat-General  shall  prepare  minutes  of  meetings  documenting  discussions, 
resolutions  and  recommendations.  Such  minutes  shall  be  prepared  for  all  meetings  of 
the  Council  and  its  sub-committees. 
3.  The  Secretary-General  shall  supervise  the  organization  of  the  Council's  relations  with 
the  information  media. 
4.  The  Secretary-General  shall  convey  the  Council's  resolutions  and  recommendations 
and  relevant  documentation  to  the  member  states  within  fifteen  days  after  the  end  of 
the  session. 
(Article  Twenty-four) 
The  Council's  secretariat  and  sub-committees  shall  receive  and  distribute  documents, 
reports,  resolutions  and  recommendations  of  the  Council  and  its  sub-committees  and 
shall  draw  up  and  distribute  minutes  and  daily  bulletins  in  addition  to  safeguarding 
documents  and  performing  other  tasks  required  by  the  Council's  work. 
(Article  Twenty-five) 
Texts  of  resolutions  or  recommendations  made  by  the  Council  may  not  be  announced  or 
published  except  by  resolution  of  the  Council. 
(Article  Twenty-six) 
Deliberations: 
Every  member  state  may  take  part  in  the  deliberations  of  the  Council  and  its  sub- 
committees  in  the  manner  prescribed  in  these  Rules  of  Procedure. 
(Article  Twenty-seven) 
1.  The  Chairman  shall  direct  deliberations  on  matters  on  hand  in  the  order  they  are  listed 
on  the  Council's  agenda. 
2.  The  Chairman  shall  give  the  floor  to  speakers  in  the  order  of  their  requests.  Priority 
may  be  given  to  the  chairman  or  reporter  of  a  particular  committee  to  present  its 
report  or  explain  certain  points  therein.  The  floor  shall  be  given  to  the  Secretary- 
General  or  his  representative  whenever  it  is  necessary. 
3.  The  Council  Chairman  may,  during  deliberations,  read  the  list  of  the  names  or 
members  who  have  requested  the  floor,  and  with  the  approval  of  the  Council,  close 
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(Article  Twenty-eight) 
The  Council  shall  decide  whether  the  meetings  shall  be  held  in  open  or  closed  session. 
(Article  twenty-nine) 
1.  Every  member  state  may  raise  a  point  of  order,  on  which  the  chairman  shall  pronounce 
immediately  and  his  decision  shall  take  effect  unless  vetoed  by  a  majority  of  the 
member  states. 
2.  A  member  who  raises  point  of  order  may  not  go  beyond  the  point  he  has  raised. 
(Article  Thirty) 
I.  Every  member  may,  during  discussion  of  any  matter,  propose  the  suspension  or 
adjournment  of  the  meeting,  or  discussion  of  the  matter  on  hand,  or  closure.  The 
Chairman  shall  in  such  cases  put  the  proposal  to  the  vote  directly,  if  the  proposal  is 
seconded  by  another  member.  Such  proposal  requires  the  approval  of  the  majority  of 
the  member  states  to  pass. 
2.  With  due  regard  to  the  provisions  of  the  preceding  paragraph  proposals  indicated 
therein  shall  be  submitted  to  the  vote  in  the  following  order: 
a.  Suspension  of  meeting 
b.  Adjournment  of  meeting 
c.  Postponement  of  discussion  of  the  matter  in  hand 
d.  Closure  of  discussion  of  the  matter  in  hand 
(Article  Thirty-one) 
1.  Member  States  may  suggest  draft  resolutions  or  recommendations,  or  amendments 
thereto,  and  may  withdraw  all  such  unless  they  are  voted  upon. 
2.  Drafts  indicated  in  the  preceding  item  shall  be  submitted  in  writing  to  the  Secretariat- 
General  for  distribution  to  delegations  as  soon  as  possible. 
3.  Except  for  proposals  concerning  formulation  or  procedures,  drafts  indicated  in  this 
Article  may  not  be  discussed  or  voted  upon  before  their  texts  are  distributed  to  all 
delegations. 
4.  A  proposal  already  decided  upon  may  not  be  reconsidered  in  the  same  session.  unless 
the  Council  decides  otherwise. 
(Article  Thirty-two) 
The  Chairman  shall  follow  up  the  work  of  the  committees,  inform  the  Council  of 
incoming  correspondence,  and  formally  announce  before  members  the  resolutions  and 
recommendations  arrived  at. 
(Article  Thirty-three) 
Voting: 
1.  The  Council  shall  pass  its  resolutions  with  the  unanimous  approval  of  the  member 
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be  passed  by  a  majority  vote.  Any  member  abstaining  from  voting  shall  record  the  fact 
that  he  is  not  bound  by  the  vote. 
2.  If  members  of  the  Council  should  disagree  on  the  definition  of  the  matter  being  put  to 
the  vote,  the  matter  shall  be  settled  by  majority  vote  of  the  member  states  present. 
(Article  Thirty-four) 
1.  Every  member  state  shall  have  one  vote. 
2.  No  member  state  may  represent  another  state  or  vote  on  its  behalf 
(Article  Thirty-five) 
1.  Voting  shall  be  by  the  names  in  the  alphabetical  order  of  the  states'  names,  or  by  show 
of  hands. 
2.  Voting  shall  be  by  secret  ballot  if  so  requested  by  a  member  or  by  decision  of  the 
Chairman.  The  Council,  however,  may  decide  otherwise. 
3.  The  vote  of  every  member  shall  be  recorded  in  the  minutes  of  the  meeting  if  voting  is 
by  calling  the  names.  The  minutes  shall  indicate  the  result  of  voting  if  the  vote  is 
secret  or  by  show  of  hands. 
4.  Member  states  may  explain  their  positions  after  the  vote  and  such  explanations  shall  be 
recorded  in  the  minutes  of  the  meeting. 
5.  Once  the  Chairman  announces  that  voting  has  started,  no  interruption  may  be  made 
except  for  a  point  of  order  relating  to  the  vote  or  its  postponement  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  this  Article  and  the  next. 
(Article  Thirty-six) 
1.  The  Council  Chairman  with  the  help  of  the  Secretary-General  shall  endeavour  to 
reconcile  the  positions  of  member  states  on  disputed  matters  and  obtain  their 
agreement  to  a  draft  resolution  before  submitting  it  to  the  vote. 
2.  The  Council  Chairman,  the  Secretary-General  or  any  member  state  may  request 
postponement  of  a  vote  for  a  specific  period  during  which  further  negotiations  may 
take  place  on  the  item  submitted  to  the  vote. 
(Article  Thirty-seven) 
1.  If  a  member  requests  amendment  of  a  proposal,  voting  on  the  amendment  shall  be 
carried  out  first.  If  there  is  more  than  one  amendment,  voting  shall  first  be  made  on 
the  amendment  which  the  Chairman  considers  to  be  farthest  from  the  original 
proposal,  then  on  the  next  farthest,  and  so  on  until  all  proposed  amendments  have 
been  voted  upon.  If  one  or  more  amendments  have  been  voted  upon.  If  one  or  more 
amendment  is  passed,  then  voting  shall  be  made  on  the  original  proposal  as  amended. 
2.  A  new  proposal  shall  be  deemed  to  be  an  amendment  to  the  original  proposal  if  it 
merely  entails  an  addition  to,  omission  from,  or  change  to  a  part  of  the  original 
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(Article  Thirty-eight) 
1.  Any  member  state  or  the  Secretary-General  may  propose  amending  these  Rules  of 
Procedure. 
2.  No  proposed  amendment  to  these  Rules  of  Procedure  may  be  considered  unless  the 
relevant  proposal  is  circulated  to  the  member  states  by  the  Secretariat-General  at  least 
thirty  days  before  submission  to  the  Council. 
3.  No  basic  changes  may  be  introduced  to  the  proposed  amendment  mentioned  in  the 
preceding  item  unless  the  texts  of  such  proposed  change  have  been  circulated  to  the 
member  states  at  least  fifteen  days  prior  to  submission  to  the  Council. 
4.  Except  for  items  based  on  provisions  of  the  Charter,  and  with  due  regard  to  preceding 
items,  these  Rules  of  Procedure  shall  be  amended  by  a  resolution  of  the  Council 
approved  by  a  majority  of  its  members. 
(Article  Thirty-nine) 
Effective  Date: 
These  Rules  of  Procedure  shall  go  into  effect  as  of  the  date  of  approval  by  the  Council 
and  may  not  be  amended  except  in  accordance  with  procedures  set  forth  in  the  preceding 
article. 
Thus,  these  Rules  of  Procedure  are  signed  at  Abu  Dhabi  City,  United  Arab  Emirates,  on 
21  Rajab  1401  AH  corresponding  to  25  May  1981  AD. 
The  United  Arab  Emirates 
The  State  of  Bahrain 
The  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia 
The  Sultanate  of  Oman 
The  State  of  Qatar 
The  State  of  Kuwait 
Rules  of  Procedures  of  the  Commission  For  Settlement  of  Disputes: 
Preamble: 
In  accordance  with  the  previous  of  Article  Six  of  the  Charter  of  the  Gulf  Arab  States 
Cooperation  Council;  and  in  implementation  of  the  Provisions  of  Article  Ten  of  the 
Cooperation  Council,  a  Commission  for  Settlement  of  Disputes,  hereinafter  referred  to 
as  Commission,  shall  be  set  up  and  its  jurisdiction  and  rules  for  its  proceeding  shall  be  as 
follows: 
(Article  One) 
Terminology: 
Terms  used  in  these  Rules  of  Procedure  shall  have  the  same  meanings  as  those 
established  in  the  Charter  of  the  Gulf  Arab  States  Cooperation  Council. A  PPE,  NDIX  (C)  296 
(Article  Two) 
The  location  &  Session  of  the  Commission: 
The  commission  shall  have  its  headquarters  at  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia,  and  shall  hold  its 
meetings  on  the  territory  of  the  state  where  its  headquarters  is  located,  but  may  hold  its 
meetings  elsewhere,  when  necessary. 
(Article  Three) 
Jurisdiction: 
The  Commission  shall,  once  installed,  have  jurisdiction  to  consider  the  following  matters 
referred  to  it  by  the  Supreme  Council: 
a.  disputes  between  member  states. 
b.  Differences  of  opinion  as  to  the  interpretation  or  implementation  of  the 
Cooperation  Council  Charter. 
(Article  Four) 
Membership  of  the  Commission: 
a.  The  Commission  shall  be  formed  of  an  appropriate  number  of  citizens  of  member 
states  not  involved  in  the  dispute.  The  Council  shall  select  members  of  the 
Commission  in  every  case  separately  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  dispute,  provided 
that  the  number  shall  be  no  less  than  three. 
b.  The  Commission  may  seek  the  advice  of  such  experts  and  consultants  as  it  may  deem 
necessary. 
c.  Unless  the  Supreme  Council  resolves  otherwise,  the  Commission's  task  shall  end  with 
the  submission  of  its  recommendations  or  opinion  to  the  Supreme  Council  which, 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  Commission's  task,  may  summon  it  at  any  time  to  explain 
or  elaborate  on  its  recommendations  or  opinions. 
(Article  Five) 
Meetings  and  Internal  Procedures: 
a.  A  meeting  of  the  Commission  shall  be  valid  if  attended  by  all  members. 
b.  The  Secretariat-General  of  the  Cooperation  Council  shall  prepare  procedures  required 
to  conduct  the  Commission's  affairs,  and  such  procedures  shall  go  into  effect  as  of  the 
date  of  approval  by  the  Ministerial  Council. 
c.  Each  party  to  the  dispute  shall  send  representatives  to  the  Commission  who  shall  be 
entitled  to  follow  proceedings  and  present  their  defence. 
(Article  Six) 
Chairmanship: 
The  Commission  shall  select  a  chairman  from  among  its  members. APPENDIX  (C)  297 
(Article  Seven) 
Voting: 
Every  member  of  the  Commission  shall  have  one  vote,  and  shall  issue  its 
recommendations  or  opinions  on  matters  referred  to  it  by  a  majority  of  the  members.  In 
the  event  of  an  indecisive  vote  the  party  with  whom  the  Chairman  has  voted  shall  prevail. 
(Article  Eight) 
The  Secretariat  of  the  Commission: 
a.  The  Secretary-General  shall  appoint  a  Secretary  for  the  Commission,  and  a  sufficient 
number  of  officials  to  carry  out  the  work  of  the  Commission's  Secretariat. 
b.  The  Supreme  Council  may  if  necessary  create  an  independent  organisation  to  carry  out 
the  work  of  the  Secretariat  of  the  Commission. 
(Article  Nine) 
Recommendations  &  Opinions: 
a.  The  Commission  shall  issue  its  recommendations  or  opinions  in  accordance  with  the 
Cooperation  Council's  Charter,  with  international  laws  and  practices,  and  the 
principles  of  Islamic  Shari'ah.  The  Commission  shall  submit  its  findings  on  the  case  in 
hand  to  the  Supreme  Council  for  appropriate  action. 
b.  The  Commission  may,  while  considering  any  dispute  referred  to  it  and  pending  the 
issue  of  its  final  recommendations  thereon,  ask  the  Supreme  Council  to  take  interim 
action  called  for  by  necessity  or  circumstances. 
c.  The  Commission's  recommendations  or  opinions  shall  specify  the  reasons  on  which 
they  were  based  and  shall  be  signed  by  the  Chairman  and  secretary. 
d.  If  an  opinion  is  not  passed  wholly  or  partially  by  unanimous  vote  of  the  members,  the 
dissenting  members  shall  be  entitled  to  record  their  dissenting  opinion. 
(Article  Ten) 
Immunities  and  Privileges: 
The  Commission  and  its  members  shall  enjoy  such  immunities  and  privileges  in  the 
territories  of  the  member  states  as  are  required  to  realize  its  objectives  in  accordance 
with  Article  Seventeen  of  the  Cooperation  Council  Charter. 
(Article  Eleven) 
The  Budget  of  the  Commission: 
The  Commission's  budget  shall  be  considered  part  of  the  Secretariat-General's  budget. 
Remunerations  of  the  Commission's  members  shall  be  established  by  the  Supreme 
Council. A  PPENDIX  (C) 
(Article  Twelve) 
Amendments: 
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a.  Any  member  state  may  request  for  amendments  to  these  Rules  of  Procedure. 
b.  Requests  for  amendments  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Secretary-General  who  shall  relay 
them  to  the  member  states  at  least  four  months  before  submission  to  the  Ministerial 
Council. 
c.  An  amendment  shall  be  effective  if  approved  unanimously  by  the  Supreme  Council. 
(Article  Thirteen) 
Effective  Date: 
These  Rules  of  Procedure  shall  go  into  effect  as  of  the  date  of  approval  by  the  Supreme 
Council. 
These  Rules  of  Procedure  were  signed  at  Abu  Dhabi  City,  United  Arab  Emirates  on  21 
Rajab  1401  AH  corresponding  to  25  May  1981  AD. 
The  United  Arab  Emirates 
The  State  of  Bahrain 
The  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia 
The  Sultanate  of  Oman 
The  State  of  Qatar 
The  State  of  Kuwait 
111.  THE  UNIFIED  ECONOMIC  AGREEMENT  OF  THE  COOPERATION 
COUNCIL  FOR  THE  ARAB  STATES  OF  THE  GULF 
With  the  help  of  God  Almighty;  The  Governments  of  the  member  states  of  the  Gulf 
Cooperation  Council; 
In  accordance  with  the  Charter  thereof,  which  calls  for  closer  relations  and  stronger 
links;  and,  desiring  to  promote,  expand  and  enhance  their  economic  ties  on  solid 
foundations,  in  the  best  interest  of  their  peoples;  and,  intending  to  coordinate  and  unify 
their  economic,  financial  and  monetary  policies,  as  well  as  their  commercial  and  industrial 
legislation,  and  customs  regulations;  have  agreed  as  follows: 
Chapter  One:  Trade  Exchange: 
(Article  One) 
a.  The  member  states  shall  permit  the  importation  and  exportation  of  agricultural,  animal, 
industrial  and  natural  resource  products  that  are  of  national  origin.  Also,  they  shall 
permit  exportation  thereof  to  other  member  states. APPENDIX  (C)  299 
b.  All  agricultural,  animal,  industrial  and  natural  resource  products  that  are  from  member 
states  shall  receive  the  same  treatment  as  national  products. 
(Article  Two) 
1.  All  agricultural,  animal,  industrial  and  natural  resource  products  that  are  of  national 
origin  shall  be  exempted  from  customs  duties  and  other  charges  having  equivalent 
effect. 
2.  Fees  charged  for  specific  services  such  as  demurrage,  storage,  transportation,  haulage 
or  unloading,  shall  not  be  considered  as  customs  duties  when  they  are  levied  on 
domestic  products. 
(Article  Three) 
1.  For  products  of  national  origin  to  qualify  as  national  manufactured  products,  the  value 
added  ensuing  from  their  production  in  member  states  shall  not  be  less  than  40 
percent  of  their  final  value.  In  addition,  the  share  of  the  member  states  citizens  in  the 
ownership  of  the  producing  plant  shall  not  be  less  than  51  percent. 
2.  Every  item  to  be  exempted  hereby  shall  be  accompanied  by  a  certificate  of  origin  duly 
authenticated  by  the  government  agency  concerned. 
(Article  Four) 
1.  Member  states  shall  establish  a  uniform  minimum  customs  tariff  applicable  to  the 
products  of  countries  other  than  GCC  member  states. 
2.  One  of  the  objectives  of  the  uniform  customs  tariff  shall  be  the  protection  of  national 
products  from  foreign  competition. 
3.  The  uniform  customs  tariff  shall  be  applied  gradually  within  five  years  from  the  date 
on  which  this  agreement  becomes  effective.  Arrangements  for  its  gradual 
implementation  shall  be  agreed  upon  within  one  year  from  the  said  date. 
(Article  Five) 
Member  states  shall  grant  all  facilities  for  the  transit  of  any  member  state's  goods  to  other 
member  states,  exempting  them  from  any  duties  and  taxes  whatsoever,  without  prejudice 
to  the  provisions  of  Paragraph  2  of  Article  2. 
(Article  Six) 
Transit  shall  be  denied  to  any  goods  that  are  barred  from  entry  into  the  territory  of  a 
member  state  by  its  local  regulations.  Lists  of  such  goods  shall  be  exchanged  between  the 
customs  authorities  of  the  member  states. 
(Article  Seven) 
Member  states  shall  coordinate  their  commercial  policies  and  relations  with  other  states 
and  regional  economic  groupings  and  blocs  with  a  view  to  creating  balanced  trade 
relations  and  favourable  circumstances  and  terms  of  trade  therewith.  To  achieve  this 
goal,  the  member  states  shall  make  the  following  arrangements: 
1.  Coordination  of  import/export  policies  and  regulations. APPENDIX  (C)  300 
2.  Coordination  of  policies  for  building  up  strategic  food  stocks. 
3.  Conclusion  of  collective  economic  agreements  in  cases  where  joint  benefits  to 
member  states  would  be  realized. 
4.  Taking  of  action  for  the  creation  of  collective  negotiating  power  to  strengthen  their 
negotiating  position  vis-A-vis  foreign  parties  in  the  field  of  importation  of  basic 
needs  and  exportation  of  major  products. 
Chapter  Two:  Movement  of  Capital,  Citizens,  and  Exercise  Economic  Activities 
(Article  Eight) 
The  member  states  shall  agree  on  the  executive  rules  which  would  insure  that  each 
member  state  shall  grant  the  citizens  of  all  other  member  states  the  same  treatment 
granted  to  its  own  citizens  without  any  discrimination  or  differentiation  in  the  following 
fields: 
1.  Freedom  of  movement,  work  and  residence. 
2.  Right  of  ownership,  inheritance  and  bequest. 
3.  Freedom  to  exercise  economic  activity. 
4.  Free  movement  of  capital. 
(Article  Nine) 
The  member  states  shall  encourage  their  respective  private  sectors  to  establish  joint 
ventures  in  order  to  link  their  citizens'  economic  interest  in  the  various  spheres  of 
activity. 
Chapter  Three:  Coordination  of  Development: 
(Article  Ten) 
The  member  states  shall  endeavor  to  achieve  coordination  and  harmony  among  their 
respective  development  plans  with  a  view  to  achieving  integration  in  economic  affairs. 
(Article  Eleven) 
1.  The  member  states  shall  endeavor  to  coordinate  their  policies  with  regard  to  all 
aspects  of  the  oil  industry  including  extraction,  refining,  marketing,  processing, 
pricing,  exploitation  of  natural  gas  and  development  of  energy  sources. 
2.  The  member  states  shall  endeavor  to  formulate  unified  oil  policies  and  adopt  common 
positions  vis-A-vis  the  outside  world,  and  in  the  international  and  specialized 
organizations. APPENDIX  (C)  301 
(Article  Twelve) 
To  achieve  the  objectives  specified  in  this  Agreement,  the  member  states  shall  perform 
the  following: 
1.  Coordinate  industrial  activities,  formulate  policies  and  mechanisms  aimed  at  the 
industrial  development  and  the  diversification  of  their  productive  bases  on  an 
integrated  basis. 
2.  Standardize  their  industrial  legislation  and  regulations  and  guide  their  local  production 
units  to  meet  their  needs. 
3.  Allocate  industries  between  member  states  according  to  relative  advantages  and 
economic  feasibility,  and  encourage  the  establishment  of  basic  as  well  as  ancillary 
industries. 
(Article  Thirteen) 
Within  the  framework  of  their  coordinating  activities,  the  member  states  shall  pay  special 
attention  to  the  establishment  of  joint  ventures  in  the  fields  of  industry,  agriculture  and 
services,  and  shall  support  them  with  public,  private  or  mixed  capital  in  order  to  achieve 
economic  integration,  productive  interface  and  common  development  on  sound 
economic  bases. 
Chapter  Four:  Technical  Cooperation 
(Article  Fourteen) 
The  member  states  shall  collaborate  in  finding  spheres  for  common  technical  cooperation 
aimed  at  building  a  genuine  local  base  founded  on  encouragement  and  support  of 
research  and  applied  sciences  and  technology  as  well  as  adapting  imported  technology  to 
meet  the  needs  of  the  region  and  to  achieve  the  objectives  of  progress  and  development. 
(Article  Fifteen) 
The  member  states  shall  establish  procedures,  make  arrangements  and  lay  down  terms 
for  the  transfer  of  technology,  selecting  the  most  suitable  or  introducing  such  changes 
thereto  as  would  serve  their  various  needs.  Member  states  shall  also,  whenever  feasible, 
conclude  uniform  agreements  with  foreign  governments  and  scientific  or  commercial 
firms  to  achieve  these  objectives. 
(Article  Sixteen) 
The  member  states  shall  formulate  policies  and  implement  coordinated  programs  for 
technical,  vocational  and  professional  training  and  qualification  at  all  levels  and  stages. 
They  shall  also  upgrade  educational  curricula  at  all  levels  to  link  education  and 
technology  with  the  development  needs  of  the  member  states. APPENDIX  (C)  302 
(Article  Seventeen) 
The  member  states  shall  coordinate  their  manpower  policies  and  shall  formulate  uniform 
and  standardised  criteria  and  classifications  for  the  various  categories  of  occupations  and 
crafts  in  different  sectors  in  order  to  avoid  harmful  competition  among  themselves  and  to 
optimize  the  utilization  of  available  human  resources. 
Chapter  Five:  Transportation  and  Communication: 
(Article  Eighteen) 
The  member  states  shall  accord  means  of  passenger  and  cargo  transportation  belonging 
to  citizens  of  the  other  member  states,  when  transiting  or  entering  their  territory,  the 
same  treatment  they  accord  to  the  means  of  passenger  and  cargo  transportation 
belonging  to  their  own  citizens,  including  exemptions  from  all  duties  and  taxes 
whatsoever.  However,  local  means  of  transportation  are  excluded. 
(Article  Nineteen) 
1.  The  member  states  shall  cooperate  in  the  fields  of  land  and  sea  transportation  and 
communication.  They  shall  also  coordinate  and  establish  infrastructure  projects  such 
as  seaports,  airports,  water  and  power  stations  and  roads,  with  a  view  to  realising 
common  economic  development  and  linking  their  economic  activities  with  each  other. 
2.  The  contracting  states  shall  coordinate  aviation  and  air  transport  policies  among  them 
and  promote  all  spheres  ofjoint  activities  at  various  levels. 
(Article  Twenty) 
The  member  states  shall  allow  steamers,  ships  and  boats  and  their  cargoes,  belonging  to 
any  member  state  freely  to  use  the  various  port  facilities  and  grant  them  the  same 
treatment  and  privileges  granted  to  their  own  in  docking  or  calling  at  the  ports  as 
concerns  fees,  pilotage,  and  docking  services,  haulage,  loading  and  unloading, 
maintenance,  repair,  storage  of  goods  and  other  similar  services. 
Chapter  Six:  Financial  and  Monetary  Cooperation 
(Article  Twenty-one) 
The  member  states  shall  seek  to  unify  investment  in  order  to  achieve  a  common 
investment  policy  aimed  at  directing  their  internal  and  external  investments  towards 
serving  their  interest,  and  realizing  their  peoples'  aspirations  in  development  and 
progress. A  PPE,  NDIX  (C)  303 
(Article  Twenty-two) 
The  member  states  shall  seek  to  coordinate  their  financial,  monetary  and  banking  policies 
and  enhance  cooperation  between  monetary  agencies  and  central  banks,  including  an 
endeavor  to  establish  a  common  currency  in  order  to  further  their  desired  economic 
integration. 
(Article  Twenty-three) 
Member  states  shall  seek  to  coordinate  their  external  policies  in  the  sphere  of 
international  and  regional  development  aid. 
Chapter  Seven:  Closing  Provisions: 
(Article  Twenty-four) 
In  the  execution  of  the  Agreement  and  determination  of  the  procedures  resulting 
therefrom,  consideration  shall  be  given  to  differences  in  the  levels  of  development 
between  the  member  states  and  the  local  development  priorities  of  each.  Any  member 
state  may  be  temporarily  exempted  from  applying  such  provisions  of  this  Agreement  as 
may  be  necessitated  by  temporary  local  situations  in  that  state  or  specific  circumstances 
faced  by  it.  Such  exemption  shall  be  for  a  specified  period  and  shall  be  decided  by  the 
Supreme  Council  of  the  Gulf  Arab  States  Cooperation  Council. 
(Article  Twenty-rive) 
No  member  state  shall  give  to  any  non-member  state  any  preferential  privilege  exceeding 
that  given  herein. 
(Article  Twenty-six) 
a.  This  Agreement  shall  enter  into  force  four  months  after  its  approval  by  the  Supreme 
Council. 
b.  This  Agreement  may  be  amended  by  consent  from  the  Supreme  Council. 
(Article  Twenty-seven) 
In  case  of  conflict  with  local  laws  and  regulations  of  member  states,  execution  of  the 
provisions  of  this  Agreement  shall  prevail. 
(Article  Twenty-eight) 
Provisions  herein  shall  supersede  any  similar  provisions  contained  in  bilateral  agreements. 
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